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Abstract 
Africa has the highest share of young people in the world relative to the total population, with the median 
age of the population under 25 years old, which is not expected to change in the coming decades. This 
high proportion of young people, combined with other factors, has prompted a sharp rise in youth 
unemployment in many Sub-Saharan African countries, including Ethiopia, with implications for 
Africa’s social and economic future. This thesis examines the current dynamics of youth employment, 
occupational choices, and factors driving these dynamics within the agricultural sector in Ethiopia across 
space, time, and gender.  
Using gender and age-specific values of agricultural labor return from farm-level panel data collected 
from a sample of youth and households in rural Ethiopia, the second chapter econometrically 
investigates the effect of marginal products of labor (or shadow wages) on youth agricultural labor 
supply across gender, time and farm locations. Evidence from fixed effects and fixed effects instrumental 
variables (FE-IV) models show that changes in economic incentives (or shadow wages) matter for 
youth’s involvement in agriculture, but their impact differs for young men and women. Results suggest 
that it is necessary to enhance labor productivity and employment opportunities, as well as structural 
transformation addressing the imperfections and rigidities in labor and other input markets, to make 
agriculture more attractive to youth. 
Recent empirical work provides evidence that people take actions out of a concern for relative standing, 
suggesting that more can be explained if we move beyond the standard choice theory and recognize 
relative concerns. Incorporating relative deprivation (RD) in youth occupational choices helps to provide 
a complementary explanation, if not an alternative explanation, to better understand occupational 
choices of rural youth and the causes of rural under-development in Ethiopia. Relative concerns (or 
positional income concerns) are one mechanism through which income or wealth inequality is 
hypothesized to affect human behavior such as occupational choices, with consequences on well-being. 
Employing survey experimental methods and a socio-demographic survey, the third chapter finds that 
positional concerns for income vary across household members (youth, mothers and fathers) impacting 
on the youth’s well-being. Chapter four extends the analysis of relative concerns from income per se to 
consider social as well as assets (non-monetary) RD, using objective and subjective measures. The 
evidence suggests that while income RD has a motivational impact (resulting from a “positive 
externality”), assets and social capital RD have deterrent impacts (resulting from a “status effect”) on 
the well-being of youth, though this varies across young men and women.  
The thesis aids understanding of the implications of different forms of relative deprivations by 
examining their interactions with both the underlying drivers of occupational choices of young people 
and the occupational choices themselves. Using different estimation techniques, chapter five finds that 
RD is a strong predictor of occupational choices of the rural youth and their engagement in agriculture 
(irrespective of the RD and occupational choice indicators employed), together with an influence of the 
preferences and attributes of the parents.  
This thesis argues that confining RD to the monetary sphere may be misleading and doing so does not 
capture the real effects of RD on the well-being or occupational choices. In addition, the use of multiple 
reference groups and measures suggest possible areas of intervention to enhance the positive 
externalities arising from economic gains to peers, not captured using conventional approaches. The 
thesis indicates that controlling for both father and mother attributes simultaneously crucially interacts 
with the impacts of RD and that indicators of realized and intended occupational choices vary greatly. 
Studies using such data for the labor market, poverty and/or migration policy analysis should be mindful 
of such variations.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Afrika hat weltweit den höchsten Anteil junger Leute an der Gesamtbevölkerung; der Altersmedian der 
Gesamtbevölkerung liegt bei unter 25 Jahren. An diesem Trend dürfte sich laut aktuellen Prognosen 
auch in den nächsten Jahrzehnten nichts ändern. Dieser hohe Anteil an jungen Leuten  hat, zusammen 
mit anderen Faktoren, zu einem starken Anstieg der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in zahlreichen Ländern 
südlich der Sahara, so auch in Äthiopien, geführt – mit Folgen für Afrikas soziale und ökonomische 
Zukunft. Diese Arbeit untersucht die aktuelle Dynamik in der Beschäftigungssituation der Jugend, ihre 
Berufswahl sowie die Treiber und Bedeutung dieser Entwicklung für die Landwirtschaft in Äthiopien, 
und zwar im Hinblick auf Raum, Zeit und Geschlecht.  
Das zweite Kapitel untersucht ökonometrisch die Auswirkungen von Grenzprodukten der Arbeit  
(Schattenlöhnen) auf das Arbeitsangebot junger Menschen in der Landwirtschaft, und zwar unter 
Berücksichtigung von Geschlecht, Zeit und des Orts der einzelnen Bauernhöfe. Dabei legen wir 
geschlechts- und altersspezifische Werte des Ertrags landwirtschaftlicher Arbeit (Schattenlöhne) 
zugrunde, die aus einer Panelerhebung unter Jugendlichen und Haushalten auf Bauernhof-Ebene im 
ländlichen Äthiopien stammen. 
Die Ergebnisse, die wir mit der Fixen-Effekte-Methode und der Instrumentvariablenschätzung (IV-
Schätzung) mit fixen Effekten ermittelt haben, zeigen, dass Veränderungen bei ökonomischen Anreizen 
– wie sie Schattenlöhne darstellen – bei der Beteiligung Jugendlicher in der Landwirtschaft durchaus 
eine Rolle spielen. Dabei gibt es jedoch Unterschiede zwischen jungen Männern und jungen Frauen. Die 
Ergebnisse legen Folgendes nahe: Wenn die Landwirtschaft für die Jugend attraktiver werden soll, 
müssen Arbeitsproduktivität und Arbeitsmöglichkeiten gefördert werden. Zudem ist eine strukturelle 
Transformation vonnöten, um die Unzulänglichkeiten und Starre des Arbeitsmarktes und anderer 
Märkte aufzubrechen.  
Jüngere empirische Studien zeigen, dass Menschen aufgrund einer Sorge um ihre eigene Stellung in der 
Gesellschaft aktiv werden. Aktuelle theoretische Arbeiten führen aus, dass der Erklärungsanteil in 
ökonometrischen Analysen größer wird, wenn wir uns jenseits gängiger (rationaler) 
Entscheidungsmodelle bewegen und auch Relativinteressen berücksichtigen. Bezieht man relative 
Deprivation – also Entbehrungen – in die Berufswahl von Jugendlichen mit ein, erhält man einen 
zusätzlichen Erklärungsanteil – wenn nicht gar einen alternativen Erklärungsansatz, um die 
Entscheidungen für die Berufswahl von Jugendlichen im ländlichen Äthiopien sowie die Ursachen der 
ländlichen Unterentwicklung in Äthiopien zu verstehen. Es wird angenommen, dass relative 
Einkommensinteressen (oder die Position betreffende Einkommensinteressen) bei Einkommens- oder 
Wohlstandsungleichheit das menschliche Verhalten beeinflussen – mit allen Folgen für das 
Wohlbefinden der Individuen. 
Kapitel 3 arbeitet mit einer soziodemografischen Umfrage sowie mit umfrage-experimentellen 
Methoden heraus, dass sich die Sorge um die eigene Stellung bezüglich des Einkommens unter den 
Haushaltsmitgliedern (Jugendliche, Mütter, Väter) unterscheidet, was sich auf das Wohlergehen der 
Kinder auswirkt. Kapitel 4 weitet die Analyse der relativen Interessen vom reinen Einkommensbezug 
aus auf Aspekte sozialer Entbehrung sowie auf nicht-monetäre Faktoren (vermögensbezogene 
Deprivation), wobei objektive und subjektive Maße relativer Deprivation eingesetzt werden. Die 
Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass einkommensbezogene Deprivation einen motivierenden Einfluss hat (der 
von „positiven Außeneffekten“ oder „Signaleffekten“ herrührt). Demgegenüber wirken sich 
Entbehrungen, die das Vermögen oder das soziale Kapital betreffen (und sich aus dem Statuseffekt 
ergeben), eher negativ auf das Wohlbefinden der Jugend aus; dabei fallen die Aussagen nach Geschlecht 
unterschiedlich aus. 
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Ein Kanal, über den sich relative Entbehrungen im menschlichen Verhalten ausdrücken, sind 
menschliche Entscheidungen, zum Beispiel die Berufswahl betreffend. Das Hauptziel dieser Arbeit ist 
es schließlich, die Auswirkungen unterschiedlicher Formen relativer Deprivation zu verstehen, indem 
deren Wechselwirkungen untersucht werden – und zwar sowohl jene mit den Treibern, die der 
Berufswahl junger Leute zugrunde liegen, als auch solche mit den Berufswahlmöglichkeiten und 
Entscheidungen selbst. Kapitel 5 bezieht die tatsächlichen Berufe in die Analyse ein. Dabei stellt sich 
heraus, dass die relative Deprivation ein starker Prädiktor für die Berufswahl sowie das Engagement in 
der Landwirtschaft der ländlichen Jugend ist – und zwar unabhängig davon, welche Indikatoren relativer 
Deprivation und Berufswahl angewendet werden. Dabei ist ein Einfluss der Präferenzen und Merkmale 
der Eltern zu verzeichnen. 
Diese Arbeit kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die Beschränkung relativer Deprivation auf die monetäre 
Ebene in die Irre führen kann. Wer dies tut, erfasst nicht die tatsächlichen Effekte, die relative 
Entbehrungen auf das Wohlbefinden, die Berufswahl oder auch auf Arbeitsmarktanalysen haben. 
Außerdem deckt die Verwendung multipler Referenzgruppen und unterschiedlicher Messmethoden 
bezüglich des relativen Status mögliche Interventionsfelder auf, um positive externe Effekte zu 
verstärken. Dies ist mit konventionellen Forschungsansätzen nicht möglich. Zuletzt macht diese Arbeit 
deutlich, dass die gleichzeitige und kritische Berücksichtigung väterlicher und mütterlicher Attribute die 
Wirkung einiger wichtiger Variablen beeinflusst – und dass die Indikatoren tatsächlichen und geplanten 
Engagements in der Landwirtschaft stark variieren. Studien, die derartige Daten für die Analyse 
arbeitsmarkt-oder migrationspolitischer Entscheidungen verwenden, sollten diese Variationen und 
Einflüsse berücksichtigen.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Youth in agriculture in Africa and in an Ethiopian context  
Africa has the highest share of young people in the world relative to the total population, with the 
median age of the population under 25 years old ever since data exists, a trend that is expected to 
continue for the coming decades, as indicated in figure 1.1 (UNDP, 2015). This demographic trend will 
determine the paths of structural changes, and this combined with low levels of agricultural productivity 
(McCullough, 2015), changing needs of youth (Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi, 2007), ill-defined land tenure 
policies (Pingali et. al, 1987; Amanor, 2010), lack of job creation (World Bank, 2012) and rising 
inequality (Milanovic, 2003) have prompted a sharp rise in youth unemployment in many Sub-Saharan 
African countries, including Ethiopia, with implications for Africa’s economic and social development.    
 
Figure 1.1. Median age of the population of Ethiopia, Kenya and SSA, 1950-2100 
Source: UN Population Division 2015 revision   
Note: 1950 to 2015 show historical estimates. From 2015, the UN projections are shown.  
Young people make up the bulk of the labor force (primarily in the agricultural sector) and bear most 
of the unemployment burden. Each year, more than 10 million African youth enter the continent’s 
workforce, posing a great challenge for youth unemployment and opportunities (ILO, 2016). For 
instance, according to a CSA (2015) estimation, youth unemployment in Ethiopia constitutes 60 % of 
the total unemployment; and 49 % of working youth live on USD 1.90 a day or less (AfDB et al., 2012). 
1 The effect of unemployment or underemployment is not limited to loss of current income and 
livelihood; rather it has long-term consequences on their life-long welfare such as lower future 
employment and lower subsequent earnings.  
                                                                
1 This estimation is based on a revised version of the poverty line in 2011. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
A
ge
 (
ye
ar
s)
Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa Kenya
2 
 
The trend of youth employment in Ethiopia can also be examined by looking at the agricultural labor 
force breakdown of the youth labor force in agriculture–to- total agricultural labor force shares. Figure 
1.2 below depicts the trend of labor force in agriculture in comparison to youth labor force in agriculture 
beginning shortly before 2000. As can be seen below, Ethiopian agriculture is labor intensive. The 
majority of the working group is employed in agriculture (agriculture employing 80% of the total labor 
force in 2004, which had declined to 75% in 2014). It also shows that while the share of labor force in 
agriculture (labor force in agriculture to total labor force) is slightly decreasing, youth labor force in 
agriculture has been gradually increasing since 2009. For instance, youth labor force in agriculture 
(percentage of labor force in agriculture) in 2009 was about 45% of the total labor force in agriculture. 
This figure has increased to 48% in 2014, further suggesting that agricultural jobs play a significant role 
for youth employment and is potentially the main source of job creation for youth.    
 
Figure 1.2: Trend of youth labor force in agriculture: Ethiopia 
Source: FAOSTAT based on ILO estimation 
On the one hand, the sustainability and effective contribution of the agriculture sector to the different 
economic dimensions (economic growth, poverty reduction and food security) depends on the 
employment of youth in agriculture. A study by the Global Forum on Agricultural Research indicate 
that if Africa experiences a 10 percent decrease of youth involvement in farming (including family 
farming), GDP and agricultural outputs would fall and dependency on imports would rise (The Global 
Forum on Agricultural Research, 2015). Given the magnitude of employment in the continent is 
agriculture based, this drop could increase unemployment, creating a vicious cycle, further hampering 
the economy. This means that the future of African agriculture and the speed of transformation depend 
on the involvement of young people in agriculture. Youth are also expected to provide labor and infuse 
agriculture with innovation and entrepreneurial impetus that will help to realize the transformation of 
the sector (Anyidoho et al., 2011; Fox et al., 2016). Thus, if properly harnessed (i.e. if modernization 
of the production side of African agriculture is likely to happen with real structural change), this 
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growing working population could drive Africa’s economic transformation. Thus, agriculture is the key 
to addressing youth employment challenge in Africa (Bernard and Taffesse, 2012; von Braun and Kofol, 
2017).   
On the other hand, the rising youth unemployment and lack of stable economic opportunities for young 
people are one of the major global challenges facing the continent. These challenges force migration, 
frustrations, and conflict which perpetuate poverty; which in turn undermine youth contribution to 
development (von Braun and Kofol, 2017). For instance, the rate of unemployment or vulnerably 
employed is the highest among youth compared to adults. Youth face almost doubles the unemployment 
rate of adults, although the figures vary across African countries (FAO et al. 2014; Brooks et al. 2012). 
The social, political, and economic consequences of youth unemployment and lack of stable economic 
opportunities can be far-reaching, as observed in the recent political unrest in many African countries 
including Ethiopia. Addressing youth employment and related problems requires broad-based economic 
reform. For instance, there is a need to shift the focus from agriculture to the agri-food system more 
broadly to change the picture as well as to potentially promote transformative jobs. Therefore, it is 
important to understand the current dynamics of youth employment, occupational choices, and factors 
driving these choices in agriculture in Ethiopia across space, time, and gender.  
1.2. Livelihood diversification in rural Africa and prospects of youth in agriculture  
Agricultural sector development policy in Africa as it relates to employment creation has three different 
employment outcomes: self-employed farmer or producer (enhanced remuneration from self-employed 
farming), farm labor (on-farm employment opportunities) and agriculture-related off-farm jobs (off-
farm employment opportunities for others with forward and backward linkages, etc.) (Sumberg et al., 
2013). Considerable empirical work on rural livelihoods in the past decades has shown that rural 
residents are not solely dependent on agriculture (World Bank, 2008; FAO, 2008). A significant number 
of farmers including young people engaged in off-farm activities that provide them either an additional 
source of income or serve as the main source of livelihood, especially for landless rural residents (Ellis, 
2000; Reardon et al., 2001; Barrett et al., 2001; Bezu and Holden, 2014). Some have even argued that 
the pace of livelihood diversification in rural areas, including rural areas in Africa, is trending toward 
‘deagrarianization’ (Bryceson, 2002; Rigg, 2006). For instance, studies indicate that on average, the 
share of non-farm income to rural household income ranges from 6% (in Mali) to 93% (in Namibia) 
(Reardon et al., 2007); and farmers participation rate in non-farm sector ranges from 93 % for Malawi 
to 75% for Ghana (Winters et al., 2009). In Ethiopia, the proportion of rural households who participate 
in non-farm employment ranges from 25% in Oromia region (van den Berg and Kumbi, 2006) to 81% 
in Tigray region (Woldenhanna and Oskam, 2001). Likewise, the share of non-farm income to total 
income varies greatly: 8% in Oromia (van den Berg and  Kumbi, 2006) and 35% in Tigray 
(Woldenhanna and Oskam, 2001).   
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One insight from this body of work is that the contribution of off-farm employment is becoming an 
important livelihood strategy especially among young people; most young people choose unskilled, off-
farm wage employment because of resource deprivation such as land and lack of viable livelihood 
opportunities. Self-employment is the most commonly practiced form of employment outcome 
(including non-farm) in rural areas. The poor performance of agriculture (which cause drops in farm 
income, food insecurity and fluctuations in farm income), imperfections in factor markets (land markets, 
insurance markets against risk, financial markets), and weather shocks are among the main drivers of 
income diversification for individuals and households. 
Migration is the most commonly used livelihood strategy used by young people to cope with adverse 
effects of unemployment and underemployment in search of a better life. As indicated in Table 1.1, 
there are different forms of migration in Ethiopia: rural to rural, rural to urban, urban to rural and urban 
to urban migration (CSA, 2013b). Based on a 2013 Ethiopia national labor force survey (NLFS), rural 
to rural migration is the dominant form of migration (34.5%) followed by rural to urban migration 
(32.5%). This form of migration is consistent in pattern with that of the 1999 and 2005 NLFS (37.6% 
in 1999 and 46% in 2005 for rural-rural form of migration whereas it was 23.5% in 1999 and 24.3% in 
2005 for rural-urban form of migration), implying that still rural employment both formal and informal 
sector plays an important role in youth employment. However, the trend of rural-rural migration has 
been decreasing since 2005 (Table 1.1). Since the main source of employment is agriculture and the 
dominant form of migration is rural-rural, agriculture is still playing a major role in youth employment 
creation and absorption. This raises skeptic to the argument that agriculture is becoming an old group 
occupation. 
Table 1.1: Trend and forms of migration at the national level (percentage of total migrants) 
Forms of migration  1999 2005 2013 Trend  
Rural-Rural  37.6 46.0 34.5 ↓since 2005 
Rural-Urban  23.5 24.3 32.5 ↑ 
Urban-Rural  15.7 12.1 11.6 ↓ 
Urban-Urban  23.2 17.7 21.3 ↑ since 2005 
Source: CSA (2013) and own computation based on NLFS of 1999, 2005, and 2013  
 
Decisions to explore the available distant opportunity space through migration may result in new 
capital, skills, information, and networks being incorporated into the rural economy. This may result in 
youth migration back to rural areas (Table 1.1). Despite the strong interest of youth to migrate to urban 
areas among many African countries, return migration to the countryside, often compelled by economic 
decline in urban areas, has also occurred. For instance, in Ethiopia, due to the increasing cost of urban 
life and limited employment opportunities in urban areas combined with attractive returns from 
agriculture, labor demands from families and improvement in the relative standing of youth compared 
to other youth groups are the drivers of return migration. Similarly, in the 1980s, the collapse of copper 
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mining forced Zambians to migrate back to rural areas (Ferguson, 1999), and in Benin, unemployed 
graduates returned to their villages since job opportunities in the public sector became increasingly 
limited and labor force growth is faster than the economy (Bierschenk and Sardan, 2003). In Cote 
d’Ivoire economic decline provoked unemployed young people to migrate from cities to the arable rural 
areas (Banegas, 2006).  
For young people in rural areas living in poverty, and where information, as well as resources, are 
limited to make meaningful livelihood decisions (such as decisions to diversify livelihood alternatives, 
develop one's human capital, or whether or not to migrate), is complex. Often most decision-making 
processes occur under conditions of uncertainty, scarcity, and social pressures. This can further bias or 
complicate the choices young people make. Thus, viewing young people’s occupational choices and 
understanding the drivers of such choices require innovative research approaches that enable the 
analyses by incorporating behavioral or psychological factors. I will elaborate on how and why 
incorporating such factors in the analyses of young people’s occupational choices is important in the 
following section.  
1.3. Beyond resource deprivation and youth occupational choices  
Development debate related to youth employment should move beyond the resource related deprivation 
and consider behavioral factors in shaping young people’s decision-making and labor force 
participation in Ethiopia, with consequences on individual and household well-being outcomes. In 
doing so, it may require a new set of development approaches which views people in general and youth 
population group, in particular, more fully and recognize that a combination of behavioral and social 
forces affect and shape young people perceptions, cognition, and decisions. What is evident and 
common in the existing literature is that much of the focus to youth employment is on the importance 
of material well-being (Barrett et al., 2001; Bezu and Holden, 2014; Sumberg et al., 2013).  
Though much of the discussions and policy discourse around youth (employment) in rural areas in 
Africa in general and Ethiopia, in particular, is related to resource constraints such as land and other 
material resources; behavioural (psychological) factors also play a significant role in shaping young 
people’s interests and behaviours, especially in relation to occupational choices, migration decisions, 
and well-being outcomes. Put differently, the current discussions of youth (un)employment mainly 
focuses on the absence of resources such as land, labor market, lack of opportunities, political factors; 
and mainly ignores how might the sense of relative deprivation experienced by the youth themselves 
and the information set that derives their livelihood choices which would eventually affect their 
behaviour(such as economic decisions). Behavioural factors that shape occupational choices of rural 
young people include rising aspirations, relative concerns (or relative deprivation- interpersonal wealth 
comparisons), gender norms and changes in the labor market conditions (Sumberg et al., 2017; Stark, 
1991; 2013). As an increasing body of evidence is showing, beyond the material deprivation, 
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psychological and behavioral factors resulting from relative concerns are equally important to 
understand how comparisons with others impinge individual’s sense of well-being and 
influences behavior, including in relation to migration decisions and occupational choices. The 
recent empirical work has raised doubts about the notion that economic growth or an increase in 
absolute incomes (absolute motives) alone leads to an increase in the welfare of people (Easterlin, 1974, 
2001, 2005; Alpizar et al., 2005; Clark et al., 2008). Rather well-being or economic decisions, such as 
labor force participation decisions and migration decisions especially among young people, depends to 
a larger degree on other factors such as relative motives, on what they see around them. In other words, 
beyond absolute income and material possession, relative deprivation plays an important role in shaping 
economic decisions (labor supply decisions, for instance), consumption decisions as well as to set goals 
in life.  
Therefore, tackling rural poverty, transforming the economy, generating employment opportunities for 
young people, and making use of Africa’s young people (demographic dividend), requires 
understanding the role of relative concerns and the extent to which such concerns and related factors 
explain the decision-making behaviour of young people and the context in which decisions are made. 
This, in turn, helps to equip the youth of tomorrow with the right tools by providing alternative 
livelihood sources.  
1.4. Statement of the problem  
Despite the increasing awareness of the importance of youth participation in development and political 
discourse, young people are not properly located in the development debate and dialogue for impactful 
policy design. In recent years, however, governments at national, international as well as core 
institutions such as the African Union, African Development Bank, The World Bank, national 
governments and the United Nations, adopted a number of policies and initiatives, and embarked on a 
number of reforms (World Bank, 2010; AfDB et al., 2012). For instance, the world’s governments 
adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which put much emphasis on the employment, 
inequality, and poverty eradication to achieve a sustained increase in living standards (UN, 2016). SDG 
goals also explicitly state that there is a need to empower youth in vulnerable situations for the full 
realization of their rights and capabilities, promoting youth employment to help countries recap the 
demographic dividend (UN, 2016). African Development Bank has recently launched a five years 
program of creating youth employment ‘’Jobs for youth in Africa’’ (AfDB, 2016). Youth employment 
and related issues have also attracted the attention of mainstream economic development discussions 
since the 1990s, following the effects of economic recessions caused by the various currency and debt 
crises. Considering the importance of youth involvement in agricultural and rural development policy 
in in Africa, Ethiopia in particular, and its strong and favourable impacts on agricultural productivity, 
innovation and entrepreneurial stimulus, rural poverty reduction, reduction of unemployment and food 
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security, it is important to understand and analyse factors that determine the outcome of youth 
involvement in agriculture. 
Youth employment creation programs in agriculture, which many African countries are embarked on 
to curb unemployment as well as to attract young people into agriculture, is not an end in and of itself. 
The success of such approaches and programs depends on the wage levels and/or the returns accrued 
from the sector. This also depends on understanding how households allocate their family labor to on 
and off-farm work. There is little information and empirical evidence that captures the dynamics on the 
link between intra-household labor productivities, and youth agriculture (dis)engagement decisions 
(Kögel, 2005; Bezu and Holden, 2014; Palacios-Lopez et al., 2017). Thus, examining whether youth 
agricultural labor supply is responsive to such wage differentials, especially agricultural shadow wages, 
is vital for designing proper development programs that can contribute to the solutions of the rural youth 
unemployment problem. 
As stated earlier, studies on rural youth in Africa have concentrated on the role of resource deprivations 
such as lack of land, access to credit, and lack of agricultural technologies as core determinants of youth 
agricultural and rural employment and migration decisions (Ellis, 2000; Reardon et al., 2001; Bezu and 
Holden, 2014). One of the basic assumptions rooted in these studies is that addressing these barriers – 
many of which are structural- would ultimately address the problems of youth unemployment, rural 
poverty and eventually result in wealth accumulation that in turn prompts growth. As Sumberg et al 
(2017: 151) summarize in their recent work, “these are the same barriers that have been the focus of 
agriculture and rural development efforts over decades”. However, the trust to ensure that young 
people can achieve economic efficiency, social equity, as well as aspirations to life (through creating 
access to resources or resource provision) does not seem to correspond to the troubles in the youth 
employment structure and recent trends. These studies make assumptions about the behavior and 
decisions of young people. An increasing number of development programmes as well as empirical 
studies place little emphasis on the role of attitudes and behavioral factors, in addition to resource 
deprivation, in understanding drivers of youth occupational choices and decisions (Kögel, 2005; Bezu 
and Holden, 2014).  
Yet some recent empirical work provides evidence that people take actions out of a concern for relative 
standing. Recent theoretical work also illustrates that more can be explained if we move beyond the 
standard choice theory and recognize relative concerns (Stark and Wang, 2000; Easterlin, 2005; Stark, 
2006). A large body of literature from economics (though it has been slow to take root), sociology, 
psychology, and neuroscience, for instance, indicates that humans routinely engage in interpersonal 
comparisons (Runicman, 1966; Townsend, 1997; Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002). Such engagement in 
interpersonal comparisons affect their sense of well-being, and influences their behaviour, including 
relationships to livelihood decisions such as migration decisions (Stark and Taylor, 1991; 1992; Stark, 
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2017), labor force participation of wives (Park, 2010), consumption choices (Sapp and Harrod, 1989; 
Runicman, 1966; Townsend, 1997), financial decisions and fairness concerns (Fehr and Gachter, 2000) 
and well-being (Pingle and Mitchell, 2002; Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002; Andolfatto, 2002;  Stark 
and Fan, 2011; Stark and Hyll, 2011; Jagger et al., 2012; Stark, 2017). For instance, Stark (2017:1) 
noted that ‘’[…]people are discontented when their income, wealth, consumption or social standing 
falls behind that of those who constitute their ‘reference group’, making them take certain actions.” 
Andolfatto (2002) shows that individuals are adversely affected by the material well-being of others in 
their reference group when this well-being is far below their own. The notion that people are concerned 
about their relative position is more pronounced among young population groups (Pingle and Mitchell, 
2001). The recent protest and uprising in most African countries suggest this. Recent empirical evidence 
in economics also show that lagging behind others in income (or wealth) in comparison to that of those 
who constitute ones ‘’comparison group’’ could serve as a source of motivation, in the sense that the 
desire to escape low status (or rank) or ‘’to keep up with the Joneses’’ makes individuals or workers 
likely to exert more effort (Ulph, 2014; Park, 2010).  
One of the main lessons from these bodies of work is that productivity-enhancing policies are necessary 
but not sufficient to achieve desirable rural and youth-related development. Incorporating relative 
deprivation in youth occupational choices provides a complementary explanation, if not an alternative 
explanation; to better understand occupational choices of rural youth in Ethiopia. Despite the fact that 
understanding relative concerns is important— due to their critical influence on behavior, well-being 
and other related issues— lack of comprehensive evidence on who actually compares and to whom, and 
whether such comparisons count enough to influence youth behaviors and decisions remain unclear. 
Often the existing studies suffer from methodological bias, data limitations, and empirical inadequacy 
in order to design evidence-based policy for growth and employment in developing countries (Oya and 
Pontara, 2015). Since relative deprivation is highly endogenous to the model, conclusions based on 
cross-sectional data could be misleading. In addition, this thesis uses different triangulating measures 
of relative deprivation and studies how the use of the different measures of relative deprivation might 
affect the predictions of outcome variables of interest: namely well-being, occupational choices, or 
migration outcomes. As Stark (2017:3) noted ‘’models based on ordinal rank may predict very different 
behavior from models based on cardinal rank’’. Surprisingly, the literature is silent on empirically 
testing the robustness of the different measurements, such as the role of distaste for low ordinal rank as 
an alternative explanatory variable to distaste for low cardinal rank in predicting migration decisions, 
labor participation decisions, and/or welfare outcomes. This calls for proper methodological 
applications as well as the use of panel data to overcome those inherent limitations prevalent in the 
existing literature.  
Unlike the conventional approach to modeling decisions and behaviors (or welfares), the use of relative 
deprivation approach supplements the received empirical inquiries in four ways. First, despite 
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remarkable reductions in absolute poverty, relative poverty has risen over the last two decades. Thus, 
relative deprivation helps to reflect on conditions of worsening poverty (relative poverty) (Easterlin, 
1997, 1995; Stark and Taylor, 1991; Alpizar et al, 2005). Second, relative deprivation is a measure of 
inequality—an important policy target of many countries (Yitzhaki, 1979). This concept could explain 
the current growing disparity between youth and other population groups across time and space. For 
instance, incorporating relative deprivation in youth labor participation analysis might help to provide 
a complementary, if not an alternative explanation, to the considerable gender differences existent in 
the labor markets of developing countries. Third, relative deprivation helps to understand a number of 
factors related to life satisfaction or well-being (Ferreri-i-Carbonell, 2005). Finally, relative deprivation 
measures are consistent with the large body of scientific evidence in public health, psychology, and 
economics (Deaton, 2001) in predicting decisions outcomes such as migration decisions or welfare 
outcomes. Thus, more can be explained if we move beyond the conventional approach (standard theory) 
to recognize relative concerns. 
The decision of youngsters or teenagers to engaging in agriculture not only depends on youth’s own 
choices or employment preferences driven by their capabilities and behaviors but also depends on the 
preferences and attributes of parents (families) and communities (Marilena, 2015). This differs 
significantly based on gender and age of youth, the background of parents, and behavioral responses of 
parents (Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2014). Yet, there is a huge gap in the literature in this regard.  There 
are no adequate empirical works that examine the role of parents in shaping/influencing the employment 
preferences and well-being of children, particularly that of youth, nor does it study how parents’ 
attitudes toward positionality might affect the occupational choices of their children, and the 
corresponding intra-household resource allocation consequences (Kazianga and Wahhaj, 2017). 
Particularly, this research will contribute to the literature on the role of parents distaste for low social 
status (positional concern) in shaping the employment preferences and migration decisions of youth in 
the context of the rural setting. Such analysis also contributes to our understanding of the mechanisms 
through which relative wealth concerns might affect well-being as well as individual behavior involving 
employment decisions. Therefore, tackling youth unemployment (particularly those living with their 
parents) and underemployment, and for optimal outcome of interventions aimed at young people 
requires understanding intra-household resource allocation, human capital development as well as 
economic independence. Thus, my analyses in this regard will serve to identify and analyze the potential 
role of parents in shaping the employment preferences and well-being of their children.  
1.5. Research questions  
The study explores the following research questions: 
1. What are the trends, patterns, and prospects of youth in agriculture in Ethiopia [by gender]?  
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2. How does marginal productivity of youth labor (shadow wages) affect agricultural labor supply 
decisions of youth?  
3. What are the determinants of youth and their parents’ positional income (or wealth) concerns?  
4. How do parents’ attitudes toward positionality affect the well-being of rural youth in Ethiopia?  
5. How might household’s relative deprivation [of different dimensions] affect the well-being of 
young people in Ethiopia?  
6. How do household’s relative deprivations affect (or shape) young people’s occupational choices?  
1.6. Overview of the data and methodology  
The study uses data from the Ethiopian Agricultural Growth Program (AGP) survey, a detailed 
agricultural panel survey carried out in 2010/11 in four major regions (Oromiya, Amhara, SNNP, and 
Tigray) and in the Oromiya region in 2014/15 on sub-sample of households and youth. AGP is a five-
year program of a component of the broad effort aimed to increase smallholder productivity and value 
addition in the agricultural sector with increased participation of women and youth. The Central 
Statistical Agency (CSA) and the Ethiopian Strategic Support Program (ESSP) of International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) implemented the first wave of a survey jointly during July 3-22, 2011. 
The second wave (follow-up) was carried out during the months of December 2014 and January 2015.  
Out of the four regions of AGP sites, this study focuses on Oromiya (figure 1.3) and exclusively on 
youth members and youth-headed households sub-sampled from the region. Multi-stage sampling 
techniques were employed to sub-sample households with youth members and youth-headed 
households during the second wave. In the first stage, the fresh listing of AGP woredas2 from Oromiya 
covered during baseline was prepared. Accordingly, woredas in the region were sorted in descending 
order based on youth population size, then randomization was applied to select the 
predetermined 12 woredas. Each woreda contains 3 enumeration areas, thus, a total of 36 
enumeration areas were covered during the second wave. In the second stage, a fresh listing of all the 
households covered during baseline for the 12 sub-sampled woredas. Each woreda contains 78 
households. Households who were without youth members were dropped from the fresh listing. 
Following that, a total of 525 households with youth members and youth-headed were randomly 
selected from the 12 selected woredas. Reappointment was made if a member of the qualified 
households was not available at the time of appointment. Households that met the criteria but were 
unavailable due to either death or migration, which made tracking difficult, were replaced from the 
contingency list. Accordingly, the empirical analysis is based on a panel survey of youth individuals 
drawn from 525 households in 36 enumeration areas of Oromiya region. Detail sample selection and 
distribution of the sample size across the selected weredas is presented in the next chapter. In this 
analysis, youth is defined to be within the age interval of 13 to 34. There is no consensus regarding the 
                                                                
2 Worada is equivalent to district.  
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age bracket that defines youth. For instance, the UN defines youth as persons within the age interval of 
15 to 24 and adults are as 25 years and older. The African Youth Charter extends the upper age bracket 
to 35 (thus, defines youth as persons between the ages of 15-35). Ethiopia’s National Youth Policy 
defines youth as persons between the ages of 15-34. Given the Ethiopian rural context, especially 
children’s participation in wage employment in contribution to rural household income starts at their 
early age (as early as 7 years)  (Admassie, 2003) and considering Ethiopia’s National Youth Policy of 
the definition of youth; in this study, I define youth over the age interval of 13 to 34 years in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: AGP woredas-location of the study sites 
1.7. The conceptual framework  
Figure 1.4 below presents the overall conceptual framework that guides the thesis. The framework 
depicts the possible channels through which relative deprivation and other related factors might be 
linked to various decisions or economic outcomes (through affecting behaviors). To begin with, 
institutions and policies are the arrangements and processes through which interactions are transformed 
into outcomes, which could be negative and positive. Policies and institutions facilitate, mediate, or 
determine access to material as well as human resources necessary to translate into opportunities that 
in turn determine well-being outcomes or labor market participation decisions of young people. For 
instance, institutions and policies determine youth’ and their parents’ access to basic resources such as 
land, water for irrigation, access to finance, etc., which would affect the livelihood pathways of youth. 
Policies and institutions also determine structural changes that enhance the productivity of agricultural 
sector and the linkages with other sectors and allowing greater mobility or allocation of labor between 
or across sectors.  
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While constraints on access to material resources such as land and other factors of production 
are important determinants of youth occupational choices in agriculture or outside, relative 
concerns (or relative deprivation) forces youth to take actions such as increasing labor 
participation by working longer hours or migrating to other places out of concerns for such 
relative standing. Rising relative deprivation or the feelings of relative deprivation causes 
people to react to their exposure to (increased) relative deprivation in a variety of ways. 
Relative deprivation affects individuals’ or households’ behaviors and decisions, hence 
occupational choices through different channels. First, the feelings of relative deprivation may 
motivate or force a relatively deprived individual or household to work hard and/or supply 
more labor time in order to improve their relative standing. This could happen without 
necessarily changing occupation or migration. For instance, an individual may work more 
hours than before or may be motivated to invest more to expand farmlands, improved seed, and 
other innovations in order to improve his/her relative standing in their reference groups. 
Second, relative deprivation may induce migration. In this context, RD causes either shifting 
occupation from saying farm employment to non-farm employment or diversification of 
livelihood strategies. As a result, labor supply to agricultural activities may decrease. This is 
especially the case for those who are able to fund the rising cost of migration and who find 
limited employment opportunities within agriculture. The rich or less deprived will have less 
incentive to migrate.  
Social networks (and social deprivation) can be both a driver of and barriers to, occupational choices 
such as internal migration. It appears that existing individual or family or friend networks in certain 
space are a key precondition and/or facilitating factor driving labor participation or migration decisions. 
This networks/social capital function should provide young people with information for viable decisions 
and access to opportunities. On the contrary, the presence of family ties or friends networks can also 
appear to operate as a barrier to migration or explore certain employment opportunities available at 
distant places. Thus, social deprivation can function as a push and a pull factor that influences decisions, 
and thus, the effect on well-being depends on whether it serves as an opportunity or a barrier.   
In addition to the effects of relative deprivation, absolute deprivation and absolute wage gains and other 
resources (as the standard economic theory suggests), play an important role in driving the labor supply 
and migration decisions of individuals or households to improve their well-being. These deprivations 
can be categorized as pull and push factors. Push-factors related to the performance of agriculture which 
includes the basic production potential given available technologies and agro-ecological characteristics 
and risk factors (which cause drops in farm income, food insecurity and fluctuations in farm income), 
imperfections in factor markets (land markets, insurance markets against risk, financial markets), and 
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weather shocks are among the main drivers of youth employment preferences. The higher returns to 
labor and capital in non-agricultural employment attracts more youth employment that could result in 
more out-migration or more labor time allocation to non-farm sectors if there are strong and vibrant 
non-farm sectors in rural areas.  
Moreover, whether and to what extent youth engage in the non-farm sector or out-migration also 
depends on the capacity of youth (individual capacity) or their parents (parental factors), which includes 
human, physical and other capitals. Limitation in one or more of these capitals may restrict resource-
poor individuals and households to stay in low paying activities as they could not afford the rising cost 
of migration to engage in relatively better-paying jobs or to diversify their sources of income. Absolute 
deprivation and the mechanisms through which absolute deprivation likely affect youth labor 
participation decisions, hence well-being is elaborated below.  
Own characteristics (or individual capacity) plays a significant role in making appropriate decisions. 
Youth set their intention and hence their decisions, based on their own goal and the feelings they 
perceive about themselves, their parents and what societies place upon them. The decision of youngsters 
to engage in agriculture not only depends on the motivation or aspiration of a youth but also depends 
on parents’ decisions and investments and this can vary depending on the age, gender, and other factors. 
For example, the decision on schooling or migration by families is important factor determining whether 
individuals work in agriculture or elsewhere and this is highly influenced by the characteristics and 
background of the youth’s parents. Parents transmit knowledge and inspire their children favorably, 
influencing both what their children are capable of and what they want to do. Thus, parents can 
contribute insights into the formation of preferences which would affect the occupational choices of 
youth. Communities and societies also play a significant role in shaping or influencing the behaviors 
and decisions of youth opting for farming or migrating.  
Modern agricultural technologies and increased productivity of agriculture can increase youth 
likelihood of choosing occupations in agriculture. On the other hand, Bosurup (1965) and von Thünen 
(1826) showed that resources constraints used in agricultural production such as land constraints, 
improved access to markets, or both can create positive pressures to intensify agricultural production 
and productivity for participants, which may result in agricultural innovations, thereby hence increasing 
labor participation of youth and their well-being.  
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Figure 1.4. Channels through which relative deprivation and other related factors affect occupational choices 
and well-being of young people  
Source: Own conceptualization based on the reviewed literature  
 
1.8. Organization of the thesis 
The thesis is further structured into four main chapters, and a general conclusions and recommendations 
chapter. Chapter two starts with exploring the current states of affairs (slightly different from other 
chapters but interrelated), and is organized in different parts: a brief description of the current state of 
affairs (youth and agriculture in Ethiopia), detail empirical estimation strategy employed to estimate 
youth labor supply followed by the presentation of results. The overall objective of the chapter is to 
analyze trends, patterns, and prospects of youth in agriculture, thereby examining whether youth labor 
supply is responsive to rural shadow wages (marginal labor productivities).   
The remaining chapters of the thesis are organized to empirically investigate whether beyond resource 
deprivations; the feeling of relative deprivation affects or shapes the well-being and occupational 
choices of young people. I empirically explore that young person compare their life condition (income, 
wealth, social capital) to that of others (their comparison groups) and such comparisons are driving 
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youth economic decisions such as labor participation decisions, migration decisions, with consequences 
on well-being. In doing so, the third chapter presents the relationship between parents’ positional 
concerns and youth well-being using survey experimental approaches. The chapter presents whether 
intra-household positional concerns matter for young people. It presents then the determinants of 
positional concerns for fathers, mothers, and youth themselves. As such, the chapter investigates both 
the prevalence and the determinants of youth’s own and their parents’ positional income concerns, and 
their association with the life satisfaction of young people, with implications on intra-household 
resource allocations.  
The fourth chapter extends the analysis of the role of (household) relative concerns and/or relative 
deprivations in youth well-being. I do so by examining the impact of the different dimensions of relative 
deprivations (disaggregated along income, non-income, and social capital) on youth life satisfaction 
(subjective well-being). The chapter discusses in detail and tests whether relative deprivation is likely 
to impose substantial welfare gain or loss. The discussions in the chapter are organized along two main 
parts in line with the two measurement approaches employed to capture the effect of relative deprivation 
on the well-being of young people: cardinal and ordinal approaches.   
In chapter five, I develop the link between household’s absolute and relative deprivations and youth 
occupational choices (mainly youth’s labor participation decisions and propensity to migrate decisions). 
In other words, this chapter extends the empirical analysis of how and in what way parent’s relative 
deprivation (or income, non-income and social capital comparisons) is driving youth behavior and 
decisions, mainly occupational outcomes (i.e. youth’s labor participation decisions in and outside 
agriculture and migration decisions).  
The final chapter, chapter six, is the synthesis and summary of the previous preceding chapters. 
Summarizing the key findings in each chapter, I draw lessons, conclusions, and recommendations. 
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2. RURAL SHADOW WAGES AND YOUTH AGRICULTURAL LABOR 
SUPPLY IN ETHIOPIA: EVIDENCE FROM FARM PANEL DATA 
 
Abstract 
The majority of the youth in Ethiopia lives in rural areas where agriculture is the main source of 
livelihood. Using gender and age-specific values of agricultural labor return (shadow wages), I 
systematically analyze trends, patterns, and prospects of youth’s labor supply in agriculture across 
space (farm locations). I also analyze whether the household male or female youth members’ 
agricultural labor supply is responsive to economic incentives. I investigate these using shadow wages 
estimation techniques applied to farm-household panel data collected during the 2010/11 and 2014/15 
agricultural seasons. The results indicate that trends and patterns of the youth’s involvement in 
agriculture vary across gender and farm work locations, and so do their labor returns. Yet the on-farm 
participation for youth members is declining across time irrespective of gender, whilst their 
participation in off-farm activities is increasing. The findings also suggest that changes in agricultural 
shadow wages matter for the youth’s involvement in the sector, but their impact differs for male and 
female youth. The results are consistent after controlling for individual heterogeneity, sample selection 
and instrumenting for possible endogeneity. In addition, I find that youth’s intentions and realized 
engagement in agricultural production vary greatly. This suggests that the frequent narrative of youth 
disengaging from agriculture may be a result of methodological flaws or data limitations. Taking into 
account the intensity of the youth’s involvement in family farm, own farm and off-farm work, the results 
challenge the presumption that youth are abandoning agriculture, at least in agricultural potential 
areas of Ethiopia. Instead, the youth’s involvement makes an important economic contribution to the 
operation of the family farm. Therefore, it is necessary to invest in agricultural development to enhance 
labor productivity and employment opportunities, and in the structural transformation that addresses 
the imperfections and rigidities in labor and other input markets to make agriculture more attractive to 
youth.  
 
Keywords: youth, labor productivity, shadow wage, economic incentives, shadow income, 
agricultural labor supply  
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
The composition of the population and its distribution across the globe indicates that Africa South of 
the Sahara (SSA) has the world’s youngest population and is home to over 200 million young people 
(aged between 15 and 24 years). This trend is expected to continue for the coming decades. Seventy 
percent of youth reside in rural areas and are employed primarily in the agricultural sector (Omoti, 
2012). This poses a great challenge for youth unemployment, but also an opportunity for youth to 
become the engine of the development of new agricultural enterprises in farming, research, processing, 
packaging, and retailing foodstuffs. As is the case in most developing countries, agricultural labor in 
Ethiopia is mainly composed of unpaid family work and self-employment (CSA, 2005). Rural youth 
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are the dominant contributors of agricultural labor and constitute the lion’s share of the population of 
Ethiopia.  
Literature on the analytical or empirical estimation of the labor demand and supply decisions of 
agricultural households in developing countries extensively uses the empirical advantage of separability 
(see for instance, Singah and Strauss, 1986; Barnum and Squire, 1979; Rosenzweig, 1980; Benjamin, 
1992; Bezu and Holden, 2014; Ahaibw et al., 2013; Agwu et al., 2014). When labor markets are 
imperfect, a common feature of developing countries, including Ethiopia, empirical results based on 
such an approach is likely to mislead policy conclusions. Indeed, a growing literature has indicated that 
empirical findings cast doubt on the perfect substitutability of farm labor and demonstrate the 
importance of the gender division of labor as well as the inappropriateness of aggregating the different 
age groups of a household labor force (Dupraz and Latruffe, 2015; Su et al. 2016). Specifically, existing 
studies on youth employment often suffer from methodological bias, data limitations, and empirical 
inadequacy. Most studies use the aggregated or homogenous approach of measuring labor supply of 
agricultural households (Benjamin and Kimhi, 2006; Ahearn et al., 2006; Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994; 
Kien, 2009; Dupraz and Latruffe, 2015). As a result, it is difficult to distinguish whether and to what 
extent labor is spent on-farm and/or off-farm and on which household members and age categories the 
analysis is focusing. In addition, the literature on youth’s employment in agriculture is scant and the 
findings are inconclusive as to whether youth are leaving agriculture or not (Bezu and Holden, 2014; 
Ahaibw et al., 2013; Agwu et al., 2014). Furthermore, there is little empirical evidence documenting 
the rapidly changing number of working hours for different age cohorts and the subsequent effects on 
agricultural production and productivity (Calves and Schoumaker, 2004).  
In fact, a closer examination of the existing literature suggests that the recurrent narrative of youth exit 
from the agricultural sector does not reflect the trend and patterns of participation in agriculture but may 
rather arise from methodological issues. Data limitations (especially the absence of panel data) and 
empirical inadequacy have also contributed to the inconclusive findings. Often the existing studies use 
stated intentions (for instance, intention to stay in or exit from agriculture, or having agriculture as a 
primary occupation) as an outcome variable rather than the realized time spent in agriculture in 
analyzing youth participation in agricultural activities. The main problem with this type of analysis is 
its inadequacy to capture realized engagement of youth as well as other household members in 
agriculture across time, space, and gender. Evidence shows also that realized engagement and intentions 
vary greatly (Omoti, 2012).  
Methodologically, working with shadow wages allows accounting for the simultaneity between 
production and consumption decisions of the household and its members (Deolalikar and Vijverberg, 
1983, 1987; Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994; Schultz, 1999; Benjamin and Kimhi, 2006; and Chang et 
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al., 2012). Non-separability may arise for several reasons: binding labor time constraints in off-farm 
employment, imperfect substitutability between family labor and hired labor; farmers or youth 
preference towards on-farm or off-farm employment, to list a few. For instance, Chang et al. (2012) 
argued that the validity of the separation method depend crucially on whether the availability of 
agricultural off-farm jobs is limited or not. As we will show empirically later, in line with Bedemo 
(2013), the non-separability assumption best fits the Ethiopian rural setting.  
Migration history in Ethiopia also shows that rural youth prefer rural over urban destinations (CSA, 
2013). A recent survey indicates that more than 55 percent of youth migrants in Ethiopia went to another 
rural area, where they tend to find work on large farms or plantations as hired laborers (de Brauw, 
2014). The same study indicates that those who migrate from urban back to rural areas account for 13 
percent. These figures are also consistent with the recent national statistics on migration. This reflects 
that rural employment opportunities (e.g. off-farm labor) play a vital role as drivers of internal migration 
and as a source of livelihood for participating youth or households. Hence, it is important to analyze 
how off-farm employment is supporting the livelihood of the rural youth, how it has evolved over time, 
and what explains this evolution.  
There are several reasons why it is necessary to analyze the link between youth labor supply in 
agriculture and labor productivity in the presence of imperfect labor markets. First, agriculture is the 
main source of livelihood for rural people, including the youth. In addition, higher agricultural 
productivity and/or labor productivity make the incentive to move out of agriculture less attractive. As 
productivity increases, wages rise and thus labor supply increases. In some seasons and places, wages 
in agriculture are higher than wages in other sectors. Furthermore, the rising productivity in agriculture 
and rising urban unemployment is expected to force rural youth to migrate back to rural areas. There 
are well-documented studies on the impact of out-migration on agricultural productivity or vice versa 
(de Brauw, 2014; Bezu and Holden, 2014). However, there is scant information on the link between 
labor productivity and the youth’s labor supply. Second, youth individuals, especially those living with 
their parents, are at the age in which they make decisions about when to finish their schooling (for those 
in schools), where to work, and what type of work to pursue after their education is completed. Third, 
Ethiopian agriculture is manual labor intensive, and the youth are typically considered among the most 
productive manual laborers. Thus, it is crucial to analyze whether youth labor supply is responsive to 
economic incentives such as shadow wages. Finally, the household needs to use surplus labor time 
among its members to buffer household income and/or to reallocate family labor due to low on-farm 
returns, it is easy to do so using youth labor, especially for off-farm activities. Youth are less likely to 
migrate with children or the remainder of their family. The increasing trend of off-farm employment in 
rural areas is an indication of this (Bezu and Holden, 2014; Bachewe et al., 2016).  
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This suggests that it is important to look at whether and how the youth’s labor supply in agriculture, 
on- and off-farm, is responsive to agricultural wages (rural shadow wages), and whether this differs 
across gender and labor categories. It is equally important to examine what factors determine these 
dynamics and whether agriculture could also be a potential source of employment and under what 
condition it offers opportunities for youth employment.   
The study goes beyond the previous studies in several ways. First, unlike the previous literature on the 
topic, I work with plot-level realized time spent by different members of the farming households, 
disaggregated by gender and age, across several years. I feel that this is an improvement from studies 
working with stated intentions of labor allocation or categorical definitions of the activities (e.g. 
“primary involved in agriculture”). This enables us to also examine the intensity of youth’s participation 
in agriculture. Second, I apply the non-separability approach to estimate and analyze the agricultural 
labor supply of youth. This approach accounts for simultaneity between production and consumption 
decisions of the households and widespread labor market failures (Deolalikar and Vijverberg, 1983, 
1987; Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994; Schultz, 1999; Benjamin and Kimber, 2006; and Chang et al., 
2012). This approach provides better analysis and fits to the Ethiopian rural setting. Third, the panel 
data allows us to control for the possible sources of endogeneity, a common problem often 
unsatisfactorily addressed in the existing studies. Finally, migrant youth who left the household to work 
elsewhere were tracked and included in the analysis. This provides more accuracy in assessing youth 
involvement in agriculture across gender, space, and time. It also avoids a selection bias in the sample 
of youth. 
The objective of the study is twofold. First, I analyze the trends, patterns, and prospects of youth’s 
involvement in agriculture by gender and labor type (on-farm and off-farm). Second, I examine the 
determinants of youth’s supply of farm labor. Specifically, I examine the effects of gender and age-
specific rural shadow wages on youth labor supply at farm-level in agricultural potential areas of 
Ethiopia. The result suggest that trends and patterns of youth involvement in agriculture vary across 
gender and work locations, and so do their marginal products. In addition, changes in economic 
incentives such as agricultural labor returns (shadow wages) matter for youth involvement in 
agriculture. However, the impact of it induces different outcomes for male and female youth labor 
supply. My estimation approach tests the existence of separability - the hypothesis being strongly 
rejected in the estimation in favor of a non-separable model. Moreover, I find that realized engagement 
and intentions vary greatly, suggesting that narrative about youth exiting agriculture is founded on data, 
methods, and models rather than effective trends and patterns. The remainder of the paper is organized 
as follows: part 2 is a brief description of the theoretical model. Part 3 presents the background and a 
detailed data description. Part 4 provides descriptive statistics. Part 5 describes the empirical estimation 
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strategy for youth’s labor supply functions. Part 6 presents the results of the econometric estimation and 
Part 7 tests the separability assumption. Finally, Part 8 concludes and discusses policy implications.   
2.2. The theoretical model  
Farm labor input differs not only between men and women, but also according to age, and so does labor 
productivity. Hence, I extend the notion of farm household time allocation model to estimate the labor 
supply of youth, disaggregating the farm household agricultural labor in terms of gender and age groups.  
I use a utility maximization approach based on the model of structural time allocation of the agricultural 
household members (mainly youth male and female members) (Becker, 1965; Manser and Brown, 
1980). In this approach resource allocation decisions (including time) of rural residents is a constrained 
optimization problem. The model employed here is a version of Gronau (1977) modified by Jacoby 
(1993) and employed by Skoufias (1994). Economic decisions such as supplying labor are significantly 
affected by choices made within households. Each type of labor input is specified as having a different 
effect on agricultural output and evolves over time. The model is thus non-separable by construction. I 
assume that a household consists of male mature members, male youth members, female mature 
members, female youth members, and children. I further assume that male and female members’ labor 
as well as youth and mature members labor are not necessarily substitutes. Hence, there would be labor 
quality differentials within households across gender and age groups. Similar to Lopez (1984), I am 
also explicitly considering cases where household members, including youth members, have 
preferences over working on or off-farm. Households allocate their time endowment (T) among at least 
four main activities: Leisure (Li), household production (Si), market work (Mi) and farm work (Fi); 
where subscript i indexes male (m) and female (f) youth members, mature members and children. The 
time devoted to market work yields a wage, which allows the purchase of market goods (G). The 
effective real wage for off-farm work, Wi, is assumed to be constant. I further consider that household 
members jointly choose consumption of home and agricultural produced goods, market goods, and 
household leisure time.    
Time allocated to household production combined with other fixed inputs (denoted here by vector K) 
yields a household produced a composite commodity (X) described by the production function: 
 
𝑋 = 𝑋(𝑆𝑚𝑦, 𝑆𝑓𝑦, 𝑆𝑚𝑚 , 𝑆𝑓𝑚, 𝑆𝑐; 𝐾)                  (2.1) 
 
𝑆 = 𝑆𝑚𝑚 + 𝑆𝑓𝑦+ 𝑆𝑚𝑚 + 𝑆𝑓𝑚 + 𝑆𝑐                 (2.2) 
Where my, fy, mm, fm and c denotes male youth household members, female youth household 
members, male mature household members, female mature household members, and children, 
respectively.  
The household produced commodity X is assumed to be a perfect substitute with the composite 
agriculture commodity that is either produced by the household or purchased from the market. The 
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production function for the composite agricultural commodity produced by the household is specified 
as:  
 
Γ(𝐹𝑚𝑦, 𝐹𝑓𝑦, 𝐹𝑚𝑚, 𝐹𝑓𝑚, 𝐹𝑐 , 𝐻𝑚𝑦, 𝐻𝑓𝑦, 𝐻𝑚𝑚, 𝐻𝑓𝑚, 𝐻𝑐; 𝐴)                       (2.3) 
 
Where Γ a concave function;  𝐹 denotes family labor; 𝐻  denotes hired labor; subscript i is as defined 
earlier; A is a vector of fixed factors such as land. Hired labor for the different groups is paid at the 
corresponding real wage rates 𝑊𝑖
ℎ. In addition, due to transportation or transaction costs, the wage 
received by family members participating in off-farm may differ from the wages paid out to hired labor 
(i.e. 𝑊𝑖 ≠ 𝑊𝑖
ℎ). Given this set of information, households are assumed to choose 𝐺, 𝑆𝑖, 𝐹𝑖, 𝑀𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 to 
maximise their utility: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈(𝐶, 𝐿𝑚𝑦, 𝐿𝑓𝑦, 𝐿𝑚𝑚, 𝐿𝑓𝑚, 𝐿𝑐; 𝒁)               (2.4) 
Subject to  
𝐶 = 𝐺 + 𝑋                    (2.5) 
𝑋 = 𝑋(𝑆𝑚𝑦, 𝑆𝑓𝑦, 𝑆𝑚𝑚, 𝑆𝑓𝑚, 𝑆𝑐  ; 𝐾)3                   (2.6) 
𝐺 = Γ(𝐹𝑚𝑦, 𝐹𝑓𝑦, 𝐹𝑚𝑚, 𝐹𝑓𝑚, 𝐹𝑐 , 𝐻𝑚𝑦, 𝐻𝑓𝑦, 𝐻𝑚𝑚, 𝐻𝑓𝑚, 𝐻𝑐; 𝐴) − ∑ 𝑊𝑖
ℎ5
𝑖=1 𝐻𝑖 + ∑ 𝑊𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑀𝑖 + 𝐈   (2.7)4 
𝑇 = 𝐿𝑖 +𝐻𝑖 +𝑀𝑖 + 𝐹𝑖                     (2.8) 
𝑀𝑖 ≥ 0          i = {𝑚𝑦, 𝑓𝑦,𝑚𝑚, 𝑓𝑚, 𝑐}                          (2.9) 
Where C is total household consumption; 𝑍 is a vector of individuals (groups) or household 
characteristics influencing preferences; 𝐼 is real non-labor income (transfers, gifts, remittances, etc) and 
i is as defined earlier.    
 
Substituting some of the constraints into the utility function specified in Eq. (2.4), the Lagrangean 
function can be formulated as follows: 
 
𝑈[𝐺 + 𝑋(𝑆𝑚𝑦, 𝑆𝑓𝑦, 𝑆𝑚𝑚 , 𝑆𝑓𝑚, 𝑆𝑐; 𝐾), 𝑇 − 𝑆𝑚𝑦 −𝑀𝑚𝑦 − 𝐹𝑚𝑦, 𝑇 − 𝑆𝑓𝑦 −𝑀𝑓𝑦 − 𝐹𝑓𝑦,   
  𝑇 − 𝑆𝑚𝑚 −𝑀𝑚𝑚 − 𝐹𝑚𝑚,   𝑇 − 𝑆𝑓𝑚 −𝑀𝑓𝑚 − 𝐹𝑓𝑚, 𝑇 − 𝑆𝑐 −𝑀𝑐 − 𝐹𝑐); Z] 
+𝜆 [
Γ(𝐹𝑚𝑦, 𝐹𝑓𝑦, 𝐹𝑚𝑚, 𝐹𝑓𝑚, 𝐹𝑐 , 𝐻𝑚𝑦, 𝐻𝑓𝑦, 𝐻𝑚𝑚, 𝐻𝑓𝑚, 𝐻𝑐; 𝐴)
−∑ 𝑊𝑖
ℎ5
𝑖=1 𝐻𝑖 + ∑ 𝑊𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑀𝑖 + 𝑰 – 𝐺
] + ∑ 𝜇𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑀𝑖            (2.10) 
 
                                                                
3 Can be expressed as  𝑋 = 𝑋(𝑆𝑚𝑦, 𝑆𝑓𝑦, 𝑆𝑚𝑚 , 𝑆𝑓𝑚, 𝑆𝑐;𝐾) in its long form. The same is true with Fi and Hi. 
4 ∑ 𝑊𝑖
ℎ = 𝑊𝑚𝑦
ℎ +𝑊𝑓𝑦
ℎ +𝑊𝑚𝑚
ℎ +𝑊𝑓𝑚
ℎ +𝑊𝑐
ℎ5
𝑖=1  in its long form  
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Where 𝜆 and 𝜇 are the lagrangean multipliers associated with the income inequality constraint and 
inequality constraints on market work of each labor type (i.e. 𝑀𝑖 ≥ 0), respectively.   
 
Maximising the lagrangean with respect to Fi, Si, Hi, Mi, where 𝑖 = 𝑚𝑦, 𝑓𝑚,𝑚𝑚, 𝑓𝑚, 𝑐) results the 
following first order condition5: 
 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐿𝑖
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
= 𝑊𝑖
∗ = 𝑊𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖/𝜆                     (2.11) 
 
∂Γ
𝜕𝐻𝑖
= 𝑊𝑖
ℎ                (2.12) 
 
∂Γ
𝜕𝐹𝑖
= 𝑊𝑖
∗                 (2.13) 
         
∂X
𝜕𝑆𝑖
= 𝑊𝑖
∗                (2.14) 
 
Where 𝑊𝑖
∗ is a “shadow wage rate” of labor type i ∈ {𝑚𝑦, 𝑓𝑦,𝑚𝑚, 𝑓𝑚, 𝑐}. Equation (2.11) states that 
household will equate the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure of family labor 
type 𝑖 and the ‘’shadow wage rate’’,𝑊𝑖
∗, of labor type 𝑖. Equation (2.12) state that hired labor will be 
utilized until the marginal product of hired labor of each gender and age category is equal to the wage 
rate paid out to hired labor. Similarly, Equation (2.13) and (2.14) implies that at the optimum, family 
labor of type i on farm will be utilized up to the point where the marginal productivity on the farm or at 
home is equal to the respective shadow wage rate. If a person is working in the market then their shadow 
wage rate will be equal to the respective market wage rate Wi for that gender and age group (i.e. 𝑊𝑖
∗ =
𝑊𝑖), since the complementary slackness condition requires that  𝜇𝑖 = 0 if 𝑀𝑖 > 0.  In contrast, if a 
person is not working in the labor market, then the shadow wage rate6, 𝑊𝑖
∗will be in general greater 
than Wi (Skoufias, 1994) because 𝜇𝑖 ≥ 0 if 𝑀𝑖 = 0.  In the latter case (i.e.𝑀𝑖 = 0), the optimum will 
occur at
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐿𝑖
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
= 𝑊𝑖
∗, see Eq. (2.11), as indicated above. Under this condition, the market wage rate W 
may underestimate the opportunity cost of time of such households. Thus, at the optimum we can 
redefine the full income of the household as follows: 
 
                                                                
5 I assume that members participate in non-leisure activities to obtain the optimal choices. For details on this I 
refer the reader to (Skoufias, 1994). 
6 At the equilibrium point, the shadow wage of farm workers is the marginal product of their labor in farming 
(Jacoby, 1993).   
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𝑰∗ = max
ℎ𝑖𝐹𝑖
{Γ(𝐹𝑚𝑦, 𝐹𝑓𝑦, 𝐹𝑚𝑚, 𝐹𝑓𝑚, 𝐹𝑐 , 𝐻𝑚𝑦, 𝐻𝑓𝑦, 𝐻𝑚𝑚, 𝐻𝑓𝑚, 𝐻𝑐; 𝐴) − ∑ 𝑊𝑖
ℎ5
𝑖=1 𝐻𝑖 − ∑ 𝑊𝑖
∗5
𝑖=1 𝐹𝑖} 
+  max
𝑆𝑖
{X(𝑆𝑚𝑦, 𝑆𝑓𝑦 , 𝑆𝑚𝑚 , 𝑆𝑓𝑚, 𝑆𝑐; 𝐾) − ∑ 𝑊𝑖
∗5
𝑖=1 𝑆𝑖} + 𝑰              (2.15)  
 
Linearizing the budget constraint at the optimum allows one to reformulate the leisure days for each 
family labor type as the solution to a traditional model of family labor supply. Thus, the equilibrium 
solution can be expressed as: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈[𝐺 + 𝑋∗, 𝐿𝑚𝑦, 𝐿𝑓𝑦, 𝐿𝑚𝑚, 𝐿𝑓𝑚, 𝐿𝑐; Z]               (2.16) 
Subject to the constraints  
𝐺 + 𝑋∗ + ∑ 𝑊𝑖
∗5
𝑖=1 𝐿𝑖 = 𝐼
∗ + ∑ 𝑊𝑖
∗5
𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖    i ∈ {𝑚𝑦, 𝑓𝑦,𝑚𝑚, 𝑓𝑚, 𝑐}                           (2.17) 
 
The left-hand side of (2.17) is the value of total expenditure on goods and leisure, with X* denoting the 
amount of X commodity produced at the optimum;  𝑊𝑖
∗, being the shadow value of time defined above. 
The right hand side of the equation (2.17) is the “shadow full income”.   
 
After some mathematical computation (details of the computation is provided in annex A2.1), the 
solution to this simpler maximization problem results in the structural demand for leisure and the 
corresponding structural labor supply functions respectively: 
 
𝐿𝑖
∗ = 𝐿𝑖(𝑊𝑚𝑦
∗ ,𝑊𝑓𝑦
∗ ,𝑊𝑚𝑚
∗ ,𝑊𝑚𝑓
∗ ,𝑊𝑐
∗, 𝐼∗;  𝑍)                                    (2.18) 
 
𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝐷𝑖(𝑊𝑚𝑦
∗ ,𝑊𝑓𝑦
∗ ,𝑊𝑚𝑚
∗ ,𝑊𝑚𝑓
∗ ,𝑊𝑐
∗, 𝐼∗;  𝑍)                                     (2.19) 
 
Where 𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝑇 − 𝐿𝑖 = 𝐹𝑖
∗ + 𝑆𝑖
∗; if Mi*=0                                  (2.20) 
 
𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝑇 − 𝐿𝑖 = 𝐹𝑖
∗ + 𝑆𝑖
∗ +𝑀𝑖
∗; if   Mi* >0                                            (2.21) 
 
Where 𝐷𝑖
∗ refers to the total working days for family labor of type i spent on-farm and off-farm (market 
work) and labor days allocated to the production of the composite commodity X. For simplicity 𝐷𝑖
∗ 
refers to total labor days spent on production of crops on-farm and off-farm, aggregated from each 
parcel and crop at household level for the respective gender and age categories, and I exclude labor 
days allocated to animal production in the empirical analysis.  
In practice, an estimate of shadow wage rate 𝑊𝑖
∗ could be obtained either from marginal product of 
each type of family labor in agricultural production or from the marginal product of family labor in the 
production of commodity X. Since I have collected detailed information on crop production 
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(disaggregated by age and gender), I estimate the marginal product of family labor from the parameters 
of the agricultural production. This is particularly useful in estimating the value of time for household 
members such as youth students and domestic workers who do not sell their labor time. The detailed 
estimation method is presented in the empirical analysis. Note that the core difference between labor 
supply derived from this framework and the one derived from the more conventional labor supply model 
using the observed market wages and full income, is that 𝑊𝑖
∗ and 𝐼∗ are endogenous variables since 
both are correlated with the unobservable characteristics. This is because of the fact that the estimated 
marginal productivities of each family labor depend on their respective realized days of work causing 
the causality to run from the hours worked to the estimated wages as well. In order to control for reverse 
causality in estimation (working days to wage), I estimate the labor supply equation (2.19) using fixed 
effects instrumental variables (FE-IV), a point I will discuss later with the empirical estimation.  
2.3. Data  
This study is based on a household and youth panel survey conducted in Oromia region, one of the 
largest regions in Ethiopia, in woredas selected for Agricultural Growth Program (AGP). Increasing 
smallholder productivity and value-addition in the agricultural sector are core elements of the Ethiopian 
government’s approach to poverty reduction. The program is a component of this broad effort. The 
AGP is a five-year program to increase agricultural productivity and market access for key crop and 
livestock products in agricultural potential areas of Ethiopia with increased participation of women and 
youth (AGP baseline report, 2011). The program focuses on agricultural productivity growth in four 
major regions (Oromia, Amhara, SNNP, and Tigray) deemed to possess high agricultural growth 
potential that can be realized with appropriate interventions. The AGP has two main components: 
agricultural production and commercialization, and small-scale rural infrastructure development and 
management. The baseline survey covered 93 woredas (305 enumeration areas) called AGP sites from 
Oromia, Amhara, SNNP, and Tigray regions. In these woredas, crop production and animal husbandry 
are the main livelihood means for households. In addition, off-farm employment opportunities play a 
vital role in the livelihood of households. I built on a baseline study of 926 households from Oromia 
region that were surveyed in 2010. The base survey was conducted by the collaboration of Central 
Statistical Authority (CSA) of Ethiopia and Ethiopian Strategic Support Program (ESSP) of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) during July 3-22, 2010. AGP participating woredas 
were selected based on multiple criteria: agricultural potential or productivity, access to market (access 
to cities of 50,000 population or over in less than 5 hours), natural resource endowment, suitable rainfall 
and soil for crops and fodder production, potential for development of small-scale irrigation facilities, 
and institutional plurality of service providers such as cooperatives and farmer groups. 
Of the original 926 AGP households in Oromia region, 525 households who have at least one youth 
member were randomly selected and surveyed again during December 2014 and January 2015. I 
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purposively selected Oromia region out of the four AGP regions. Of the original 27 AGP woredas in 
the region, I covered only 12 randomly selected AGP woredas. Due to cost and time-related factors, I 
predetermined to cover 12 woredas. Each woreda contains 3 enumeration areas (EAs). Thus, 36 
enumeration areas spread out among the 12 woredas were covered during the follow-up survey. In each 
woreda, 78 households were covered during baseline survey. The selection of households for this study 
were identified using (stratified) multistage random sampling based on the following additional criteria: 
youth population density, youth migration history, the desired number of respondents, availability of 
youth members in the household during base survey, and possibilities of tracking migrant youth, and 
the sample sizes in the fresh list of selected AGP. This study focuses exclusively on households who 
have either youth members or youth household heads. The AGP baseline slightly oversamples 
households headed by both young and mature females relative to their share implied by census survey 
in 2007. Since the original survey was designed with multiple objectives, detailed information on the 
amount of time allocated per each youth individual per plot was not available. Nevertheless, times 
allocated per plot for the respective gender and age groups (i.e. disaggregated by gender and farm plot) 
within the household were available, upon which the second round survey built for the estimation of 
youth labor supply in agriculture. It was possible to construct a panel data set since AGP baseline 
collected detail information on labor allocation of household members disaggregated by gender and 
farm plot.  
Following the selection of the 12 woredas, the next step was to determine the survey sample households. 
Once complete lists of the households in each selected AGP woreda were prepared from the base survey, 
households without youth members were dropped from the listing. After carefully preparing a fresh list 
of households with youth household head and youth members [based on AGP baseline data], on 
average, 44 households per woreda were randomly selected based on probability-proportion-to-size 
sampling to maintain an equal distribution of sample respondents in each woreda. Put differently, given 
my interest in youth labor supply in agriculture, determination of sample size and apportionment of the 
sample households per the 12 selected woredas were based on a proportional sampling technique. One 
of the main challenges in the process was how to allocate the survey samples across enumeration areas, 
for which a proportional sampling method was used. Based on the list of names from the baseline 
survey, the number of households selected was based on (
𝑁
𝑛
) 𝑡ℎ, where n denotes the current sample 
size and N denotes the base year sample size (limited to households with youth members). A complete 
list of households was used to select the survey respondents.  
Once the required samples per the randomly selected woredas were determined, the respective woreda 
and kebele administrators were consulted to determine the availability of sample households. 
Reappointment was made if a member of the qualified households were not available at the time of 
appointment. In cases of unavailability of sample households due to death or difficulty to track for those 
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who moved, the next household on the contingency list was chosen as a replacement. Youth migrants 
were identified from the household survey as either youth (siblings) of the household head or youth 
household members who left the household to work elsewhere (rural, urban) for at least 3 months during 
the year. In some instances, migrant youth were tracked and interviewed (the success rate was so low, 
about 20 percent). These were included in the analyses of off-farm labor supply. We have also checked 
whether attrition resulted from the migration of youth biases my estimation or not. We find that overall 
the main characteristics (or observables) of migrant youth (i.e. those we were not able to track) are 
similar in other respects to youth with complete data (i.e. youth who are covered during the second 
round) (see Appendix Table A2.1). Accordingly, 525 households (202 youth household heads and 323 
mature household heads) who have at least one youth member have surveyed again (Table 1). Due to 
missing key variables (such as income, education) for some households, only 634 youth individuals 
from 520 households in 36 enumeration areas of Oromia region were used in the analysis.  
There is no consensus regarding the age bracket that defines youth. For instance, UN defines youth as 
persons within the age interval of 15 to 24. The African Youth Charter extends the upper age bracket 
to 34(thus, defines youth as persons between the ages of 15-35) (UN, 2014). Ethiopia’s National Youth 
Policy defines youth as persons between the ages of 15-34. Given the Ethiopian rural context, especially 
children’s contribution to the household income and in line with Ethiopia’s National Youth Policy, in 
this paper, I define youth over the age interval of 13 to 34. Distribution of households and youth across 
the sample woredas is presented in Table 2.1. The geographic location of the study sites is presented in 
Figure 1.1. 
Table 2.1: Ethiopian study areas, sample sizes, and distribution across the study areas 
Woreda EAs per 
woreda 
AGP 
sample 
Number of 
sampled 
Youth 
headed 
households 
Number of 
sampled 
mature 
headed 
households 
no of sampled youth members 
(for household-based analysis 
of youth labor supply) 
no of sampled youth members 
(for individual-based analysis of 
youth labor supply) 
Average number of youth 
per sampled household 
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Shirka 3 109 16 37 127 95 212 62 47 109 1.2 0.9 2.0 
Agarfa 3 122 21 33 130 108 248 66 56 122 1.2 1.0 2.3 
Dugda 3 70 17 15 77 64 141 37 33 70 1.2 1.0 2.2 
Guduru 3 109 11 24 105 112 217 52 57 109 1.5 1.6 3.1 
Jima Rare 3 132 16 34 130 140 260 64 68 132 1.3 1.4 2.6 
Bedele Zuriya 3 108 16 31 122 94 216 59 49 108 1.3 1.0 2.3 
Gechi 3 121 18 30 125 115 240 64 57 121 1.3 1.2 2.5 
Limu seka 3 95 20 29 98 88 186 50 46 95 1.0 0.9 1.9 
Abichugna 3 108 14 31 108 108 216 55 53 108 1.2 1.2 2.4 
Weliso 3 75 17 17 82 68 150 42 33 75 1.2 1.0 2.2 
Dinsho 3 110 22 26 86 134 221 44 65 110 0.9 1.4 2.3 
Dendi 3 61 14 16 60 60 120 30 30 61 1.0 1.0 2.0 
Total 36 1217 202 323 1022 1022 2144 695 592 1320 1.2 1.1 2.3 
Source: Own computation based on AGP baseline survey 
The primary research had three phases: first, focus group discussions to understand the context and to 
examine how households allocate youth labor and other family members; second, a pre-test of the added 
questions to the survey modules that were not included during the baseline study; third, the formal 
survey. Two types of questionnaires were administered to one household: head questionnaire and youth 
questionnaire. The survey collected detail information on youth characteristics, household 
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characteristics, wealth, agricultural production such as farms, production inputs including detail labor 
allocated to each plot and crop for household members (categorized by age, gender, and farm type) and 
other inputs, outputs, plot tenure, and other farm characteristics and off-farm activities. I aggregated 
labor hours spent on-farm and off-farm into adult equivalent labor days (AELD)7 from each plot and 
crops at household for the respective age and gender categories. The aggregation method is presented 
in Annex 3. Community questionnaire to capture community-level characteristics was administered 
separately. Prior to data collection, enumerators familiar with Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing 
(CAPI) technique were recruited and provided intensive training. The use of CAPI helps to ensure the 
quality of my data by preventing measurement error, maintaining consistency, and avoiding missing 
data.  
2.4. Descriptive statistics  
In this section, I provide the descriptive statistics for main variables of interest. Table 2.2 provides basic 
overview statistics of the youth and household in the sample. As expected, my sample contains more 
male youth than female. I found that 66% of youth in my sample who live with their parents at the time 
of baseline study has decreased to 62%. Migration and marriage are the two main reasons for this 
change. On average, youth in my sample have completed three years of education at the time of baseline 
study. The average years of education of the youth in my sample at the time of second-round survey 
were four. The average number of youth per household was about two.   
Table 2.2. Main characteristics of youth and household head 
 2011 2015 
Youth characteristics    
Male youth (%) 61.02 59.05 
Female youth (%) 38.98 40.95 
Youth household headed (%) 34.25 38.48 
Live with parents (%) 65.75 61.52 
Average education of the youth  (years) 2.54 3.78 
Average number of youth per household  2.39 2.23 
Household head characteristics    
Average education of the household head (years) 1.63 1.92 
Household head is male (%) 72.44 69.90 
Household head is female (%) 27.56 30.10 
 Source: survey results  
As indicated in Table 2.3 trends and patterns of youth participation in agriculture vary by gender. For 
instance, 63% of male youth members’ main occupation was farming (full-time farmer either on own-
                                                                
7 One AELD represents 8 hours. An adult equivalent labor day equals the amount of labor an adult male spent during a 
working day. Adult equivalent labor days were obtained as a weighted sum of labor days reported for adult males (weight=1), 
adult females (weight=0.84) and children below the age of 14 (weight=0.48). It is important to note as a caveat that the labor 
days reported by respondents were not necessarily equal to full working days in every case. It is also unlikely that these days 
were identical across crops and/or activities. Labor allocation for the respective gender and age groups for the respective 
household was obtained at plot level in working days and later converted to adult equivalent labor days (AELD) at household 
level. Information on household members’ labor utilization per plot per crop was collected for the main agricultural 
production season (meher season) and only for crop production. It was then aggregated into total AELD per household per 
farm type (on-farm and off-farm) for the respective gender and age group. The exclusion of household labor utilization during 
the Belg season (short rainy season) may underestimate the total supply of labor.  
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farm or family farm) in 2010; while it was about 39% for female youth members. The main occupation 
refers to the main activities of the youth. In 2015, about 68% and 42% of male and female youth 
members’ reported full-time farming on either their own or family farm as their main occupation, 
respectively.  
Table 2.3. Summary of the main occupation as reported by the youth   
  
Main occupation  
2010 2015 
Male youth 
(%)  
Female 
youth (%) 
All youth 
(%) 
Male youth 
(%) 
Female 
youth (%) 
All youth 
(%) 
Full-time farming  63.34 38.77 54.46 68.58 42.73 58.42 
Off-farm  1.5 3.08 2.07 4.24 11.45 6.53 
Student  35.16 58.15 43.47 27.18 45.81 35.02  
Source: survey results. Note: full-time farming refers to farm work on either own or family farm. 
 
On average, 2014/15 on-farm labor supply for both male and female youth members is declining 
compared to 2010/11 agricultural season; whereas off-farm labor supply is increasing for both. In 
2010/11 Meher8 season, the average labor days (in AELD) used on on-farm for all crops cultivated for 
male and female youth members at household level were 57 and 20 labor days (in AELD), respectively. 
In 2014/15, these figures have decreased to 52 and 15 labor days for male and female youth members, 
respectively. In 2010/11 Meher season, on average, a household utilized about 6.93 labor days (in 
AELD) which were contributed by male youth members and 6.24 labor days contributed by female 
youth members in off-farm9 activities. However, in 2014/15 Meher season, the average household level 
labor supplied to off-farm for male and female youth members have increased to 10.39 and 7.01, 
respectively (Table 2.4). Whilst there is an increasing trend in total labor supply (which is the sum of 
labor days supplied to on-farm and off-farm during Meher season by male youth, female youth, male 
mature, female mature and children) at household level, there is a decreasing trend in labor demand (the 
sum of labor used on the farm in AELD including hired labor). 
Table 2.4: Average youth members and household labor supply and demand per hectare (in adult 
equivalent labor days-AELD) for main agricultural season  
 
 
 
Year 
Male youth members 
Contribution per 
household 
Female youth members 
contribution per household 
 
Household 
On-farm Off-farm On-farm Off-farm Total demand Total supply 
2010/11 69.88 6.93 20.31 6.24 95.92 (102) 109.67 
2014/15 63.98 10.39 15.28 7.01 94.62 112.41 
Total 65.60 8.66 16.91 6.77 95.26 111.07 
Mean diff -5.24 3.46 -5.03 0.77 -1.29 3.74 
P-value 0.25 0.13 0.05 0.51 0.41 0.34 
N 1159 1159 1022 1022 1022 1022 
Source: Survey results    
                                                                
8 Meher season is the main agricultural season linked to long rainy season from May to January. It accounts for 
about 90-95% of the annual crop production of Ethiopia. 
9 off-farm in this context includes off-farm farming employment, business and other income generating 
activities 
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Note: Total household labor is the sum of on-farm and off-farm labor supply of all household members per 
household. The null hypothesis is that the mean difference between the two years agricultural seasons is zero, i.e. 
Diff = mean (2014) - mean (2011) =0.  
The summary of reports regarding youth intentions to engage in agriculture during a base survey in 
comparison to their realized engagement after five years is presented in Table 5. In 2010/11 (at the time 
of base survey), youth were asked about their career intentions/plan, given their current occupation. 
After five years, they were asked again their realized occupation. As one can see from Table 5, only 
32% of youth respondents during base survey had been considering agriculture employment as their 
intended occupation. Contrary to their intentions, however, a significantly higher percent (51%) of them 
have ended working in agriculture in 2014/15. This means that significant number of youth were not 
able to find employment outside agriculture 26 % of survey respondents had planned to work in off-
farm by 2014/15, only 14% of them fail to work in line with their preferences. In 2014/15, the 
respondents were asked again about their future occupation preferences. About 28% of the youth 
sampled are considering agriculture as their future occupation. It is also interesting to note that in 
2010/11, 12% of youth respondents’ main occupation was off-farm (such as farm wage employment, 
businesses, and other non-farm income generating activities). The intention to work in off-farm 
activities is somehow, in line with the realized engagement, however, there is still a mismatch between 
youth intention and realized engagement. These suggest that youth intentions and realized engagement 
vary greatly. Thus, some studies who have found evidence that youth are abandoning agriculture (based 
on intentions than using realized engagement as outcome variable) would be misleading and result in 
methodological flaws. I find less discrepancy between youth’s intention to study and realized 
enrolment. It is also interesting to note that youngsters who are currently working (who were dropouts) 
are planning to go back to school (reflected by the higher number of youngsters with future intentions 
to study are greater than the number of current students) (Table 2.5, row 3). 
Table 2.5. Youth livelihood occupation: realized engagement and intentions   
 
 
 
 
Category  
Livelihood occupation (%) 
During base survey During follow-up survey 
Main occupation (realized 
engagement): 2010/11  
Intended/planne 
occupation: 2010/11-
2014/15) 
Main occupation realised  
(realized engagement): 
2014/15 
Future occupation 
(intended/planned 
occupation) from 2015-2020 
Male Female All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female All 
Farming   43 23 43 42 20 32 62 37 51 35 18 28 
Student / 
further study  
33 56 42 35 56 42 28 46 35 34 59 42 
Off-farm  8 16 12 21 20 26 10 17 14 31 23 30 
Source: Survey results  
Note: off-farm in this context includes off-farm farming employment, business, and other income-generating 
activities. The sum of the percentage figures may not add 100 as the percentage figures exclude unemployed youth 
and those who said don’t know.   
 
Different factors have contributed to the mismatch between what was planned and realized and part of 
the underlying factors has resulted in increased participation of youth in agriculture. These include 
demand for family labor (60%), the absence of other viable means of livelihood in the areas (19%) and 
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profitability of agriculture (12%). Summary of variables used in the estimation of agricultural 
production function is presented in Table 2.6.  
Table 2.6: Definition, Mean and standard deviation of other variables used in the estimation of the agricultural 
production: main agricultural season  
 
 
Variable  
 
 
Variable  descriptions  
2010/11 2014/15 
Mean  Standard 
deviation  
Mean  Standard 
deviation  
Totoutput Total output value in 2011 prices-crop only  10812.89 24909.85 13431.54 24650.95 
MYL Total working days of family labor contributed 
by male youth members (in AELD)  
69.05 58.19 63.04 84.75 
FYL  Total working days of family labor contributed 
by female youth members (in AELD) 
21.31 31.73 20.28 28.34 
AML Total working days of mature family labor 
contributed by male members  (in AELD) 
50.06 43.25 26.98 39.44 
AFL Total working days of mature family labor 
contributed by female members (in AELD) 
16.17 16.43 19.72 25.78 
CL Total working days of family child labor (in 
AELD) 
5.82 12.62 6.44 12.64 
THHL Total working days contributed by all members 
of the household in AELD 
(MYL+FYL+AML+AFL+ CL) 
114.38 101.26 106.96 126.55 
HL  Total hired labor days   6.06 20.94 14.37 78.75 
OXEN Total oxen owned (TLU) 1.78 2.49 2.18 2.62 
Mechanization  Value of agricultural production tools to capture 
mechanization(in birr)   
5363 3849 7518 5420 
AREA Total cropped areas in hectares  2.08 3.18 1.66 2.165 
SEEDVAL Value of seeds (2010/11 birr) 277.00 734.37 309.59 834.31 
FERRVAL Value of fertilizer (2011 birr) 740.96 1164.15 802.84 1344.83 
WEEDVAL Value of seeds  46.55 193.411 53.49 220.80 
Extension Frequency of extension visits  0.88 1.88 0.86 1.87 
Expert Frequency of expert visit per crop calendar  1.79 0.40 1.80 0.39 
Age_head  Age of household head in years  41.71 15.18 43.09 15.30 
Sex_head Sex of head of the household (1=male; 
2=female  
1.27 0.44 1.30 0.45 
Educ_head Education of the household head in completed 
years  
1.63 2.67 1.96 2.94 
Age_youth  Average age of the youth in completed years  19.37 6.63 22.22 6.07 
Educ_youth  Average education of youth in completed years  2.51 2.58 3.86 3.24 
Number of households  521  511  
Source: Survey results. Note: All value variables such as asset values and others are deflated to 2011 prices. 
Mechanization in this context includes agricultural assets or farm implements plough beam, plough metal, 
chemical sprayers, motorized pumps, handheld, small tractors and the like that are assumed to affect labor 
productivity links.  
 
2.5. Empirical analysis  
Most agricultural labor studies in developing countries rarely analyze the agricultural labor supply 
disaggregated by gender and age group. To estimate labor supply of youth members in agricultural 
households, my empirical estimation strategy relies on the use of shadow wages. The use of shadow 
wages accounts for simultaneity between production and consumption decision of the households and 
widespread labor market failure. Following Jacoby (1993), Skoufias (1994), and Chang (2012), the 
estimation of youth labor supply consists of three main steps.  
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First, I obtain the estimates of the marginal productivities of the different family labor10 (male youth, 
female youth, male mature, female mature, and children) and hired labor estimated from a Cobb-
Douglas (C-D) production function specified as heterogeneous inputs. The C-D production function is 
widely used in developing countries mainly because of its simplicity to interpret and compute the 
parameters of interest. However, C-D production function has limitations in the functional specification; 
simplest assumption of homogeneity, sensitivity to the choice of inputs and it restricts that marginal 
rate of technical substation depends only on the ratios of labor inputs and not on other inputs. 
Consequently, C-D production function assumes substitution is between labors only. However, in 
reality, farming machines may substitute labor; hence, I need to use interactions such as labor with farm 
implements. 
To complement my findings, I replicated the analysis using the more flexible functional form of a 
production function such as the translog. The use of translog helps to overcome these inherent 
limitations of C-D production function but it’s difficult to estimate. Both production functions require 
intensive data and computation. Since neither measure is perfect, I adopted also Kien (2008) approach 
of estimating shadow wages and shadow income, which does not require the estimation of production 
function (see Kien, 2008 for the details). Kien (2008) proposed an alternative approach to estimate the 
shadow wage based on the observation that the shadow wage is the marginal product of labor at the 
optimal point of both farm and household production functions without estimating the production 
function for the analysis of agricultural labor supply regardless of market failures. He suggested the use 
of expected output instead of estimating the predicted output from the production function. Advantages 
of his approach includes less data requirement requires no assumption on the functional form and 
reduces errors from estimating the production function that will contaminate shadow wage. It should 
be noted, however, that the two approaches to the estimation of shadow wages are based on developing 
a time allocation model and the key observations come from the fact that the shadow wage is the value 
of the marginal product of labor at the optimal point on the production function curve. The estimation 
results from translog and Kien approach are available upon request.  
Multiple crop outputs are aggregated into a single output measure using the medians of their reported 
prices within each village. I considered only crop output and did not include livestock products such as 
the sales of dairy, skins, and hides, and other animal products. I checked the robustness of my results 
by including these output values for which the data was reported and found similar conclusions. I 
included draught animal as an input into the production of crops.  
 
I specify the C-D production function as: 
                                                                
10 The labor working days are collected at plot level, but aggregated to household level   
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ln 𝑌(ℎ,𝑡) = ∑ 𝛽𝑗
5
𝑗=1 ln 𝑋𝑗(ℎ𝑡) + 𝛽6  ln(𝐾ℎ𝑡) + 𝛽7 ln(𝐹ℎ𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝜇(ℎ) + 𝜏(𝑡 ) + 𝜀(ℎ,𝑡)                        (2.22) 
Where ln 𝑌(ℎ,,𝑡) denotes the total value of agricultural crops produced by farmer h in year t; 𝛽𝑗
′s are 
parameters to be estimated(the marginal productivity of labor category j), Xj (h,t) is the total quantity 
of labor input used and/or contributed by members (youth, mature and children disaggregated by 
gender) in household h in year t; Kht is the value of other variable input11 used by in household h in 
year t; Fht is set of fixed inputs used by household h in year t; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of household and youth 
observable characteristics in year t and 𝜇(ℎ, 𝑘) is household fixed effect that captures the time invariant 
household-specific heterogeneity that can arise from the omission of some key variables such as 
household managerial or soil characteristics;; 𝜏(𝑡, 𝑘) is a year effect common to all households such as 
rainfall and the last term 𝜀(ℎ,𝑡) is a random disturbance term. All variables measured in monetary terms 
such as output, seed and other inputs are deflated to 2011 prices. I use both the fixed effects and random 
effects specification for comparison. District-level fixed effects are applied to all estimations in order 
to account for the factors of this nature that are invariant within districts and that could bear influence 
on gendered productivity levels. Standard errors are clustered at household level in order to account for 
correlation individuals situated in the same household.  
Second, based on the coefficients estimated from equation (22), the shadow wage rates for male and 
female youth members’ labor days in household h in year t are derived using the following expressions: 
?̂?𝑚𝑦
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) =
?̂?(ℎ,,𝑡)
𝑀𝑌𝐿(ℎ,𝑡)
𝛽𝑀𝑌?̂?          and                                (2.23) 
 
?̂?𝑓𝑦
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) =
?̂?(ℎ,𝑡)
𝐹𝑌𝐿(ℎ,𝑡)
𝛽𝐹𝑌?̂?                                              (2.24) 
Where  ?̂?𝑚𝑦
∗  & ?̂?𝑚𝑦
∗  are shadow wages for male and female youth members, respectively; ?̂?(ℎ,𝑘,𝑡) 
denotes the fitted value of output for household h in year t; MYL is total working days of family labor 
contributed by male youth members in year t; FYL total working days of family labor contributed by 
female youth members in year t;  ?̂?𝑚𝑦
∗  &  ?̂?𝑓𝑦
∗  are shadow wages for male and female youth members 
derived from the estimated coefficients of 𝛽?̂? referred in equation (2.22) above (it refers to the marginal 
productivity of labor); subscripts my and fy denote male and female youth members in household h in 
year t, respectively .  
Similarly, the shadow wage rates for male and female mature members’ labor days in the household h 
in year t are derived as follows:  
 
                                                                
11 In general inputs include fixed inputs such as land and variable inputs such as labor disaggregated by age category and 
gender, fertilizer, improved seeds, local seeds, irrigation, extension services and oxen draught.  
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?̂?𝑚𝑚
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) =
?̂?(ℎ,𝑡)
𝐴𝑀𝐿(ℎ𝑡)
𝛽𝐴𝑀?̂?              and                                                                    (2.25) 
 
?̂?𝑓𝑚
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) =
?̂?(ℎ,𝑡)
𝐴𝐹𝐿(ℎ,𝑡)
𝛽𝐴𝐹?̂?                                                                                         (2.26) 
 
Where mm and fm denotes male and female mature members in the household h, respectively; AML is 
the total labor for male mature members’ (excluding male youth labor) and AFL is total labor for female 
mature members’ (excluding female youth labor); the rest as defined earlier. 
Once I estimate the shadow wages, the next step is the estimation of shadow income 𝐼(ℎ, 𝑡) of the 
household, h to which the youth belong. This can be derived from the expression: 
 
𝐼(ℎ, 𝑡) = ?̂?(ℎ,,𝑡) − ?̂?𝑚𝑦
∗ (ℎ, , 𝑡) ∗ 𝑀𝑌𝐿(ℎ, 𝑡) − ?̂?𝑓𝑦
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) ∗ 𝐹𝑌𝐿(ℎ, 𝑡) − ?̂?𝑚𝑚
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝐿(ℎ, 𝑡) − ?̂?𝑓𝑚
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) ∗
𝑀𝐹𝐿(ℎ, 𝑡) − 𝑊𝑚𝑦(ℎ, 𝑡) ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝑌𝐿(ℎ, 𝑡) −𝑊𝑓𝑦(ℎ, 𝑡) ∗ 𝐻𝐹𝑌𝐿(ℎ, 𝑡) − 𝑊𝑚𝑚(ℎ, 𝑡) ∗ 𝐻𝐴𝑀𝐿(ℎ, 𝑡) −𝑊𝑓𝑚(ℎ, 𝑡) ∗
𝐻𝐹𝑌𝐿(ℎ, 𝑡) − 𝑊𝑜𝑥(ℎ, 𝑡) ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝐸𝑁(ℎ, 𝑡) − 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑉𝐴𝐿(ℎ, 𝑡) − 𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑃(ℎ𝑡) + Πp(h, t) + V(h, t)          (2.27) 
 
Where 𝑊𝑚𝑦, 𝑊𝑚𝑚,𝑊𝑓𝑦,𝑊𝑓𝑚, 𝑊𝑜𝑥 are the village level average wage rates for male youth, male mature, 
female youth, and female mature and oxen labor services, for household h, in time t, respectively. 
Πp(h, t) is the sum of net returns from the sale of livestock products, livestock sales and off-farm 
income, and V(h, t) is income from land rent, oxen rent, handicrafts, business (trade), and transfers 
received by household h in year t. 
The third stage of estimation12 is the estimation of male and female youth members’ labor supply, i.e. 
total working (labor days) in AELD used on-farm and off-farm are regressed on the shadow wage rates 
and shadow income. In other words, the shadow wages and shadow income in step two are inserted into 
labor supply for estimation. I aggregated working days spent on each plot for crop production 
[agricultural activities] for the respective male youth, female youth, male mature, female mature and 
children of farm household-to-household level. Since my focus is on the trend and analysis of factors 
affecting youth labor supply, these aggregations may not necessarily affect the core objective of our 
analysis. I matched these working days (aggregated per sex and per age group per household) with 
shadow wages and income estimated in the second stage of the analysis together with youth and 
household head demographic, asset information and other variables. Excluding some observations for 
which some data is missing, I end up with a total of 1015 observations on male youth members, and 
1011 observations on female youth’s members for the estimation at the household level.  
                                                                
12 Though my interest is the participation of youth in agriculture, I excluded labor allocated to animal 
production, domestic and non-farm labor allocations from the sample in labor supply estimation because of 
absence of data. Hence, my data is limited to crop production   
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In computing our measure of youth labor supply in agriculture, I generally categorized time spent into 
on-farm, off-farm, and total (which is the sum of both on-farm and off-farm labor supply). In 2010/11 
agricultural season, it was reported that 23% of households have experienced participation in off-farm 
wage employment either through the head, spouse or youth members, and this figure has increased to 
28% in 2014/15 agricultural season. In terms of the off-farm participation of male youth members, 8% 
and 10% of them have engaged in off-farm employment in 2010/11 and 2014/15 agricultural seasons, 
respectively. In 2010/11 and 2014/15 agricultural seasons, off-farm participation for female youth 
members of farm household were 16% and 17%, respectively. 
The empirical representations of equation (2.19) for male and female youth members of farm household 
h in year t are specified in log-linear form as follows13: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑚𝑦
∗ (ℎ𝑡) = 𝛾𝑚𝑦0 +  𝛾𝑚𝑦𝑙𝑛?̂?𝑚𝑦
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) + 𝛾𝑚𝑓𝑦𝑙𝑛?̂?𝑓𝑦
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) + 𝛾𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑛?̂?𝑚𝑚
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) + 𝛾𝑚𝑓𝑚𝑙𝑛?̂?𝑓𝑚
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) +
 𝛾𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑙𝑛I ̂(h, t) + 𝛿𝑚𝑦 T + 𝛾𝑚𝑦𝑥𝑍( ℎ, 𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖+𝜇𝑖𝑡+ 𝜖𝑚𝑦(ℎ, 𝑡)                          (2.28) 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑓𝑦
∗ (ℎ𝑡) = 𝛾𝑓𝑦0 +  𝛾𝑓𝑦𝑙𝑛?̂?𝑓𝑦
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) + 𝛾𝑓𝑚𝑦𝑙𝑛?̂?𝑚𝑦
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) + 𝛾𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑛?̂?𝑚𝑚
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) + 𝛾𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑙𝑛?̂?𝑓𝑚
∗ (ℎ, 𝑡) +
𝛾𝑓𝑦𝐼𝑙𝑛I ̂(h, t) + 𝛿𝑓𝑦 T + 𝛾𝑓𝑦𝑥𝑍(𝑗, ℎ, 𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖+𝜇𝑖𝑡 + +𝜖𝑓𝑦( ℎ, 𝑡)                               (2.29) 
 
where the 𝛾′𝑠  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿 are parameters to be estimated, 𝐷∗ (ℎ𝑡),  ?̂?𝑚𝑦
∗  (h,t), ?̂?𝑓𝑦
∗  (h,t), ?̂?𝑚𝑚
∗  (h,t), ?̂?𝑚𝑓
∗  
(h,t) and I ̂(h, t) are as described above, 𝑍(ℎ, 𝑡) denotes a vector of youth/individual and household 
specific observable characteristics in household h in year t presented in Table 6; 𝜇𝑖 is the standard time 
invariant unobserved characteristics, (𝜇𝑖𝑡)  is unobserved time variant and 𝜖𝑖( ℎ, 𝑡) is error term 
representing unobservable factors. The coefficient (𝛿𝑖) of year dummy (T) is one of our interests as it 
indicates trend. For individual estimation, the outcome variables in the labor supply model are the 
average working days per the respective gender for the different labor categories.  
The coefficients of the shadow wage provide estimates of own wage elasticities and cross-wage 
elasticities, whereas the coefficients of the shadow income provide the estimates of income elasticities 
for the respective gender category. Since, the shadow wage and shadow income depend on on-farm 
labor (Fi) which is part of the labor supply (Di) they will be, therefore, endogenous. As Murtazashvili 
and Wooldridge (2008) suggested, when endogenous explanatory variables are continuous and when I 
have endogeneity that arises from both time-invariant unobservable characteristics (𝜇𝑖) and time variant 
unobservables (𝜇𝑖𝑡), the better way to estimate the parameters is to use the fixed effects instrumental 
variables (FE-IV) estimators. This sweep away individual specific time trends and enables us to control 
for the simultaneity between labor supply, and shadow wages and income. The relevant variables I used 
as instruments in shadow wage and income are discussed in the results section. To control for within 
                                                                
13 If the shadow income is negative, a value of 1 is assigned so that the observations will not be lost after talking 
logs. In doing so, 146 observations out of 1051 observations on I were negative.  
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correlation, I use cluster-robust covariance. Table 2.7 summarizes the statistics of the variables used in 
the estimation of the labor supply functions. In the next sections, I present the results of the regression 
models described earlier.   
Table 2.7.Definition and descriptive variables used in the estimation of labor supply 
 
Variable name  
 
Description of key variables used in labor supply models 
2010/11 2014/15 
Mean  Standard 
deviation  
Mean  Standard 
deviation  
Î Shadow income estimated for the household 4,708 5,743 6,760 8,872 
𝑊𝑚𝑦  Shadow wage estimated for male youth members 8.268 8.761 21.61 40.67 
 𝑊𝑓𝑦 Shadow wage estimated for female youth members  20.764 25.14 40.804 24.32 
𝑊𝑚𝑚 Shadow wage estimated for male mature members  7.134 6.556 24.86 25.91 
𝑊𝑓𝑚 Shadow wage estimated for female mature members  26.38 31.86 34.00 33.54 
Wm Market wage earned by male youth  16.82 4.041 39.27 12.73 
Wf Market wage earned by female youth  14.09 3.085 20.95 16.36 
ToT_On Total on-farm family labor days(AELD) 114.38 101.26 106.96 102.5 
off_MYL_ha Total off-farm male youth labor days(AELD) 6.73 54.12 10.70 101.38 
off_MFL_ha Total off-farm female youth labor days(AELD) 6.42 43.44 7.01 51.23 
ToT_Off Total off-farm labor days (in AELD) 11.17 36.51  28.37 
ToT_Lss Total supply of household labor (in AELD) 130.5 99.04 119.6 125.8 
MYL Total male youth members labor contribution (AELD, on-
farm) 
57.10 58.57 52.38 84.78 
FYL Total female youth members labor contribution 
(AELD,on-farm) 
20.69 31.17 16.71 27.77 
MML Total male mature members labor days (in AELD, on-
farm) 
30.58 43.35 23.40 39.45 
MFL Total female mature labor days (in AELD, on-farm) 10.55 16.39 17.04 25.68 
CHL Child labor (in AELD, on-farm) 5.759 14.05 5.249 11.21 
THL Total hired labor days (in AELD) 6.130 21.02 14.43 78.91 
Farm_Dist Farm distance from the household home(in minutes) 0.207 0.295 0.198 0.283 
Childern_tot # of children under 14 years 1.427 1.122 1.362 1.159 
Student_m # of male student youth 13-34 years 0.733 0.942 0.703 0.925 
Student_f # of female student youth 13-34 years 0.702 0.932 0.717 0.922 
Full_timeyou_m # of full-time male youth 13-34 years 0.722 0.701 0.730 0.716 
Full_timeyou_f # of full-time female youth 13-34 years 0.310 0.548 0.262 0.482 
TLU Number of livestock owned in TLU 8.204 8.530 8.523 8.733 
Educ_male Average education of male youth (years) 2.844 2.976 2.895 3.061 
Age_male Average age of male youth members (years) 17.60 9.893 17.99 10.01 
Educ_female Average education of female youth members (years) 2.558 3.279 2.365 3.008 
Age_female Average age of female youth members (years) 18.12 9.403 19.16 9.026 
Headtype  Head type(1=youth headed, 0 otherwise) 0.34  0.39  
Land_quality Land quality (1=Teuf, 2-lem-teuf, 3-lem) 2.441 0.673 2.347 0.733 
Durables Total durable and consumable asset values(in 2011 ETB) 5,385 38,571 7,577 66,499 
Sex_head  Sex of household head (1=female, 0 otherwise) 0.28  0.30  
Educ_head Education of the household head(years) 1.640 2.66 1.94 2.9 
Marit_head Marital status of the household head(1=married, 0 
otherwise) 
0.72 0.44 0.71 0.45 
Assetprod Value of assets for agricultural production (in 2011 prices) 5,363 3849 7518 5420 
Youth_male # of male youth in the household 13-34 years 1.22  1.15  
Youth_female # of male youth in the household 13-34 years 1.17  1.08  
Mature_male # of male mature in the household >35 years 1.0  0.86  
Mature_fem # of female mature in the household >35 years 0.70  0.54  
 Number of observations(households)  511  506  
Source: Survey results   
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2.6. Results and discussions  
Table 2.8 presents the OLS, random-effects (RE) and fixed-effects (FE) estimates of the coefficients of 
the production technology specified in equation (22). The Hausman test of the random versus fixed-
effects specification fails to reject the random-effects specification at the 5% significance level. 
However, I use also fixed-effects for comparison as it controls for the correlation of the unobservable 
farmer-specific effects with the observed inputs. The use of random effects estimates indicate that use 
of family labors such as male youth, female youth, male matures, female matures and child labor have 
larger significant effects on output than the use of hired labors. In addition, the results of both FE and 
RE estimates indicate that the use of family male youth members seem to have a bigger effect on output 
compared to family female youth members, though care should be taken in interpreting the results as I 
pooled the resources of the household in estimating the labor productivities of family members. I also 
note that the use of family female mature members has higher effects on output compared to other 
family members. Furthermore, the RE estimates show that child labor has a positive and significant 
effect on output, suggesting the economic contribution of child labor in the production of crops.  
There are mainly three issues in investigating labor supply- the need to control for sample selection 
bias, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogeneity of shadow wages and shadow income. Selection 
process driving the decision to work, and where to work is only observable for the youth who are only 
present in the off-farm employment. Use of OLS under such condition results in biased estimates. Our 
panel data make it possible to correct for selection bias and as well as unobservable heterogeneity. 
Nijman and Verbeek (1992) propose simple tests for sample selection in the presence of panel data: to 
include variables measuring whether the individual is observed in the previous period (P1), the 
individual is observed in both period (P2) and a total number of periods the individual is observed (P3). 
The null hypothesis is that P1, P2, P3 should not be significant in our model if there is selection problem. 
Accordingly, the results rejected the null for the off-farm labor equations for both male and female 
youth labor. The Hausman type test also fails to reject the null for on-farm models for both groups while 
it rejected the null hypothesis of no selection problem for the off-farm models. Following Kyriazidou 
(1997) method, I estimated the selection equation to get consistent estimates. 
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Table 2.8: Cobb-Douglass agricultural production function: OLS, FE and RE estimates  
Dependent variable: Log(total value of output) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables  OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Sex_head -0.168* - -0.1518* 
 (0.0925) - 0.0935 
Age_head 0.0215* 0.0254 0.0234** 
 (0.0120) (0.0200) (0.0116) 
Age_head (squared) -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0002* 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Educ_head 0.0018 -0.0088 0.0016 
 (0.0130) (0.0352) (0.0120) 
Marit_head 0.0671 - (0.0352) 
 (0.0707) - 0.0316 
Log(MYL) 0.0590*** 0.0463* 0.0579*** 
 (0.0224) (0.0214) (0.0224) 
Log(FYL) 0.00786 0.0234 0.00740 
 (0.0370) (0.0482)** (0.0383)* 
Log(MML) 0.0333 0.0284 0.0214* 
 (0.0285) (0.0325) (0.0302) 
Log(MFL) 0.0693** 0.0661** 0.0653** 
 (0.0271) (0.0306) (0.0260) 
Log(CHL) 0.0441 0.0382 0.0492* 
 (0.0271) (0.108) (0.0281) 
Log(HL) 0.0256 0.0119 0.0239 
 (0.0242) (0.0314) (0.0241) 
Log(OXEN) 0.254*** 0.173** 0.254*** 
 (0.0456) (0.0734) (0.0459) 
Mechanization  0.0937*** 
(0.0302) 
0.0883*** 
(0.0270) 
0.0883*** 
(0.0270) 
Log(land) 0.446*** 0.347*** 0.432*** 
 (0.0736) (0.0740) (0.0698) 
Log(FERRVAL) 0.0356*** -0.0286 0.0335*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0303) (0.0110) 
Log(SEEDVAL)  -0.0034 -0.146 -0.0032 
 (0.0115) (0.732) (0.0116) 
Log(WEEDVAL) -0.0745*** -0.0591 -0.0762*** 
 (0.0180) (0.757) (0.0182) 
Educ_male  -0.0057 -0.0131 -0.0058 
 (0.0126) (0.0221) (0.0129) 
Age_male  0.0045 0.0041 0.0050 
 (0.0045) (0.0075) (0.0048) 
Educ_female -0.00342 -0.0030 -0.0038 
 (0.0098) (0.0161) (0.0097) 
Age_female -0.0028 -0.0104* -0.0035 
 (0.0032) (0.0055) (0.0032) 
Much_RAIN  -0.209*** -0.0770 -0.1812** 
Constant 6.517*** 8.106 6.523*** 
 (0.342) (6.300) (0.340) 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 
Household FE - YES YES 
Year FE Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.46 0.20 0.46 
Fixed vs Random Hausman  Probn>chi2                    =      0.2378 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Survey results  
Note: other regressors used in the model includes woreda dummies, shock dummies such as input prices, output prices, 
pests, livestock diseases, household production shifters which include total number of children in the household, total 
number of male and female youth members and total number of mature male and female members, farm tools 
(mechanization), land certificate, plot characteristics-slope, soil quality, farm distance from residence place. Given the 
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presence of zero values in some inputs, the logarithmic transformation was carried out by adding one to all input levels (i.e., 
InXi = ln (Xi+1))14. This is a common practice in literature to keep the estimation manageable and under such condition the 
use of CD production function is plausible (McCurdy and Pencavel, 1986; Jacoby, 1993); hence the labor supply estimates 
will be robust to the choice of constant. For example, some households have only male or female youth labor; labor is hired 
by about 30 percent of the households, and about 35 and 40 percent of the households do not use any chemical fertilizer 
and improved seed, respectively. Fifty-nine percent of households report zero labor inputs for child labor.  
 
To control for individual heterogeneity, sample selection, and instrumenting for possible endogeneity 
of shadow wages and shadow income, I estimated the labor supply functions in equations 28 and 29 
using the fixed effects and fixed effects instrumental variables (FE-IV) methods. FE-IV involves two-
stage regressions. First, shadow wage rates and shadow income for the different gender and age groups 
are regressed on the complete set of instruments presented below. Using the predicted values from these 
first stage regressions as regressors, I estimated the labor supply functions by using fixed effects. I also 
estimated the models using OLS but not reported here. In this estimation, as discussed earlier, I assume 
that all youth farm labors are of equal quality within the same sex and the same age category but 
different between sexes and age categories.  
Based on the random-effects estimates in column (3) of Table 2.8 used to derive the shadow wage rates 
of male and female youth members’ (using the expressions in equations (2.25) to (2.27)), the effect of 
shadow wages and shadow income on the different types of youth labor supply is presented in Table 
2.9. Most of our discussion will concentrate on the estimated effects of shadow wages and incomes 
(mainly the results of FE estimates) on the labor supply of youth members. The first column, third, fifth, 
seventh, ninth and eleventh reports the FE estimates of male and female youth members on-farm and 
off-farm labor supply, while the results from the IV counterpart of this model (FE-IV) is given in 
column two, column four, column six, column eight, column ten and column twelve.   
 
                                                                
14 As to other inputs, such as fertilizer, the baseline study show that mature headed and male headed households 
applied more fertilizer compared to youth and female headed households (up to 10% more fertilizer). Though 
the utilization of improved seeds is low among households (about 40%), the application rate of improved seeds 
among users was significantly large (about 17.5 kg/ha). Slightly households with mature heads applied more 
improved seeds. As to irrigation and soil conservation measures, male heads and mature households used 
irrigation and soil conservation measures more than their counterparts. Interestingly, young heads were visited 
more by an extension agent than mature household heads. 
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Table 2.9: Determinants of on-farm and off-farm male and female youth members’ labor supply (FE and FE-IV estimation result): at household level 
(Dependent variable: Log (total working days of male or female members’) 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
On-farm  Off-farm  Total  
Male FE Male  
FE-IV 
Female  
FE 
Female 
 FE-IV 
Male FE Male 
 FE-IV 
Female  
FE 
Female  
FE-IV 
Male  
FE 
Male  
FE-IV 
Female  
FE 
Female 
 FE-IV 
ln (𝑊𝑚𝑦 )̂ 0.399*** 
(0.0666) 
1.639*** 
(0.0740) 
-0.0850* 
(0.0451) 
0.0737 
(0.0634) 
0.105** 
(0.0469) 
0.147** 
(0.0703) 
-0.0266 
(0.0427) 
-0.0760 
(0.0835) 
0.404*** 
(0.0669) 
1.575*** 
(0.0784) 
-0.122*** 
(0.0450) 
-0.0295 
(0.0699) 
ln (𝑊𝑓𝑦 )̂  -0.208*** 
(0.0564) 
0.133 
(0.109) 
-0.293*** 
(0.0595) 
1.535*** 
(0.105) 
0.0178 
(0.0487) 
-0.00685 
(0.133) 
0.0503 
(0.0477) 
0.237** 
(0.107) 
-0.211*** 
(0.0566) 
0.0573 
(0.111) 
-0.264*** 
(0.0585) 
1.162*** 
(0.110) 
ln (𝑊𝑚𝑚)̂  -0.227*** -0.921*** -0.0195 -0.714*** 0.0283 -0.0184 0.0341 -0.118 -0.208*** -0.840*** 0.0188 -0.502*** 
 (0.0519) (0.158) (0.0453) (0.154) (0.0452) (0.166) (0.0413) (0.143) (0.0515) (0.159) (0.0461) (0.165) 
ln (𝑊𝑓𝑚)̂ 0.133*** 0.927*** 0.0310 0.527** 0.0273 -0.190 0.0366 -0.144 0.130*** 0.836*** 0.0269 0.450* 
 (0.0422) (0.236) (0.0400) (0.227) (0.0399) (0.265) (0.0424) (0.216) (0.0429) (0.248) (0.0430) (0.239) 
ln (𝑊𝑐ℎ)̂ -0.0925* -0.136 -0.0170 0.149 -0.0674 -0.273* -0.00835 -0.0394 -0.110* -0.165 -0.00525 0.00749 
 (0.0550) (0.111) (0.0591) (0.109) (0.0634) (0.144) (0.0565) (0.135) (0.0568) (0.121) (0.0567) (0.122) 
ln (𝐼)̂ -0.0436 -0.129 -0.0158 -0.0915 0.0198 0.132 0.0639** 0.256** -0.0415 -0.0828 0.00165 0.0656 
 (0.0294) (0.0896) (0.0220) (0.0980) (0.0267) (0.125) (0.0265) (0.125) (0.0306) (0.0956) (0.0222) (0.105) 
Trend  -0.0676 -0.226* 0.0175 -0.0579 0.0283 0.160 -0.104 0.101 -0.0310 -0.175 -0.0761 -0.175 
 (0.127) (0.117) (0.120) (0.127) (0.117) (0.153) (0.104) (0.144) (0.126) (0.129) (0.119) (0.137) 
Educ_male 0.0375 0.0339 0.0553 0.0983 -0.0913 -0.101 -0.0503 -0.0600 -0.0206 -0.0258 -0.0351 -0.00406 
 (0.0864) (0.0595) (0.0739) (0.0598) (0.0697) (0.0693) (0.0666) (0.0679) (0.0877) (0.0658) (0.0743) (0.0672) 
(Edu_male)2 -0.0003 -0.0032 -0.0089 -0.0129** 0.0080 0.0082 0.0029 0.0035 0.0041 0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0040 
 -0.0090 -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.0054 -0.0076 -0.0079 -0.0054 -0.0062 -0.0095 -0.0075 -0.0062 -0.0061 
Age_male -0.0019 -0.0085 0.0202 -0.0129 0.0281 0.0384* -0.0074 -0.0049 0.0116 0.0073 0.0230 -0.0037 
 -0.0291 -0.0198 -0.0241 -0.0210 -0.0218 -0.0217 -0.0240 -0.0247 -0.0296 -0.0205 -0.0239 -0.0225 
(Age_male)2 0.0006 0.0005 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 0.0004 
 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 
Educ_female -0.1280 -0.0332 -0.129** -0.172*** -0.0678 -0.0649 -0.0727 -0.0830 -0.141* -0.0503 -0.141** -0.189*** 
 -0.0794 -0.0555 -0.0646 -0.0499 -0.0506 -0.0495 -0.0530 -0.0553 -0.0797 -0.0565 -0.0607 -0.0535 
(Edu_femal)2 0.0039 -0.0004 0.0057 0.0188*** 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0033 0.0047 0.0006 0.00621* 0.0194*** 
 -0.0066 -0.0042 -0.0039 -0.0032 -0.0036 -0.0034 -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0066 -0.0043 -0.0037 -0.0034 
Age_female 0.077*** 0.0187 0.0547 0.0386* 0.0327 0.0239 0.0560** 0.0514** 0.0836*** 0.0273 0.0522* 0.0440** 
 -0.0271 -0.0192 -0.0333 -0.0201 -0.0229 -0.0216 -0.0236 -0.0238 -0.0255 -0.0194 -0.0307 -0.0221 
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Table 2.9 continued 
 
 
Variables  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
On-farm  Off-farm Total  
Male FE Male  
FE-IV 
Female FE Female 
 FE-IV 
Male FE Male 
 FE-IV 
Female FE Female  
FE-IV 
Male FE Male  
FE-IV 
Female FE Female 
 FE-IV 
(Age_female)2 -0.0024*** -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.00121* -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.00127* -0.0011 -0.003*** -0.0010* -0.0012 -0.0013* 
 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0007 
Childern_tot -0.0051 -0.0304 0.0840 0.0588 -0.0700 -0.0735 -0.0290 -0.0277 -0.0014 -0.0212 0.1120 0.0989 
 -0.0772 -0.0545 -0.0657 -0.0578 -0.0607 -0.0621 -0.0546 -0.0547 -0.0786 -0.0564 -0.0683 -0.0658 
Student_m 0.1220 0.0442 0.0716 0.0302 0.130** 0.125** 0.108* 0.118** 0.1100 0.0334 0.1100 0.0726 
 -0.0984 -0.0695 -0.0787 -0.0645 -0.0611 -0.0608 -0.0598 -0.0598 -0.0935 -0.0702 -0.0765 -0.0696 
Student_f -0.0515 -0.112* -0.0583 -0.0906 -0.0568 -0.0652 -0.0368 -0.0441 -0.0523 -0.111* -0.1250 -0.156** 
 -0.1050 -0.0658 -0.0817 -0.0647 -0.0664 -0.0673 -0.0660 -0.0653 -0.1050 -0.0659 -0.0814 -0.0702 
Full_timeyou_m 0.0605 0.0761 0.0786 0.154** 0.1020 0.0946 0.0779 0.0867 0.0461 0.0605 0.0838 0.156* 
 -0.1080 -0.0788 -0.0924 -0.0785 -0.0973 -0.0997 -0.0813 -0.0793 -0.1100 -0.0845 -0.0907 -0.0831 
Full_timeyou_f 0.0478 -0.0301 0.1020 0.0607 -0.0280 -0.0064 -0.0324 -0.0354 0.0850 0.0152 0.0956 0.0668 
 -0.1260 -0.0848 -0.0926 -0.1060 -0.0919 -0.0949 -0.0984 -0.0985 -0.1220 -0.0884 -0.0992 -0.1110 
Mature_male -0.576*** -0.407*** -0.0107 0.00677 -0.0943 -0.0352 -0.0197 -0.00731 -0.592*** -0.424*** -0.0361 -0.0292 
 (0.106) (0.0732) (0.0845) (0.0838) (0.0827) (0.0825) (0.0751) (0.0747) (0.104) (0.0745) (0.0866) (0.0883) 
Mature_fem -0.0340 0.0364 -0.478*** -0.278*** -0.0322 -0.0276 -0.163** -0.109 0.00347 0.0645 -0.399*** -0.248*** 
 (0.109) (0.0756) (0.0931) (0.0727) (0.0816) (0.0749) (0.0760) (0.0727) (0.110) (0.0785) (0.0989) (0.0826) 
Age_head 0.00421 0.0129 -0.0508* -0.0324 -0.00991 -0.00630 -0.0332 -0.0226 0.0111 0.0193 -0.0476 -0.0305 
 (0.0354) (0.0208) (0.0307) (0.0235) (0.0218) (0.0223) (0.0236) (0.0233) (0.0347) (0.0214) (0.0313) (0.0290) 
Educhead 0.0143 0.0171 0.0990** 0.0459 -0.081** -0.0907** -0.098*** -0.116*** -0.0003 0.00489 0.0509 0.00846 
 (0.0525) (0.0358) (0.0428) (0.0498) (0.0348) (0.0362) (0.0355) (0.0374) (0.0498) (0.0359) (0.0417) (0.0473) 
Constant 3.020*** 0.651 3.378*** 1.121 0.669 0.595 1.322 0.0693 2.930*** 0.555 4.177*** 1.508 
 (0.996) (0.921) (0.921) (1.146) (0.773) (1.409) (0.803) (1.313) (1.003) (1.020) (0.920) (1.228) 
Observations 1,015 1,011 1,015 1,011 1,015 1,011 1,015 1,011 1,015 1,011 1,015 1,011 
R-squared 0.267 0.643 0.198 0.389 0.168 0.169 0.184 0.188 0.273 0.606 0.185 0.277 
          Source: survey results           Robust standard errors in parentheses        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: other additional regressors used in the model include sex of household head, woreda dummies, livestock diseases, farm tools, land certificate.
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After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (FE estimates in column 1, column 5 and column 9), I 
find positive and significant shadow wage elasticities (0.40, 0.11 and 0.40 for on-farm, off-farm and 
total labor supply of male youth members, respectively); suggesting an upward sloping youth male 
labor supply. The magnitude of the estimates (own shadow wage elasticity and shadow income) for 
male youth members in this study are similar to the previous empirical findings of Skoufias (1994), 
Jacoby (1993) and Kien (2009), though on-farm wage elasticity is a bit higher in this study. An 
important notable difference observed by comparing the coefficients for male youth members working 
on-farm with that of male youth members participating in the labor market is the effect of shadow wages 
on both types of labor supply. The effect of shadow wage is higher in an on-farm labor supply compared 
to off-farm (0.40 vs 0.11). This suggests that family members have stronger work incentives of working 
on-farm compared to off-farm work.  
The negative effect of female youth members shadow wage on male youth members labor supply 
suggests that male and female youth labors are gross substitutes. The significance of this cross-wage 
effect is “consistent with family utility maximization and it suggests that studies that strict such cross-
wage effects to be zero may yield estimates that are subject to specification error” (Skoufias, 1994: 
224). However, the positive effect of female mature members shadow wage on male youth members 
labor supply indicates gross complementarity (or less substitutability) between the two labor categories. 
The less substitutability of labor between male youth members and mature female members, given the 
agricultural production system in Ethiopia, is as expected. Men mainly do activities such as planting, 
ploughing, harvesting and threshing of some crops [such as teff, wheat, barley, and pulses].    
The coefficients on year dummies describe how average time spent in agricultural activities has changed 
over time for the different groups, controlling for changes in key demographics; trend indicator. Using 
the 2010/11 main agricultural production season as a base year, male youth members’ on-farm labor 
supply is decreasing whereas the off-farm labor supply is increasing. There is a decreasing trend in total 
labor supply since the on-farm labor supply decrease is greater than the off-farm labor increment. 
However, none of them are statistically significant, an indicator that youth are not disengaging in 
agriculture, rather working less number of days on family or own farm and working more hours on 
others farm for a wage (to some extent changing farm work locations for migrant youth) as revealed in 
off-farm increment. The conclusion of the main result remain unchanged after controlling for some 
variables such as part-time workers, the age of youngest or oldest son-there is no significant reduction 
in the labor supply of male youth members.  
The effect of male member’s education, age and their squares, which is an indicator of experience and 
life cycle effects on labor supply is insignificant, interestingly education has a positive effect, though. 
Education could affect labor supply indirectly through its effect on marginal productivity and 
profitability in farm production. The effect of age of female youth members on on-farm male youth 
labor supply is positive and significant. As a female youth in the household get older, the labor supply 
of male youth members increases. This is mainly because of the fact that at an early age there is 
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substitutability while at the later ages the two labor categories play some complementarity. In addition, 
as female members get older, they leave the household because of marriage. This, in turn, creates labor 
shortage in the household. To fill that gap, the household increases the allocation of male youth 
members’ labor. As to the family composition variables, the number of male mature household 
members is the only significant variables affecting labor supply of youth male members. Off-farm labor 
supply of male youth members increases with a number of male student members in the household. On 
the other hand, on-farm labor supply of youth male members’ decreases significantly with the number 
of mature labors in the household since the two labor types are substitutes.  
The effect of female shadow wages on youth female members labor supply is negative and strongly 
significant at 1% level, suggesting that female youth agricultural labor supply is backward bending. The 
effect of shadow income on female youth labor supply is partly realized through the reallocation of 
labor from on-farm to other activities such as schooling and domestic work. This is reflected in 
backward sloping labor supply and a recent increasing trend in school participation of female youth, 
which is also consistent with the marginal role female youth play in agricultural production. This effect 
is more pronounced via the effect of female youth members’ education on total labor supply. As the 
sign of wage elasticities is theoretically unpredictable, this result is not unusual considering the 
agricultural production system of farm households in rural Ethiopia. It should be noted, however, that 
the estimated marginal productivity for female youth members could be a biased estimate of the shadow 
value of time of female youth members that work mainly on domestic activities and not in crop 
production (26 % of households reported zero working days of female youth members in either in an 
on-farm or off-farm). Since I pooled a household resource in the estimation of male and female youth 
members labor supply, it also may bias the estimates. Furthermore, measurement errors would be an 
avoidable that may influence the magnitude and direction of the estimate. The positive effect of female 
shadow wages on female youth labor supply, after instrumenting shadow wages, suggests this line of 
thinking. Female youth members’ on-farm and off-farm labor supply are decreasing over time though 
none of them is statistically significant, an indicator also that cast doubt on the presumption that youth 
are exiting agriculture. An important difference observed is the effect of shadow income on on-farm 
and off-farm female labor supply: an increase in shadow income induces a decrease in on-farm female 
labor supply whereas it induces an increase in off-farm female labor supply.  
 Similar to the findings of Skoufias (1994) female youth members’ labor supply appears to exhibit the 
usual concave pattern in age with adult female members working less. The family composition variables 
that appear to have a significant effect on female youth members labor supply (off-farm) include a 
number of male youth students and number of mature female members. Off-farm female youth labor 
supply increases with the total number of male youth students in the household. The labor supply of 
female youth members’ (on-farm and off-farm) decreases with a total number of female mature 
members’. Unlike the case for male youth members, the effect of education of the household head on 
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on-farm female youth members labor supply is positive and significant at 5% level whereas the effect 
is negative on off-farm labor supply.  
So far, I have focused on results of the fixed effects estimators without instrumenting the endogeneity 
of key variables of interest such as shadow wages and shadow income. In columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12, 
I present FE-IV estimators of the different labor supply models. As stated earlier, the fixed effects 
estimation enables to remove the time-invariant unobservable characteristics (𝜇𝑖) but not the time 
variant unobservables (𝜇𝑖𝑡) that are potentially correlated with the error term𝜖𝑖( ℎ, 𝑡). The difficult 
exercise here is to find appropriate and good instruments for shadow wages and shadow income. For 
an instrument to be valid, two conditions need to fulfil (Sargan, 1958; Stock et al., 2002). First, the 
instrumental variables should strongly correlate with the endogenous variables, and second, the 
instruments must influence the outcome variables through the endogenous variables (i.e. exogeneity of 
the instruments -the exclusion restriction criteria). Accordingly and in line with the previous studies, 
who have used similar approaches (Tassew, 2000; Awudu and Punya, 2000; Jacoby, 1993), I propose 
to use the following instruments for the shadow wages and shadow income: housing facilities (roof 
type, floor type, and bed type), ownership of mobile phones and radios, jewellery, ownership of cart 
and youth population density. In addition to the above instruments, ownership of stove, sources of 
drinking water during rainy and dry seasons are used in female youth members. Though debatable, 
these variables are assumed to affect shadow wages and shadow income but not number of working 
days. Accordingly, the validity of these instruments is tested.  
Higher youth population density15 causes more available infrastructure per youth worker, which 
enhances labor productivity, facilitate the availability of fertilizer and other inputs (Glover and Simon, 
1975). Ownership of mobile and carts increase labor productivity-they channel the effect of capital 
investment through wages on labor supply. Housing facilities, ownership of stoves, and source of 
drinking water improve health and thereby raise shadow wages (or labor productivity of individuals); 
hence influence number of working days through shadow wages and income. In this respect, these 
variables can be qualified as good instruments that capture variations in shadow wages and shadow 
income. One the other hand, it’s unlikely that these variables directly determine the number of working 
days. The statistical evidence on the exclusion restrictions using the Sargan and Basmann test of 
overidentifying restrictions shows that the identified instruments explain a number of working days 
indirectly only via its correlation with shadow wages and shadow income. The results of the tests for 
the validity of the instruments are presented in Appendix Table B. The first stage regressions in 
appendix Table B show that the coefficients of all instruments are statistically significant in explaining 
the endogenous shadow wages and shadow income largely; except for jewelry. As stated above, the 
                                                                
15Youth population density explains about 12-13 percent of the total variations in the shadow wages of male 
and female but none of them are significant in explaining labor supply. 
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exogeneity of the instruments is tested using the Sargan and Basmann test of overidentifying 
restrictions. There are concerns that radio and stove may be a direct cause of labor supply if these 
variables are other determinants of a number of working days. In this case, these variables may not 
serve as exogenous instruments (Appendix Table A2.2). 
Focusing on the total labor supply FE-IV estimators, I find that the effect of shadow wage elasticities 
is higher and strongly significant in all the models than that reported by the FE estimators. In the male 
youth members’ labor supply model, there are no dramatic changes in the sign of the estimated 
coefficients. However, there are dramatic changes in the size and significance of some of the estimated 
coefficients. For instance, variables such as education of a female, shadow wage for female youth, and 
age of female become insignificant and the only variable that becomes significant is a number of female 
youth students in the household. In the female youth members’ labor supply model, there are not only 
dramatic changes in the sign but also in the magnitude of the coefficients estimated. For instance, the 
negative value of female youth agricultural labor products (or shadow wage) of female youth members 
disappear and turns to positive while its magnitude has increased dramatically (from 0.26 to 1.16). The 
effect of male mature members’ productivity on female youth members’ labor supply becomes 
significant, with a change of sign from positive to negative. Though decreasing trend is observed in 
both male and female members total labor supply in agriculture, none of them are significant. These 
findings suggest again that youth are not disengaging from agriculture. Other explanatory variables in 
the female youth members’ total labor supply model that show an increase in magnitude and 
significance include female mature shadow wage, education of a female, the age of the female, the total 
number of female youth students and the total number of male full-time youth in the household. The 
negative effect of female education on female youth labor supply remains negative and strongly 
significant. In general, all the results indicate that the trends and patterns of youth involvement in 
agriculture vary across gender and farm work locations; so do the values of their agricultural labor 
products. For comparison, the labor supply functions in equations (2.28) and (2.29) were re-estimated 
for the sub-sample at the individual level. The overall similar trend, pattern, and magnitude in the 
estimated coefficients have been observed (results not reported here). 
2.7. Testing for separability: equality of shadow wages and market wages  
In order to test whether the labor market functions efficiently, I examined the relationship between the 
estimated shadow wages (the value of marginal products) and market wages (Jacoby, 1993). Assuming 
that farm households maximize utility, the marginal productivity of work on the family farm should be 
equal to the market wage received by family members working on the off-farm, if separability exists. 
This means that the estimated ?̂? = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∝̂= 0), when there is separability. In this context, 
individual’s allocation of time between farm and market is made purely on efficiency grounds, and 
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there is an efficient labor market. I report the results of the test in Table 2.10, which is obtained from 
the regression of the form: 
𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡
∗ =∝ +β𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                      (2.30) 
Where 𝑊𝑖𝑡
∗is the estimated shadow wage of labor type i = male youth members, female youth members 
in year t (i.e. the estimated marginal product of labor i derived from the production function stated in 
equation (2.22)); 𝑊𝑖𝑡 is the wage received by working in the off-farm labor market in year t and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a 
random term. The observed market wage is instrumented for possible measurement errors using the 
variables age, education, and their squares. As one can see in Table 2.10, the results strongly rejected 
the existence of separability; suggesting that the use of non-separability approach best predicts the 
agricultural labor supply of youth members and likely to produce more reliable policy conclusions.    
 
  Table 2.10: Test for separability 
  
Variables 
Jacoby Test 
(Ho:β=1 & ∝=0) 
Benjamin Test 
 Log (predicted Wm) 2.117*** 2.106*** 
             (0.198) (0.555) 
Constant            -1.757*** -4.584*** 
             (0.616) (1.396) 
Observations           1,220 1,192 
F-test for joint significance:                    0.000  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: survey results 
 
2.8. Conclusions and policy implications  
The dichotomy often exists in the literature of agricultural household members allocation of their labor 
is its inadequacy to distinguish whether market and non-market labor is spent on-farm or off-farm and 
for which household member and age category is the phenomenon refers to (Bezu and Holden, 2014; 
Ahaibw et al., 2013; Agwu et al., 2014). Second and most importantly, if I want to understand the 
behavior of youth career choices, I need to understand how youth labor is allocated within or among 
households that involves both market and non-market economy. In doing so, I investigate the trends, 
patterns and analyze the effect of shadow wages on youth labor supply in agriculture, disaggregated by 
gender using household and youth sample survey data collected during 2010/11 and 2014/15 
agricultural seasons. I find that trends and patterns of youth involvement in agriculture vary across 
gender and farm work locations; so do the values of their agricultural labor products. Whilst the 
participation of youth in on-farm for both sex is declining across time (though insignificant), the 
participation in off-farm is increasing for both. The total agricultural labor supply for both male and 
female youth is decreasing but none of them is significant. The effect of male youth shadow wage on 
male youth members labor supply is positive and significant, suggesting an upward sloping male youth 
labor supply. However, FE estimation results indicate that the effect of female shadow wage on female 
youth labor supply is negative and strongly significant at 1% level, suggesting that female youth labor 
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supply is backward bending. Our results also indicate that the magnitude of shadow wage elasticities 
and shadow income depends on the estimators chosen. The shadow wage elasticities are especially 
higher when instrumenting for shadow wages, a higher result than what is reported in some other 
studies. Furthermore, our results suggest that aggregating heterogeneous labor productivities in the 
computation of shadow wages are likely to mislead policy conclusions. 
Taking into account intensity of youth involvement on the family farm or own farm, off-farm as well 
as their farm work at the destination for youth migrating to other rural and per-urban areas, the results 
challenge the presumption that youth are exiting agriculture, at least in agricultural potential areas of 
Ethiopia. Instead, youth’s labor makes an important economic contribution to the operation of their 
family or own farm. Based on descriptive and econometric results, I conclude that the myths of 
departing youth participation in agriculture over the last decade do not necessarily emanate from the 
trend and evolution of participation in agriculture but also from the methodological drawbacks. For 
instance, the comparison of youth responses regarding their intentions (plan) to work in agriculture and 
the farm level realized time spent by household members (including youth members) between 2010/11 
and 2014/15 agricultural seasons, indicate that realized youth engagement in agriculture and the 
intention to engage in the sector vary greatly. Limitation of data regarding youth labor allocation in 
agricultural production has also contributed to this inconclusive finding in the literature, especially the 
absence of panel data. Thus, analyses that use intensions alone to examine youth labor market outcomes 
would likely produce misleading policy implications.  
Our estimation approach tests the existence of separability-the hypothesis strongly rejected in the 
estimation in favor of a non-separation model. A policy implication of the results suggests that changes 
in economic incentives such as marginal productivities (shadow wages) matter for youth involvement 
in agriculture, but the impact of it induces different outcomes for male and female youth members labor 
supply. In addition, governments need to give proper attention to agricultural development since 
improving agricultural labor productivity both at on-farm and off-farm level would help to provide 
employment for youth that helps to reduce unemployment and underemployment. Moreover, attributes 
related to youth female members such as their education and age, the composition of family structures 
and education of the household head matters for youth participation in agriculture. Furthermore, a 
structural transformation that addresses the imperfections and rigidities in labor and other input markets 
(especially land, fertilizer, seed) as well as poor infrastructure and social impediments that condition 
access to markets and services in rural areas need to be addressed to make agriculture more attractive 
to the youth.  
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3. INTRA-HOUSEHOLD POSITIONAL CONCERNS AND WELL-
BEING OF THE RURAL YOUTH IN ETHIOPIA: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS 
 
Abstract 
Empirical evidence documenting the link between parents’ positional concerns for income and the well-
being of their children is scant. This paper aims to fill this gap. Specifically, I explore how and to what 
extent positional concerns differ within a household (between youth, fathers and mothers) and how they 
are linked to the well-being of youth. In doing so, the study employs survey experimental methods and 
a socio-demographic survey. The survey experimental approach is based on a tailor-made experimental 
design conducted among Ethiopian youth and their parents (fathers and mothers) in rural areas. Our 
analysis suggests that youth display higher positional concerns for income than their parents do. The 
results also differ across gender: female youth are more positional than male youth. Our results also 
suggest that factors motivating positional concerns for income differ across household groups and 
gender categories. Estimation results further show that youth’s own and their fathers’ positional 
concerns are significantly associated with the well-being of youth. Though mothers display a higher 
positional concern, I find no significant association between mothers’ positional concern and the well-
being of youth. The strong significant effect of fathers’ positional concerns on well-being compared to 
mothers’ may have to do with differences in intra-household bargaining power affecting resource 
allocations, social norms and/or preferences. I discuss the implications of these findings. 
 
Keywords: Ethiopia, youth, parents, positional concerns, survey experiment, subjective well-being 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
A relative concern (or positional concerns) is one mechanism through which income or wealth 
inequality is hypothesized to affect components of well-being such as health, happiness, or human 
capital formation (Stark, 1991; Graham, Nikolova, 2015). Adjaye-Gbewonyo and Kawachi (2012: 130) 
stated that ‘’when income inequality rises, this may result in inequalities in access to material goods 
that have become the norm in a society or ability to participate in common social activities such as 
employment or social networks.’’ Townsend first articulated this idea in 1979 (Townsend, 1979). To 
ease the feelings resulting from relative concerns (i.e. lagging behind others), household members, 
especially parents, may redirect allocation and distribution of household resources (material as well as 
non-material) to themselves or members of the family so that the relative standing of family members 
in terms of income or wealth can improve. Empirical evidence shows that a household or its members 
undertake economic decisions not necessarily to increase the household’s income or own absolute 
income but rather to improve the household’s income or own position with respect to others in a specific 
reference group (Stark, 1991). 
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There is a growing empirical literature investigating positionality or relative concerns in the context of 
optimal taxation (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Alpizar et al., 2005; 
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008), labor supply (Park, 2010), saving and investment (Abel, 
1990; 2005) and migration (Stark and Taylor, 1989; Akay et al., 2012b), among others. However, 
empirical evidence documenting the link between positional concerns of parents and well-being (SWB) 
of offspring (in this case youth) in developing countries is scant and the existing findings are 
inconclusive (Anderson, et al., 2014; Carlsson et al., 2007a; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2010; Akay and 
Martinsson, 2011). The existing evidence also suggests that positional concerns in poor societies have 
less effect on the well-being of the poor than absolute concerns (e.g. total income) (Akay et al., 2012a; 
Akay et al., 2014). These studies often build on the assumption that household members have 
homogenous preferences toward positionality (hence have identical utility functions) and the attitudes 
towards such positionality do not vary across age cohorts. However, emerging empirical evidence 
indicates that there is heterogeneity of preferences toward positional concerns among different age 
cohorts. For instance, Pingle and Mitchell (2002) find that those who are younger more likely exhibit 
positional concern for income.  
Concern for positionality implies that individuals or groups compare their (or others) wealth, income 
or consumption level with ‘’relevant others’’ or ‘’reference groups’’. This means that the utility that 
people derive from saying income or goods depends on the absolute amount of income or goods 
consumed and the amount of income or goods consumed relative to the amount of income, goods 
consumed by others (Frank, 1999; Akay and Martinsson, 2011; Pingle and Mitchell, 2002; Stark, 2010). 
Recent empirical work provides evidence that people take actions out of concern for positionality 
(status) (Clark and Oswald, 1998; Pingle and Mitchell, 2002). In other words, people take actions such 
as working longer hours, shifting allocation of resources, migrating to other places or changing 
occupations to improve their relative standing; and to some extent engage in riots or uprisings (this is 
becoming evident with the manifestation of uprisings among young generations in developing 
countries) out of concern for fairness  and altruism.  
The implications of positional concerns on individual welfare has been studied using two approaches: 
survey experiments (Johansson Stenman et al., 2002; Alpizar et al., 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007a; Akay 
et al., 2012a; Akay et al., 2014) and subjective well-being data (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 
2005; Clark et al., 2008). Evidence from the two approaches indicates that while own utility is 
significantly and negatively affected by the income or consumption of others in rich countries, the effect 
of positional concerns (relative concerns) on the utility of individuals in poor countries is mixed. For 
instance, using the subjective well-being approach, Carlsson et al (2007b), Ravallion and Lokshin 
(2010), and Akay and Martinsson (2011) find that relative income does not significantly affect the well-
being of the poor. Akay et al. (2012a; 2014) find a similar conclusion using a survey experiment carried 
out in Northern Ethiopia among mature and poor households. The drawback of the studies includes the 
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following: In all the studies, the sample is biased to mature households and fail to cover different age 
cohorts as well as gender categories within households (addressed household heads only and implicitly 
assume households are homogenous). In addition, these studies assume that reference groups are the 
same across all individuals of different age cohorts. Furthermore, in their regression analyses, the 
authors simply try to capture such heterogeneity using age variable along with other control variables. 
However, empirical evidence indicates that the standard aggregation with a quadratic control for age 
cannot capture the effects of positional concerns; rather it can obscure major differences in the effects 
of relative concerns (FitzRoy, 2011).  
In general, empirical work suggests that increased concerns for relative income or consumption levels 
among individuals would affect sons’ or daughters’ well-being through either ‘’material pathways’’ or 
through ‘’psychological factors’’ (Gordon and Spicker, 1999; Lhila and Simon, 2010; Sweet, 2011). 
Whereas the ‘’material pathways’’ refers to uneven access to material goods and services as a result of 
rising inequality or parents’ allocation of resources to improve the relative standing of family members; 
‘’psychological factors’’ denotes frustration or stress among the relatively deprived. The later also refers 
to parental cares or praises that can affect the mental or physical well-being of the youth (Stafford et 
al., 2016). Positional concerns may also induce a stronger pursuit of status that motivates or inspires 
individuals to work hard and gain higher wealth that in turn fosters life satisfaction. For instance, Stark 
(2006) shows that an increase in the inequality of wealth prompts a stronger quest for status that in turn 
foster the accumulation of wealth. From the youth’s perspective, relative concerns (or positional 
concerns) could affect their well-being via peer effects, i.e. behavioral change resulting from 
observations of how others in the reference group are performing. 
As stated earlier, parents heterogeneity in preferences (in our case reflected through parents positional 
concerns) may affect household members in several ways: allocation of resources within households, 
allocations of consumption to members that have both short term and long terms implications for 
transmission of poverty, development of human capital, as well as well-being. Yet little has been done 
in this regard in economics, especially encompassing the different age groups in households (youth, 
father, and mother) (Blundell et al., 2005; Basu, 2006; Dunbar et al., 2013). For example, Dunbar et al. 
(2013), using data from Malawi, indicate that allocation of resources from male spouses to the female 
can affect the shares directed to children. In their estimation, like in this paper, each child is represented 
as having their own utility function. Positional concerns differ among fathers and mothers, across 
households and within households based on preferences, gender, birth order, resource availability, 
resource allocation, sharing rule, institutional features, norms, etc. (Thomas, 1990). Most studies often 
miss an important element of the distribution of welfare that can vary dramatically depending on the 
power relations within the household (for example, the different effect of fathers’ and mothers’ 
positional concerns on the well-being of members depends on the role and or power relation of 
members, including fathers and mothers).  
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Whether parents’ attitudes toward positionality (regarding the income prospects of their children) and 
their attributes are important for the well-being of youth members is a question that requires empirically 
investigated. In line with this, I ask the following questions: Do parents’ attitudes toward positionality 
and their attributes matter for youth in Ethiopia? If so, how might parents’ attitudes toward positionality 
affect the well-being of the offspring, especially youth members? This chapter is devoted to addressing 
the above questions. In doing so, I first investigate whether there is intra-household (youth, father, 
mother) heterogeneity in positional concerns (or status concerns) and what determines positional 
concerns. Following that, I examine whether and in what way youth subjective well-being is associated 
with their own and with parents’ attitudes toward positionality.  
Though experimental research documenting the effects of positional concerns on well-being has 
brought new insights into economic phenomena that are not easy to capture using the standard 
approaches of neoclassical approach, patterns, origins and the mechanisms through which positional 
concerns persist within households and between peers (social comparisons) remain understudied in the 
economic literature. Particularly given the adverse development and social ramifications of intra-
household and the inter-household quest for status, analyses of the patterns and drivers of parents’ 
attitudes towards positionality and the interrelations with the well-being of their members (in this case 
youth members) is essential for framing appropriate public policy towards youth development. 
Examining the effects of positional concerns among the population of different age cohorts have 
important implications for poverty alleviation and social welfare. For instance, interventions based on 
some socioeconomic criteria in communities or areas where there are strong positional concerns may 
result in ‘conspicuous consumption’: diverting scarce resources (from productive investments and 
savings) to unproductive ones that could hamper the success of the poor or youth and sometimes may 
lead to greater inequality and migration. It might also lead to more self-investment or investment in 
members that can enhance welfare (Linssen et al., 2011). Our paper contributes to this literature by 
documenting the existence of an important relationship between parents’ (with a special focus on fathers 
and mothers) positional concerns and the well-being of youth members using a survey experimental 
methods matched with a socio-demographic survey.  
The impact of fathers’ or mothers’ preferences to devote resources to the well-being of members 
(reflected through improvement in the well-being of the offspring) have been studied in sociology and 
psychology intensively, but only at an infant stage in the field of economics (Lundberg, 2005; Biblarz 
and Stacey, 2010). Most of the existing studies focus on the effect of child-gender on fertility decisions, 
marriage stability, time allocation decisions and parenting behavior and not the other way around.  
This study is different from the existing studies at least in three ways. First, methodologically the study 
combines a survey experiment with socio-economic survey data and information generated via focus 
group discussions (FGD)). Second, in terms of sample composition, the study is the first in its kind 
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targeting youth, and each parent separately: fathers and mothers. Third, in terms of analyses, the effects 
of parents’ positional concerns on the well-being of youth members are computed separately for fathers 
and mothers. Exploring the relationship between parents’ positional concerns and youth members’ well-
being is particularly relevant in the context of rural Ethiopia for the following reasons.  
First, young age is the age in which parents invest household resources for economic independence of 
youth, which partly depend on the attitudes of parents toward positionality. Second, it is important to 
look at whether youth SWB is responsive to parents’ concerns about positionality (or status) and 
whether this differs across gender and youth type. This helps to understand the mechanisms through 
which intra-household preferences towards positionality might persist and empirically test some 
hypotheses on the role of parents’ attitudes toward positionality in determining current youth well-
being. Finally—unlike the common practice in the literature that uses household head characteristics to 
analyze the role of parents’ attributes in the well-being of members (Santos et al., 2013; Clark and Sofer, 
2004; Becker, 1965) — this study directly approach both fathers and mothers. This approach better 
captures intra-household dynamics and enables us to capture the effects of parents’ positional concern 
and its impact on the well-being of youth members. I also believe that this approach helps to improve 
our understanding of the extent of differing intra-household behaviors in influencing the welfare of 
youth members.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Part 2 is a brief review of literature and description 
of theoretical framework employed in this study to link parents’ attitudes toward positionality with the 
well-being of the youth members. Part 3 presents the data, experimental design and measurement issues. 
Part 4 provides descriptive characteristics of youth and their parents, and estimation techniques. Part 5 
provides estimation results and discussions. Finally, part 6 summaries the findings and concludes. 
Appendices are presented at the end.  
3.2. Linking parents’ positional concerns and their attributes to well-being 
There are different explanations in literature as to the relationship between relative income and well-
being. For instance, a positive relative concern can be interpreted as a sign of community ties and 
altruistic preferences among poor rural households (Kingdon and Knight, 2007; Bookwalter and 
Dalenberg, 2010, for South Africa and Akay et al., 2012, for China). For instance, Akay et al (2012) 
find a positive and significant effect of relative income on the well-being of migrants in China. 
Alternatively, it may reveal a ‘signal effect’ or ‘tunnel effect’ (Hirschman, 1973), i.e., a worker's well-
being that is positively affected by the observation of faster income progression of others if they 
interpret this movement as a sign that their own turn will come around soon. For instance, respondents 
indicate that reference income serves as information to create future expectations and as an aspiration 
for the possibility of achieving that income level. Hence, under such conditions, relative income may 
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be positively correlated with SWB. Opposite effects, status effects and signal effect may offset each 
other, and their relative weight depends in particular on beliefs about social mobility (Senik, 2008). 
In linking parents’ positional concerns with well-being of youth members, there are two common ways 
to model positional concerns (status concerns) in a utility framework: 1) a ratio comparison utility 
function, 𝑈 = 𝑢(𝑌,
𝑌
?̅?
 ), where Y refers to individual income earnings, and 𝑌 ̅is the average income in 
the society (Persson, 1995) and 2) additive comparison utility function, 𝑈 = 𝑢(𝑌, 𝑌 − 𝑌)̅̅ ̅ (Akerlof, 
1997). In this study, I choose to use the additive comparison utility function of the following form: 
𝑈𝑖 (𝑌𝑖, 𝑌𝑖 − ?̅?𝑠) = (1 −  𝛾)𝑌𝑖 + 𝛾(𝑌 − ?̅?𝑟)                              (3.1) 
 
Where 𝑈𝑖 indicates the utility of an individual i; 𝑌𝑖 is individual income, 𝑌𝑟̅̅ ̅ is average income in the 
reference group (i.e. the average income in the society A or B); 𝛾 measures the marginal degree of 
positional concern, i.e. the portion of the total change in utility that comes from an increase in relative 
income after a marginal increase in own absolute income; 0 ≤  𝛾 ≤ 1. Based on the utility function 
specified in (3.1), 𝛾 is expected to be positive, and that a higher 𝛾 indicates a stronger positional concern 
for that specific subject. It should be noted also that the positive sign of 𝛾 does not imply a utility 
increase as in the case of the SWB approach.   
The utility function adopted here contains two important elements: 1)a parameter 𝛾 𝜖[0,1] that measures 
the degree to which parents or youth own positional concerns affect well-being of youth members as 
opposed to absolute income (see Eq. 3.1)  and 2) the curvature of the welfare function as it is affected 
by positional concerns (Pingle and Mitchell, 2002). The assumption here is that the preferences of 
participants can be expressed using the utility function and the nature of the data allows one to infer 
what properties the utility function should possess in order to infer a specific type of behaviour 
observed. For instance, the distribution of data could indicate whether preferences are heterogeneous or 
not, whether a fraction of youth, fathers and mothers exhibit tendencies to give weight to relative 
concerns and whether fraction of youth, fathers, and mothers give weight to positional concerns. 
Since the utility of youth depends not only on their own positional concern but also on the positional 
concerns of their fathers and mothers as well as their attributes, I extend a utility function presented 
above assuming the following relation: 
𝑈(𝑖, ℎ) = 𝑆𝑊𝐵(𝛾𝑖 , 𝛾𝑓 , 𝛾𝑚, 𝑋, 𝑌ℎ),                                   (3.2) 
Where U is the economic concept of utility or well-being of youth i who is a member of household 
h,𝛾𝑖, 𝛾𝑓 , 𝛾𝑚 stands for the marginal degree of positional concerns of youth who are members of 
household h, father and mother subjects, respectively; X denotes individual and household attributes 
(including father and mother characteristics) as well as community and institutional factors that 
influence well-being of youth. Set of variables categorized under X, that influence youth SWB has been 
53 
 
widely discussed in both economics and psychology literature (Alpizar et al., 2005; Pingle and Mitchell, 
2002), and in this paper I consult variety of literature to include relevant variables deemed to affect 
well-being. Yh denotes the household income. Our empirical analysis presented under section 3.6, 
which I briefly discuss under estimation strategy, is based on different specifications of Eq. (3.2). 
A second specification will add the marginal degree of positional concerns of fathers and mothers as 
well as their individual characteristics such as age, education and their relationship or role in the 
household. The marginal degree of positional concerns of both fathers and mothers are anticipated to 
be positively correlated with sons’ and/or daughters’ subjective well-being. In this case, fathers and/or 
mothers preferences are toward equal society. In other words, the higher the marginal degree of 
positional concerns of parents, the higher the son/daughter SWB living in Bi society, i.e. in a society 
where income difference is less. If it is negatively related and significant, it means that its absolute 
income that matters most for the well-being of youth and relative income comprises the smaller portion 
of the utility of youth. It also means that parents prefer their sons/daughters earn more income in 
absolute terms, irrespective of the income of others. In this case, the subject is less positional or has less 
preference for positionality (relative income). It can be interpreted in such a way that subjects use the 
higher income of the peers (comparison groups) as a signal effect in the sense that it is an indication of 
future earnings or prospects.  
Finally, for comparison purpose, I also specify our estimation that SWB of youth is associated with 
youth’s own marginal degree of positional concerns and the marginal degree of positional concern of a 
household head along with a set of individual and household characteristics or attributes. In this model, 
I specify that X include individual characteristics and the characteristics of the household head, besides 
the household assets (including family income) and community characteristics. This specification 
serves as a comparison model if head characteristics (or attributes) are used instead of father and mother 
attributes. This also serves as a sensitivity analysis of the relevance of the choice of parental variables.  
3.3. Data and experimental design  
3.3.1. The data     
The primary research has three phases. Firstly, participatory rural appraisal techniques were employed 
to understand how positional concerns are perceived in the society, how such perceptions affect the 
well-being of people in general, and youth in particular, and to examine a good range of income figures 
to be used in the experiment. Secondly, a pre-test of the survey questionnaires was administered to the 
three groups of respondents: fathers, mothers, and youth. Finally, the experimental surveys (positional 
concern for income among the three categories of subjects) and socioeconomic surveys were addressed 
to these three groups. Activities carried out along the process (phases) are elaborated as follows: 
Participants in both the experiment and socio-economic survey are drawn from the novel Ethiopian 
Agricultural Growth Program (AGP) youth and household survey covering agricultural potential areas 
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of Ethiopia. As stated earlier, out of the four regions of AGP sties, the study focuses on the Oromiya 
region and exclusively on youth (both as household members and as household heads) and their parents 
(mainly fathers and mothers) sub-sampled from the first wave conducted in 2010/11.  
Multi-stage sampling techniques were employed to sub-sample households with youth members and 
youth household heads during the second wave. A subsample of 660 youth from 521 randomly selected 
households who were included during baseline was selected randomly during the second wave and 
participated in the experiment. Households who were selected but not available due to death or 
migration that made tracking difficult were replaced from the contingency list. The survey collected 
detail information on youth characteristics/attributes, household characteristics (or attributes), father 
characteristics(or attributes), mother characteristics, wealth as well as separate wealth owned and 
managed by the youth themselves, employment conditions, social networks, and life events. 
Community characteristics such as location and access to basic infrastructures, institutions, availability 
of youth-related projects and interventions in the areas were also collected. After eliminating some due 
to missing information, non-response, and inconsistency, I obtained a sample of 641 youth16, 291 
fathers, and 341 mothers.  
To ensure consistency and understanding, the experiment was administered by a set of administrator 
instructions. Prior to that, participant was presented a set of examples and offered explanations of the 
difference between the different hypothetical scenarios. During data collection, back and forth questions 
were raised and discussed as well to make sure that respondents have understood the game. In most 
cases, the experiment was carried out simultaneously for youth, fathers, and mothers. For household 
members who were not available, the survey was carried out one after the other to avoid 
communications/information sharing within families, learning, fatigue or a combination. In addition, 
respondents were instructed not to communicate with other participants during the survey period. A 
consent form was signed to keep the anonymity and confidentiality of the survey. All interviewers have 
at least first degree and accumulated experiences in conducting household surveys. All of them had 
obtained intensive training about the experiment, the questionnaires, and data collection methods, 
including practical demonstrations of the survey experiment. All had participated in the pre-test. 
Participation in the pre-testing has an advantage of enabling these interviewers to gain experience in 
administering the experiment and survey. It is after the experiment that the respondents participated in 
a survey in order to collect additional information on socioeconomic information of the subjects. In 
order to generate qualitative data that complement the quantitative findings, I carried out six focus group 
discussions in three woredas with selected groups (two with youth subjects, two with father subjects, 
                                                                
16 Because subjects for field experiments on positional concerns among youth members and their parents are randomly 
selected from the general follow up survey, the new sample is less. 
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and two with mother subjects). The student was present during the whole process and fluent in Afan 
Oromo, the main language spoken in the study areas.   
3.3.2. Experimental design  
In order to test the effect of parents’ positional concerns and their attributes on life satisfaction of youth 
members, I limit the experiment to income per se. As stated earlier, the survey experiment consisted17 
of two sections addressed to the three types of subjects (youth, fathers and mothers): i) positional 
concern from the effect of income by the youth subjects, father subjects and mother subjects; and ii) 
questions regarding the respondent’s socioeconomic status. Heads of the household were provided with 
a list of additional questions related to household characteristics and assets. Let us turn to discuss the 
experimental design in more detail.  
In the survey experimental methods, I present hypothetical scenarios similar to Johansson-Stenman et 
al. (2002) in order to measure the marginal degree of positional concerns by letting the youth, fathers, 
and mothers make trade-offs between youth hypothetical income and the relative income of other youth 
in the society18, keeping everything else equal. In doing so, youth were instructed to consider the well-
being of their imagined income when making choices; while their fathers and mothers were instructed 
to consider the well-being of the youth under considerations when making their choices (see appendix 
A3.1 for the instructions presented to the three subjects). From the responses, I construct a marginal 
degree of positional concern and match the results with the outcome variable: the subjective well-being 
of youth. The computation of the marginal degree of positional concern is presented under 
measurements.  
In the case of the fathers and mothers experiment, they were frequently reminded that they should not 
choose what they considered the overall best society, but the society that would be the best for their son 
(s) and or daughter(s), i.e. youth under consideration. They were frequently reminded that in all other 
aspects, the societies are identical; this briefing is especially important for fathers and mothers who 
always relate their choice with social and economic benefits they could receive from the support of their 
son(s) and or daughter(s). This was to help eliminate respondent bias based on their current 
circumstances, as well as liberate themselves from any conditions affecting their decisions. Though 
such exercises are not free from some biases19, it is possible that “it is presumably cognitively easier, 
                                                                
17 “A survey experiment differs from both laboratory and field experiments. A survey experiment is not monetary incentivized 
whereas in a laboratory experiment individuals are paid according to their choices. Field experiments have the feature of 
being conducted in people’s normal life without them knowing they are part of an experiment.”(Carlsson, 2010: 265 ) 
18 Society (village) and the same age group was used as a composite reference group. This reference group was 
determined after focus group discussion and pre-test. 
 
19 The experimental approach has some disadvantages. First, the survey experimental approach used in this 
paper, as is also common in recent studies, is based on a hypothetical scenario that may not reflect positionality 
preferences of the subjects. Second, the sample size is relatively small for fathers, as in the most experimental 
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and perceived to be a more natural task” to choose what is best for own son and or daughter than to 
choose for a complete stranger” (Alpizar et al., 2005: 409).  
One of the advantages of this approach is that it does not suffer from the problem of unknown or 
switching reference groups (or both) since the reference groups are explicitly stated in the survey 
experiment. Though I extend later in the next chapter the use multiple reference groups, I chose to stick 
to one composite reference group (identified via focus group discussions and pre-tests) which subjects 
reported as the main comparison group against which one often compare their relative income. This 
helps to avoid confusion and fatigue. The reference group in this experimental analysis is assumed to 
be exogenous, a standard in empirical work (Stark and Taylor, 1991; Easterlin, 1997, 1995; Hyll and 
Schneider, 2014; Oshio et al., 2011, among others). A detailed analysis and issues related to reference 
group are presented in Akay et al. (2014) and Ferreri-i-Carbonell (2005). I present also the robustness 
of using various self-identified reference groups (identified through surveys) in analyzing the link 
between the subjective well-being of youth and the different dimensions of relative deprivation 
measured using objective and subjective approaches in the next chapter.  
In the experiment, the three categories of respondents make repeated choices between two 
villages/societies, A and Bi, defined by the average income and the youth’s income. The choice of 
alternatives for all respondents starts from a choice with the lowest degree of positionality (from the six 
successive choices available to them, see Appendix Table A and B) until the respondent switches to the 
choice where they care more about absolute income than relative income. I assume that society A is a 
fixed alternative where the average income is 1080 birr per month and the youth’s income is 720 birr 
per month, the society (village) is then compared with six different B societies (villages) with varying 
individual incomes, but a given average income as proposed by Alpizar et al (2005). As such, the 
youth’s income in village B was chosen to correspond to a certain degree of relativity if the youth, 
father, and mother are indifferent between the two villages.  
3.3.3. Measurement of positional concerns and subjective well-being   
Marginal degree of positionality  
Positional concerns can be measured in several ways: using the distance between individual income and 
mean or median income of the reference group; rank of the observation in the group; the marginal 
degree of positionality, etc. Following Alpizar et al (2005) marginal degree of positionality using the 
additive comparison utility function is computed as follows:  
𝛾 =
𝑌𝐴−𝑌𝐵
?̂?𝐴−?̂?𝐵
 ;                            (3.3) 
                                                                
studies in the literature (see Carlsson, 2010 for the advantages and disadvantages of using survey experimental 
approaches to test positional concerns).  
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Where YA is individual hypothetical monthly income in society (village) A and ?̂?𝐴 is average income 
of other youth in society (Village) A. YB is individual monthly income in society (village) B, and ?̂?𝐵 
is the average income of other youth in village B. Fathers’ marginal degree of positional concern refers 
to positional concerns for father of youth members. The same is true with mothers and household heads. 
The experiment begins offering youth to choose between society A, where their monthly income is 
lower than the average monthly income of the reference group (960 birr vs 1080 birr), and society B1, 
where their monthly income is higher than the average monthly income of the reference group but lower 
than their income in society A. Exact replicas are offered to fathers and mothers, except that  fathers 
and mothers make their choices with respect to the youth under consideration (see appendix 3A.1). I 
assume that society A is a fixed alternative. If the individual chooses society A, the session ends since 
the individual has revealed their realized marginal degree of positionality. In this case, the realized 
degree of positionality is lower than the implied degree of positionality. If the individual chooses B1, 
then they are asked to choose between society A and society B2, where their income is further lower 
than in B1 but still higher than the income level in the reference group. Since the choice is always 
against society A, the degree of positional concern increases as we go from society Bi to society Bi+1. 
The process ends if an individual chooses society A or has reached the last choice set, i.e. B6, in this 
setting. Note that the reference group is also held constant throughout the process to make the process 
simple and easy for the respondent. An illustrative example for youth scenario is presented as follows 
(detailed instructions for the three groups are presented in appendix A3.1): 
Imagine that you can choose to live in one of two different societies, society A and society B. Your monthly 
income and the average monthly income of people differ between the two societies. Except for the income 
differences, other things, like living expenses, are the same in the two societies. For each society that I will 
consider, I will tell you the amount of your monthly income and the average monthly income of the group. 
Then, I will ask you to choose which society you would like to live in. Let me illustrate this choice by the 
following example. In this example, I will just name the group of people “other youth.”  
 
Society  Your own income  Average income of other youth: 
birr/month  
Society A 800 900 
Society B 770 600 
Which society do you choose to live in? 
 
In this example, the youth earns an income of 800 birr per month in society A while the average 
income of other youth in the same society is 900 birr per month. In society B, the youth income is 
770 birr per month while the average income of other youth in that society is 600 birr per month. 
The youth monthly income is 30 birr more in society A than in society B. In society A, the youth 
earn 100 birr less than the average income of other youth in the society; while in society B the youth 
get 170 birr more. Given these differences, the youth is asked to choose either to live in Society A 
or B. When the subject (youth) chooses Society A, I computed the marginal degree of positional 
concern for each youth within an upper and lower bound. Using equation (3.3), the marginal degree 
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of positional concern is 0.1. In this example, if the youth chooses society (village) A, then it implies 
that the youth has a marginal degree of positionality lower than 0.1(𝛾 ≤ 0.10). Through a repeated 
choice between the two set of choices, I are able to obtain information about their marginal degree 
of positional concerns, at least within an upper and lower bound. In the same manner, if a father and 
mother make the same choice, the marginal degree of positionality of a father and mother towards 
the youth under consideration is 0.10. Repeated choices between the two societies have been 
presented in a subsequent order for each youth, father, and mother. The lowest possible income 
choice in our experimental setting is about 720 birr. To avoid design effect related to income levels 
across the age cohorts (youth, father, and mother) in the choice sets, I decided to use the same income 
levels. Hence, the implicit degree of positionality is the same across the groups (father, mother and 
youth), changing between 0.1 and 0.6.  
Subjective well-being 
The use of well-being assessment questions such as life satisfaction has widely been used since 1930’s 
by scholars such as Likert (Likert, 1932). Literature suggests various proxies of measuring subjective 
well-being (SWB) or life satisfaction, which are in general based on ‘’happiness’’, ‘’life satisfaction’ 
or ‘’mental health’’ (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Akay et al., 2013). Our data include both standard life 
satisfaction measures, referred here as subjective well-being, SWB, which allows subjects to rate their 
level of life satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 9 (1 indicating the worst possible life and 9 the best possible 
life), and work satisfaction measures of the general Edenred-Ipsos Barometer20 that uses scores from 
1 to 5 (1 strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree).  
In computing SWB index from the first approach (referred here as option 1), I classify the measures 
into 5 ordinal categories, ensuring adequate variability at the same time reducing empty cells. In order 
to obtain a measure of SWB from the latter approach (referred here as option 2), I added the scores of 
the different items related to work satisfaction of individuals and derive a SWB index ranging from 12 
to 71. I use this index as a proxy for the latent experienced individual utility, hence the low levels of 
the scores indicating low well-being while high scores indicating a relatively higher or better well-
being. The subjective well-being measure of youth (option 1), a proxy variable to quantify subjective 
well-being of youth, runs as follows: 
Say, we would like to ask you some questions about how you see your circumstances in 
comparison to others. There are nine steps on this ladder. Suppose the very top (the 9th step) 
represents the best possible life for you and the bottom represents the worst possible life for 
                                                                
20 Edenred-Ipsos Barometer can be categorized into three pillars: the Environmental, Appreciation and Emotion 
(EDENRED-IPSOS, 2016). This alternative measure was originally designed to assess well-being of individuals at 
work. Environment refers to the equipment, work-life balance, a clear idea of what is expected, etc. Appreciation 
refers to respect shown by parents, friends, skills, etc. Emotion includes enjoying the work, interest in the job, 
its stimulating nature, etc. (EDENRED-IPSOS, 2016). 
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you. Where on the ladder do you personally feel you stand [at the present time, three years ago, 
and one year ago]? [Show the picture of ladder (RECORD STEP NUMBER 01-09)] 
The answer to this question takes discrete values from 1 to 9. I then convert these scales into an ordinal 
scale of 5, with 5 indicating the highest level of well-being and 1 indicating the lowest level of well-
being. I refer to these ordinal measures as subjective well-being (SWB). This approach has been widely 
used in the psychology literature and recently frequently used in economics literature (Easterlin, 1974, 
1999; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Akay et al., 2012). Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2002) indicates that the use of this approach is based on three important assumptions: i) 
willingness and the ability of individuals to answer well-being questions; ii) that SWB is linked with 
the economic concept of welfare, and iii) the possibility of interpersonal comparability at an ordinal 
level. For instance, an individual whose SWB is say 5 is better off (happier) than one with a SWB of 3.  
The second option of measuring SWB (option 2) is constructed from the sum of 17 different questions 
of Edenred-Ipsos Barometer. Each individual was asked 17 questions rated on a scale ranging from 1 
(‘’strongly disagree’’) to 5 (‘’strongly agree’’) (11 questions), and 0 (‘’no’’) to 1 (‘’yes’’) (6 questions); 
hence the lowest score is 11 and the highest is 71 (see Appendix Table A3.2 for the list of questions 
used). I sum up the responses of these 17 questions and categorized into 5 ordinal scales. The scores 
are arranged in order so that the highest scores indicating higher well-being. For instance, one of the 17 
questions addressed to respondents run in the following manner:  
You feel proud to show your friends or other visitors where you live. You are proud of the work 
you are doing. The responses would be from 1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree.  
As a practice, also in the literature, I interpret the measure as a proxy for the latent utility (Clark et al., 
2008; Akay et al., 2012). Our empirical analysis reported below is mainly based on the self-reported 
measure of well-being computed using option 1, and use the alternative approach (option 2) as a 
robustness check (results reported in Appendix Table A3.4). The distribution of the SWB for youth 
sample are reported in figure 3.1 and the resulting reports of summary statistics of selected variables 
for the whole sample used in the analysis is presented in Table 3.7. In terms of gender, SWB is higher 
for male youth than female youth (figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of youth subjective well-being by gender. Note that SWB is based on life satisfaction 
asking subjects to rate their life satisfaction on 1 to 9 scales (1 indicating the worst possible life and 9 the best 
possible life). 
In the following section, I present the descriptive results. 
3.4. Characteristics of subjects and their attitudes toward positionality 
As indicated earlier, the focus in our empirical estimation is to understand whether fathers’ and mothers’ 
attitudes towards positionality and youth’s own positional concerns matter for the well-being of youth 
members (proxied by youth’s self-reported life satisfaction). I also examine if the existence of 
heterogeneity in preferences towards such concern for positionality relates to intra-household allocation 
of resources in ways crucial to the development of youth. I start our analysis by presenting the 
descriptive results of the characteristics of our respondents followed by the presentation of the mean 
marginal degree of positionality of youth and their parents.  
3.4.1. General description of respondents: youth, fathers and mothers  
Table 3.1 summarizes the basic characteristics of our sample. The average age of youth, father and 
mother participants are about 21, 53 and 46 years, respectively. About 63% of youth respondents are 
male and about 70 % live with their parents (as household members). The average years of education 
(measured as the average number of years of schooling completed) for youth sample are about 4.2 years 
while it is 1.8 and 1.0 years for fathers and mothers, respectively. As expected, youth are more educated 
than their fathers are, who themselves are more educated than mothers are. Moreover, about 49% of 
youth engage in agriculture as full-time farmers and 64% are single. The average birth order in our 
youth sample is about 3 whereas the average family size is about 6 persons per household, which is also 
the same as the average household size for the national regional state.  
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of youth and their parents  
 Youth 
[n=659] 
Father 
(n=291) 
Mother 
(n=341) 
Average age in years  21.44 53.00 46.00 
Gender (%)    
Male 62.97 - - 
Female 37.03 - - 
Years of education  4.20 1.80 1.00 
Marital status (%)    
Single 63.79 - - 
Married(single spouse) 36.21 89.53 60.05 
Other  - 5.40 39.35 
Family size   6.00 6.00 6.0 
Farm size per capita(ha) 0.53 0.53 0.53 
Birth order  3.00 - - 
Occupation (main) (%)    
Part-time/ student/domestic worker 48.48 - 50.88 
Full-time farmer 48.64 96.53 46.17 
Non-farm worker 2.88 3.47 3.05 
Youth type (%)    
Household head  30.00 - - 
Member(live with parents) 70.00 - - 
Source: survey results  
Note: Other include-widow, divorced, not together for any reason, married more than one spouse. 
3.4.2. Descriptive results from the survey experiments  
Using equation (3.3), Table 3.2 presents a summary21 of the experiment. Forty-four percent of youth 
respondents have a degree of positionality less than 0.1; while it is 63 and 61 percent, respectively for 
father and mother subjects. Overall, the distributions of the responses are almost identical for fathers 
and mothers. The mean degree of positionality22 is 0.30, 0.26, and 0.24 for youth, fathers, and mothers, 
respectively while the calculated median degree of positionality was 0.2 for youth and 0.1 for fathers 
and mothers. This indicates that youth are more positional than their parents do. In addition, the results 
indicate that the marginal degree of positionality for fathers’ and mothers’ is relatively lower than youth 
interval but higher than the one estimated by Akay and Martinsson (2011) and Akay et al. (2012a; 
2014), who find very low positionality estimates (0.17) in rural areas of Northern Ethiopia. Our 
estimates are also higher than ones found in developing countries are. Akay and Martinsson (2012) find 
no or low positional concerns among Swedish young people though the level of concerns for income 
increases gradually and significantly with age among Swedish adults. As expected, participants in our 
study were younger (21 years age compared to the Akay and Martinsson (2012) sample average of 44 
years) and more educated (4.2 years of schooling compared to their average of 1.2 of years among 
household heads). Gender wise, female youth are more positional than male youth (Table A3). The 
results obtained from the experimental data support the hypothesis that there is heterogeneity of 
                                                                
21 The marginal degree of positional concerns with the ratio comparison utility function for this scenario took 
the values of 0.0110, 0.224, 0.345, 0.471, and 0.605 and 0.746. 
22 The average marginal degree using the ration comparison utility function is 0.33, 0.31 and 0.29 for youth, 
fathers and mothers, respectively. Reference group is youth of similar age living in the same society or village. 
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positional concerns among household members and youth population are more positional than 
mature/adult population group. The difference between youth and parents’ concerns about positionality 
is partly related to the higher value that youth assign to their relative standing than their parents. 
One of the reasons why respondents chose to live in society A, where the subject’s monthly income is 
lower than the average income, is that upward comparisons serve as a motivation (incentive) to work 
hard and hence, a signal for future prospects. A careful compilation of the qualitative responses provided 
by subjects also indicates that choosing society A does not mean less preference for positionality. As 
Clark and Oswald (1998), also point out the participant may have positional concern and yet may behave 
as though they do not. Stark (2006) also argues that inequality of wealth prompts an individual’s want 
of social status that in turn fosters the accumulation of wealth; a point I will explore more in a 
subsequent chapter.  
Table 3.2: Results of the experiment using additive comparison utility function  
  Marginal degree of positional concern  Frequencies 
Alternatives   (if indifferent between village  A and Bi)  Youth Father Mother* 
       
Alternative A   𝛾 < 0.10  290(43.85) 129(62.93) 196(61.28) 
       
Alternative B1  0.10 ≤ 𝛾 < 0.20  132(20) 1(0.01) 44)13.78) 
       
Alternative B2  0.20 ≤ 𝛾 <0.30  23(3.49) 3(1.46) 14(4.28) 
       
Alternative B3  0.30 ≤ 𝛾 <0.40  27(4.10) 5(2.44) 4(1.19) 
       
Alternative B4  0.4≤ 𝛾 < 0.50  47(7.13) 39(19.01) 3(0.95) 
       
Alternative B5  0.50 ≤ 𝛾 < 0.60  12(1.82) 2(0.10) 4(1.19) 
Alternative B6  𝛾 ≥ 0.60  129(19.55) 26(12.68) 55 (17.34) 
Total    659(100) 291(100) 341(100) 
Source: Survey experiment. Figures in parentheses are percentages. 
I further categorized the responses of positional concerns in an ordinal scale (e.g. non-positional when 
a subject chooses option A, somewhat positional when the subject chooses option B2; medium when 
subject chooses B3 and B4, and high when the subject chooses option B5 and above). Table 3.3 presents 
the results of the ordinal approach. Consistent with the previous findings, again I find that positional 
concerns are heterogeneous among the different groups within households, with youth more positional 
than their father and mother.  
Table 3.3: Ordinal responses of respondents’ concerns about positionality (in percent) 
 
Category   
Youth 
(n=659) 
Father 
(n=291) 
Mother 
(n=341) 
household head   
(n=466) 
Non positional (A) 43.93 62.0 61.28 66.74 
Somewhat but not high  (B2) 20 14.86 13.78 15.02 
Medium (B3- B4) 7.57 3.14 5.47 3.01 
High (B5 and above) 28.48 14.86 19.48 15.24 
Total  100 100 100 100 
Source: survey results 
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Figure 3.2 below presents the distribution of the marginal degree of positional concerns for the three 
categories of subjects (household members) disaggregating by youth groups. I find again that the 
distributions of the responses are similar for fathers and mothers. As shown in figure 3.1, the mean 
marginal degree of positionality is similar between youth members and youth head subjects. However, 
the mean marginal degrees of parents differ by youth category. Fathers are more positional towards 
youth members while mothers are more positional towards youth headed subjects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.2: Distribution of marginal degree of positional concerns of youth, fathers and mothers: the results of 
experiments    
To test whether the differences between the estimated degrees of positionality are statistically 
significant or not, I carried out chi-square tests of the difference between the distributions of answers 
for the youth, fathers, and mothers: ᵪ2  tests of the difference in the distribution of answers for parents 
(fathers and mothers) and for the youth. As indicated in Table 3.4 below, I can strongly reject the null 
hypothesis of the same underlying distributions for youth compared to fathers, on the one hand, and 
youth and mothers on the other. I can also reject the null hypothesis between fathers and mothers; 
confirming that positionality concern differs among the different age categories of household members. 
The same result was obtained using the distributions of ordinal measures of respondents’ preferences 
towards positionality presented in Table 3.4.  
Table 3.4: Chi-square tests of the differences in distribution of answers for youth, fathers, and mothers  
 Youth  Father  
Father  34.45***  
Mother  64.96*** 20.40* 
Source: survey results 
Note Ho: Distribution of youth and fathers’, and distribution of youth and mothers’, and distribution of fathers 
and mothers’ positional concerns are the same. ***, *indicates a significant difference at the 1 and 10 percent 
level, respectively; the critical level is 19 (the critical level at the 10 percent level is 19) with 15 degrees of 
freedom.  
 
 
3.4.3. Relationship between positionality and subjective well-being  
Mean marginal degree of positional concern is highest among the richest (the 5th quantile income 
group) for the three groups (0.33 for youth, 0.20 for father and 0.27 for mothers). The mean SWB 
among the 5th quantile income group is 3.1 on a scale of 5 whereas SWB is about 1 among the first 
quantile income group. The distribution of SWB against positional concern for the youth, fathers, and 
mothers in our sample are reported in Table 3.5. Youth from positional fathers and mothers have a 
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relatively comparable income per capita and education level but have higher land per capita, TLU and 
have reported higher SWB. I find no significant difference in terms of other characteristics (Table 3.5). 
This suggests that the difference in SWB is partly attributed to more allocation of intra-household 
resources to youth as a result of parents’ positional concerns; i.e. youth from positional parents are more 
likely to share more household resources, better supported, more likely to continue schools and more 
likely to have less social stress resulting from lagging behind others (Biblarz and Stacey, 2010).    
Table 3.5 Mean SWB comparisons with respect to positionality  
Group  Non-positional Positional Mean Difference All 
SWB_wrtyouth (N=659)  4.276 4.629 -0.352*** 4.470 
SWB_wrtfather (n=284) 4.427 4.750 -0.322* 4.531 
SWB_wrtmom (n=405) 4.303 4.823 -0.519*** 4.506 
SWB_wrthead(n=447) 4.292 4.818 -0.527*** 4.467 
LogPCI_wrtfather 7.52 7.56 -0.04 7.53 
Currstud_wrtfather 0.55 0.57 -0.01 0.56 
Source: survey results. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Ho: mean (non-positional)-mean (positional) =0 
SWBwrtyouth denotes SWB against the positional concern of youth; SWBwrtfather denotes SWB against the 
positional concern of father, and SWBwrtmom denotes SWB against the positional concern of the mother.  
 
Summary of descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the regression analysis is presented in 
Table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6: Summary of descriptive statistics of the variables of interest   
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Youth subjective well-being  2.93 1.36 1 5 
Positionality concern for youth: 0 if a youth chooses society A in the 
first choice situation and 1 otherwise. 
0.57 0.50 0 1 
Positionality concern for father: 0 if a father chooses society A in the 
first choice situation and 1 otherwise. 
0.33 0.47 0 1 
Positionality concern for mother: 0 if a mother chooses society A in the 
first choice situation and 1 otherwise. 
0.39 0.49 0 1 
Sex of youth (1-female, and 0 otherwise) 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Youth has mobile phone   0.53 0.50 0 1 
Age of youth  21.44 5.87 15 34 
Education of youth (years) 4.21 3.37 0 14 
Youth is currently attending school(1, yes; 0 otherwise) 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Birth order (rank) 3.35 2.33 1 14 
First born is son  0.17 0.38 0 1 
Age of father  52.55 12.27 29 95 
Education of father (years) 2.52 3.19 0 16 
Marital status of father (1=married to single spouse, 0 otherwise) 0.90 0.31 0 1 
Mother relationship to head (1 if household head, 0 otherwise) 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Age of mother respondent  46.76 11.79 25 90 
Education of mother respondent(years) 0.79 1.79 0 9 
# of male youth in the household 13-34 years 1.29 0.93 0 5 
# of female youth in the household 13-34 years 1.20 0.88 0 5 
Family size  7.41 3.29 2 20 
Land size holding per household (in hectares) 1.89 2.29 0.1 27.3 
Land size per own child (in hectares) 0.54 0.62 0.01 9.1 
Total income per household (in Birr) 17440 18714 9.3 190021 
Per capita income  2502 2739 1.86 27145 
Number of livestock owned (TLU) 9.78 10.10 0 86.4 
Materials used to construct the roof of the main house(1-corrugated 
metal, 0 otherwise) 
0.48 0.50 0 1 
The PA has access to electricity (1 yes, 0 otherwise) 0.32 0.47 0 1 
The PA has access to public pipe water  0.44 0.50 0 1 
Availability of youth-related projects and programs in the 
kebele/woreda (1 yes, 0 otherwise) 
0.77 0.42 0 1 
Land registration process completed in the PA (1 yes, 0 otherwise) 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Rural credit and saving institutions available in the PA (1, 0) 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Number of observations       
Youth   659    
Father   291    
Mother  341    
Household heads  466    
Source: survey results.  
Note: Per capita income (PCI) is calculated by dividing the income by household size. Household heads exclude 
youth household heads.   
In the following section, I present the estimation strategies employed in the regression analyses to 
explore further what factors motivate positional concerns and how might such concern for positionality 
affect the well-being of youth.    
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3.5. Empirical approach  
Determinants of positionality  
Before presenting the estimation procedures of the different specifications to empirically relate parents’ 
positional concerns (and that of youth) and SWB, I first present the estimation procedure of the 
determinants of positional concerns among the three categories of household members. As stated earlier 
different factors might have motivated the positional concerns of youth subjects and their parents that 
include youth’s own characters, fathers’ and mothers’ characteristics or attributes and these 
determinants are potentially different across the three groups of household members. The specifications 
used to estimate the determinants of the marginal degree of positional concerns for subject i is presented 
as follows: 
𝑚𝑖
𝑠 =∝0+ 𝛽𝑋𝑖  +  𝑢𝑖                               (3.4a) 
𝑚𝑖
𝑠 =∝0+ 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃𝐹𝑖 + 𝜇𝑀𝑖  +  𝑢𝑖                                      (3.4b) 
Where in these specifications, 𝑚𝑖
𝑠 is the marginal degree of positionality of subject i є {youth, father, 
mother, household head}, Xi is a linear function of subject i characteristics/attributes, Fi is father 
characteristics/attributes, and Mi is mother characteristics/attributes. The only difference between (3.4a) 
compared to (3.4b) is the father and mother attributes included in the model as the determinants of 
subjects marginal degree of positionality. In the case of interval regression, the dependent variable is 
the interval of the lower and upper bounds of the marginal degree of positional concerns. In the probit 
regression model, the dependent variable takes on the value of 1 if a subject doesn’t choose society A 
in the first choice situation and 0 otherwise.  
 Estimating the effects of positional concerns on SWB  
A common practice in literature to model the link between positional concerns and well-being is the 
use of relative income (relative deprivation) captured using a standard household surveys (Easterlin, 
1995, 2001; Stark and Taylor, 1991; Alpizar et al., 2005, among others), a topic I will cover in detail in 
the next chapters. Relative income is computed from the realized income of the respondents and 
matched with subjective well-being. There are no adequate empirical works that capture and link intra-
household positional concerns (measured experimentally) with subjective well-being. In line with this, 
I investigate the correlation of subjective well-being of youth with experimentally measured positional 
concerns of youth, fathers, mothers, and household socio-economic variables to examine whose 
positional concern matter most for the well-being of youth members, and examine the implications of 
such to intra-household resource allocation.  
In this section, I outline simple econometric models that I employ in order to estimate the relationship 
between parents’ attitudes toward positional concerns of youth members, youth’s own positional 
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concern, and SWB. Similar to Dunbar et al. (2013), in this paper, I model that each youth is represented 
as having their own utility function. This means that each youth belonging to the same household is 
modeled as having different utility functions, assuming that preferences are different within the 
household (member’s preferences in terms of consumption, career choices, etc) and in terms of 
preferences of fathers and mothers towards the youth under consideration. For instance, firstborn may 
be more favored by fathers; hence, fathers may be more positional toward that youth which would 
eventually affect the resource allocation/investment preferences within households in terms of 
improving the relative standing of that particular youth. This, in turn, affects the life satisfaction of 
youth. The same is true for mothers. Therefore, the marginal degree of positional concern of youth as 
well as the marginal degree of positional concerns of parents, and its subsequent effect on the life 
satisfaction of youth is modeled in a systematic approach. The key features of our approach are that it 
allows the capturing of the different factors motivating positional concerns of the different groups 
within a household and then relating these roles to the well-being of youth members. As such I specify 
and estimate the models in which a SWB measure, as reported by youth subjects, is regressed on youth 
marginal degree of positional concern, and the marginal degree of positional concerns of parents 
(fathers, mothers and household head), controlling for other relevant variables affecting youth well-
being. I expect a significant positive correlation between the marginal degree of positional concerns of 
the three groups of household members and SWB of youth if concern for positionality induces well-
being.  
The novelty of this approach is that it not only captures within a household heterogeneity and the effect 
on life satisfaction of youth but also helps to investigate how concerns about status could vary across 
the different age intervals. This systematic approach enables us to model the nexus between the well-
being of youth household members and parents’ positional concerns of offspring using experimental 
survey. As outlined earlier, our outcome variable, i.e. youth SWB is being measured in an ordinal scale, 
suggesting that the appropriate model of the specification under such condition would be an ordered 
probit or logit model. However, I prefer our specification in a linear regression model and present the 
model results from an ordered probit model. I outline the description of the ordered model specifications 
in appendix A3.4. Linear specifications of the relationship between parents’ and youth’s own concerns 
about positionalities, and SWB of youth are specified as follows: 
𝑆𝑊𝐵(𝑖,ℎ)
∗ =∝0+∝𝑦 𝛾𝑦 + 𝜎𝑌ℎ + 𝛽𝑍𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                   (3.5a)  
𝑆𝑊𝐵(𝑖,ℎ)
∗ =∝0+∝𝑦 𝛾𝑦 +∝𝑓 𝛾𝑓 +∝𝑚 𝛾𝑚 + 𝜎𝑌ℎ + 𝛽𝑍𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                                         (3.5b)  
𝑆𝑊𝐵(𝑖,ℎ)
∗ =∝0+∝𝑦 𝛾𝑦 +∝ℎℎ 𝛾ℎℎ + 𝜎𝑌ℎ + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                                          (3.5c)  
Where in these equations, 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖
∗ is the self-reported SWB of youth i who is a member of household h 
reported on an ordinal scale (measured either using the life satisfaction measure of Likert scale or using 
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the general Edenred-Ipsos Barometer described previously); (𝛾𝑦), 𝛾𝑓, 𝛾𝑚 and 𝛾ℎℎ denote the marginal 
degree of positional concerns of youth, father, mother and household head, respectively. As stated 
earlier, in the empirical results reported in the appendix of this thesis, I convert marginal degree of 
positional concerns of the different groups into binary variable that equals one if the subjects choose 
society Bi in the first choice and zero otherwise. 𝑌ℎ  is absolute income of a household h youth belong 
to; Zi is a set of controls including youth and parents’ attributes deemed to affect SWB of youth and 𝑢 
is the error term. Zi also include potential determinants of SWB as often used in the literature including 
household, local institutions and community characteristics. The individual level 
characteristics/attributes of youth include age, gender, education, birth rank, current occupation of the 
youth-whether the youth is a student or full-time farmer, and youth marital status (member or head).  
The household factors are categorized into father related factors (such as age, education, marital status), 
mother related factors (age, education, marital status, relationship to household head) and other factors 
common to the household (which includes land holdings, livestock holding, income, housing facilities, 
access to potable water and demographics). In addition, community characteristics such as availability 
of youth-related development projects in the district, availability of electricity, land registration, access 
to saving and credit institutions. Furthermore, district dummies are included to control for variations 
(such as infrastructure, information etc.) at the district level.  
The difference between (3.5a), (3.5b) and (3.5c) specification is that (3.5a) is the specification which 
includes youth own marginal degree of positional concern and own individual characteristics as well as 
own family assets (part of X but excluding father and mother characteristics/attributes, and separately 
estimated based on youth type) as a determinant of youth SWB. These are the first set of specifications 
that I will present in the empirical analysis. A second specification (3.5b) will add positional concerns 
of fathers and mothers as well as their individual characteristics (attributes) such as age, education and 
their relationship or role in the household only to the first specification. Finally, (3.5c) estimate 
specifications I add status concerns’ of household heads and their attributes to the first specification. 
This specification is based on the assumption that resources are pooled and allocated according to 
household members need (i.e. household members are homogenous). In addition, this specification 
serves as a comparison model if head characteristics/attributes are used instead of father and mother 
attributes. It also serves as a sensitivity analysis of the relevance of the choice of parental variables. In 
this model, I specify that X, includes own individual characteristics and the characteristics of the 
household head, besides the household assets (including family income) and community characteristics.  
As stated earlier, though the sign of coefficients cannot be determined a priori, I expect that the signs 
of the coefficients of the marginal degree of positional concerns to be positive (∝𝑦> 0; ∝𝑓>
0; ∝𝑚> 0; ∝ℎℎ> 0). This means the more parents’ are positional, the happier is the youth, because of 
the reasons outlined earlier. In other words, the higher the marginal degree of positional concerns of 
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parents, the higher the son (s)/daughter(s) SWB living in Bi society, i.e. in society where income 
difference is less (less inequality). It can also be interpreted in such a way that subjects use the higher 
income of the peers (comparison groups) as a signal effect (reported during focus group discussions) in 
the sense that it is an indication of future earnings or prospects. If the coefficients are negative and 
significant it means that parents put more weight to absolute income more than to relative income for 
the well-being of youth. Put differently, parents’ put less weight to positional concerns (status) of youth. 
In this case relative income (or status concerns) comprises the smaller portion of utility of youth from 
parents’ perspective. It also means that parents prefer their sons/daughters to earn more income in 
absolute terms, irrespective of the income of others. I anticipate that family income is positively related 
to well-being. Furthermore, I carryout series of robustness checks to complement the findings of our 
results, based on different specifications to Eq (3.5a-3.5c). Results are reported in appendix A3.7-A3.8. 
I now present the econometric results of the different specifications.  
3.6. Econometric results and discussions  
3.6.1. Factors influencing positional concerns  
Before relating parents’ positional concerns estimated from the specifications to SWB of youth, which 
is the focus of this paper, I analyze first factors influencing the marginal degree of positionality 
explained by socio-demographic, economic, and other institutional characteristics for the three groups 
of household members, separately. In other words, I explore first what explains concerns about 
positionality among youth and parents. Table 3.8 presents the results of the estimates of the form of Eq 
(3.4a and 3.4b). I present here the results of the interval regression specification. The results of the 
probit model and a separate regression for sons and daughters are presented in Appendix Table A3.5 
and A3.6 
Factors motivating youth positional concerns  
The marginal degrees of positionality among subjects are explained by several factors and the factors 
explaining the variations differ across the groups. For instance, results of the first specification (without 
controlling for fathers’ and mothers’ characteristics) (column 2),  show that youth ownership of mobile 
phones, being currently a student, number of female youth members and mature in the household and 
access to public water are found to explain the marginal degree of positionality of youth. Youth subjects 
who have no mobile phones are more positional than youth subjects who have mobile phones.   
Separate estimates of the determinants of positional concerns for youth members who live with their 
parents and youth-headed (column 3 and 4) indicate that factors explaining the degree of positionality 
of the two subjects differ. Whereas number of female youth members, mature members, farm size per 
own child and income per capita have significant effect on youth member subjects’ marginal degree of 
positional concern; none of these variables are found to have significant effects on the marginal degree 
of positional concerns of youth who are household head except for number of female youth members 
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in the household. However, accessibility to public pipe water has a significant effect on the marginal 
degree of positional concern of youth who are household head. Youth household head who have no 
access to public pipe water is more positional than those who have access to public pipe water. 
Interestingly, the number of female youth members in the household has opposite effect on the marginal 
degree of positionality for youth members and youth household head. While this variable has a negative 
effect on youth who live with their parents, it has a positive effect on youth household head subjects.  
I further control for various fathers’ and mothers’ characteristics including age, education, marital status 
of fathers and mothers while for mothers’ I control also for mothers’ relationship to head (column 5 
based on Eq.3.4b). Once I control for these variables, I find that being first born child, having separate 
cash income apart from household income, the age of mother, education of mother, family size per own 
child and land size per own children turn to be significant. Interestingly, first-born youth are more 
positional than second and above-born youth. However, income per capita becomes insignificant in 
influencing preferences for positional concerns, once father and mother characteristics are controlled 
for.  
Surprisingly, demographic variables are not significant in explaining youth’s own marginal degree of 
positionality, unless I control for father and mother attributes. The educational level of mothers have a 
significant effect on the positional concerns of youth, i.e. youth subjects from educated mothers23 are 
more positional than youth subjects from uneducated mothers. One of the most important assets in rural 
areas is landholding. Controlling for household characteristics, I find that, increasing land size per capita 
is negatively associated with youth subjects’ preferences for positional concerns. Since the effect of 
land size per capita also depends on the expected inheritance of youth, i.e. depending on who is likely 
to inherit, I interact first-born child with land per capita. However, I find no significant effect of this 
interaction term. Further disaggregating the data set into male and female subjects, I find that the 
determinants for positional concerns for the two subjects are different, though there is no significant 
difference of the degree of positional concerns between female youth subjects and male youth subjects. 
For instance, factors that explain male youth subjects’ positional concerns include a mobile phone, 
being a student, marital status of the father (married to single spouse), the age of mother, and livestock 
holding; whereas none of these variables have a significant effect on the marginal degree of positionality 
of female youth subjects. Instead, the following variables have a significant influence on the marginal 
                                                                
23 I investigate further whether positionality of mothers in the household is related to their bargaining power via 
their human capital-education that enable households’ decision  to divert more resources to improve the 
relative standing of youth. To do so I interact education of mothers with income of household. I find that 
education remain positive but becomes insignificant, and the interaction between education and income of 
household is negative. However the effect of household income on mothers’ positionality turns positive though 
insignificant. In addition, the effect of household education, especially mothers become significant when I 
analyse separately for male and female youth; suggesting that the effect of education of parents differs based 
on gender of youth. 
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degree of positional concerns of female youth subjects: having a land certificate, availability of youth-
related projects and programs, mothers’ education and access to pipe water. This is not surprising given 
the role of male youth in rural areas compared to female youth. Livestock holding and availability of 
youth-related projects and programs in the village have a significant effect on the marginal degree of 
positional concerns of both male and female youth subjects (appendices Table A3.6).  
Factors motivating fathers and mothers positional concerns   
Factors determining fathers’ and mothers’ positional concern varies. The only significant common 
factor between the two is the number of children under the age of 13 years. A number of children 
between 5 and 13 years at home has a significant influence on both fathers’ and mothers’ subjects degree 
of positional concerns towards the youth under consideration. The only youth characteristic that has a 
significant influence on the fathers’ positional concerns is birth order. Fathers are more positional 
towards first-born youth whereas birth order has no significant influence on mothers’ positional 
concerns towards youth. Separate analysis for sons and daughters indicate that birth order has a 
significant effect on parents’ preferences for positional concerns. While fathers seem to be more 
positional toward first-born sons and daughters, mothers seem to be less positional for first-born sons. 
Interestingly, fathers are more positional for first-born daughters too; while this variable has no 
significant association with mothers’ positional concerns for daughters (see Table A3.6). The only 
youth characteristics that have a significant association with mothers’ preferences are the marital status 
of youth, which is not the case for fathers. During the focus group discussions held, I also learned that 
mothers are more positional towards married sons and daughters compared to unmarried youth.  
Another important factors influencing the degree of positionality of fathers towards youth include 
mobile phone ownership by youth, the total number of male youth in the household, the total number 
of female youth in the household, male adult, female adult, and land size per own children. For instance, 
land per own child has a significant influence on fathers’ preferences towards positional concerns. None 
of these variables has a significant influence on mothers’ degree of positionality. For mothers’, 
however, their age, their education, youth independent income sources and the presence of credit and 
saving institutions in the village have a significant influence on the degree of positional concern. 
Mothers’ whose youth have access to saving and credit seem to be more positional than mothers’ whose 
youth have no such access. Marginal degree of positionality of mothers increases with educational level 
of mothers’ whereas it decreases with their age [i.e. the level of education of mother has a positive 
association with the marginal degree of positionality] 
I use also household head characteristics (including household head positional concern towards a youth) 
to investigate whether the results could be different from the use of father and mother related 
characteristics in the analysis (column 7). Except for ownership of mobile phones and number of 
children under age of 13 years, the determinants of household heads’ positional concerns towards youth 
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members is virtually different from that of using father and mother characteristics. For household heads 
the following additional variables matter for their concerns about positionality (or status) of youth 
members: age of youth, being first-born youth is son and age of the household head. For instance, 
concerns about positionality decrease as the age of youth and household head increases. Likewise, to 
the mothers’ model, head’s educational background has a positive and strong significant effect on 
positional concerns. Overall, the different specifications indicate that the determinants of parents’ 
attitudes toward relative standing of youth members depend on the choice of parental variables and the 
specifications used. I re-estimated the whole models using the probit and logit models and got virtually 
similar results (see appendices Table A3.5 and A3.6). I now turn to the discussions of the link between 
youth’s own and parents’ attitudes toward positionality, and subjective well-being (life satisfaction) of 
youth members. I also discuss the association between parents’ attributes and life satisfaction of youth.  
Table 3.8: Determinants of positional concerns for youth, father, mother and head: Interval regression 
estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Youth   Father Mother Head  
VARIABLES All members  head   controlling for parental 
characteristics   
   
Youth characteristics        
Female youth  -0.00163 -0.00773 0.0416 -0.00927 0.0162 0.00100 0.00392 
 (0.0278) (0.0323) (0.0618) (0.0454) (0.0310) (0.0283) (0.0258) 
Youth has no mobile phone  0.00597 0.00936 -0.00396 0.0108 -0.0793*** -0.0308 -0.0759*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0268) (0.0384) (0.0390) (0.0257) (0.0238) (0.0215) 
Age  -0.0236 -0.0506 -0.00967 -0.0323 0.0393 0.0121 0.0239 
 (0.0197) (0.0344) (0.0593) (0.0484) (0.0328) (0.0297) (0.0276) 
Age squared  0.0005 0.0012 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0007 
 (-0.004) (-0.0008) (-0.0011) (-0.0011) (-0.0008) (-0.0007) (-0.0006) 
Education(years) 0.00182 0.00654 -0.00647 0.00121 0.00295 0.00569 0.00299 
 (0.00353) (0.00447) (0.00599) (0.00615) (0.00424) (0.00389) (0.00359) 
Currently student  0.0219 0.0260 0.154 0.0908* 0.0102 0.0130 0.00410 
 (0.0301) (0.0316) (0.160) (0.0463) (0.0298) (0.0289) (0.0255) 
First born  0.00818 0.0281 -0.0780 0.116** 0.0723* -0.0586 0.0372 
 (0.0401) (0.0448) (0.0971) (0.0573) (0.0406) (0.0391) (0.0365) 
First born son  0.0208 0.00545 0.0973 -0.0642 -0.0813 -0.00533 -0.0725* 
 (0.0486) (0.0571) (0.106) (0.0739) (0.0503) (0.0502) (0.0458) 
Married   0.0376 0.0418 0.00112 0.173 -0.0865 0.214** 0.0007 
 (0.0436) (0.0290) (0.0376) (0.154) (0.115) (0.0971) (0.0988) 
Have separate cash income  0.0260 0.0463 -0.00491 0.0700* 0.0250 0.0443* 0.0214 
 (0.0228) (0.0291) (0.0376) (0.0420) (0.0276) (0.0257) (0.0232) 
Father characteristics/attributes         
Age     0.000201 -0.00239*   
    (0.00281) (0.00136)   
Education (years)     0.00479 0.00268   
    (0.00580) (0.00400)   
Married to single spouse     0.0845 0.0397   
    (0.0697) (0.0417)   
Mother characteristics/attributes         
Age     0.00623*  -0.00392***  
    (0.00341)  (0.00130)  
Education(years)    0.0195*  0.0192***  
    (0.0101)  (0.00669)  
Relationship to head(1- head, 0 otherwise)      -0.000928  
      (0.0376)  
Head characteristics/attributes          
Female-headed household        -0.0383 
       (0.0344) 
Age        -0.0028*** 
       (0.00106) 
Education of head(years)       0.00320 
       (0.00398) 
Married to single spouse        -0.00357 
       (0.0164) 
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Table 3.8. Continued (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Youth     
 
VARIABLES 
All members  head   controlling for parental 
characteristics   
Father Mother Head  
Household characteristics         
# of male youth in the household 13-34 years -0.0331 -0.0212 -0.00999 0.0160 0.0523* -0.0361 0.0273 
 (0.0243) (0.0276) (0.0860) (0.0420) (0.0302) (0.0324) (0.0296) 
# of female youth in the household 13-34 years -0.0631** -0.0617** 0.26138** 0.00595 -0.0764*** 0.0255 -0.0356 
 (0.0268) (0.0302) (0.0936) (0.0435) (0.0270) (0.0292) (0.0251) 
# of male mature in the household >35 years 0.00466 -0.0104 0.0376 -0.0384 -0.0735** 0.0322 -0.0478 
 (0.0225) (0.0243) (0.0823) (0.0445) (0.0310) (0.0329) (0.0303) 
# of female mature in the household >35 years 0.0756*** 0.0692** 0.0680 -0.0160 0.0455* -0.0322 0.0239 
 (0.0259) (0.0297) (0.0616) (0.0484) (0.0273) (0.0295) (0.0244) 
# of children under 13 years -0.00533 -0.00670 -0.0145 -0.00789 -0.0433*** -0.0192 -0.0223** 
 (0.0100) (0.0125) (0.0183) (0.0190) (0.0124) (0.0119) (0.0109) 
Household assets         
Farm size per own child(in hectares) 0.00253 0.000106 0.00628 -0.0184** -0.00901* 0.00903* -0.000266 
 (0.00520) (0.00601) (0.0120) (0.00732) (0.00526) (0.00479) (0.00459) 
Log(per capita income in Birr) 0.0116 0.0213 -0.00377 -0.00256 0.0140 -0.0115 0.00969 
 (0.0121) (0.0154) (0.0221) (0.0258) (0.0145) (0.0153) (0.0125) 
Livestock holing (tlu) -0.000318 6.27e-05 -0.00251 0.00313 0.00113 0.000115 0.000847 
 (0.00128) (0.00138) (0.00424) (0.00203) (0.00125) (0.00125) (0.00114) 
Roof of the main house is made of corrugated 
iron 
0.0162 0.0118 0.0234 0.0161 0.0158 0.00509 0.0184 
 (0.0242) (0.0299) (0.0413) (0.0444) (0.0297) (0.0266) (0.0244) 
There is electricity in the PA  0.0167 -0.00293 0.0597 -0.0125 -0.0214 -0.0655** -0.0434 
 (0.0309) (0.0369) (0.0589) (0.0546) (0.0327) (0.0320) (0.0287) 
Have no access to public pipe water  0.0853* 0.111 0.123 0.274*** 0.0214 0.0197 0.00829 
 (0.0510) (0.0693) (0.0799) (0.0935) (0.0688) (0.0576) (0.0545) 
There is no youth related projects and programs 
in the PA  
0.0422 -0.00575 0.0968 0.0255 0.00103 0.0162 -0.00323 
 (0.0374) (0.0465) (0.0621) (0.0633) (0.0413) (0.0407) (0.0374) 
has no land certificate  0.0515 0.0881 -0.0390 0.0717 -0.0109 -0.0378 -0.0251 
 (0.0570) (0.0709) (0.0969) (0.0891) (0.0637) (0.0611) (0.0572) 
Saving and credit institutions are available in the 
PA  
0.00621 
(0.0391) 
-0.0533 
(0.0497) 
0.0902 
(0.0640) 
0.00520 
(0.0626) 
-0.0195 
(0.0443) 
0.167*** 
(0.0425) 
0.0487 
(0.0397) 
 0.405 0.695* 0.210 0.257 0.133 0.322 0.230 
District dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant 0.140 0.188 0.0380 0.0226 0.553*** 0.385** 0.4943*** 
 (0.118) (0.160) (0.261) (0.294) (0.170) (0.169) (0.1413) 
/lnsigma -1.404*** -1.399*** -1.509*** -1.472*** -1.730*** -1.583*** -1.621*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0374) (0.0566) (0.0515) (0.0471) (0.0399) (0.0377) 
Observations 638 442 196 233 284 394 443 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: survey results  
Note: Dependent variable is the interval of the lower and upper bounds of the degree of positional concerns. I 
assign 0 for the lower bound of the first interval and 1 for the upper bound of the last interval. All standard errors 
in this paper are clustered at the household level. 1 Euro is about 19.5 birr. PA stands for peasant association, 
lower level administration. In the fathers’ model: It’s interesting to note that controlling for mothers attributes 
(age and education) affect the significance of father attributes: father age turns significant(-), education of father 
turns from positive to negative but insignificant. Both age and education of mother have a positive effect on 
fathers’ attitude towards positionality; further supporting the intra-household heterogeneity and the necessity of 
controlling intra-household in the analyses rather than using household head characteristics. In the mothers’ 
model, like in the fathers’ model, I control for fathers attributes (age, education, and marital status). Once I control 
for these variables, the age of mother remains significant and negative, education of mothers turns insignificant 
but remains positive, land PC turns negative and significant, income PC turns into positive but insignificant. Age 
of father is positive and education of father is negative, both insignificant.  
3.6.2. Positional concerns and subjective well-being youth  
This section presents the estimation results of the form of Eq (3.5a-3.5c), considering different 
specifications presented earlier. In the first model (column 1) I control for youth exogenous variations 
(age of youth, sex, education, relationship to head, studentship status, birth rank); demographic 
characteristics (number of male and female youth members in the household); assets (land per capita, 
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income per capita, livestock holding, roof type, and districts; among others). In the second model 
(column 2), I report the estimates of youth member subjects, separately without controlling for parents 
characteristics. In the third model (column 3) presents the results of the estimates of youth household 
heads, separately. In the fourth model (column 4) I estimate for youth members, controlling for various 
father’s and mother’s characteristics including age, education, marital status of fathers’ and mothers’ 
while for mothers’ I control also their relationship to head. In the fifth model (column 5), I control for 
household head characteristics as an alternative proxy to father and mother characteristics (attributes) 
in addition to youth own characteristics and present the results for members, as an additional 
comparison model and as a way of examining the role of parents in the welfare of youth. It also helps 
to make sure that I have captured adequately relevant variables in the model specifications reducing the 
possibilities of omitted variables bias. In this regard then, I check the sensitivity of our main estimates 
to the inclusion of parents’ characteristics. In all the models, youth own marginal degree of positional 
concerns, fathers as well as heads marginal degree of positional concerns are positively related to youth 
subjective well-being and significant at 1%, 5%, 5%, respectively (column 1,3, and 5 of Table 3.9). The 
major discussion hereafter focuses on the coefficients of the positional concerns of youth, father and 
mother and I present the main results for other variables of interest here since the relationship between 
these variables and SWB has been widely investigated in SWB literature (see, for example, Clark and 
Oswald, 1994; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2003, 2005; Akay, 2012, 2014; among others).  
Disaggregating youth by type without controlling for parents characteristics  
The ordered probit model of the first specification (Eq. 3.5a) suggests that youth own positional concern 
is strongly positively correlated with well-being (highly significant at the 1% level). The sign and the 
significance of the coefficient of the marginal degree of positional concerns confirms that there is a 
strong correlation between youth well-being and the corresponding own marginal degree of positional 
concerns (status concern). These results are robust to two specifications, with members only and with 
youth who are household head (column 2 and 3). This means that the proportion of the total change in 
subjective well-being of youth that comes from an increase in relative income after a marginal increase 
of own income is higher among more positional youth compared to non-positional ones. In other words, 
the positive significant correlation between youth own positional concern and subjective well-being 
suggest that concerns about positionality do matter in their assessments of life satisfaction. In addition, 
it challenges the presumption that positional concerns have an insignificant effect on the utility of 
individuals in poor countries, especially among youth population groups (Akay et al., 2012). The effect 
of (magnitude of) positional concerns on subjective well-being is higher among youth household head 
compared to youth members, suggesting the important role of positional concerns as a determinant of 
SWB and heterogeneous effect of positional concerns among youth categories.  
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A positive relationship between concerns about positionality and well-being of youth can be partly 
interpreted as a sign of ‘signal effect’ or ‘stimulus’  i.e., a youth’s well-being is positively affected by 
the observation of other youth’s faster income progression if they interpret this movement as a sign that 
his own turn will come around soon (Hirschman, 1973; Stark, 2006). It serves them also as an indicator 
of prospects about their future jobs. Participants reported that reference income serves as an information 
to create future expectations and as an aspiration for the possibility of achieving that income level. A 
similar explanation has been reported in South Africa, Russia (Senik, 2004), China (Akay 2012), 
Eastern EU countries and US (Senik, 2008). Relative concerns may induce positive externalities as a 
result of living with wealthy neighborhoods such as learning new moods of production, an adaption of 
new varieties of crops, aspirations to work hard, etc. Compiled responses of the justifications given by 
respondents for choosing society A in the experiment also support this line of argument. In this case, 
then, the relative incomes of the reference groups serve as a stimuli or prospect indicator. I will 
investigate this claim in detail in the next chapter using the realized (realized) income.   
The sign of the coefficients of other variables also turn out to be consistent with a priori expectations 
and the findings are in line with the findings in the existing literature (Akay et al., 2012; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Van Praag, 2003; Akay et al., 2014, among others). I now discuss briefly each of the 
significant variables of other variables influencing SWB of youth using these specifications, before 
presenting the relationship between parents’ marginal degree of positional concerns (a proxy for 
parents’ concern for status) and youth SWB. Youth who do not have mobile phones have lower levels 
of well-being compared to those who own mobile phones. Contrary to the previous studies who have 
documented the existence of U-shape relationship between age and SWB (Akay et al., 2013, 2014), I 
find an inverted U-shape relationship between two. This is not surprising and expected given the fact 
that our sample is youth age groups, i.e. well-being of youth increases as the age increases in the early 
age of their livelihood and decreases as they get older.  
Being enrolled in school is associated with higher well-being. In the benchmark model, birth order (both 
birth rank as well as being a first-born is son) is found to be insignificant, though the coefficient is 
positive. However, being the first-born son becomes significant for youth who are household heads, 
when I separately analyze for members and household head. Land per own child is positively correlated 
with the well-being of youth (similar to what is documented by Bezu, 2014; Akay et al., 2014) but 
insignificant across all the three benchmark models. All these variables turn out to be significantly 
associated with SWB, when SWB is constructed from the 17 different questions of Edenred-Ipsos 
Barometer. Income per capita and livestock holding is positively and significantly associated with 
subjective well-being. This is consistent with the existing empirical evidence (Ravallion and Lokshin, 
2010; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2007). With regard to housing facilities, youth whose roof of a house is 
constructed with corrugated iron have a higher well-being compared to those whose roof is made of 
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other materials. The absence of public pipe water in kebele is associated with lower well-being across 
the three specifications (the highest negative effect for youth household heads).  
Because of youth exposure to different information, youth may perceive that concerns about 
positionality are an important component of their well-being than their parents believe. This could 
perhaps reflect that youth are more equality and socially oriented and/or responsive to inequality among 
peers, hence their perception of well-being is more closely related to other people’s (or their peers) 
income or wealth, including other people's prestige (social standing).   
For youth who are household heads, the magnitudes of the estimates outlined above are larger than the 
one for members. The sign of the estimates is also identical for almost all variables except for being 
currently studying. Controlling for other factors, youth head subjects who are currently studying are 
having less well-being than those who are no longer students. This would be probably because of the 
fact that once youth become household heads, an increase in educational achievement (pursuing 
education) would not increase one’s expectation of success in rural areas. 
Parents’ positional concerns and well-being of the rural youth 
In the following section, I examine whether parents’ concerns about positionality of sons/daughters 
affect the well-being of youth. I explore this by adding a marginal degree of positional concerns of 
fathers’ and mothers’ to the benchmark specification (column 4 of Table 3.9). When I do so and control 
for fathers and mothers characteristics, youth own marginal degree of positional concern remains 
positively and significantly associated with SWB. Interestingly, the size of estimated coefficient has 
increased (from 0.45 to 0.56). As explained earlier, this suggests that quest for status among youth 
induces aspirations/motivation to work hard which in turn foster accumulation of assets, hence higher 
life satisfaction. However, I have to be cautious in interpretations that still higher or extreme income 
disparity may lead to frustration that in turn lower life satisfaction.  
Of parents’ concern for status (fathers and mothers), fathers’ concern for status is highly and 
significantly associated with youth SWB, even higher than the effect of youth’s own status concern. 
Youth from positional fathers are associated with higher well-being compared to those with less 
positional fathers. As stated earlier in the descriptive results, there could be several factors at play. One 
possible justification is that parents who are more positional (those who are more concerned about the 
relative status of their sons/daughters) invest more on their offspring in order to improve the relative 
standing of youth compared to less positional parents. This is also partly reflected with the strong and 
significant positive association between youth SWB and per capita income. The other justification could 
be the altruistic behavior of parents towards their children. This is also likely in rural areas where there 
is strong social capital that complements (or eases) the stress resulting from relative concerns.   
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It would suggest also centralized motives between youth and parents, as a youth would later expect to 
take care of their parents in the way that today’s investment on youth would be repaid later in the form 
of taking care of parents. Though mothers’ are more positional than fathers are, I find no significant 
association with the life satisfaction of youth. This would be partly due to their less influence or 
bargaining power on resource allocation decisions (recent evidence shows that spouse have weak intra-
household bargaining power over their husband and the main control over resource allocation and 
utilization is the main role of men) (Anderson et al., 2017; Wang, 2014). As a result, mothers’ concerns 
for status would have less impact on the well-being of youth. Though the effect of mothers’ concern for 
positionality on the well-being of youth is insignificant, the effect on well-being is revealed through 
their education. I investigate further whether more educated mothers’ influence intra-household 
allocation decisions (or have stronger bargaining power) including investment on youth compared to 
less educated mothers. I explore this by including an interaction term between education of mothers and 
household income and between education of mothers and concern for positionality. I find that the 
interaction terms have positive though insignificant effects on SWB. However, the magnitude of the 
estimates of household income improves significantly suggesting the validity of our claim. Seebens and 
Sauer (2007) find that bargaining power associated with greater control over household resources 
affects the share of an individual’s consumption. Basu (2006) modeled a household behavior with the 
endogenously determined balance of power, and show that the power balance between the husband and 
the wife can depend on the decisions made.  
Interestingly, the inclusion of parents’ concerns for status and their attributes in the specifications do 
substantially affect the estimates of some of the previously discussed parameters (Table 3.9, column 4). 
For instance, the inclusion of parents’ positional concerns and their attributes such as attributes of 
mothers’ improve the explanatory power of the models as well as the magnitude of the estimates of 
some variables such as birth order, the gender of the first born and per capita income. This suggests that 
failing to control for parents characteristics would imply an underestimation of parental effects as well 
as that of youth and might alter the conclusion of the results. At the same time, failure to capture parents’ 
attributes in the analysis of well-being of youth would result in biased estimates.  
Other explanatory variables affecting the well-being of youth members in addition to the ones discussed 
earlier using these specifications include age of the father. I find a negative and significant association 
between fathers’ age and SWB of youth members. Being first-born sons increased the likelihood of 
having higher SWB than first-born daughters. This is mainly because of the fact that the lion’s share of 
household’s resource such as land and livestock is shared to first-born sons than first-born daughters. 
Sons in general and firstborn sons, in particular, are expected to take over family farms. Previous studies 
also indicate that women and girls are less likely to inherent important assets such as land from their 
parents, which limits their access to such resources (Bezu and Holden, 2014). In addition, social norms 
and culture in most rural areas favor first-born sons than daughters. When I disaggregate between sons 
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and daughters, I find a positive and significant association between daughter’s birth order and SWB 
(appendix Table 2.1F). Though one would expect that first born have a higher well-being, it’s equally 
justifiable also that the opposite could hold true. First-born children bear all the responsibilities and 
hardships in order to change the living condition of a household. It’s the role of firstborn to share the 
responsibilities in the family such as looking after the younger siblings as well as their parents at older 
age.  
An alternative estimation technique to analyze the correlation between parents’ concern for status and 
the SWB of youth is the use of household head positional concerns and characteristics in the 
specifications. In doing so, I analyzed the relationship between youth SWB and parents’ positional 
concerns using household head positional concerns, controlling for other head characteristics (Table 
3.9, column 5). I find a positive and statistically significant estimate of household head’s positional 
concern on SWB of youth; similar to the effect of fathers’ positional concern. The size of the estimated 
coefficient is even larger than youth’s own estimated coefficient. In addition, household head married 
to a single spouse is associated with the higher well-being of youth compared to those married to more 
than one spouse. Furthermore, the age of household head is negatively associated with SWB of youth. 
The interpretations of the estimates of the remaining parameters in this specification are the same as 
outlined above. I re-estimated alternative specifications using OLS models and matching techniques as 
well as for work satisfaction measures of SWB, and find substantially similar results24, suggesting that 
our results are robust to different specifications and measurements.    
One of the interesting things to note from the different estimation results reported in Table 3.9 is that 
the use of fathers’, mothers’ and/or household heads’ characteristics, including their concerns for 
positionality have different effects on the life satisfaction of youth. For instance, while fathers’ and 
household heads’ marginal degree of positional concerns are positively correlated with SWB, mothers’ 
positional concern is negatively correlated with SWB. The same is true with the effect of other parental 
characteristics/attributes such as education and age; suggesting intra-household heterogeneity in 
                                                                
24 In addition to using the regression treatment effect (the standard regression techniques), the robustness of 
my results are re-estimated using matching techniques (estimates of the treatment impact); where positional 
dummy indicates treatment status, i.e. treated =1 if positional and 0 otherwise. The positional (treated) and 
non-positional (control) groups are reasonably comparable in terms of age, schooling, gender, families, TLU, 
land, per capita income. Better comparability between the two groups ensures that the matching assumptions 
are to some extent satisfactorily meet. Thus, I use matching techniques (nearest neighbourhood, kernel, and 
propensity score matching) to check further the robustness of the results. The estimation results confirm that 
youth or youth from positional parents have a higher well-being than non-positional youth (or youth from non-
positional parents). For instance, on average, youth who are positional are (0.332/4.276*100)=8% to 
(0.599/4.427*100)=14% more likely happier (have higher level of life satisfaction) than non-positional youth and 
the difference is significant at 1%. Likewise, the effect of mothers’ positional concerns on well-being is positive 
and significant when matching methods are used to estimate the impact.   
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preferences, power relations, and influences. Therefore, the choice of parental characteristics matters in 
the analyses of youth welfare. Note also that I use the hypothetical rural labor income across the groups 
in constructing marginal degree of positional concerns. However, one might argue that the effect of 
hypothetical rural income is not the same as realized labor income. For instance, Akay et al. (2012) find 
that the magnitude of relative income effect on the well-being of migrants is slightly lower when 
realized labor income is used in place of hypothetical rural income. As indicated in the footnote earlier, 
I find that the effect of mothers’ positional concerns on well-being is positive and significant when 
matching methods are used to estimate the impact.  
Table 3.9: The effect of parents’ and youth’s own positional concerns on the well-being youth: results 
from ordered probit models   
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Without controlling for parents 
characteristics: 
 Controlling for parents 
characteristics:  
All Members  household heads   with father and mother 
characteristics  
with head 
characteristics   
Positional concerns  
Youth marginal degree of 
positional concern   
0.446*** 0.311* 0.619**  0.550* 0.362* 
 (0.152) (0.185) (0.302)  (0.281) (0.187) 
Father marginal degree of 
positional concern  
    0.599** - 
 - - -  (0.300)  
Mother marginal degree of 
positional concern  
    -0.0281 - 
 - - -  (0.298)  
Head  marginal degree of positional 
concern  
     0.409** 
      (0.202) 
Mean dependent variable (SWB) 
(control subjects ) 
4.276 4.278 4.273  4.23 4.291 
       
Youth characteristics        
Female youth  -0.0525 -0.165 0.586  0.213 -0.0710 
 (0.193) (0.226) (0.445)  (0.339) (0.226) 
Youth has no mobile phone  -0.498*** -0.347* -0.942***  -0.126 -0.224 
 (0.163) (0.198) (0.318)  (0.310) (0.203) 
Age  0.000257 0.0171 0.0157  0.0617 0.0383 
 (0.0236) (0.0317) (0.0408)  (0.0510) (0.0332) 
Education(years) 0.00899 0.0235 0.0290  0.0179 0.0316 
 (0.0261) (0.0319) (0.0518)  (0.0484) (0.0326) 
Currently student  0.337* 0.515** -1.933  0.724** 0.478** 
 (0.205) (0.227) (1.301)  (0.360) (0.230) 
Relationship to head(1 if member 
and zero otherwise) 
0.488* - -  0.583 1.314 
 (0.288)    (1.383) (0.951) 
Birth rank  0.0334 0.0166 0.0974  0.163** 0.0823* 
 (0.0360) (0.0419) (0.0789)  (0.0776) (0.0458) 
First born is son  0.381 0.443 0.784*  0.974** 0.648** 
 (0.236) (0.300) (0.441)  (0.426) (0.307) 
Have a separate cash income  -0.111 0.0793 -0.634**  -0.269 0.0753 
 (0.167) (0.211) (0.313)  (0.325) (0.212) 
Father characteristics        
Age      -0.0400*  
     (0.0216)  
Education(years)     0.0102  
     (0.0463)  
Married to single spouse      -0.467  
     (0.531)  
Mother characteristics        
       
Age      0.0295  
     (0.0277)  
Education (years)     0.0546*  
     (0.0352)  
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Table 3.9. Continued       
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
VARIABLES All Members  household heads   with father and mother 
characteristics  
with head 
characteristics   
Head characteristics        
Sex      0.0345 
      (0.219) 
Age       -0.0204** 
      (0.00947) 
Education(years)      0.00427 
      (0.0361) 
Married to single spouse       0.307** 
      (0.151) 
Household characteristics        
# of male youth in the household  
13-34 years 
-0.0712 -0.0949 -0.210  0.0518 -0.0473 
 (0.0957) (0.105) (0.326)  (0.145) (0.107) 
# of female youth in the household  
13-34 years 
0.189* 0.182* 0.886**  0.288* 0.158 
 (0.100) (0.109) (0.372)  (0.168) (0.111) 
Household assets        
Farm size per own child(in 
hectares) 
0.225 0.0481 0.668  -0.0693 0.168 
 (0.159) (0.169) (0.491)  (0.201) (0.177) 
Log(per capita income in Birr) 0.324*** 0.453*** 0.271  0.881*** 0.548*** 
 (0.100) (0.126) (0.197)  (0.220) (0.132) 
Livestock holing (tlu) 0.0250** 0.0262** -0.00822  -0.00387 0.0141 
 (0.00975) (0.0107) (0.0368)  (0.0157) (0.0109) 
Roof of the main house is made of 
corrugated iron 
0.279 -0.00774 0.559  -0.0519 0.0160 
 (0.172) (0.212) (0.345)  (0.335) (0.216) 
There is no electricity in the PA  -0.824*** -0.700** -1.528***  0.141 -0.402 
 (0.232) (0.276) (0.510)  (0.382) (0.268) 
Have no access to public pipe water  -0.760** -0.491 -1.460**  -1.201* -0.183 
 (0.383) (0.506) (0.693)  (0.718) (0.495) 
There is no youth-related projects 
and programs in the PA  
0.334 -0.142 1.317**  -0.327 -0.0710 
 (0.279) (0.341) (0.524)  (0.490) (0.344) 
has no land certificate  0.506 0.448 1.005  0.352 0.520 
 (0.428) (0.539) (0.810)  (0.733) (0.539) 
Source water during dry seasons  0.216 0.615*** -0.573    
 (0.181) (0.225) (0.364)    
District dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 638 442 196  291 443 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable, youth subjective well-being, is based on life satisfaction asking subjects to rate their 
life satisfaction on 1 to 9 scales (1 indicating the worst possible life and 9 the best possible life) and then 
categorized into 5 ordered values. Alternatively, the positional concern is converted into a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if a respective subject chooses society Bi in the first choice and 0 if society A in the first choice; 
estimation results reported in Appendix Table A3.7).  
 
3.7. Conclusions and policy implications  
In this study, I have examined whether positional concerns matter for youth and their parents 
(specifically for fathers and mothers) and factors explaining it among rural youth in Ethiopia. I also 
analyzed how and in what way parents’ quest for status is related to the well-being of youth members. 
Then, I explore implicitly whether stronger positional concerns (an increase in relative concerns) among 
parents increases or diverts allocation of household resources to youth members in order to improve the 
relative standing of the offspring which in turn fosters life satisfaction. The study also implicitly 
explores whether the choice of parental attributes matters for the well-being of youth. Intra-household 
positional concerns are computed from the survey experimental approaches addressed to the three group 
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of household members (fathers, mothers, and youth members) while youth well-being is computed from 
a self-reported measure of life satisfaction and/or work satisfaction indicators. Our study is the first 
attempt in explicitly studying the associations between intra-household positional concerns and 
household attributes, and well-being of youth members in developing countries. The findings indicate 
that while there are differences in concerns for positionality among parents and youth members, higher 
marginal degree of positional concern is observed among youth members compared to their fathers and 
mothers; a higher estimate than what is reported in literature in developing countries (Akay et al, 2012, 
2014; Anderson, 2014). Gender wise, young women are positional than young men are. In addition, 
factors explaining positional concerns among the three categories of household members are different. 
Ownership of mobile, having separate independent income, enrolment in school and household 
demographic composition (number of youth, children, and adults in the household) are among the 
factors that motivate youth’s positional concern. On the other hand, birth order and farm size per own 
child (for fathers only), marital status, youth ownership of separate cash income, the age of mothers and 
education of mothers are among factors that determine parents’ positional concerns. When I use a 
household heads marginal degree of positionality as a proxy for parents’ positional concerns, the age of 
youth, the gender of first-born and age of the household heads are found to determine positional 
concerns of parents. Overall, the results indicate that factors determining youth’s own positional 
concerns and parents’ positional concerns differ significantly; though similarity exists between youth 
and mothers.  
It is interesting to note that parents’ and youth’s concern for positionality and their attributes determine 
youth well-being independently and significantly. I find a strong significant correlation between youth 
well-being and parents’ positional concerns. The magnitudes of correlation vary with the socio-
economic characteristics of youth, parents, institutional norms, and youth gender. Fathers’ positional 
concerns have a stronger effect on the well-being of youth than youth’s and mothers’ positional 
concerns. In addition, I find that the effect of fathers and mothers’ positional concerns on SWB of youth 
is heterogeneous. If I use household heads’ as a proxy and alternative to parents’ positional concern in 
the specifications, household heads’ positional concern has also the positive and significant effect on 
the well-being of youth but the effect is less than youth’s own positional concerns. The results are robust 
to different specifications of the utility function and measurement types. Though mothers’ are more 
positional than fathers, I find no significant association with the life satisfaction of youth. This would 
be probably due to their less influence over within-household resource allocation. This line of thinking 
is further supported by the strong positive effect of mothers’ education on the well-being of youth 
members (where more educated mothers’ have a stronger effect on well-being than non-educated 
mothers). The inclusion of interaction term between education of mothers and households income in 
the model as well as estimation results using matching methods also suggest this.  
82 
 
Youth from positional fathers are associated with higher well-being compared to those with less 
positional fathers. There could be several factors at play. One possible explanation is that parents who 
are positional (those who are more concerned about the relative standing of the offspring) invest more 
on their children compared to less positional parents; also reflected with the strong and significant 
positive association between youth life satisfaction and per capita income. The other justification could 
be the altruistic behavior of parents towards their children. It would probably suggest also contractual 
motives between youth members and parents  ̶investment on offspring would be repaid later in the form 
of taking care of parents. The more families make their children happier by reducing the feelings of the 
relative concerns (i.e. the more parents pay attention to their children’s psychological well-being), the 
more their children are creative, productive, and innovative, hence improving long-term welfare 
outcomes. In addition, our findings suggest that the inclusion of parents’ positional concerns and 
mothers’ attributes improve the explanatory power as well as the magnitude of the estimates. This 
clearly suggests that failure to capture parents’ attributes in the analyses of well-being of youth would 
result in biased estimate that has misleading policy implications. The positive impact of relative income 
deprivation on SWB, to be presented in the next chapter, also suggests this. Our results also challenge 
the presumption that positional concern does not matter in poor societies, at least among the younger 
generation, and low marginal degree of positionality among parents does not necessarily reflect the 
irrelevance of positional concerns. In addition, it challenges the unitary models that there is no 
heterogeneity of preferences within households. Rather the result posits that the presence of 
heterogeneous preferences of individuals within households has paramount implications for within 
household resource allocations, utilization, and youth welfare. Most importantly, our findings 
underscore the implications of heterogeneity of parents’ preferences toward positional concerns that 
would affect the well-being of household members suggesting that interventions targeting youth should 
also consider intra-household heterogeneity and within household resource distributional issues.   
I believe that our results would also contribute to the growing evidence that quest for the status matter 
in low-income countries that might affect within household resource distribution as well as a source of 
motivation that in turn fosters well-being. Especially, the findings shed light on the importance of 
relative concerns for SSA countries where the population is dominated by the young generation. Our 
study also provides interesting policy implications (i.e. as inputs into public resource allocation 
decisions regarding efforts to improve youth development outcomes) in designing incentives and 
implementation of projects such as agricultural technologies and access to financial resources targeting 
youth development and participation in agriculture. It’s evident that more work has to be done on how 
the quest for status among parents and household members would affect and shape intra-household 
resource allocation/distribution and the possible pathways through which quest for status may affect 
economic growth. In the next chapter, I explore more in detail how relative concerns might affect youth 
decisions and behaviors, and their occupational choices, with implications on well-being.   
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4. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION IN INCOME, ASSETS AND SOCIAL 
CAPITAL: MOTIVATIONAL AND DETERRENT IMPACTS ON THE WELL-
BEING OF RURAL YOUTH IN ETHIOPIA 
 
Abstract 
Relative income concern (or relative deprivation) is one mechanism through which income or wealth 
inequality is hypothesized to affect human behavior, with consequences on well-being. The study checks 
these effects against multiple self-identified reference groups using a unique rich panel data set from 
Ethiopia, enabling us to examine a broader range of questions related to youth well-being than in 
previous studies in developing countries. In doing so, the study extends the standard analysis of relative 
deprivation (RD) from income per se, to consider social RD as well as assets (non-monetary) RD. Since 
the effects of RD on well-being are also sensitive to the kind of measurements employed, the thesis 
employs two measurements of RD: objective and subjective and compare the results from both. 
Objective measures of RD is based on the Yitzhaki Index defined as the cumulative difference between 
the income, non-income and social capital of an individual and that of all those with greater incomes, 
non-incomes and social capital within a reference group, respectively. Subjective measures of RD is 
defined as an individual’s self-reported assessments of social status or rank based on the three 
dimensions in comparison to his or her reference group(s). Evidence from random-effects ordered 
logistic regression and fixed effects models suggest that while income RD has a motivational impact 
(resulting from a “positive externality” or “signal effect”), assets and social capital RD has a deterrent 
impact (resulting from a status effect) on the well-being of youth. A “signal effect” or a “positive 
externality” - higher income of others in the reference group indicate higher prospects for youth (that 
induce motivation), though this varies male to female youth. Our findings are robust to different 
specifications and use of multiple reference groups. Overall, the thesis suggests that confining RD to 
the monetary sphere may be misleading and doing does not capture the real effects of RD on the well-
being. Our findings have implications for poverty reduction and highlight positive externalities from 
economic (income) gains to peers.  
Keywords: objective relative deprivation, subjective relative deprivation, income, non-income, social 
capital, subjective well-being, rural youth, Ethiopia  
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
Deprivation is often referred as lack of welfare and is understood in terms of both material goods and 
non-material resources but equally applicable to psychological factors (Adjaye-Gbewonyo and 
Kawachi, 2012). Deprivation can be conceptualized in both absolute and relative terms. While the effect 
of the former is often researched in developing countries, the effect of the latter is less investigated, 
especially with respect to a young population group. Relative deprivation involves an explicit social 
comparison that has consequences on an individual or household well-being such as life satisfaction 
and health. This paper investigates both the material and psychological effects of relative deprivation 
on youth well-being.  
Extensive research carried out in developed countries has shown that relative deprivation affects 
individual well-being and behavior, and this has been recognized since the time of Adam Smith (Alpizar 
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et al., 2005). More recently, this analysis has extended to empirically testing the importance of both 
subjective (stated) and objective (revealed) relative deprivation (Easterlin, 1995; Clark et al., 2008; 
Akay and Martinsson, 2011). Existing literature on relative deprivation focuses on the adult or mature 
population. Pingle and Mitchell (2002) report those who are younger and more competitive more likely 
exhibit relative income in the US. Using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel Study (SOEP), 
Friehe et al (2014) find that relative income decrease with age. Similarly, Dahlin et al (2014) find that 
income comparisons are less important among older individuals. Adolescents are more likely to engage 
in risky behaviors than adults are, and emerging empirical evidence shows that peer influence can 
increase risk-taking behaviors (Gardner and Steinberg, 2005).  
Relative deprivation may affect the well-being of people in general and youth in particular in several 
ways. First, “well being is maximized when people live under conditions that mimic those under which 
humans evolved’’ (Chen, 2015: 3). For instance, hunter-gatherer societies punished those who deviated 
from customary practices of equal sharing of food (Deaton, 2001). Second, studies have shown that 
relative deprivation undermines the protective role of the biochemical system of stress response against 
a wide range of human diseases (Salti. 2010; Elgar et al., 2016; Subramanyam et al., 2009). Third, rank, 
rather than absolute possession of resources (money) itself, may determine power and access to 
(exclusion of) material goods and services (Eibnar and Evans, 2005). A good example here is the 
occupational status, which may determine the degree of control people have over others. Fourth, 
empirical evidence has shown that relative deprivation affects health and happiness - the two most 
common indicators of well-being (Kondo et al., 2008; Subramanyam et al., 2009). Finally, relative 
deprivation can foster life satisfaction by promoting a stronger pursuit for status. As Stark (2004) 
indicates, increase in inequality of wealth prompts a stronger quest for status that in turn fosters the 
accumulation of wealth. Thus, such feelings of relative deprivation diminish or enhance individual’s 
wellbeing. Youth population groups are usually responsive to such feelings of relative deprivation. Such 
behavioral responses as competing for higher status, as indicated by the results from the experimental 
approach presented earlier, often force individuals to shift their allocation of resources from meeting 
basic needs to the purchase of positional goods such as mobile phones or expensive clothes, even though 
their absolute income remains low. It may also induce individuals to work hard in order to achieve the 
higher living standard, which others in the reference groups have achieved.  
Despite increasing research on relative deprivation, four issues remain unclear in the literature that tests 
the relative deprivation hypothesis in relation to well-being. First, the choice of objects of comparison 
which individuals or groups use to compare their life conditions against their reference groups are not 
standard (whether income, consumption, wealth, housing facilities, social capital, or political 
connections is a good object of relative comparison or not to capture the likely impact of relative 
deprivation on well-being). Second, the choice of reference groups (whether to use geographic 
proximity, demographic characteristics or economic reference groups) are often determined by the 
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researcher. Third, efforts to establish stronger causal designs that require longitudinal studies with 
careful control for confounding by an individual or household income and other indicators of 
socioeconomic position are limited. Finally, there is inadequate research to advance innovative 
approaches to operationalize the measurement of relative deprivation including the measurement of RD 
in dimensions other than income (Adjaye-Gbewonyo and Kawachi, 2012). To our surprise, the existing 
literature in economics relies on a limited measure of relative deprivation based on income, mainly 
‘’unidimensional’’ measure of relative deprivation (RD), where individuals, households or groups are 
said to be deprived of all income above their income. There are limited empirical works that compare 
and test the effects of subjective and objective measures of RD (including measures of relative 
deprivation in dimensions) on well-being, with implications on poverty reduction. The subjective 
approach has been widely covered in other disciplines such as sociology or anthropology though 
(Runciman, 1966; Goerke and Pannenberg, 2015). The objective measurement approach widely used 
in economics literature uses income as an object of social comparison to test the relative deprivation 
hypothesis while explicitly or implicitly assuming individuals compare themselves with individuals 
within the same reference group (comparison groups) (Yitzhaki, 1979; Stark and Taylor, 1991; Stark et 
al., 2009; Alpizar et al 2005; Elgar et al., 2016).   
Modelling the causal link between relative deprivation and outcome variables of interest such as well-
being has not been an easy task. Different methods and approaches have been adopted to measure and 
link relative deprivation and well-being (Yitzhaki, 1979; Deaton, 2001; Wildman, 2003; Li and Zhu, 
2006; Salti, 2010). Each method and approaches has its own advantages and disadvantages. Put 
differently, the definition of relative deprivation in the analyses of SWB is also another source of 
variations. Literature defines relative deprivation in several ways: i) share of income over mean income 
(ratio) (e.g. Duesenberg and Persson, 1995), ii) distance of individual income from mean income 
(Akerlof, 1997), and iii) income rank (e.g. Frank, 1985). Others like Johnsson-Stenman et al (2002) 
compare ratio and distance formulations of relative income and found that ‘’ratio’’ approach performed 
better than the ‘distance’ approach. 
Measuring relative deprivation is not easy and an elusive issue (Adjaye-Gbewonyo and Kawachi, 2012). 
It is evident that the methods employed partly dictate the results. In this paper, I adopt two different 
methods of measuring relative deprivation: objective and subjective measures of relative deprivation 
by disaggregating relative deprivation along different dimensions. There are two measurement 
approaches to test the effect of relative deprivation on well-being, and I employ both in this paper. The 
first approach uses a revealed preferences approach based on survey data, employed here using 
subjective and objective measurement approaches. The objective approach is common in economics 
literature while the second approach is extensively used in sociology and anthropology literature. The 
second, analytical approach is based on the stated preferences theory (Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002). 
This approach is common in experimental economics. The detail computation and the results of the 
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experiments are presented in the earlier chapter. The difference between the two measures of RD, which 
I employ in this chapter, is that objective measures of RD (of different dimensions) are computed using 
the Yitzhaki index that takes into account the distances in incomes, non-income and social capital. On 
the other hand, subjective measures of relative deprivations are the self-reported level of individuals’ 
relative standing in the income (or wealth) and social capital distribution of the reference groups. The 
subjective measures of RD can be taken as the rank or informative only of the position of individual in 
the income (or wealth), non-income and social capital scale. The two measurement approaches are 
similar in terms of analytical approaches but differ in terms of measurement, which I turn later to discuss 
in more detail. In this paper, the use of subjective measures (self-perceived ratings) to analyze the 
impact of relative concerns (relative deprivation) is distinguishable from objective approaches to 
relative deprivation. I explicitly model the two measurement approaches to relative deprivation and 
relate them to subjective well-being of youth, and compare the results of the two approaches as a 
robustness check. In analyzing objective and subjective RD of different dimensions, I am not only 
comparing the two types of approaches, rather I examine the behavior of the same subject in two 
different settings.  
Similarly, the critical challenge in the computation of RD is the identification of the ‘reference group’ 
within which individuals and/or groups make economic and social comparisons (Subramanyam et al., 
2009). The literature on this is inconclusive. It varies from individual to individual, group to group or 
even society to society. The common practice in existing studies is that researchers determine or assign 
a reference group to each individual or group (Stark and Taylor, 1991; Stark and Wong, 2000; Stark et 
al., 2009; Quinn, 2006; to mention a few). The choice of reference groups critically affects the outcomes 
and the policy implications as well shall show later in this study. In this study, I use 12 different self-
reported reference groups identified through a structured questionnaire, focus group discussions and 
through observational experiences.  
To test the effect of relative deprivation on SWB of youth, regression analyses have been used in the 
literature. A variety of definitions and measures of relative deprivation are used, and whether these 
measures are valid in terms of their correspondence to conceptualizations of RD and their ability to 
capture the essence of the RD hypothesis as it applies to well-being remains an open question (Adjaye-
Gbewonyo and Kawachi, 2012; Salti, 2010). Objective measures used to quantify RD include Yitzhaki 
Index (Yitzhaki, 1979), Deaton formulation (Deaton, 2001), and other income-based measures such as 
log-normal formulations and percentile rank (Eibner and Evans, 2005; Li and Zhu, 2006; Subramanyam 
et al., 2009). In the regression analyses, relative income deprivation together with the absolute level of 
income, and other relevant variables, including observed and unobserved individual characteristics are 
used. In doing so, the sign and significance of the relative income parameter are then used as an 
approximation for relative deprivation among the population of interest. What is evident as a general 
conclusion in the literature is that the effect of relative deprivation on well-being is negative and 
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significant in both economic and statistical sense, which implies that relative deprivation, on average, 
result in welfare loss (Akay and Martinsson, 2012; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Stark, 2010; Ferreri-i-
Carbonell, 2005; Clark et al., 2008, among others).  
Recent evidence has shown the importance of multidimensional relative deprivation - relative 
deprivation that uses multiplicity of indicators or dimensions such as social capital (social relative 
deprivation), non-monetary indicators (such as consumption) and social capital relative deprivation) 
beyond the space of income or monetary approach (Barnet et al., 2004; Sweet, 2011). Incomes or 
monetary indicators are inadequate in themselves in capturing the prevalence and real effect of relative 
deprivation on well-being, especially in developing countries because of the following reasons. Firstly, 
income is often under-reported (understated) in most poor countries. Secondly, in rural areas, a 
significant portion of well-being or livelihood is derived from non-income (or non-monetary assets) 
and social capital such as from in-kind transfers, gifts, material possessions, household amenities and 
other items. For instance, Sweet (2011: 2) suggest that ‘‘because individuals may not know others' 
incomes, symbolic capital — the material possessions or consumption patterns one uses to display one's 
social status—may be a more salient basis for social comparisons.’’ Likewise, Barnett et al. (2004) note 
that it’s not clear whether income alone is most relevant to individuals when they compare themselves 
with others. Another justification to move beyond the money metric measurement of poverty is that the 
poor people most commonly define poverty in terms of insecurity and capabilities, rather than low 
income (Barret and Carter, 2000: 36; World Bank, 2001).  
Social deprivation refers to deprivation in terms of the inability to fulfill the expectations and pressure 
of family, neighbors and tutors, say schoolteachers, and the failure to participate in customary 
community events (Townsend, 1997). It's best captured by measures of social capital such as trust and 
cooperative relations between an individual who share a social identity, for example, ethnicity and 
connections with others of comparative status and power (Kawachi et al., 2004). It also points to power, 
social inclusion or exclusion (Von Braun and Gatzweiler, 2014) and prestige dimensions of relative 
deprivation. Status or relative concerns matter for welfare for the fact that status serves as a collateral 
in poor societies to get a loan, for instance, that translates into poverty reduction. Relative concerns also 
create a force or influence that affect occupational choices in order to meet certain family expectations. 
In some instances, aspiration for certain careers is motivated by an underlying desire to lower relative 
deprivation. In developing countries factors other than income such as social capital via different 
institutions (social networks, religion, sense of belongingness to certain community or groups of 
societies,etc.) is, thus,  equally important for explaining changes in life satisfaction. This adds to the 
justification to go beyond the income sphere in the analyses of SWB.  
The novelty of our research is five folds. First, I extend the standard analysis of relative concerns (or 
relative deprivation) to income per se and consider social relative deprivation as well as non-monetary 
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(non-income) relative deprivation. I investigate their effects on the life satisfaction of the rural youth. I 
show that strictly monetary indicators of deprivation can be misleading in terms of identifying the well-
being impacts of deprivation. Second, using different types of reference groups, I show how critical the 
choice of reference groups can be, how it influences the robustness of the results and identifies different 
avenues for policy intervention. Third, I rely purely on self-reported reference groups (as opposed to 
assigned reference groups), thus increasing the level of information about each reference group. In other 
words, I rely on respondents’ own classification of reference groups in defining and operationalizing 
relative deprivation measures, rather than our own classifications. Fourth, our paper is the first in the 
literature that combines these three innovations with objective and subjective measures of relative 
deprivation. I provide evidence that relative deprivation is a key determinant of life satisfaction for the 
rural youth, and show that our results are robust to the different analytical approaches. Finally, our panel 
data set allows us to control for omitted variable bias and confounding factors that lead to possible 
endogeneity.  
By doing so, I close some of the gaps in the existing and inconclusive literature as well as in the lack of 
empirical evidence on the importance of relative concerns among young people and the relevance of 
multiple choice of reference groups in the analysis of subjective well-being of the rural youth. The 
recent studies I am aware of which have similar applications to ours are Hyll and Schneider (2014) 
(limited to income but used multiple reference groups), Akay and Martinsson (2011) (limited to 
income), Goerke and Pannenberg (2015) (limited to income) and Elgar et al (2016) (they analysed the 
correlation between relative deprivation and risk factors for obesity using both income and consumption 
indictors). Except for Akay and Martinsson (2011), all are in developed countries. Akay and Martinsson 
(2011) concluded that relative income has no impact on the subjective well-being of adults in rural areas 
of northern Ethiopia. However, as I shall argue later, their analysis treats household members as 
homogenous groups and their study is limited to the very poor and mature households. As indicated in 
the previous study, youth, father, and mother have different preferences for positional or relative 
concerns and their preferences have different impacts on the well-being or utility of household 
members, especially on youth members.  
Overall, the results consistently imply that though the magnitude of relative deprivation depends on the 
measurement of RD employed, the reference group definitions and type of youth, the results converge 
that relative deprivation (of different dimensions) having statistically and economically meaningful 
impacts on the SWB of the rural youth. An increase in individual relative income deprivation prompts 
a stronger desire for hard work; that, in turn, fosters the accumulation of wealth and/or income, hence 
enhances life satisfaction, if the objective measurement of relative deprivation is employed. Our 
findings also suggest variation in the impact of relative deprivation of different dimensions on youth 
SWB for sons and daughters across reference groups. In addition, the effect of absolute income on SWB 
of male youth is consistent across the two measurement approaches employed but vary for the female 
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youth members; and the results are robust across various measures of relative deprivation and reference 
group definitions. Furthermore, the results indicate that decomposing the contributions of each RD 
along different dimensions would help to avoid the averaging of positive and negative income and non-
income RD, and SWB relations (reduces problems of aggregation of RD). The same is true with splitting 
male and female youth as well as members and household head youth.  
 The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. The next section will present a brief literature 
review focusing on objective and subjective measures of relative deprivation. Section 3 report which 
reference groups are perceived to be important for youth respondents. Section 4 presents the results 
from objective measures of relative deprivation, including the data set, empirical framework, estimation 
techniques, and the impact of objective relative deprivation of different dimensions on subjective well-
being. I also explore a comprehensive robustness check based on multiple definitions of self-identified 
reference groups. In addition, the section presents the impact of relative deprivation on SWB 
disaggregated by gender. Section 5 presents the results from the subjective approach based on different 
specifications, after presenting the empirical framework, descriptions of the subjective data set and the 
estimation techniques employed using subjective measures. Finally, section 6 discusses the results of 
the two approaches and concludes. Appendices are presented at the end.   
4.2. Literature review: objective and subjective measures of relative deprivation  
The perception of ourselves in the social hierarchy depends on the relative notion according to which I 
compare ourselves to neighbors, colleagues, relatives, more generally to a ‘’reference group’’. Thus, 
our decisions or satisfaction in life depends partly on what I see around us. As such, the social status of 
an individual plays an important role in the determination of well-being. Runciman (1966: 1) defines 
the concept of relative deprivation as: “We can roughly say that [a person] is relatively deprived of X 
when (i) he does not have X; (ii) he sees some other person or persons, which may include himself at 
some previous or expected time, as having X, (iii) he sees it as feasible that he should have X”. He 
noted also, “The magnitude of a relative deprivation is the extent of the difference between the desired 
situation and that of the person desiring it.” Based on Runciman, Yitzhaki (1979) operationalized the 
concept using income as the object of relative deprivation where individual relative deprivation is 
simply the sum of the gaps between the individual’s or household’s income or wealth and the income 
or wealth of all other individuals or households richer than he does. In this context, income is considered 
an index of the individual’s ability to consume commodities.  
Robson (1992:5) developed a model of decision making in which agents care not only about their 
relative wealth but also about their relative position in the wealth distribution. He stated, “Subjective 
rank in the wealth distribution enters von Neumann–Morgenstern utility as an argument in addition to 
wealth itself. Thus, higher wealth increases utility not only directly but also indirectly via higher status.” 
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Pham (2005) also developed a model in which social status is positively associated with individual 
wealth and negatively related to the average wealth of the society.  
In the literature, empirical specifications of welfare and relative deprivation have several sources of 
variations. These include the choice of measures to compute RD- objective (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; 
Oshio et al., 2011) or subjective (McBride, 2001), the functional modelling of both absolute and relative 
income, and the choice of control variables (McBride, 2001), determination and choice of reference 
groups (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Clark et al., 2008), use of estimators to approximate RD (Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters, 2004), and use of data set (cross-section vs panel data set) (Di Tella et al., 2003). 
Table 4.1 summarises the main empirical studies in different areas employed objective and subjective 
measurement of relative deprivation. Before presenting our data sources, estimation methods and the 
main results from the two measurement approaches to RD employed in this chapter, lets us discuss first 
the choices and types of self-identified reference groups used in this study. 
Table 4.1:  Selected literature on the measurement of RD and areas of application  
Authors  Reference group  Comparison   Dimension   Area of study  Method  
Velben (1909) Society  Income  Unidimensional  Economics   
Runciman (1966) Society/community Income Multidimensional Poverty  Subjective   
Yitzhaki (1979) Region/national  Income Unidimensional  Poverty/inequality   Objective  
Sen (1983) Neighbors/community Income Unidimensional  Well-being/poverty  Objective  
Stark and Taylor (1991) Village  Income Unidimensional  Migration, poverty  Objective  
Quinn(2006) Community (average income) Income Unidimensional  Migration  Objective  
Stark et al.(2009) Region  Income Unidimensional Migration  objective  
Goerke and 
Pannenberg(2015) 
Multiple reference groups 
(colleagues, occupation, friends, 
neighbors, age group, parents, 
partner) 
Income Unidimensional  Well-being  Subjective   
Hyll and Schneider(2014) Relatives/friends  Income  Unidimensional  Migration  Objective  
Elgar et al(2016) Schoolmate  Income, social 
status  
Multidimensional  Health (obesity)  Objective   
Subramanyam 
et al., 2009 
multiple reference groups(17) 
(age, gender, race, education, 
state residence, and combination 
of the above) 
Income  Unidimensional  Health (self-rated:0 
excellent/very good, 
good and 1 if poor or 
fair)-poor health 
Objective  
Singer (1981) Multiple reference groups(gender, 
education, race, geographic 
proximity 
Income  Unidimensional  Poverty   
Akay and 
Martinsson(2011) 
Multiple(district, community, age, 
land) and combination of it  
Income  Unidimensional  Well-being (on very 
poor) 
Objective   
Easterlin,1997, 1995 Country  Income  Unidimensional  Well-being  Subjective  
Alpizar et al 2005 Society  Income and 
consumption  
Multidimensional  Well-being   Objective   
Note: All reference groups are assigned by authors, i.e. the researcher chooses reference groups a priori. Objective 
means that realized income is used as the object of relative deprivation and Yitzhaki index applied to compute 
relative deprivation and subjective means respondents self-reported measures of intensity of comparisons 
(respondents are asked to report their relative deprivation). General means not specific to relative deprivation. 
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4.3. Relative deprivation and the choice of reference groups 
The first step in the computation of relative deprivation (RD) is the determination and choice of relevant 
‘reference group’ with whom individuals or groups make comparisons about their life situations. The 
concept of reference group was first explored in the 1960’s in the field of social psychology (Runicman, 
1966). For instance, Runciman noted that the choice of reference groups is important for the study of 
status concerns. Akay et al (2014) present a brief history and explanations of the different reference 
groups.  
The most difficult task in empirical tests of the RD hypothesis is the choice or determination of reference 
group. What is common in economics literature is that reference groups are chosen a priori by the 
author(s) based on geographic proximity, demographic characteristics such as age, education, race, 
gender or other economic comparison groups undermining the fact that individuals do not necessarily 
share the same reference group (e.g. Eibner and Evans, 2005; Kondo et al., 2009; Subramanyam et al., 
2009). In addition, individuals may have various simultaneous reference groups that affect their well-
being in different ways. Furthermore, unlike in developed countries, the presence and reliance on 
informal insurance systems in low-income countries make the reference groups to be complex in 
structures. For instance, an income increase of others in their network either could positively or 
negatively affect the utility of an individual belonging to that network or reference group. Hence, the 
choices of reference group matters as the effect of relative deprivation vary depending on how the 
reference group is specified and defined. Unlike the previous surveys, this survey contains questions 
that ask people directly to whom they compare themselves. Like our study, I am aware of only a few 
studies who have employed this approach (Clark and Senik, 2010a; Senik, 2009; Knight et al., 2009; 
Carlsson and Qin, 2010; Carlsson et al., 2009; Mayraz et al., 2009; Akay et al., 2014). For instance, 
Akay et al (2014) ask how respondents perceive themselves relative to others by presenting multiple 
reference groups. They didn’t ask about the reference groups against which people compare themselves. 
The insignificant effect of relative income deprivation in poor societies could be partly due to the way 
the reference groups are defined, and RD is measured as well as operationalized. To overcome this 
inherent limitations, I propose the use of multiple reference groups identified via structured 
questionnaire and focus group discussions (FGD) with different groups of societies such as women 
mature, men mature and most importantly youth, by explicitly asking respondents with whom they are 
more likely to compare their life situations to or socio-economic status. In other words, respondents 
were asked to identify their most relevant reference groups25, used separately as well as in combination, 
to whom they make economic, social and political comparisons. The responses are summarised in Table 
4.2. Following that, questions relating to subjective relative deprivation and standard life satisfaction 
(or dissatisfaction) against the same multiple reference groups were presented to respondents. After 
                                                                
25 In my survey, I identify that the same individual have different reference groups based on variable of 
interest (this is in line with Runciman, 1966). 
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dictating their current standing, respondents have also requested to position themselves compared to 
others four years ago, three years ago, and one year ago.  
This kind of approach gives respondents the freedom to make their own comparisons, thus avoiding the 
problem of determining which comparison groups are most important for social comparisons and 
consequently for well-being. A problem with this approach is that self-rating of RD may be endogenous 
with respect to the well-being outcome being reported. For instance, poor health condition may lead to 
lower self-ratings because of lower self-esteem. To overcome this problem, the presence of panel data 
enables us to use fixed effects that remove time-invariant characteristics. The focus group discussions 
held with different groups of youth, mature men and women also suggest that youth, as well as their 
parents, do care about relative concerns. I will examine in detail later which scope of comparison 
(within, upward or society-wide) matter for youth well-being as well as occupational choices. Given 
the observed distribution of income and consumption intensities across the reference groups, it may be 
of interest to know to which reference group youth and their parents compare most. Let’s first discuss 
the different reference groups identified. Later on, for simplicity and empirical reasons, I will use mainly 
some of the identified reference groups for the remainder of the analyses.  
Rural youth may be slightly comparable in terms of observed attributes such as age. It is not logical to 
assume that a youth who is 16 years old can compare himself/herself with 32 years old. Hence, I narrow 
down this reference group categorizing youth into similar age group (into four categories). Accordingly, 
I divide age brackets into 13-19, 20-24, 25-29, and older than 30. Education is divided into four different 
categories according to the number of years of education: illiterate to only literate, 1-6, 7-10, and more 
than 10 years of education. Of the socio-demographic reference groups, 88% and 58% of the youth 
respondents indicate similar age group and youth in the same religion as a relevant comparison group, 
respectively. With regard to geographic areas reference groups, 94% and 67% of youth respondents 
regard other youth in their village and woreda as their relevant comparison groups when they compare 
their economic, social, and political status with that of others, respectively. As to the economic reference 
groups, for instance, focusing on work-related reference group, 94% of respondents regard economic 
comparisons (such as the size of land holding, number of livestock holding and other youth in the same 
occupation) as important when they compare their socio-economic status with that of others. Since the 
educational infrastructure in our study areas is more or less similar, direct comparisons can be 
established. Hence, it may be the case that youth in rural areas, compare themselves to the completely 
rural youth population. In doing so, I explore RD “relative to an array of possible reference groups 
defined using different comparison orbits of social proximity” (Mayraz et al., 2009:2). I identify self-
93 
 
selected multiple reference groups26 used separately as well as in combination based on geographic 
areas as well as demographic and economic status are presented in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2:  Self-identified reference groups (as reported by respondents) 
 
Reference group 
Youth Father Mother 
Yes (%) No (%) 
Socio-demographic reference groups     
   The same age group  88 12 ** ** 
    Birth order/siblings  31 69   
    Other youth in the same ethnic group 55 45   
    Other youth in another ethnic group 39 61   
    Educational level  of other youth in the same village    ***  ** *** 
    Housing facilities of other youth in the same village  ***  ** ** 
    Other youth in the same religious group 58 42   
    Other youth in another religious group  41 59   
    Peers’ behavior (alcohol, and other)    ** *** 
     
Geographical areas reference groups     
    Other youth in the same Village [neighbors] 94 6 *** *** 
Other youth in the same kebele 93 7 *** *** 
    Other youth in the same Woreda   67 33 ** ** 
     
Economic reference groups     
     Size of land holdings  92 8 ** ** 
     Number of livestock holdings  87 13 *** ** 
    Other youth in the same occupation (all the same-type workers)  94 6 ** ** 
Source:  survey result and own compilation from FGD responses.  
Note: *** and ** indicates the intensity of comparisons (or relevance of reference groups) for the different object of 
comparisons (income, economic and social indicators) is highly important and important for socio-economic status comparison 
as identified during the FGD, respectively. These reference groups are not included in the survey questionnaire and identified 
through FGD. Some reference groups overlap, for instance, an ethnic group with the whole sample used in combinations with 
others while others used in their own. Especially, geographic area reference groups are highly used in combination with other 
reference groups. The use of the same religion as reference group is reported in districts where Muslim and protestant is 
dominant; whereas use of different religion is so strong in Muslim dominant areas.  
Based on Table 4.2, I decided to use the following reference groups: 1) socio-demographic reference 
groups (other youth of similar age group, education level), 2) geographical areas reference groups 
(village, kebele and woreda level), 3) economic reference groups (land size, TLU, and youth employed 
in similar occupation having similar experience) and combinations of the three categories. The concept 
of the neighbourhood was approximated using the entire village (enumeration area), entire kebele, and 
entire woreda. Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics based on the classifications of the reference 
groups.  
 In this study, some reference groups serve as an object of comparison. For instance, educational level 
and a number of livestock owned could serve also as comparison variables. Recent evidence indicates 
that religion, (which is often ignored, while religious adherence is on the rise), in developing countries 
                                                                
26 In my survey, I identify that the same individual have different reference groups based on variable of 
interest (this is in line with Runciman, 1966). 
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is becoming an important factor for economic and social inclusion (or exclusion), and poverty 
alleviation (or aggravation). The 2015 Global Attitudes survey looked at how people around the world 
feel about religion in their lives. The study finds that 98 percent of Ethiopians consider religion as a 
very important part of who they are (Pew Research Centre, Statista).  
     Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for the different classification of the reference groups 
Reference group Mean Std.Dev. N 
Socio-demographic reference groups    
Age    
13-19 16.55 1.33 334 
20-24 21.53 1.41 109 
25-29 26.66 1.49 115 
30-34 31.50 1.49 102 
Ethnic  group    
Oromo  1 0 659 
Educational level(in years)    
Illiterate to only literate 0 0.9 221 
1-6 years of education 3.74 1.70 349 
7-10 years of education 8.31 1.16 82 
More than 11 years 12.28 0.45 7 
Religion (frequencies)    
Christian 0.69 0 457 
Muslim 0.31 0 202 
Youth type     
Live with parents  0.70 0 462 
Youth headed  0.30 0 198 
    
Geographical areas reference groups    
Village [neighbors] level 1 0 108 
Kebele level  1 0 36 
Woreda  level  1 0 12 
    
Economic reference groups    
Land size(hectares)    
[0.05-0.75] 0.50 0.21 166 
(0.75-1.0] 0.95 0.07 99 
(1.0 -1.25] 1.16 0.08 79 
(1.25-2.0] 1.69 0.23 126 
>2.0 4.24 3.43 172 
Number of livestock (TLU)    
[0-1.64] 0.84 0.47 71 
(1.64-3.62] 2.61 0.49 90 
 (3.62-6.73] 5.22 1.01 159 
(6.73-12.2] 9.23 1.56 161 
>12.2 22.72 12.44 162 
Occupation/education     
   Part-time/student  0.35 0 229 
Full-time/farmer 0.59 0 391 
Business/off-farm worker 0.06 0 40 
Source: survey results  
Note: Average land size (in hectares) holding per household was about 1.89 (median 1.25) with a standard deviation of 2.31 
(min land size was .05 ha and the maximum was about 27.29ha). Mean TLU holding for the whole sample was 9.71(median 
6.73) with a standard deviation of 10.44. Almost 93.3% of youth employed in farming either on their farm or family farm.    
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4.4. Objective measurement of relative deprivation and subjective well-being  
4.4.1. The data set for objective measurement of relative deprivation  
As stated earlier, our main dataset for this study is drawn from the novel Ethiopian Agricultural Growth 
Program (AGP) survey covering agricultural potential areas of Oromia, Ethiopia. Since I discussed 
earlier our sample selection procedures, I focus on important data sets used in this chapter.  
The survey collected detail information on youth characteristics, household characteristics, father 
characteristics, mother characteristics, wealth of households, as well as youth’s separate wealth, 
income, employment, social networks, life events, reference groups, and subjective well-being. 
Community questionnaire includes location and access to basic infrastructures, institutions and youth-
related projects and interventions in the areas. After eliminating some due to missing information, non-
response and inconsistency, I obtain a sample of 1162 observations based on 620 youth individuals 
covered in 2010/11 and 2014/15.  
In the econometric specifications, I followed the main approach in the analyses of SWB, and regress 
relative deprivation and other socio-economic factors such as income, health, and non-income factors 
on youth SWB (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2008).  
In the objective measures to relative deprivation along different dimensions, I categorize relative 
deprivation into income, non-income both called economic relative deprivation and social relative 
deprivation. I construct separate indices for each dimension of relative deprivation using Yitzhaki index 
across the different reference groups. I follow series of steps presented in section 4.4.3 (in line with 
Eglar et al., 2016) in computing r objective relative deprivation from the social and non-income 
indicators. In this paper income used for the computation of relative deprivation index using Yitzhaki 
measure is yearly household income27, which is calculated as the sum of the sale of crops, off-farm 
income, the sale of livestock and livestock products, oxen rentals, gifts, transfers, and remittances. In 
order to take account of inflation, all income measures are deflated to 2011 prices. Computation 
techniques are presented in the following section. Finally, I relate these indices with youth well-being 
along with other control variables. The scales of the responses for non-income and social capital 
indicators show that the weighting of indicators implicitly done by the respondent. 
4.4.2. Measuring well-being  
Like relative deprivation, the measurement of well-being has always been a controversial issue and 
subject of debate in economics. There are two main approaches to the measurement of well-being: 
                                                                
27 The farm income here is the gross value of farm output, mainly crop, evaluated at the average farm-gate sales 
prices in the case of substance farming. The income contributions from livestock is income from the sales of 
animals and animal products reported by households who sold livestock during the agricultural production 
seasons. Rental income here is mainly the income contributions from land rents, oxen as well as payments 
received for capital services such as machineries. Other income includes income from handicrafts, sales of 
firewood, and charcoal. 
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cardinal (objective well-being metrics) and ordinal (or subjective well-being metrics). Neo-classical 
economists such as Alfred Marshall, Leon Marlus and Menger argue that utility (here well-being) is 
cardinal or quantitative like weight, height and temperature and can be expressed in mathematical 
variables derived from income, consumption, education or employment status, what is commonly called 
objective indicators of well-being. On the other hand economists such as Hicks argue that utility cannot 
be measured numerically, rather it can only be ranked (as 1, 2, 3, and so on) and utility or welfare is 
related to psychological aspect (or mental state) of individuals. Well-being can also be captured using 
perceived opportunities and means to achieving things in life using perceptions variables such as 
perceptions of health, belief in hard work as a means of getting ahead and satisfaction with the freedom 
to choose in life (Graham and Nikolova, 2015). In this study, I use self-reported measures of well-being 
(i.e. self-reported subjective metrics - subjective well-being) as proxies for youth well-being captured 
using specially designed survey questions. This approach has been widely used in literature (Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; D’ambrosio and Frick, 2007; Akay and Martinsson, 2011; Easterlin, 1995, 
among others).  
As stated earlier, I capture subjective well-being in two ways: by interviewing youth in surveys using a 
single-occasion, self-report question, and from the work satisfaction questions of the general Edenred-
Ipsos Barometer. The first approach is based on the standard life satisfaction measures on a 9-point 
scale, ranging from 1 (indicating the worst possible life) to 9 (the best possible life). In this approach, 
youth respondents were requested to evaluate their well-being as a reflective assessment of one’s life 
as a whole rather than a description of an emotional state. The second approach that uses general 
Edenred-Ipsos Barometer uses sum of the answers to 17 questions of the Edenred-Ipsos Barometer 
categorized into three pillars with scores from 1 to 5 (1 strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree). 
Judgments about life satisfaction specific to life domains such as work, health, community (and/or 
social networks) and relationships were applied here to capture their satisfaction with life. In line with 
the previous analyses, the following analyses employ the empirical measure of SWB using self-reported 
life satisfaction. In other words, I measure SWB using survey questions about satisfaction with life as 
whole asking respondents to rank their current life relative to their best possible life. Since all other 
variables of interest such as income and other explanatory variables in the model are captured during 
baseline data, I used a recall method to capture SWB of individuals at the time of baseline. This 
technique enabled us to make full use of the panel nature of our dataset since panel data allows 
controlling for otherwise unobserved individual characteristics. As such, I asked respondents to rate 
their satisfaction with life over the last five years: four years ago, three years ago, and one year ago 
compared to their current situation during the second wave of the survey. This exercise also enabled the 
respondents to assess their personal well-being over time based on their own opinion. After all, SWB 
is subjective to the individual in question and completely left up to the individual to explain his SWB 
or level of satisfaction (McBride, 2001). On the other hand, these measures of satisfaction scales may 
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result in panel effects (learning effects), i.e. respondents may tend to use these scales differently after 
‘getting used’ to them. For instance, respondents may stay away from the extreme values such as ‘9’ 
(Frank et.al. 2006).  
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of subjective well-being across one of the different relevant reference 
groups (woredas). As indicated below, the distribution of SWB is not similar across the reference group, 
using woreda, for instance.  
 
Fig.4.1 Distribution of subjective well-being across woredas  
4.4.3. The Empirical Framework and estimation strategy  
Objective measurement of relative deprivation  
The theoretical foundation of this chapter bases on the concept of relative deprivation put forward by 
Runciman (1969) and operationalized by Yitzhaki (1979) and Stark and Yitzhaki (1988). As stated 
earlier, the notion of relative deprivation is that even if I can be satisfied in absolute terms, our level of 
satisfaction depends on what I see around us. In this study also I conceptualize that youth satisfaction 
in life depends on absolute and relative income (or wealth) of their own or parents, their social capital 
and the social capital of their peer groups.  
As stated earlier, I decompose ‘objective’ measures of relative deprivation (RD) along three different 
dimensions: income, non-income, and social capital. Relative income deprivation (RD) (which is 
commonly based on income and computed using Yitzhaki index) is defined as the gaps between the 
individual’s (or household’s) income (or wealth) and the incomes (or wealth) of all individuals or 
households richer than their within a reference group. According to this measure, individuals or 
households within the same reference group and with identical income, Y, all experience the same level 
of relative deprivation. The same is true with other dimensions of relative deprivation such as social 
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capital deprivation (SD) and non-monetary relative deprivation (NID) (i.e. deprivation in material 
assets). With some extension of Stark and Zawojska (2015), I model the link between relative 
deprivation of the different dimensions and youth well-being using objective measures of RD in the 
following way. Consider a youth population of n in which every member of n has a positive level of 
income, Yi. Income distribution of youth (or households) are given by 𝑌1 < 𝑌2 < ⋯ < 𝑌𝑛; where  𝑌𝑖 
denotes the income of the household to which youth i belong. In the same manner, the social score 
distribution like the income distribution are given by 𝑆1 < 𝑆2 < ⋯ < 𝑆𝑛; where Si denotes the social 
score (or capital) of the ith youth. Like-wise, the non-income items or material possessions that display 
one’s social status compared to those generally owned in his or her reference groups are also given by 
𝑁𝐼1 < 𝑁𝐼2, … < 𝑁𝐼𝑛; where 𝑁𝐼𝑖 denotes the non-income items (or patterns) of the ith youth belonging 
to a household. 
Thus, I define the utility (or well-being) function, Ui, of youth i belonging to population n as follows: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑌1, … , 𝑌𝑛)  =      𝛽𝑖𝑌𝑖 + (1 − 𝛽𝑖)𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟(𝑌1, … , 𝑌𝑛) 
+  𝜃𝑖𝑆𝑖 + (1 − 𝜃𝑖)𝑆𝐷𝑖
𝑟(𝑆1, … , 𝑆𝑛) 
                      + 𝛿𝑖𝑁𝐼𝑖 + (1 − 𝛿𝑖)𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑖
𝑟((𝑁𝐼1, … , 𝑁𝐼𝑛)                                         (4.1) 
Where 𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟(. ) is a measure of relative income deprivation; 𝛽𝑖Ͼ (0,1) expresses the weight accorded by 
youth i to ther parents’ incomes; (1-𝛽𝑖) expresses the intensity of concerns that youth i attach to relative 
income; 𝑆𝐷𝑖
𝑟 (.) and 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑖
𝑟 (.) are measures of relative social deprivation and relative non-monetary 
deprivation, respectively; θi  Ͼ (0,1) is the weight accorded by youth i to their social capital; (1 − 𝜃𝑖) 
and (1-δi ) denote the intensity of  concern that youth i attach to relative social capital and relative non-
monetary income, respectively; r denotes types of self-identified reference groups presented in Table 
4.3. Relative income, relative non-income and relative social deprivations of youth i, who are members 
of a reference group of n individuals (i.e. the subpopulation of all individuals belonging to the same 
reference group (r) such that i=1, 2,…, n), are defined as the weighted sum of the excesses of incomes, 
non-incomes and social capitals higher than Yi, Si, NIi such that the excesses are weighted by their 
relative incidence, respectively.  
To operationalize objective measures of relative deprivation, I calculated relative deprivation for each 
youth within identified reference group using the Yitzhaki index (Yitzhaki, 1979). For instance, the 
relative income deprivation function of youth i with household income, Yi, who is a member of a self-
identified reference group (r) of n individuals, is given as follows: 
𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟(𝑌1, … , 𝑌𝑛) =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑌𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+1 − 𝑌𝑖)                          (4.2) 
Where 𝑌𝑗>𝑌𝑖; noting that for any j≤i, max {𝑌𝑗−𝑌𝑖, 0} = 0; j is individuals whose income are greater than 
i; n is the subpopulation of all individuals belonging to comparison group or reference group, r ,i.e. the 
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number of individuals who are in the r reference group. Note that n varies with the kinds of reference 
groups used. With this measure of relative income deprivation, an individual (or household) i with say 
income Y is deprived of all income above Y (Stark and Taylor, 1991), i.e., RDi=RDi (RIi), where RI 
denotes relative income in comparison to the reference group. Therefore, individuals within the same 
reference group and with identical income Y all experience the same level of relative income 
deprivation. The Yitzhaki index is an ‘upward looking’ index of deprivation by construction. Based on 
this construction, I model and calculate ‘r=12’ estimates of RD for each youth i. One of the prominent 
findings in this study that deserves special attention is the direction of the effect of relative income 
deprivation on SWB. If the economic success (income in this case) of other individuals or households 
in the reference groups depresses youth welfare, it means that the coefficient of RD (1 − 𝛽𝑖) is negative 
and interpreted as ‘’status effect’’. On the other hand, youth well-being can be positively affected by 
the income of the relevant peer groups. Under such conditions, I expect that the coefficient of RD (1 −
𝛽𝑖) is positive and can be an indication of a ‘’signal effect or positive source of information’’- higher 
income of others in the reference group indicate higher prospects for youth, that shapes future 
expectations and decisions. It means also that youth build aspirations based on the achievements of 
other peers such as based on the standard of living of other youth of similar age, occupation, etc. Positive 
effect of relative deprivation on SWB could be also related to pure ‘’economic externalities’’, where 
relative income (deprivation) act as a proxy for the benefits of living with rich(er) people or wealthy 
neighbourhoods (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). It’s possible that the two effects could exist simultaneously. 
In this case, when the status effect dominate the signal effect, the coefficient of relative deprivation is 
negative, whereas the effect is positive when vice-versa.  
Similarly, I compute social relative deprivation obtained from social capital indicators, as the weighted 
sum of the excess of social scores higher than 𝑆𝑖 such that the excess is weighted by its relative 
incidence: 
𝑆𝐷𝑖
𝑟(𝑆1, … , 𝑆𝑛) =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑆𝑗 − 𝑆𝑖)
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+1                (4.3) 
 Where 𝑆𝑗 > 𝑆𝑖; noting that j≤i, max {𝑆𝑗−𝑆𝑖 , 0} = 0.  
A similar approach is used in Elgar et al. (2016). Mathematically, the same approach is also employed 
to compute relative non-income (non-monetary) deprivation (NID) from the non-income scores/items 
(NI) as follows:  
𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑖
𝑟(𝑁𝐼1, … , 𝑁𝐼𝑛) =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑁𝐼𝑗 − 𝑁𝐼𝑖)
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+1                     (4.4) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑁𝐼𝑗 > 𝑁𝐼𝑖  and j≤i, max {𝑁𝐼𝑗−𝑁𝐼𝑖 , 0} = 0 
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Though I cannot determine a priori, I expect that relative social deprivation and non-monetary relative 
deprivation are negatively associated with youth well-being. However, large social networks improve 
well-being significantly (Akay et al., 2012).  
Generally, a utility function encompassing the three dimensions of relative deprivations and other 
related factors, important for well-being can be expressed in the following relation: 
𝑈(𝑖, ℎ) = 𝑆𝑊𝐵(𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟 , 𝑆𝐷𝑖
𝑟 , 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑖
𝑟 , 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖 , 𝑁𝐼𝑖)            (4.5) 
Alternatively, the above relationship can be expressed as follows where the different dimensions of 
relative deprivation are the function of the respective income, social capital, and non-income of the 
reference groups: 
𝑈(𝑖, ℎ) = 𝑆𝑊𝐵(𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟(𝑌𝑖 , 𝑌𝑗), 𝑆𝐷𝑖
𝑟(𝑆𝑖 , 𝑆𝑗), 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑖
𝑟(𝑁𝐼𝑖 , 𝑁𝐼𝑗), 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖 , 𝑁𝐼𝑖  )                                           (4.6) 
Where r, i, j, and h as defined earlier.  
Estimation strategy  
Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, SWB, the ordered probit specification would be an 
appropriate method employed in regression. In order to make full use of the panel nature of our data 
and controlling for otherwise unobserved individual characteristics and potentially different use of the 
underlying satisfaction scale across individuals, an ideal approach would be to employ a fixed effects 
estimator. Unfortunately, such a fixed-effects ordered probit estimator does not exist in standard 
statistical software packages. As an approximation, I use linear fixed-effects regression models, in 
addition to the use of random-effects ordered logistic regression models. The first alternative 
approximation has been commonly used in literature (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; 
D’Ambrosio and Frick, 2006; for instance).   
Our default model specification considers SWB as latent: 
 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒log(𝑌𝑖𝑡,ℎ) + 𝛾 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                           (4.7) 
Where 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖
∗ is the self-reported SWB of youth i on a subjective scale ranging from 1 to 9; 𝑌𝑖 is absolute 
per capita income (PCI) of youth i that belongs to household h in year t (in log form); Zi is a vector of 
observable individual, household and community characteristics which affect wellbeing; 𝜎𝑘 is district 
and other individual level fixed effects (unobservable time invariant) that captures unobservable 
differences, and 𝑢𝑖 is the error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance one. I compare our results using multiple reference groups against this benchmark model. To 
test the impacts of the different dimensions of relative deprivation on the well-being of youth, I extend 
our specification in (4.7) above as follows:  
𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒log(𝑌𝑖𝑡,ℎ) + 𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 log(𝑅𝐷
𝑟(𝑌𝑖𝑡)) 
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+  𝜃𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝐷
𝑟 (𝑆𝑖𝑡) 
                         +  𝛿𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝐼𝐷
𝑟 (𝑖𝑡) + 𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝜎𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡         (4.8) 
Where  𝑅𝐷𝑟(𝑌𝑖) is the income relative deprivation of youth i with respect to the reference group, r; 𝑆𝑖 
is an index constructed from different indicators of social capital-different indicators used to compute 
social index is presented in appendix; 𝑆𝐷𝑟(𝑆𝑖) is social relative deprivation of youth i in the reference 
group, r, defined in the same way as above; 𝑁𝐼𝑖 is non-income index computed from the different scores 
of non-income which are economic indicators (see appendix A4.1); 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑟(𝑁𝐼𝑖) is non-income relative 
deprivation of youth i who belongs to reference group, r, defined above; (. ) 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 and (. ) 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  
are parameters for absolute and relative income, non-income and social capital to be estimated, 
respectively. In the estimations, I employ a number of different specifications to check the robustness 
of our results. For instance, I separately estimate the different specifications presented above for youth 
members and youth household heads, and for young men and women. I also include father and mother 
characteristics (Eq.4.9), and interaction terms (Eq. 10), to the above specifications, expressed as 
follows: 
𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 log(𝑌𝑖𝑡,ℎ) + 𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 log(𝑅𝐷
𝑟(𝑌𝑗𝑡)) 
+𝜃𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝐷
𝑟 (𝑆𝑗𝑡) 
        + 𝛿𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝐼𝐷
𝑟 (𝑁𝐼𝑗𝑡) 
                                                         +  𝜌𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝜎𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                           (4.9) 
 
𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 log(𝑌𝑖𝑡,ℎ) + 𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 log(𝑅𝐷
𝑟(𝑌𝑗𝑡)) 
+𝜃𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝐷
𝑟 (𝑆𝑗𝑡) 
+𝛿𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝐼𝐷
𝑟 (𝑁𝐼𝑗𝑡) 
+𝛽𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 log(𝑌𝑖𝑡,ℎ) ∗ 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑚 
                                              +𝜌𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝜎𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                            (4.10) 
Where F and M denote father and mother characteristics. As stated earlier, I expect that absolute income, 
non-income and social networks or social capital affect SWB positively (𝛽𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 > 0; 𝜃𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 >
0; 𝛿𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 > 0), implying a higher income, non-income and social networks or social capital is 
associated with a higher welfare. However, the effects of relative income deprivation, non-income 
deprivation and social deprivation are a priori undetermined i.e. their effects could be negative or 
positive.  
I pre-determined that I would not use combinations in the analysis where the minimum number of 
individuals in the reference group is less than 5. I will use the whole sample “all” as a reference group, 
an indicator of the same ethnic group. To control for as well as to capture the likely impact of youth’s 
own separate income on well-being, I include a dummy variable (1 if youth have a separate cash income, 
0 otherwise).  
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For further robustness check, I propose an alternative specification to Eq (4.8) expressed as follows: 
𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛼 log(𝑌𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝑟 log(?̅?𝑟𝑡) + 𝑛 log(𝑆𝑖𝑡) + 𝑎
𝑟 log(𝑆?̅?𝑡) + 𝑏 log(𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡) + 𝑚
𝑟 log(𝑁𝐼̅̅̅̅ 𝑟𝑡) + 𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝜎𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡      (4.11) 
Where in this equation ?̅?𝑟  is the average income of reference group r, defined as: 
  ?̅?𝑟 = 
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑦𝑖
𝑟𝑛
1 );  Where 𝑦𝑖 is income of individual i in the reference group r, and the same method of 
computation and interpretation is applied for average social and non-income of reference group r; the 
rest as defined earlier; 𝛽𝑟, 𝑎𝑟 ,  𝑚𝑟denote relative deprivation of income, relative social deprivation and 
relative non-income deprivation, respectively. I find virtually similar conclusions, not reported here. 
Unlike that of the Yitzhaki index where individual’s RD is the weighted sum of the excesses of incomes, 
non-income or social capital higher than individual’s income, non-income, or social capital such that 
each excess is weighted by its relative incidence; individuals compare their income, non-incomes or 
social capital to the average income, non-income or social capital of their reference group.  
4.4.4. Results and discussions: evidence from objective relative deprivation  
I first present the main descriptive results of the characteristics of our respondents. Following that, I 
present the econometric results of the various specifications, presented earlier. 
4.4.4.1. Descriptive results from the objective measures  
Table 4.4 summarizes the basic characteristics of our youth sample. The average age of our youth 
sample is about 18 and 22 years in 2010 and 2015, respectively. Youth sample contains mostly male 
(63%). The majority of youth live with their parents (73% and 71% in the year 2010 and 2015, 
respectively). The average years of education are about 2.83 years during the baseline survey, and it has 
increased to 4.20 years during the follow-up survey. About 72% of youth are single in 2010/11; this 
percent has decreased to 64 % in 2014/15. The average farm size per own capita is about 0.56 hectares 
in 2010/11 and this has decreased to 0.53 hectares in 2014/15 agricultural production season.  
Table 4 4: Characteristics of the youth respondents 
Category  2010/11 2014/15 
Average age (in years) 18.45 21.54 
Gender (%)   
Male 62.97 62.97 
Female 37.03 37.03 
Years of education  2.83 4.20 
Family size   7 6.00 
Farm size per capita(ha) 0.59 0.53 
Man occupation (%)   
Part-time(student or domestic worker) 43.47 33.55 
Full-time farmer 54.46 59.52 
Non-farm worker 2.07 6.94 
Youth type (%)   
Household head 27.00 29.00 
Household member 73.00 71 
Source: survey results. Other includes widow, divorced, not together for any reason or married more 
than one spouse  
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Table 4.5 summarizes the main descriptive results for the different dimensions of relative deprivation 
computed using Yitzhaki index for the year 2014/15. The lowest income relative deprivation index is 
obtained when youth compare themselves with that of their peers (i.e. when the youth of similar type is 
used as a reference group). The highest income relative deprivation is obtained when youth compare 
their per capita income with that of other youth of similar age group, the same ethnic group, similar 
education and the same occupation.  
As to the non-income relative deprivation, the highest and the lowest score is obtained with respect to 
reference groups (land size, education, ethnicity), and other youth in the same kebele, respectively. I 
compare the results of the social relative deprivation scores across the reference groups. The test results 
for the mean differences suggest that the differences are statistically significant for the reference groups 
youth type versus similar age (p-value=0.000); youth type versus similar education (p-value=0.00); 
marital status versus the same ethnic group (p-value=0.000); youth type versus the same village (p-
value=0.000), and youth type versus land size (p-value=0.000). The highest social relative deprivation 
score is obtained with respect to socio-demographic reference groups (specifically youth of similar age 
and ethnicity) and economic reference groups (specifically land size and the same occupation). The 
three dimensions of relative deprivation indices indicate that youth are feeling more deprived when the 
scope of geographic reference groups increases from village to woreda level. Hence, reference group 
definition and selection matters in well-being analyses. Summary statistics of other relevant variables 
used in the regression models is presented in appendix A4.1.   
Table 4.5: Mean relative deprivations across reference groups: results of objective measures 
 Socio-demographic reference 
groups 
Geographical areas reference 
groups 
Economic reference groups Composed reference 
group 
Age Education Ethnicity Village kebele Woreda Land 
size 
TL
U 
occupatio
n 
Age_wore
da 
Age_o
ccupati
on 
Economic relative deprivation         
Income RD  
(birr) 
1156
.22 
1.04 1155.98 829.63 840.96 1052.27 1020.
86 
990.
48 
1124.38 1132.18 344.19 
Education RD 
(years) 
1.61 - 1.52 1.33 1.26 1.36 1.50 1.40 1.41 1.38 1.51 
Non-income 
RD   
1.13 1.16 1.16 0.98 0.97 1.02 1.16 1.14 1.12 1.13 1.14 
Social relative deprivation         
Social RD  2.12 2.11 2.13 2.05 2.07 2.09 2.12 2.10 2.13 2.11 2.11 
Source: survey results  
I asked also respondents how important is the different income, non-income or wealth (such as livestock 
ownership, housing facilities, clothing), and social capital (specifically connections or networks) 
comparisons are to them in affecting their life satisfaction compared to their most relevant groups. For 
instance, I asked: “Which of the following comparison indicators are the most relevant to you to 
compare your own life situations, to that of others?” I request respondents to indicate either important 
or not important to the list of comparison indicators (the object of comparison) provided to them. This 
question was proceeded by questions that ask respondents whether they compare their living conditions 
with others and whether this kind of comparison is relevant for their life satisfaction. If a respondent 
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was found to indicate a ‘’yes’’ response, a follow-up question was asked to find out which reference 
group(s) individually or in combination is (are) at the stake in comparing once own socio-economic 
status with that of others (i.e. positioning one’s life situation) using dichotomous questions until the list 
is exhausted28. Table 4.6 presents the summary results of the most important objects of comparison, 
including income. Most respondents regard cash income (92%), livestock ownership (89%), living 
environments (access to basic infrastructure such as water, road, and electricity) (76%), education 
(80%), housing facilities (86%), clothing (85%), and social capital (75%) as important (relevant) to 
their assessment of life satisfaction with that of others. This indicates that youth regard not only cash 
income but also non-income and social capital comparisons essential for their life satisfaction. 
Descriptive results indicate that these objects of comparison change over time.  
Table 4.6: Income, non-income and social comparisons 
 
 
Dimensions (of 
comparisons)  
“Which of the following object of comparisons are perceived to be important 
for you in comparing your life situation with that of others?” 
Responses (%) 
important  not 
important  
Economic  Income  92 8 
Economic  Number of livestock  89 11 
Economic  Access to different infrastructure (access to electricity, water, road) 76 24 
Economic  Quantity of harvest 88 12 
Economic/social  Creativity (entrepreneurial ability)* FGD FGD 
Social/consumption  Education level  80 20 
Social/ consumption  Housing facilities  86 14 
Social   Clothing  85 15 
Social/  Social connectedness; membership in clubs(groups) 75 25 
Source: Survey results  
Note: FGD refers to focus group discussion, and an indicator corresponding to it was identified through group 
discussion held among groups. * suggest that the performance or success of others matter for youth assessment of 
living conditions in comparison to others.  
4.4.4.2. Econometric results from objective measures of relative deprivation 
Since the choice of a reference group in the first place determines the results of our estimation since 
results are highly sensitive to such choice and specifications. I begin our analysis by examining whether 
the reference groups identified by the respondents are statistically and economically meaningful in 
explaining the relationship between the different dimensions of relative deprivation and SWB (i.e. self-
rated life satisfaction). In doing so, I begin by estimating the following regression models:   
𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽log(𝑌𝑖𝑡,ℎ) + 𝛼𝑅𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝑟 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝜎𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                       (4.12) 
Where 𝑅𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝑟  denotes a dummy for reference group, r, reported by youth i which takes 1 if the stated 
reference group perceived as a relevant comparison group and 0 otherwise; r є {socio-demographic 
comparison groups, geographic area reference groups, economic reference groups}; the rest are as 
defined earlier. Following this, I run series of tests to show that income alone is not enough to capture 
                                                                
28 Based on literature, I prepared an exhaustive list of reference groups (about 15), out of which I finally 
selected 10 reference groups and 2 composite reference groups based on frequency of responses.   
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the effect of RD on SWB in rural areas, and show that non-monetary object of comparison such as 
social capital and non-income (or non-monetary assets) are equally important for the analyses of the 
impact of RD on well-being (Table 4.8). Our analysis in this regard is similar in sprit with Mayraz et 
al. (2009) who investigate the realized importance of the different relative income comparisons using 
German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). However, our approach is unique in the sense that I 
disaggregated relative deprivation along three dimensions: relative income (monetary) deprivation, 
relative non-income (non-monetary) deprivation and relative social deprivation that enable us to explore 
a broader range of indicators relevant for young people’s well-being. In addition, our approach is 
different in the sense that I don’t only ask respondents to report how their objects of comparison 
(income, non-income, social capital, etc.) compares to various reference groups but also I ask them to 
identify the most relevant reference groups against which they compare their life situations. The first 
thing to note in Table 4.7 is that except for village and woreda, all the self-identified reference groups 
are statistically significant and hence, relevant in the analyses of well-being. However, the relevance of 
each of the reference groups (reflected by the magnitude of coefficients) on SWB varies greatly, with 
the highest association with the reference groups: similar age and same occupation. There are also 
apparent differences of the relevance of reference groups in the SWB of young men and women. The 
insignificant positive impact of the importance of geographic reference groups (the same village and 
woreda) on SWB for the whole sample turns significant for male and female subgroup analyses. This 
suggests the importance of gender roles in relative concerns and the different impacts and preferences 
of reference groups for young men and women. It is interesting to note that with respect to woreda 
reference group, the impact is negative for the whole sample and female sub-sample. The positive 
impact of the importance of reference groups on SWB suggest the signal effect of RD, which I 
investigate later in more detail.  
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Table 4.7: The effects of reference groups on subjective well-being of youth 
  
VARIABLES AGE OCCUPATION  VILLAGE WOREDA ETHNICIT
Y  
OTHER_ETHI
C 
SAME_RELIGIO
N 
OTHER_R
ELIGION 
All 
Reference dummy (1 if 
important, 0 otherwise) 
0.570*** 
(0.149) 
0.721** 
(0.202) 
0.184 
(0.205) 
-0.0687 
(0.100) 
0.311*** 
(0.0967) 
0.438*** 
(0.102) 
0.362*** 
(0.0981) 
0.001 
(0.100) 
 
Log(income per capita) 0.198*** 0.175*** 0.181*** 0.214*** 0.168*** 0.173*** 0.169*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0596) (0.0615) (0.0615) (0.0593) (0.0612) (0.0613) (0.0613) (0.0612) 
Land size per capita 0.848*** 0.895*** 0.883*** 0.767*** 0.935*** 0.954*** 0.926*** 0.021 
 (0.261) (0.268) (0.268) (0.259) (0.268) (0.268) (0.270) (0.269) 
Observations  1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 
Male  
Reference group (1 if 
important, 0 otherwise) 
0.578*** 
(0.188) 
0.344 
(0.279) 
0.658** 
(0.275) 
0.049 
(0.133) 
0.561*** 
(0.125) 
0.486*** 
(0.128) 
0.504*** 
(0.128) 
0.525*** 
(0.127) 
 
Log(income per capita) 0.279*** 0.298*** 0.309*** 0.299*** 0.286*** 0.290*** 0.297*** 0.307*** 
 (0.0825) (0.0822) (0.0824) (0.0822) (0.0824) (0.0823) (0.0824) (0.0823) 
Land size per capita 0.531 0.446 0.412 0.420 0.536 0.483 0.431 0.371 
 (0.347) (0.346) (0.345) (0.345) (0.347) (0.346) (0.345) (0.346) 
Observations 743 743 743 743 743 743 743 743 
Female  
Reference group (1 if 
important, 0 otherwise) 
0.509* 
(0.303) 
0.174 
(0.332) 
-0.499 
(0.359) 
-0.341* 
(0.191) 
0.0309 
(0.170) 
0.342* 
(0.189) 
0.167 
(0.173) 
0.284 
(0.185) 
 
Log(income per capita) 0.0457 0.0721 0.0871 0.0888 0.0770 0.0757 0.0656 0.0799 
 (0.112) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.110) (0.109) 
Land size per capita 2.192*** 2.056*** 2.048*** 2.096*** 2.045*** 2.132*** 2.121*** 2.101*** 
 (0.574) (0.555) (0.555) (0.560) (0.555) (0.556) (0.565) (0.558) 
Observations 419 419 419 419 419 419 419 419 
Household 
characteristics  
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Individual 
characteristics  
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Standard errors in parentheses                   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: I control for woreda level fixed effects and other relevant variables (reported in Appendix Table A4.1). The 
dependent variable, youth subjective well-being, is based on life satisfaction asking subjects to rate their life 
satisfaction on 1 to 9 scales (1 indicating the worst possible life and 9 the best possible life).  
 
Benchmark results: the standard socio-demographic and economic variables  
Before turning specifically to the discussions of the impact of the absolutes and the different dimensions 
of RD on SWB in the next section, I briefly discuss here a comprehensive analysis of the determinants 
of youth SWB. For this purpose, I estimate Eq. (4.7) without including relative deprivations in the 
specifications (presented in the second column of Table 4.8). Our aim here is to check whether the 
determinants of SWB are in line with what is suggested in the literature, and also to establish the bases 
of comparisons to the various specifications and estimations for each of the multiple reference groups 
presented earlier. 
 The results of the benchmark estimation presented in Table 4.8 shows that the signs and significance 
of the parameters for the standard economic and socio-demographic characteristics are overall as in the 
literature and in line with the findings of Akay et al.(2012) and Akay et al.(2014). However, unlike their 
findings, I find an inverted U-shape relationship between SWB and age of youth. As presented earlier 
in the proceeding chapter, the result is expected given the fact that our sample is mainly youth groups. 
One would expect that well-being of young people increases in their early age and decreases, as they 
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get older. The most common factors found to have a significant impact on SWB of youth include income 
per capita, social capital, youth marital status, having separate cash income, number of female youth 
members in a household, availability of drinking water during dry season, livestock holding, availability 
of public water and age of household head. I find the strong positive impact of income, social capital, 
and drinking water sources and livestock ownership on SWB. The strong effect of social capital may 
be explained by relationship attributes such as altruism or informal support systems and kinship 
relations that help individuals to cope with risks or succeed in a career. I find also a strong and negative 
effect of lack of mobile phone, leading to a sharp decrease in well-being. As I discussed earlier, though 
lack of mobile phone among the youth is negatively related to SWB, mobile phones can serve as either 
status-seeking good or a device that bridge the information gap related to agriculture (such as weather 
forecasts and market prices). If the purchase of mobile phone is competing for higher status, this may 
often force individuals or households to divert resources from meeting basic needs. However, if mobile 
phones are for accessing information, they contribute to effective information flow thereby enhancing 
production and marketing decisions that in turn enhances welfare. Recent evidence indicate that mobile 
phones provide great opportunity to bridge the information gap related to agriculture, though currently 
there is limited access to ICT in SSA (Tekalign et al., 2011; World Bank, 2013; Tadesse and Godfrey, 
2016).  
Having access to public pipe drinking water, which indicates also the impact of health, have a strong 
positive effect on wellbeing. The strong effect of health-related factors on SWB is also reflected via the 
effect of household’s main source of drinking water during the dry season. I find that all dummies (river 
or lake, rainwater, unprotected well, stream), other than a pond or protected well (the base category), 
have negative effects on well-being. It is also interesting to note that having separate cash income is a 
strong predictor of youth subjective well-being.  
Per capita, land size and a number of livestock owned are among the other most commonly considered 
economic factors found to have a positive effect on SWB of youth (similar to what is documented by 
Bezu, 2014; Akay et al., 2014). In line with the findings from the experimental approach, the presence 
of female youth members in the household increases SWB. I also confirm a positive effect of marital 
status on SWB (Helliwell, 2003; Akay et al., 2012). Controlling for individual characteristics, education 
of youth and being enrolled in school have no statistically significant impact on SWB probability 
because of the reasons stated in the previous chapter. However, birth order has a positive significant 
effect on SWB.  
The effects of other socio-economic and demographic characteristics on SWB, controlling for 
when RD  
In the next section, I briefly discuss here a comprehensive analyses of SWB of youth estimated 
separately (using Eq. (4.9), when relative deprivations of different dimensions included in the 
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models) for each of the 10 self-identified reference groups using random effects ordered logit 
models before turning to the discussion of the effect of relative deprivations across the various 
specifications and reference groups.  Overall, the signs and significance of the parameters for 
the usual socio-economic, demographic and community characteristics presented above remain 
consistent across the various definitions of reference groups. However, the effect of some 
variables on SWB observed in the benchmark model disappears or weakens toward some 
reference groups whereas others turn significant and stronger. For instance, youth relationship 
to head (or marital status of youth) which is significant (at 10%) becomes insignificant across 
all the reference groups used. The same is true with social capital except towards the reference 
group-youth of similar type. The strong impact of social capital in the benchmark model 
disappears towards other reference groups, but it remains strongly significant for the youth of 
similar status (colleagues), which is also partly related with the youth of similar age group. 
This is probably because of the fact that youth form networks with their alike youth, hence this 
reference group serves as network formation which enhances wellbeing. That is also probably 
why the effect of social capital is significant only towards the reference group-youth of similar 
status. Other socioeconomic and demographic variables that turn significant after controlling 
for relative deprivations include a number of male youth members in the household and 
distance to the nearest public marketplace. For example, a number of male youth members in 
the household has a positive and significant effect on the well-being of youth visa-a-vis similar 
occupation. As expected, the effect of absolute income on SWB remains positive and strongly 
significant in all cases (ranging from 0.30 to 0.60 points on a scale of 1-9, the highest visa-a-
vis similar occupation). Alem (2014) in urban Ethiopia, also finds that happiness increases 
with absolute income. Authors like Knight and Gunatilaka (2012) in rural China and Stutzer 
(2004) in Switzerland find also similar effects of absolute income on happiness. Now, I turn to 
the discussions of the impact of relative deprivation along the three dimensions across various 
reference groups (domains).  
The effect of relative deprivation on SWB  
Economic relative deprivation  
The estimation results from standard random effects ordered logit models suggest that the 
magnitude of relative deprivation (relative deprivation disaggregated along three dimensions: 
income, non-income and social relative deprivation) vary with the reference groups employed. 
In other words, the effect of the three different dimensions of relative deprivation on SWB is 
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either weaker or stronger depending on the choice and definitions of reference groups; whereas 
the sign of the estimates remains consistent across the reference groups (Table 4.8).  
Specifically, the estimates of relative income deprivation remain positive and strongly 
significant towards all the reference groups employed. The strong relative income deprivation 
effect on SWB visa-a-vis the reference groups youth type (colleagues) and occupation 
compared to other domains suggest that youth compare their achievements, especially feasible 
achievement such as income with those of others of similar status and occupation. Unlike the 
previous studies in developing countries, the magnitude of relative income deprivations (0.70 
for education and 0.86 for occupation) is striking and suggest the important role of relative 
deprivation in the well-being of rural youth (the only study I am aware of is Akay et al., 2012, 
who find strong effect of relative income among migrant and urban workers in China). The 
consistent strong positive effect of relative income deprivation on well-being suggests the 
‘’signal effect’’ of relative income deprivation. The findings are robust to the use and definition 
of reference groups. The findings also serve as a basis for social comparisons or it provides a 
prospect that shapes future expectations. Thus, it suggests that youth emulous of their better-
offs (or rich) comparison groups. Other studies focused on poor countries have also found that 
relative income is positively associated with happiness or life satisfaction (Ravallion and 
Lokshin, 2010 for Malawi; Kingdon and Knight, 2007 for South Africa). Interestingly, the 
effect of non-income relative deprivation remains negative but significant only for reference 
groups’ similar education and size of livestock holding. If social capital and assets are 
differentiated, the effects of RD via-a-vis education reference group turns negative resulting in 
life satisfaction reduction.This variable turns significant in these domains mainly because of 
the fact that education and TLU are the two most important wealth and social indicators 
commonly used as status indicators. Relative deprivation in these two aspects reflects 
conditions of worsening both absolute and relative poverty strongly influencing youth welfare. 
It’s also interesting to note that, the magnitude of relative deprivation (both income and non-
income) varies across the choice of reference groups. The overall effect on SWB depends on 
the relative magnitude of the two effects as both offset each other. Contrary to our findings 
Oshio et al. (2011) find the Yitzhaki measure of relative deprivation to be negatively correlated 
with happiness for China and South Korea. Overall, our estimation results imply that living in 
high-income neighborhoods (or comparison groups whether it’s based on socio-demographic, 
geographic or economic reference groups) enhances life satisfaction via signal effect or 
economic positive externalities (results of aspirations) while non-monetary deprivation in 
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terms of material or assets reduces life satisfaction. In other words, high level of income in a 
reference group works as a signal about the future income level of young people, in general, 
leading to high well-being or less welfare loss. This finding is in line with Easterlin’s (1995) 
conclusion.  
Social relative deprivation 
Perceptions of deprivation, whether in terms of material or non-material could be a source of social 
capital as well as discontent, especially among young people. Social capital out of which I drive social 
relative deprivation is broadly constructed here: social trust, social networks (or interactions) and social 
norms. One of the most important livelihood assets rural people own is social capital. Social capital 
plays an important role in helping youth negotiate their way out of disadvantage, coping with risks or 
shocks, enjoyment of life, the source of hope and help to improve their relative standing in comparison 
to their peers. It facilitates interaction among individuals, groups or societies, to get a loan (serves as a 
collateral), create motivation or enthusiasm. This is reflected by the strong positive impact of social 
capital variable and negative and significant impact of social RD on SWB using the different 
specifications and reference groups (Table 4.8). Relative social deprivation affects the well-being of 
young people in several ways, that has long-lasting effect on human, physical, psychological as well as 
economic development. I find a statistically significant social relative deprivation towards all the 
reference groups employed except for youth type, kebele and size of livestock holdings with the strong 
effect visa-a-vis similar age, ethnicity and religion. For instance, youth who regard income comparisons 
as important compared to their peers are associated with approximately a 0.24 lower life satisfaction 
rating (measured in a 1-9 scale). During focus group discussion I also identify that the most common 
channels through which young people make frequent social contact and companionships are with their 
ethnic groups, colleagues, youth in their occupation and youth of similar age group. Thus, large social 
capital improve SWB in many ways: through social networks that enable youth access to resources, 
insurance, through creating enthusiasm or moral support and by affecting health or risk behaviour in 
the sense that individuals who are embodied in a network or community have better support and social 
trust that enable them to have access to resources to achieve better health or other goals in life, hence 
higher life satisfaction. The strong effect of social capital vis-à-vis these reference groups confirms the 
channels through which social networks, trust, and cooperation are formed in rural areas for common 
good. Social capital enables the performance of individuals or groups, the growth (capability) of an 
individual and means to exercise agency. Hence, deprivation in this regard has a strong negative effect 
on life satisfaction. Our findings confirm this.  
Though the role of social capital is significant for the well-being of youth, the effect of relative social 
deprivation is insignificant for other reference groups probably because of the high multicollinearity 
between social capital variable and social relative deprivation. Dropping social capital variable has 
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resulted in significant and strong negative impact of social relative deprivation on SWB across all 
reference groups, except for the domain colleagues. The benchmark result presented earlier also support 
this hypothesis. The insignificant impact of the later may be explained by altruism and informal support 
systems from families or colleagues, as reflected in strong significant relationship toward the reference 
group: similar age group, youth in the same ethnicity, and youth in the same religion. Evidence also 
indicate that participation in organizations such as in religious participation, and participation in 
extracurricular activities enable youth to establish extensive connections to others that would weaken 
the negative effect of social deprivation (Checkoway, 2011; Dufur et al., 2013). On the other hand, lack 
of social capital (i.e. deprivation in social capital) can impair the benefits described above. It’s also 
interesting to note that social capital may not always be used for positive ends (Monica, 2015). I find 
that social capital has a negative effect (though statistically insignificant) on youth life satisfaction for 
the reference groups-youth of similar education level, ethnicity, and religion. An example of such 
complexities of the effects of social capital is violent or protest activity that is encouraged through the 
strengthening of intra-group relationships often called bonding social capital, particularly exercised at 
schools, religious places or within ethnic groups. Social capital may also lead to undesirable outcomes, 
for instance, if the political institution and democracy is not strong enough and overpowered by the 
social capital groups. The recent protest in Ethiopia is a good example in this case where youth use their 
networks at school and religious places to organize themselves to protest.   
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Table 4.8: Estimation results from random effects ordered logit models using objective RD  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Reference groups  
VARIABLES Benchmark AGE YOUTHTYPE EDUCATION ETHNIC  RELIGION VILLAGE KEBELE WOREDA LAND TLU OCCUPATION OCCUP_AGE WORE_AGE 
               
Income RD  - 0.619** 61.11*** 0.702** 0.628** 0.612* 0.347 0.117 0.647** 0.576** 0.744** 0.869*** 0.0504*** 0.659** 
  (0.305) (18.05) (0.306) (0.312) (0.316) (0.307) (0.321) (0.319) (0.290) (0.317) (0.316) (0.00815) (0.318) 
Log(income 
per capita) 
0.107 
(0.0972) 
0.405** 
(0.188) 
0.137 
(0.0997) 
0.452** 
(0.186) 
0.407** 
(0.189) 
0.399** 
(0.190) 
0.280 
(0.187) 
0.155 
(0.190) 
0.412** 
(0.190) 
0.368** 
(0.180) 
0.453** 
(0.189) 
0.525*** 
(0.189) 
0.119 
(0.0980) 
0.420** 
(0.189) 
Social RD  - -0.331*** 
(0.125) 
19.39 
(44.09) 
0.0487 
(0.296) 
-0.36*** 
(0.128) 
-0.35*** 
(0.129) 
-0.192* 
(0.114) 
-0.169 
(0.119) 
-0.312** 
(0.128) 
-0.269** 
(0.131) 
-0.190 
(0.125) 
-0.317** 
(0.128) 
-0.298** 
(0.124) 
-0.308** 
(0.124) 
               
Non-income 
RD   
- 0.00841 
(0.305) 
-9.934 
(106.3) 
-0.362*** 
(0.127) 
0.0393 
(0.302) 
-0.0843 
(0.300) 
-0.0183 
(0.320) 
-0.242 
(0.368) 
-0.148 
(0.313) 
0.180 
(0.299) 
0.509* 
(0.266) 
0.146 
(0.258) 
-0.0582 
(0.298) 
0.121 
(0.284)  
Non-income 
index  
0.0345 0.0252 0.0367 0.0512 0.0431 -0.0330 0.0176 -0.125 -0.0692 0.127 0.332* 0.108 -0.0151 0.0976 
(0.112) (0.210) (0.113) (0.208) (0.210) (0.217) (0.248) (0.273) (0.224) (0.209) (0.194) (0.178) (0.210) (0.206) 
Social capital  0.313*** -0.0683 0.312*** -0.102 -0.104 -0.0854 0.0985 0.109 -0.0473 -0.0004 0.100 -0.0503 -0.0350 -0.0395 
 (0.102) (0.176) (0.103) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.171) (0.175) (0.178) (0.181) (0.172) (0.180) (0.173) (0.178) 
               
Individual 
controls  
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Household 
controls  
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Other controls  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,146 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: I control for woreda level fixed effects. The dependent variable, youth subjective well-being is based on life satisfaction asking subjects to rate their life satisfaction on 1 to 9 scales (1 
indicating the worst possible life and 9 the best possible life). 
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Despite using a large set of typical controls and use of multiple reference groups, I have controlled for 
individual unobservable personality traits that partly determine well-being. I have re-run our estimation 
using fixed effects (FE) model. Table 4.9 presents results from the FE models. Similar to random effects 
ordered model in Table 4.8, I find again that relative income deprivation has a positive effect confirming 
the main results of the previous findings. The only difference is that the ‘’signal effect’’ or ‘’economic 
externalities’’ of RD is significant when similar occupation and the composite reference group 
occupation with age are used. The significance of relative income deprivation visa-a-vis these reference 
groups could indicate that youth indeed build aspirations through their peers-their alike and occupation 
domains than other domains of comparisons, hence higher reference group incomes raise well-being. 
As argued earlier the presence of wealthy or successful colleagues of similar age and those engaged in 
similar occupation generate pure economic externalities and/or aspirations. Hence, living in a rich 
neighborhood defined in terms of occupation or geographic area raises the possibilities of positive signal 
(prospect) and income externalities, which in turn motivates hard work and desire to get prosper. Hence, 
peer effects such as similar age and occupation are important mechanisms through which youth 
aspirations are built. The positive and consistent effect of relative income deprivation on SWB, both for 
the whole sample and for subgroups analyses, using other reference groups further supported this 
argument. For such effect to prevail and consistent, one expects that aspirations based on peers standard 
of living would increase over time. I observe this via a significant and increasing trend (i.e. year fixed 
effect) in our results. It should be noted here that, though results suggest towards the ‘’signal effect’’ or 
‘’economic externalities’’ resulting from aspirations based on the performance of peers, I cannot 
preclude altruism. Given the strong social capital in rural areas, there could be some possibility of 
altruistic feelings toward other youth in the domains: similar occupations and in similar age groups.  
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Table 4.9: Fixed effects estimation results from objective measures of RD: All youth  
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13) (14) 
 Socio-demographic  Geographic area Economic Composite  
Benchmark AGE YOUTHTYPE EDUCATION RELIGION VILLAGE KEBELE WOREDA LAND OCCUPATION OCCUP_AGE WORE_AGE 
Income RD - 0.170 10.84 0.213 0.151 0.0240 -0.0340 0.160 0.0823 0.284* 0.0193* 0.217 
 (0.150) (21.80) (0.154) (0.155) (0.157) (0.159) (0.158) (0.134) (0.151) (0.0115) (0.157) 
Log(income per 
capita) 
-0.00853 
(0.0446) 
0.0778 
(0.0883) 
-0.00176 
(0.0467) 
0.100 
(0.0904) 
0.0670 
(0.0895) 
0.0106 
(0.0909) 
-0.0255 
(0.091) 
0.0712 
(0.0905) 
0.0303 
(0.077) 
0.132 
(0.0867) 
0.000968 
(0.0449) 
0.101 
(0.0904) 
Individual controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Household controls  NO Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Obs. 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,146 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 
R-squared 0.611 0.612 0.611 0.612 0.611 0.616 0.611 0.611 0.611 0.613 0.613 0.612 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable, youth subjective well-being is based on life satisfaction asking subjects to rate their life satisfaction on 1 to 9 scales (1 indicating the worst possible 
life and 9 the best possible life). The positive impact of relative income deprivation29 on life satisfaction is strengthened by the introduction of controls of household head 
characteristics such as age, education, and marital status. Since I did not find significant variations in social and non-income RD between baseline and end line, I could not 
compute the FE estimates for these variables.
                                                                
29 It’s interesting to note that in the xtologit model the coefficient of RD2 (age) remain positive but insignificant while RD remain significant at 10%. Y remain positive while YY turns negative but insignificant. Using 
occupation as RG, RD turns strong sign RD2 sign at 12% (both positive), PCI positive and strong sign while YY negative and sign at 5%. With the composite occup_age RG, RD negative and RD2 positive but both 
insignificant, Y negative and YY2 positive and sign at 10%. Using OLS-FE and occupation as RG, RD positive and sign at 5%, RD2 negative and insignificant, Y positive and YY2 negative both insignificant. However OLS-
FE, results in RD negative and RD2 positive both sign at 5% while Y is negative and YY2 positive and both significant at 5%. The subgroup analysis is also the same for members but varies for youth household head. 
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Robustness checks: subgroup analyses and controlling for other attributes  
 The use of various definitions of reference groups, individually and in combination, as well as FE 
estimations, which I presented earlier, is one method of robustness checks. Since the nature of our 
dataset allow us to deal with the potential endogeneity of income, non-income, and social comparisons; 
I carry out also direct comparisons of the differences across reference groups by disaggregating the 
different dimensions of relative deprivation for the subgroups. Empirical evidence indicates that the 
relationship between SWB and relative deprivation may differ across subgroups or gender (Akay et al., 
2912; Anderson et al, 2014). However, Akay and Martinsson (2012) and Georke and Pannenberg (2015) 
do not observe gender differences. I investigate whether this is the case with respect to our youth 
samples. In addition, I further split our sample into members and youth household heads to test whether 
the effect of relative deprivation on SWB varies with age groups and marital status. The main results 
for subgroups are reported in Table 4.10. 
The sign and significance of absolute income for male and female subgroups do not differ across all the 
reference groups except when education reference group is used (Table 4.10, panel A and B). It is 
interesting to note that the effect of absolute income on SWB turns significant for young men vis-à-vis 
education when parental factors are controlled for, an indicator of latent demand for education. While 
I find a consistent strong positive association between relative income deprivation and life satisfaction 
for male and female subgroups, the effect is negative for male subgroups for the reference groups the 
same village and kebele (Panel A). However, I observe that the magnitudes of the effects of relative 
deprivations on SWB differ across subgroups: gender and youth type. For instance, I observe a stronger 
and positive effect of relative income deprivation for female subgroups (Panel B). For female subgroup, 
the effect of relative income deprivation on SWB is positive and significant as well as higher in 
magnitude than for male subgroup, for all the reference groups except for education and youth in the 
same kebele, which affirms the strong signal effect of rural income for young women than men. Kingdon 
and Knight (2007) also find similar evidence in South Africa. 
 It is also interesting to note that the effect of relative income deprivation is stronger in females’ model 
than in males’ model vis-a-vis the reference groups: land size and livestock holding. This clearly implies 
that for a female such resource inequalities do matter most. Whereas the effects of non-income RD is 
either positive or negative for young men and women depending on the reference groups used, its 
significant in education domain for male and significant in the occupation domain for females. The 
insignificant effect of non-income relative deprivation in many domains may be partly explained by the 
strong family bond (or relationship) youth have within a household. Traditionally, males get strong 
family support in education domain than females, and females are encouraged in the work domain. 
Males get also strong family support than females’ household resources such as livestock and land to 
start independence life as well as share other resources. This might weaken the effect in the males’ 
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models. However, the opposite is true for female youth. The impact of social relative deprivation on 
SWB is consistently negative in all the models for male and female subgroups, though statistically and 
strongly significant for male subgroups. Hence, the effect of social capital on SWB is more pronounced 
in the males’ life satisfaction than in females’.    
The magnitude and direction of the relationship between the different dimensions relative deprivation 
and SWB also differ between youth category (members vs household head). Contrary to Georke and 
Pannenberg (2015) who find a stronger effect of relative income for older individuals in Germany, I 
find a stronger effect of relative deprivation among youth members, which suggest again the important 
role of relative deprivation for SWB among younger people. For youth who live with their parents and 
singles (i.e. younger youth), relative deprivation matters most in their well-being assessment when they 
compare themselves with their friends (their alike), their geographical areas (youth in their village, 
kebele, and woreda), and size of land and livestock holdings. For youth who are household heads, the 
effect of relative deprivation is significant within economic reference groups: education, land size and 
livestock domain. Furthermore, I have re-run the analyses, to check the robustness of our results by 
dropping some of the explanatory variables highly collinear with social and non-income deprivations. 
I find consistent estimates. Furthermore, I re-estimated all the models and the different specifications 
across all the reference groups by including additional controls such as leisure time and time that each 
youth spent caring for others such as younger siblings and ill household members that is potentially 
confounded with rural income. While the former has a positive and significant effect on SWB, the later 
has a negative effect. Interestingly, the addition of these variables does not change our results and 
conclusions. Finally, using a large set of controls, including personal traits, parental characteristics (both 
fathers’ and mothers’ attributes) and woreda heterogeneity strengthen our conclusions (Table 4. 10, 
Panel C). The uses of alternative specifications and measurement approaches to relative deprivation and 
SWB have also given us an additional advantage to confirm our main results (results not reported here).   
The signs of other socio-economic and demographic determinate of SWB for the male and female 
subgroups across all the reference groups remain unaffected except for land size and birth order (see 
Appendix Table A4.3). However, the significance and important variables determining SWB of male 
and female youth substantially differ. For young men, positional goods such as mobile phones, social 
capital, and size of livestock holding are the main determinants of SWB. On the other hand, birth order, 
number of female youth members in the household, water source during dry seasons, land per capita, 
and land ownership certificate, education of household head and availability of youth project are found 
to determine SWB of young women. For both male and female subgroups estimated separately, I find 
an inverse U-relationship between the age of youth and SWB. Furthermore, the effect of livestock 
holding is positive and stronger in the male models. For the female models, access to drinking water 
during dry seasons is more important. These two are in line with the expectations given the role of the 
two variables in the well-being of young men and women. For male youth, livestock, an indicator of 
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social status, plays an important role for entry into the marriage market; while for female youth, fetching 
water is considered as their main daily routine. 
As a final robustness check, I use residuals from income equation as a reference income and find these 
residuals to have positive and significant effects on life satisfaction. However, when both income and 
reference income (residual from income equation in this case) used together (using similar approach) 
in the life satisfaction regression, I find a significant effect and with opposite signs. Predicted income, 
in this case, is interpreted as the income that youth expect given their own and household characteristics, 
and relatively to the characteristics of the reference groups (results not reported here). Hamermesh 
(1977) for the former and Clark and Oswald (1996) for the later with a sample of British employees 
find similar results. Now let us turn to discuss the effects of subjective measures of relative deprivation 
on SWB.   
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            Table 4.10: Random effects estimation results from objectives approach: Male and female youth  
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Benchmark AGE YOUTHTYPE EDUCATION ETHNIC  RELIGION VILLAGE KEBELE WOREDA LAND TLU OCCUPATI
ON 
OCCUP_AGE WORE_AG
E 
Panel A: Male youth  
Income RD  0.487 631.9** 0.626 0.448 0.433 -0.00576 -0.158 0.377 0.193 0.281 0.729* 0.0633*** 0.382 
  (0.421) (293.8) (0.440) (0.435) (0.435) (0.437) (0.444) (0.444) (0.439) (0.453) (0.430) (0.0103) (0.447) 
Log(income per 
capita) 
0.149 0.356 0.151 0.428* 0.339 0.333 0.150 0.0624 0.300 0.221 0.257 0.456* 0.166 0.305 
 (0.126) (0.254) (0.126) (0.258) (0.261) (0.261) (0.263) (0.266) (0.260) (0.249) (0.257) (0.251) (0.129) (0.257) 
Social RD  -0.450** 61.02 -0.279 -0.500*** -0.485*** -0.262 -0.263 -0.451** -0.401** -0.292 -0.480** -0.451** -0.384** 
  (0.185) (49.69) (0.453) (0.187) (0.187) (0.162) (0.174) (0.189) (0.191) (0.181) (0.191) (0.190) (0.180) 
Non-Income RD   -0.204 -16.44 -0.498*** -0.226 -0.353 -0.130 -0.277 -0.113 0.0922 0.640 -0.426 -0.333 0.0960 
  (0.448) (225.2) (0.187) (0.461) (0.467) (0.495) (0.539) (0.503) (0.453) (0.396) (0.384) (0.434) (0.435) 
Non-income  0.0288 -0.120 0.0447 -0.154 -0.131 -0.212 -0.0627 -0.140 -0.0570 0.0615 0.395 -0.233 -0.200 0.0685 
 (0.163) (0.299) (0.164) (0.302) (0.301) (0.315) (0.349) (0.364) (0.327) (0.299) (0.278) (0.259) (0.301) (0.294) 
Social capital  0.328** -0.173 0.320** -0.235 -0.242 -0.224 0.0334 0.0129 -0.184 -0.132 0.00270 -0.214 -0.174 -0.108 
 (0.153) (0.250) (0.154) (0.252) (0.253) (0.252) (0.245) (0.251) (0.254) (0.259) (0.245) (0.256) (0.251) (0.253) 
Observations 743 743 743 743 743 743 733 743 743 743 743 743 743 743 
 
Panel B: Female youth  
Income RD  0.826* 49.36* 0.709 0.844* 0.830* 0.827* 0.434 1.019** 1.290*** 1.530*** 1.075** 1.684* 1.038** 
  (0.497) (27.75) (0.471) (0.483) (0.491) (0.475) (0.480) (0.499) (0.471) (0.501) (0.517) (0.885) (0.508) 
Log(income per 
capita) 
-0.00992 0.467 0.0519 0.403 0.463 0.452 0.448 0.222 0.549* 0.708** 0.813** 0.614* 0.374 0.573* 
 (0.161) (0.338) (0.186) (0.326) (0.322) (0.321) (0.319) (0.312) (0.322) (0.326) (0.326) (0.339) (0.253) (0.334) 
Social RD  -0.200 -91.26 0.554 -0.219 -0.202 -0.136 -0.0621 -0.173 -0.0950 -0.0907 -0.145 -0.130 -0.230 
  (0.177) (85.08) (0.429) (0.187) (0.188) (0.169) (0.177) (0.189) (0.196) (0.189) (0.185) (0.173) (0.186) 
Non-Income RD   0.461 -80.60 -0.212 0.467 0.291 0.0640 -0.206 0.000279 0.514 0.630 0.644* 0.485 0.367 
  (0.457) (122.0) (0.188) (0.440) (0.435) (0.460) (0.573) (0.459) (0.454) (0.412) (0.365) (0.450) (0.418) 
Non-income  0.0608 0.338 0.0438 0.407 0.352 0.248 0.111 -0.0819 0.0610 0.355 0.448 0.407 0.351 0.299 
 (0.155) (0.323) (0.155) (0.319) (0.322) (0.325) (0.366) (0.440) (0.340) (0.329) (0.309) (0.252) (0.319) (0.316) 
Social capital  0.218 -0.0301 0.212 -0.0356 -0.0421 -0.0247 0.0505 0.150 0.0142 0.103 0.0904 0.0508 0.0736 -0.0536 
 (0.167) (0.288) (0.166) (0.295) (0.291) (0.295) (0.282) (0.285) (0.299) (0.304) (0.287) (0.291) (0.279) (0.295) 
Observations 419 419 419 419 419 419 413 419 419 419 419 419 419 419 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The effect of RD on SWB gets stronger when I control for both fathers and mothers characteristics, instead of using household head characteristics. It indicates also that 
failure to include both fathers and mothers characteristics underestimate (and biases downward) the effects of RD. 
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Table 4.10. Continued 
Panel C: father and mother characteristics are controlled  
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Benchmark AGE YOUTHTYPE EDUCATION ETHNIC  RELIGION VILLAGE KEBELE WOREDA LAND TLU OCCUPATION OCCUP_A
GE 
WORE_A
GE 
Income RD - 0.949** 63.99*** 0.954** 0.875** 0.892** 0.866** 0.861** 0.924** 0.805** 1.054** 1.156*** 0.740 0.963** 
  (0.402) (23.97) (0.392) (0.393) (0.402) (0.351) (0.365) (0.412) (0.386) (0.419) (0.432) (0.669) (0.412) 
Log(income per 
capita) 
0.283* 0.711*** 0.354** 0.717*** 0.656** 0.665** 0.659*** 0.653*** 0.675** 0.650** 0.768*** 0.809*** 0.403* 0.696** 
 (0.149) (0.268) (0.153) (0.262) (0.257) (0.259) (0.246) (0.251) (0.269) (0.257) (0.266) (0.276) (0.207) (0.273) 
Social RD - -0.641*** 38.08 -0.416 -0.682*** -0.649*** -0.422** -0.418* -0.573** -0.540** -0.475** -0.589** -0.554** -0.698*** 
  (0.240) (55.12) (0.439) (0.245) (0.246) (0.210) (0.218) (0.233) (0.231) (0.231) (0.239) (0.236) (0.243) 
Non-Income RD  - -0.480 140.7* -0.709*** -0.353 -0.528 -0.187 -0.362 -0.500 -0.218 0.0853 0.0394 -0.478 -0.252 
  (0.464) (79.06) (0.239) (0.450) (0.431) (0.457) (0.540) (0.456) (0.438) (0.392) (0.380) (0.453) (0.452) 
Non-income  0.110 -0.218 0.127 -0.196 -0.160 -0.279 -0.0570 -0.163 -0.249 -0.0722 0.124 0.0927 -0.219 -0.109 
 (0.183) (0.317) (0.184) (0.320) (0.326) (0.329) (0.372) (0.425) (0.345) (0.319) (0.307) (0.276) (0.316) (0.342) 
Social capital  0.327* -0.444 0.304* -0.521* -0.470 -0.424 -0.169 -0.157 -0.339 -0.324 -0.229 -0.364 -0.321 -0.513* 
 (0.171) (0.309) (0.172) (0.310) (0.307) (0.307) (0.297) (0.304) (0.302) (0.301) (0.297) (0.310) (0.302) (0.309) 
Individual controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Parental controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 531 531 531 531 531 531 526 531 531 531 531 531 531 531 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The effect of RD on SWB gets stronger when I control for both fathers and mothers characteristics, instead of using household head characteristics. It indicates also that 
failure to include both fathers and mothers characteristics underestimate (and biases downward) the effects of RD. 
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4.5. Subjective measures of relative deprivation and subjective well-being  
Since I use the same sampling producers, sample size, and characteristics of respondents described earlier 
in section 4.1 here as well; I only present the description of data set used in the subjective measurement of 
relative deprivation, an alternative approach to an objective measure of relative deprivation.  
4.5.1. The data 
In the subjective approach to the measurement of relative deprivation, I categorize relative deprivation 
along two dimensions only: income relative deprivation and social relative deprivation. I use direct 
information on the intensity of income comparisons (i.e. self-reported relative income deprivation-
subjective income RD) and social comparisons (i.e. perceived relative social standing-subjective social RD) 
for the different reference groups collected in 2011/11 and 2014/15 and relate these two dimensions of RD 
with the outcome variable, SWB. In 2014/2015, youth respondents are asked: “Which of the following 
comparison indicators (object of relative comparisons) are used by you when you compare your life 
situations with that of others?” Respondents are requested to respond either ‘’yes’’ or ‘’no’’ to the list of 
income and social comparison indicators provided to them. If a respondent is found to respond ‘’yes’’ to 
the list of comparison variables (income and social capital indicators), the following follow-up question 
was asked to find out how and where they position their social status for the two comparison variables, 
across seven reference groups. Accordingly, questions relating to the seven reference groups followed 
directly afterward, “How would you describe or position your gross income [for income relative 
deprivation], social status [for social relative deprivation] in comparison to [the different reference 
groups]?” Respondents are offered a seven-scale, ranging from “the top (richest) (1) to the bottom (poorest) 
(7)”, the scales in a reverse order, for income comparisons, and a five-scale, ranging from “least connected, 
least respected, or not proud, all coded as strongly disagree (1) to the well connected, well respected, very 
proud, all coded as strongly agree (5)” for social capital comparisons. Respondents are also requested to 
recall their socio-economic status compared to their peers: three years ago and one year ago. If the 
respondents are not willing to respond to the list of the comparison variables, follow-up questions are not 
asked. Prior to these questions, respondents are asked whether and how socioeconomic status comparisons 
would affect life satisfaction. Questions used in the survey to probe the potential pathways through which 
relative deprivation may affect well-being are further discussed during FGD to understand the relevance of 
such relationships.  
 In the elicitation of both income and social relative deprivation across the self-identified reference groups, 
the reference groups used are presented in subsequent orders for each respondent per each dimension of 
relative deprivation. Since the survey contains 7 reference groups presented one after the other, the 
possibility of order effect in their responses is unavoidable which can be caused either by learning or fatigue 
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or wish to be consistent. To reduce this bias, I randomized the order of the presentation of the reference 
groups. The same is true also with the use of the comparison indicators of relative deprivation. In addition, 
dropping the non-income dimensions of RD from the series of questions and reducing the number of 
reference groups to 7 has also helped to reduce the burden and confusion for the respondents.  
The same outcome variable-subjective well-being presented earlier is also used here. In what follows, I 
begin by presenting the descriptive results from the subjective data.   
4.5.2. Descriptive results from the subjective measures of relative deprivation   
The lowest subjective relative deprivation score is obtained when youth compare the income of their 
household with the income of others in their village. The highest subjective relative income deprivation 
score is found using land size and education reference groups. As stated earlier, this is partly because of the 
fact that land is one of the necessary factors of production for youth participation in agriculture and core to 
well-being. In line with this finding, FGD results indicate that education is the most commonly used social 
status indicator among youth in the study areas (Table 4.11).   
The descriptive results from subjective measure suggest that the two dimensions of subjective RD differ 
significantly by gender and youth category mainly for economic reference groups. For instance, I compare 
the results of the income and social relative deprivation scores across the reference groups: land size and 
size of livestock holding for male youth and female youth, and for youth household head and youth 
members. Income relative deprivation score vis-a-vis the size of land holding suggest that female youth feel 
relatively more deprived compared to their male counterparts (Table 4.11); the same is true between 
members and youth household heads: members feeling more deprived compared to youth household heads. 
Comparison of social relative deprivation scores between the two types of groups (male and female; and 
members and household heads) using size of livestock holding as a reference group also suggest that male 
youth regard social comparisons more important than female youth; and youth household head regard social 
comparisons more important than youth who are household members. This heterogeneity of the importance 
of economic comparisons among different youth groups has important implications for poverty reduction, 
marriage market, and participation in agriculture. In addition, the significant role of economic comparisons 
in youth welfare compared to other comparison groups indicate the fact that beyond economic domains, 
non-monetary domains also matter in well-being analyses. For instance, social comparisons are also 
necessary in capturing the prevalence and effect of relative deprivation for both male and female, and for 
youth household heads and members. Furthermore, the figures also reconfirm that relative deprivation is 
multidimensional and that it is important to carefully and differentiate the impact of each dimension and 
their implications (Table 4.11).   
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Table 4.11: Self-reported mean values of subjective relative income and social deprivation across gender 
and categories   
 
 
 
 
Dimensions   
   Reference groups  
 Socio-demographic 
reference groups 
 Geographical areas reference 
groups 
Economic reference groups 
AGE  YOUTHTYPE EDUCATION   VILLAGE  KEBELE  WOREDA  LAND 
SIZE  
TLU OCCUPATION 
Panel A: All youth  
Income RD 3 3 4.46  3 3 4 5 3* 3 
Education 
RD 
4.48 4.48 -  4.48 4.48 4.48 4.48 4.48 4.48 
social RD*  2 3 3  2 2 2 - - 3 
           
Panel B: Male youth  
Income RD  3.4 3.4   3.11 3.52 4.20 4.02 - 3.37 
Social RD  2.38 2.38   2.30 2.25 2.60 - 0.90** 2.86 
           
Panel C: Female youth  
Income RD  3.35 3.35   3.19 3.61 4.24 4.78 - 3.36 
Social RD  2.36 2.36   2.23 2.34 2.22 - 0.85** 2.84 
Panel D: Youth household head  
Income RD  3.38 3.38   3.15 3.57 4.22 3.06 - 3.34 
Social RD  2.46 2.46   2.22 2.56 2.56 - 0.96** 2.87 
           
Pane E: Youth members  
Income RD  3.39 3.39   3.14 3.55 4.21 4.85  3.34 
Social RD  2.34 2.34   2.27 2.33 2.22 - 0.85** 2.78 
Note: social RD is on a five-point scale, 1 strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree; ** means dummy i.e. comparison 
is important if yes and 0 otherwise.  
 
4.5.3. The framework and econometric methods: subjective measures of RD 
As stated earlier, given the ordinal nature of SWB, the ordered probit or logit specification would be 
employed in regression. Hence, our default model specification considers SWB as latent: 
𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜌𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 log(𝑌𝑖𝑡,ℎ) + 𝜌𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 log(𝑆𝑅𝐷
𝑟(𝑌𝑖𝑡)) 
+𝛾𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝐷
𝑟 (𝑆𝑖𝑡) 
+𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜕 + 𝜎𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                         (4.13) 
Where 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗  is the self-reported SWB of youth i on a scale of 1 to 9; 𝑌𝑖𝑡,ℎ is absolute income per capita of 
youth i; 𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑟(𝑌𝑗𝑡) is the self-perceived rating of relative income deprivation of youth i on a subjective 
scale with respect to reference group, r; this is a subjective assessment of individual’s own ratings which is 
informative of the position of the individual in the income or wealth rank without taking into account the 
distances in income or wealth; 𝑆𝑖𝑡 is an index which denotes social status, computed using PCA; 𝑆𝑆𝐷
𝑟(𝑆𝑖𝑡) 
is a self-reported social relative deprivation of youth i on a subjective scale with respect to reference group, 
r (i.e. the rank which is informative only of the position of the individual in the social rank); (. ) 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 
and (. ) 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  are parameters for absolute and relative to be estimated, respectively;  𝑍𝑖𝑡
′  is a vector of 
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individual and household characteristics; and u is the error term. In the estimations, similar to the objective 
approach, I employ a number of different specifications to test the robustness of our results. For instance, I 
include the father and mother characteristics, and interaction terms to the above specifications (4.13) 
expressed as follows: 
𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜌𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 log(𝑌𝑖𝑡,ℎ) + 𝜌𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 log(𝑆𝑅𝐷
𝑟(𝑌𝑗𝑡)) 
+ 𝛾𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝐷
𝑟 (𝑆𝑗𝑡) + 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝐼𝐷
𝑟 (𝑁𝐼𝑗𝑡) 
+𝜔𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝜎𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                        (4.14) 
 
𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜌𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 log(𝑌𝑖𝑡,ℎ) + 𝜌𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 log(𝑆𝑅𝐷
𝑟(𝑌𝑗𝑡)) 
+𝛾𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝐷
𝑟 (𝑆𝑗𝑡) + 𝜏𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝐼𝐷
𝑟 (𝑁𝐼𝑗𝑡) 
+𝜌𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 log(𝑌𝑖𝑡,ℎ) ∗ 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑚 +𝜔𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑀𝑖𝑡 
    +𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝜎𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                (4.15) 
The effects of subjective income and social relative deprivation cannot be determined a priori, as presented 
earlier. The only difference is that the coefficients are interpreted as ‘’status’’ or ‘’signal” effect of rank 
considerations; i.e. relative rank considerations in income and social capital. In the econometric 
specifications and estimations, I follow a similar procedure with that of van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
(2008). Accordingly, I regress self-reported relative deprivations on SWB of youth controlling for other 
covariates such as absolute income and other socio-economic factors presented earlier, including parental 
characteristics. Income is entered in the analyses as the logarithm of the income per capita computed from 
all sources including government transfers, as indicated earlier.  
4.5.4. Econometric results from the subjective measure of relative deprivations   
Benchmark results  
Again, our estimation results of the benchmark model using subjective approach and specification indicate 
that the signs and significance of the parameters for the standard economic and socio-demographic variables 
are similar to the findings I obtain using the objective approach. The most common factors found to have 
significant impacts on SWB of youth include household income per capita, the age of youth, youth 
relationship to head, having separate cash income, access to drinking water during dry seasons and 
education of household head. Using these specifications and approaches, I find an inverted U-shape 
relationship between SWB and age of the youth, with the maximum around 49 years. Since the 
interpretation of the results is already provided under objective approaches; I focus on the analyses of the 
impacts of income and social subjective RD on SWB, measured using rank considerations, rather than 
distance, across seven reference groups in more detail below.  
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Subjective income relative deprivation  
Initially, various specifications of Eq (4.13) are estimated using seven reference groups discussed earlier 
but I report only for selected ones. I observe a systematic impact of the different dimensions of both absolute 
income and relative deprivation (income relative deprivation and social relative deprivation) on SWB across 
all the reference groups (Table 4.12).  
Unlike the objective measurement approach to relative deprivation, the results from subjective approach 
indicate that relative rank (income) comparisons are strongly and negatively affecting SWB across all the 
reference groups used, with the highest negative effect vis-a-vis the reference groups: the same village and 
kebele. Youth who perceive that their relative income or their household’s income rank is one unit lower 
on the 1 to 5 scale to other youth in the same village is associated with approximately 0.856 lower 
satisfaction rating (measured on a 1 to 9 scale). Thus, the relatively deprived youth exhibited a lower level 
of SWB. The effect of perceived income deprivation is the lowest for the reference group-size of land 
holding (Table 4.12). This is partly due to the dropping of land size in the control group because of high 
multicollinearity. As can be observed from the coefficients of the estimates of relative deprivation across 
the reference groups, income comparisons in the geographic domain tend to affect SWB more strongly than 
comparisons in the economic domain. One justification could be that when comparisons are rank related 
than the magnitude of the income gap, the effect of geographic comparisons are more important than 
economic comparisons. In addition, contrary to the estimates from the objective measure of relative 
deprivation approach, estimates from subjective relative deprivation (i.e. self-reported income 
comparisons) has resulted in two important issues: the magnitudes and sign of the estimates of the perceived 
relative income deprivation. On the one hand, the magnitudes of the perceived relative income deprivation 
is higher in these estimations [than in objective measure] across all the reference groups suggesting the 
strong “status effect” or “rank effect” of income comparisons as a determinant of youth SWB. On the other 
hand, the magnitudes of the estimates suggest the need for cautions in employing different measurement 
approaches in the analyses of SWB. For instance, while the subjective measures of relative deprivation in 
the context of LDCs may overestimate the real effect of RD on SWB; objective measures of RD may 
undermine the real effect of relative deprivation on SWB. In addition, the use of subjective measure can 
lead to results that differ from those reported when relative deprivation is measured objectively. Thus, the 
two measurement approaches to relative deprivation may result in two different policy implications. As 
already noted in the introduction, models that employ subjective measure (rank considerations) may predict 
plainly different behavior from models employing objective rank (objective measures in this case), and 
there is no certainty as to which type of measure, ordinal (rank) or cardinal, adequately represent people’s 
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preferences. This finding also calls for revisiting past empirical studies and re-estimate econometric models 
employing a subjective measure of relative deprivation instead of the objective measure.  
Subjective social relative deprivation  
Similar to the estimates of objective approaches and specifications, the signs of social comparisons based 
on rank considerations remain negative and strongly significant across all the reference groups except for 
similar education, similar age groups, and youth in the same geographic areas. The more youth feel highly 
disconnected or disrespected in their social spectra, the less their SWB would be. The insignificant effect 
of social relative deprivation on SWB vis-a-vis similar education may be due to the recent 1 to 5 
coordination at the school level. As stated earlier, the most common channels through which young people 
make frequent social contact and companionships are with their ethnic groups, colleagues, and youth of 
similar age group. This might weaken the negative effect of social deprivation. The insignificant effect of 
social relative deprivation visa-a-vis other youth in the same woreda may be explained by the fact that 
social connections and informal support systems are weaker when the scope of the geographic reference 
groups are larger (reflected by the strong significant effect of social deprivation visa-a-vis village or 
neighbors). The insignificant relationship between social deprivation and SWB visa-a-vis similar age 
groups may be explained by altruism and informal support systems from colleagues or relatives also 
reflected in strong significant relationship toward the reference group: youth in the same ethnicity, and 
youth in the same village.   
  Robustness checks   
In this approach as well, our data set allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity to control for 
individual unobservable personality traits that partly determine SWB (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijers, 2004) 
(Table 4.12, panel C). As I did earlier in the objective approaches, I split our sample into different subgroups 
based on gender and re-run our analyses to explore whether our results are robust to different specifications 
and sub-sample across the reference groups. Table 4.12 below summarizes the results from the random 
effects ordered regression models and FE estimations (also re-estimated the model using FE but not reported 
here) for young men and women separately. In line with the specification results using the whole sample, 
separate analyses for young men and women indicate that the effect of perceived income comparisons on 
SWB is negative and statistically significant at 1%. For instance, one unit higher on the 1 to 5 scale of 
comparing income to other youth of the same village is associated with lower satisfaction rating (measured 
on a 1 to 9 scale) for young women than men (Table 4.12, Panel A and B). This suggests that perceived 
income and social comparisons (rank considerations with respect to the reference groups) are more 
important for the life satisfaction of young women than their men counterparts are. In addition, the larger 
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negative effect of perceived income RD on SWB of young women than men vis-à-vis geographic and 
occupation domains may also explain the fact that relative deprivation induces migration to distant cities or 
abroad (such as to Arab countries) is stronger among rural young women than men.  
In line with the earlier findings, the signs of other socio-economic and demographic determinants of SWB 
for the two subgroups across the reference groups remain unaffected. It is interesting to note again that 
household head characteristics remain crucial in determining the well-being of female youth than male 
youth.  
Table 4.12: Estimation results from subjective measures of relative deprivation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES benchmark AGE VILLAGE KEBELE WOREDA OCCUPATION 
       
Panel A: Male youth  
Subjective income RD  - -1.801*** -2.208*** -1.767*** -1.407*** -1.729*** 
  (0.240) (0.271) (0.238) (0.179) (0.239) 
Subjective social RD  - -0.0722 -0.379* -0.173 -0.216 - 
  (0.193) (0.196) (0.258) (0.217) - 
Log(income per capita) 0.158 0.168 0.0665 0.135 0.106 0.119 
 (0.125) (0.136) (0.139) (0.140) (0.129) (0.136) 
N 743 743 743 743 743 743 
       
Panel B: Female youth  
Subjective income RD  - -2.471*** -2.558*** -2.321*** -1.639*** -2.497*** 
  (0.334) (0.318) (0.282) (0.225) (0.341) 
Subjective social RD  - 0.354 -0.587* 0.194 -0.188 - 
  (0.229) (0.313) (0.313) (0.269) - 
Log(income per capita) 0.0103 -0.0170 -0.0393 -0.110 -0.0486 0.0322 
 (0.161) (0.172) (0.182) (0.175) (0.172) (0.190) 
N 419 417 417 417 417 419 
Individual controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Parental controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Panel C:  FE estimates (all) 
Subjective income RD   -0.856*** -0.862*** -0.727*** -0.733*** 
   (0.0624) (0.0674) (0.0854) (0.0652) 
Log(income per capita) 0.00692 - 0.00488 -0.00113 -0.00866 -0.00682 
 (0.0438) - (0.0374) (0.0381) (0.0410) (0.0392) 
Individual controls  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Household controls  No   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Other controls  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1,162  1,160 1,160 1,160 1,162 
R-squared 0.613  0.717 0.707 0.661 0.690 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable, youth subjective well-being, is based on life satisfaction asking subjects to rate their life 
satisfaction on 1 to 9 scales (1 indicating the worst possible life and 9 the best possible life). 
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Absolute income and subjective well-being   
 In all the models employing an objective measure of relative deprivation and in all the specifications across 
all the reference groups I used, I find a consistent strong positive effect of absolute income on life 
satisfaction (SWB) for the whole sample. This is expected considering the fact that more income per capita 
leads to more consumption or investment in the well-being of youth. This finding is also in line with 
previous empirical evidence from developed countries (Georke and Pannenberg, 2015; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
and Frijters, 2004; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004) as well as developing countries (Akay and Martinsson, 
2011; Akay et al., 2012; Lelkes, 2006). The main difference between the empirical findings from developed 
and developing countries is the magnitude of the effect of absolute income on SWB; higher effect for poorer 
countries compared to rich countries. In addition, most existing studies are based on cross-sectional data, 
which is prone to endogeneity problems. Despite the consistent positive and significant effect of absolute 
income on SWB; splitting the sample into subgroups such as into male and female provided a different 
perspective as to the effect and direction of association of absolute income and life satisfaction in the case 
of subjective measure of relative deprivation (Table 4.12, panel B). For instance, the sign and significance 
of the effect of absolute income on SWB for male and female subgroups differ across all the reference 
groups in the subjective measures and specifications. While I find a consistent positive effect of absolute 
income on life satisfaction for male subgroups; the effect is either positive or negative (but insignificant) 
for the female subgroups depending on the definition of reference groups used. In other words, the 
heterogeneous effect of marginal utility of absolute income on male and female well-being suggests that 
the impact of absolute income on SWB is not the same across the different gender.  
Similar to our findings, there are also a few studies that find a negative effect of absolute income on life 
satisfaction, the case labelled as ‘’the case of the frustrated achievers’’– an increase in absolute income 
result in decrease in life satisfaction (Graham and Pettinato, 2002; Becchetti and Rossetti, 2009, the later 
for Germany). Though I am hesitant to conclude that the same factor is at work in explaining our findings, 
especially in poor countries, I suspect that sample size (small sample) in the female subgroups might have 
caused this. An equally important justification that is more likely in the rural context of Ethiopia is that 
since the negative effect of absolute income on female SWB is for the reference groups: similar age, youth 
in the same village, kebele, and woreda, cultural factors, and intra-household resource allocation methods 
might have caused these variations. A household may be rich or better off but a parent may not be culturally 
willing to invest in the welfare of young women like that of the men counterparts; as reflected by the 
negative effect of absolute income on the life satisfaction of young women. During FGD held with different 
groups, I also identify that much of the benefits such as income obtained from farm work is not fairly shared 
among youth members (especially among female youth) as parents control most of such resources. This, in 
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turn, may create welfare differences between young woman and man within a household. This line of 
thinking is further supported by the strong and significant effect of having independent income sources on 
youth well-being. In addition, the experimental results presented in the previous chapter also indicate that 
parents are more positional towards young men than women are. Furthermore, the stronger effect of income 
comparisons on SWB of young women than men discussed earlier support also this line of thinking. 
4.6. Conclusions and recommendations  
Studying the drivers of the well-being of the rural youth certainly deserves critical attention given the size 
of youth in the total population. In line with this, our work aids analyzing of the implications of relative 
deprivations by directly comparing the objective and subjective measures on SWB of youth in Ethiopia. I 
have undertaken a comprehensive investigation of the effects of the different dimensions of relative 
deprivation (monetary, non-monetary, and social) along with other factors on SWB of youth across various 
self- identified multiple reference groups. The self-identified reference groups and measurement of RD in 
dimensions other than income used in this study added interesting insights to the RD literature in relation 
to well-being, including identification of several gaps for future research in this area. I do so with novel 
panel data set from the agricultural potential areas in Ethiopia.  
Both objective and subjective measurement approaches to RD that I employ in this study generate overall 
similar conclusions: relative deprivation of different dimensions along with other economic and socio-
demographic factors matters for the well-being of rural youth. In contrast to past empirical works for 
developed countries and limited work in developing countries, our empirical results do suggest that income 
disparities relative to peers are a welfare relevant concern for most rural youth in Ethiopia. In addition, 
results suggest that taking into account the measurements of relative deprivation on SWB can significantly 
alter the sign and magnitude of the welfare impact of monetary RD irrespective of the choice of the 
reference groups. The results also indicate that decomposing the contributions of each RD would help to 
avoid the averaging of positive and negative income and non-income and SWB relations. This reduces the 
problem of aggregation of RD and poverty. Furthermore, results suggest that confining relative deprivation 
to monetary sphere may be misleading and doing so does not capture the real effects of relative deprivation 
in the well-being analyses. Thus, I should take the argument for adopting a multidimensional approach to 
the measurement of relative deprivation (or poverty) in welfare analyses more seriously. Moreover, apart 
from RDs, absolute income per capita, positional goods such as mobile phones, size of livestock holding, 
having separate income sources, social capital, education of household head are found to enhance SWB, 
whereas lack of access to clean water during dry seasons and lack of public water, age, and gender of 
household head is SWB decreasing. The results are robust for the subgroups regardless of the definitions 
of reference groups employed, the different measurement approaches used, and specifications.   
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Specific to the measurement of RD used, for instance, econometric results from the objective measures 
indicate that relative income deprivation has a positive and significant impact on SWB of youth for all the 
reference groups employed. The positive impact is an indication of ‘’signal effect’’ or ‘’positive external 
effects” - higher income of others in the reference group indicate higher prospects for youth. Relative 
income deprivation fosters life satisfaction by promoting a stronger pursuit for status that in turn foster 
accumulation of income through hard work and/or spillovers, whereas non-monetary and social relative 
deprivation in terms of material or social capital reduces well-being. Thus, relative income deprivation 
generates signal effect or economic externalities because of living with (or in) high-income reference 
groups. However, results from the subjective measure of RD (i.e. rank related comparisons rather than 
distance or money itself) suggest that SWB is consistently negatively and significantly affected by 
perceived income deprivation across all the reference groups controlling for other things, a higher income 
in the reference group reduces life satisfaction. This means that when comparisons are rank related (i.e. 
measurement of RD is based on respondents’ perceived relative income standing) than the magnitude of 
the income gaps, relative income deprivation generates the status effect. The effects of non-income and 
social RD in terms of material wealth and social capital remain negative across all the reference groups, 
irrespective of the measurement employed.  
Our findings indicate that unlike the previous studies on adults in developing countries (Ravallion, 2002; 
Akay and Martinsson, 2012; Georke and Pannenberg, 2015), the signs and significances of RD varies with 
gender, youth category (or age) and choice of reference groups. For instance, the effect of RD on SWB is 
stronger for members or younger youth who live with their parents than for household heads, and for young 
women than men. This means that the effect of RD is stronger or weaker depending on the choice of 
reference groups, gender and marital status of youth (i.e. members vs youth household head). For instance, 
when land size is used as a reference group, the effect of income RD is significant and strong for youth who 
live with their parents and for young women suggesting that land inequalities are more serious among 
female youth members [that could have implications for female youth participation in agriculture]. When 
young men compare themselves with those having a larger number of livestock, the negative effect of social 
RD is stronger and significant while this is the not the case for younger women. On the other hand, when 
young women compare themselves with those having a larger portion of land, the negative effect of social 
RD on their SWB is stronger and significant; while this is the not the case for young men. This clearly 
shows the economic and social value differences and inequalities persistent across gender and within 
households. This difference has also important implications for marriage market. For young men, livestock 
is an important asset for ploughing as well as for dowry beyond its manifesto of wealth status. For young 
women, the land is an important economic asset. This difference is clearly reflected with the strong and 
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significant signal effect of relative income deprivation in the male and female models vis-a-vis the reference 
groups: village, ethnicity, and religion, since the marriage markets mostly work within these domains.  
Moreover, our findings also shed light on the fact that though it is necessary to address absolute deprivation, 
it is equally necessary to consider the likely consequences of relative deprivation or inequalities among 
youth, especially among resource-poor young women since inequalities perpetuate poverty. Despite 
consistent positive and significant association between absolute income and SWB using the whole sample, 
splitting the sample into subgroups provided a different perspective as to the effect and direction of absolute 
income on life satisfaction. An increase in absolute income has different effects on the well-being of young 
men and women partly depending on intra-household resource inequalities, cultural factors such as favoring 
of male youth. The effect of absolute income is stronger for youth having father and mother, and youth 
from female-headed households have lower well-being compared to male headed households. In addition, 
the heterogeneous effect of marginal utility of absolute income on male and female, and on younger and 
older youth well-being suggests that the impact of absolute income on SWB is not the same across the 
different groups (i.e. the marginal utility of income is higher for male youth). The more the educated the 
father or the mother is the more well-being of the youth is. In addition, controlling for father/mother or head 
characteristics reduces the magnitude of the coefficient of income RD, suggesting that presence of head 
reduces the feeling of one’s deprivation and enhances the welfare of youth. However, the experimental 
results presented earlier indicate that parents are more positional towards young men than women. This 
also means that relative deprivation better captures intra-household resource allocation disparities and 
complements measures of intra and inter-household inequality.  
Another interesting lesson from the study is the results suggested from the direct comparisons of objective 
and subjective measures of RD that employ multiple reference groups. For instance, the significance of 
relative income deprivation toward the reference group- all other youth in the same woreda, suggests that 
a certain development policy solely motivated to raise absolute income (eg. equalisation of the rural income 
distribution of households or youth individuals say to stem rural-to-urban youth migration) may not be 
successful if the relevant reference group is woreda. For instance, raising the absolute income of individuals 
in the woreda will not induce less migration as far as town-village income differentials (urban-rural wage 
gaps) exists. Thus, implications of such policies and wishes to induce less migration may be misleading if 
the policy focus is to raise absolute income only. In this example, in an effort to combat rural-to-urban 
migration, raising absolute income level could be complemented by narrowing of urban-rural wage gap 
(see for example Stark and Taylor, 1991). The best example in case is the recent rising of rural-urban youth 
migration (both to big cities and to abroad such as Arab, Europe), despite improvements in absolute income 
in many many African countries. Thus, the use of multiple reference groups and relative deprivation theory 
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help to convey such information that cannot be captured using the conventional approaches to welfare 
analyses.  
In summary, our findings suggest that relative deprivation is the strong predictor of the well-being of youth. 
Results from objective measures of relative income deprivation suggest that relatively well-off friends, 
neighbors or generally reference groups, leads to aspirations as a result of spillover effects from others (or 
positive external effects) and/or signal effect which in turn enhances hard work and quest for status. This, 
in turn, prompts a quest for higher wealth accumulation, resulting in higher well-being. Thus, feelings of 
relative deprivation, aspirations, income, and well-being evolve jointly or sequentially.  
Based on the findings from the different estimations, I infer the following policy implications: 
 The signal effect of relative income deprivation serves as future income prospects for youth and higher 
earnings of others in the reference group induce hard work (inducing aspirations) and foster more 
wealth accumulation, thus, creating spill-over effects or positive externalities. Put differently, having 
well-off comparison groups such as friends and neighbors are seen as a source of aspirations since the 
economic gains to the relatively well-off spillovers to benefit say the poor, those at the lower economic 
stratum. Indeed, our results suggest that significant positive external effects work through the 
occupation and age group comparison domains. Hence, upward income comparisons may result in 
higher life satisfaction. Thus, development interventions that target few people in rural areas will create 
significant welfare externalities-in terms of technology adoption such as productivity-enhancing 
spillovers, provision of local public goods, private entrepreneurship, local employment opportunities, 
etc. For instance, introducing new agricultural technologies such as improved varieties or new methods 
of production to few role model young farmers enhance technology adoption and dissemination among 
alike that in turn results in increased well-being.    
 Despite setting strategies to reduce absolute poverty, there is a need to reduce relative poverty and 
resource inequalities, including income and non-income inequalities. This can be done by designing 
appropriate redistributive policies, especially among the very poor. Thus, the focus of governments, as 
well as aid donors, should move beyond reducing absolute poverty towards also reducing relative 
poverty. In addition, raising the absolute income of the household does not necessarily enhance the 
welfare of young women. Instead, it may worsen as far as intra-household resource allocation is biased 
towards male siblings and youth are not the beneficiaries of their labor income. 
 Decomposing relative deprivation across different dimensions and use of multiple self-identified 
reference groups’ offer better understanding of resource allocation inequality among different sexes 
(heterogeneity of intra-households such as investment in human capital of offspring’s): daughters and 
sons. The effect of RD is different for members and youth household head as well as for young men 
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and women. Thus, relative deprivation reflects relative poverty and complements the measurement of 
inequality. Therefore, measurement of poverty and well-being should move beyond money metric 
approaches and adopt the broad measurements of inequalities and welfare.  
 From the comparison of the two measurement approaches, I learn that limiting RD to income alone 
undermines the real effect of RD and its interrelated effect on well-being. Thus, disaggregating relative 
deprivation along different dimensions and use of different measurement approaches such as subjective 
relative deprivation in the analyses of youth well-being presents a useful complement and additional 
information to objective analyses of youth well-being. This suggests that I should take the argument 
for adopting a multidimensional approach to the measurement of poverty as well as well-being more 
seriously. Doing so will make methodological contributions for assessing societal conditions (within 
and across individuals) for improving government policy in light of well-being.  
 The negative impact of relative deprivation on youth well-being can be reduced through different policy 
instruments: imposing taxes on status goods such as fancy mobile phones to prevent diversion of 
resource allocation from meeting basic needs to luxury goods; redistributive policies to reduce 
inequalities by creating access to productive resources such as land and livestock; etc. Access to basic 
resources such as land and livestock remain crucial for youth livelihood. It is also important to improve 
property rights especially land and land-related security for young women.   
 Investment in social capital is also important. Social capital (such as the role of kinship relations, 
informal support systems like Debo, informal credit and saving systems from relatives or friends in 
smoothening shocks and bridging the deprivation of resources that would affect well-being) play an 
important role to enhance the well-being of youth. Deprivation in this capital significantly affects the 
welfare of youth as well as household. Improving social capital of youth also helps to develop human 
capital. Education for young women should be the policy priorities of governments in order to enhance 
the welfare of rural youth. The strong effect of RD vis-à-vis education suggests the strong latent demand 
for education partly resulting from the recent expansion of secondary and territory education in most 
rural areas.  
 The expansion of rural energy, transport, irrigation and ICT infrastructure should also be at the center 
of the development agenda in order to harness the potential of the demographic dividend. Though lack 
of mobile phone among the youth is negatively related to SWB, mobile phones can serve as either 
status-seeking good or a device that bridge the information gap related to agriculture (such as weather 
forecasts and market prices). If the purpose of the mobile purchase is for competing for higher status, 
this may often force households to divert resources from meeting basic needs. If mobile phones are to 
access information, they contribute to effective information flow thereby enhancing production and 
marketing decisions that in turn enhances wellbeing. Recent evidence indicates that mobile phones 
133 
 
provide great opportunity to bridge the information gap related to agriculture and enhance the social 
capital of youth (Tekalign et al., 2011; Tadesse and Godfrey, 2016). 
 Educating parents (especially mothers) via extension services or other means will enhance the well-
being of youth. Reforms related to marriage market are also necessary for youth well-being. For 
instance, polygamous marriage has a significant negative effect on the well-being of youth. In line with 
this, the study finds that having a parent would reduce the negative impact of the feelings of one’s 
relative deprivation.  
 In designing youth development intervention, there is a need to distinguish between youth from 
households whose income are transitorily low and those from households’ whose income are 
structurally trapped in low levels of welfare.  
The current African population is highly dominated by youth. Future research should focus on the important 
role of multidimensional relative deprivation and/or inequalities in other African countries in order to 
understand broadly the effect of relative concerns on well-being. In addition, future research should focus 
on addressing the methodological challenges in measuring RD, including the development of innovative 
approaches to the appropriate measurement and weighting of the different components of multidimensional 
relative deprivation indices. Furthermore, the role of reference groups, the dynamics behind the different 
effects of reference groups’ across gender, and life cycle patterns of relative concerns in developing 
countries are fertile grounds for future research. The study helps to identify the relevance and importance 
of the different dimensions of RD in SWB. However, in-depth research is necessary with expanded settings 
and social contexts to examine the importance of the concepts in developing countries. Exploring the 
relevance of the different dimensions of RD and its implications for the growing inequality remains to be 
unaddressed in the empirical literature. Future research should attempt to address the mechanisms through 
which relative concerns could raise aspirations without exacerbating further inequalities.   
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5. IMPACTS OF RELATIVE DEPRIVATION ON OCCUPATIONAL CHOICES OF 
RURAL YOUTH IN ETHIOPIA 
 
Abstract 
One of the channels through which relative deprivation affects human behavior is through its effect on 
human decisions such as occupational choices. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence in developing 
countries on the link between occupational choices and relative deprivation of any dimension: income, 
wealth, social. Specifically, literature is silent on these issues in the context of rural youth employment and 
engagement in agriculture. Using realized occupations and different indicators of intended occupations, I 
find that relative deprivation is a strong predictor of occupational choices of the rural youth and their 
engagement in agriculture (irrespective of the relative deprivation and occupational choice indicators 
employed) with an influence of the preferences and attributes of parents. Specifically, youth from relatively 
more deprived households (poor income groups) and least deprived households (rich income groups) are 
more likely to choose livelihood options within agriculture than youth from middle-income households. I 
find that, whereas the very poor appear locked in (informal) agriculture due to the lack of necessary 
resources enabling them to diversify their income sources, the rich (well off) stay or change occupations to 
agriculture because the incentive to move out of agriculture is low and agriculture is an investment 
opportunity with high return. If the exit rate is high among the middle-income groups with relatively better 
skills, resources and aspirations than the poor income groups, agriculture may become the workplace of 
the left behind, further hampering the future of agriculture and food security of the country. Our findings 
have implications for policies in the areas of rural employment, agricultural development, and inclusive 
growth and highlight the role of government interventions in addressing extreme deprivation, reaching the 
left behind. 
 
Keywords: youth occupational choices; relative deprivations; subjective measures; objective measures, 
agriculture; Ethiopia  
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
The theory of relative deprivation suggests that people take actions out of a concern for relative standing. 
For instance, household members undertake occupational choices (decisions) not necessarily to increase 
the household’s or own absolute income but rather to improve the household’s or own relative standing (in 
terms of relative deprivation), with respect to a specific reference group. Recently, there is a growing body 
of literature from econometric studies and experimental economics (Easterlin, 1995, 2001; Clark and 
Oswald, 1996; Alpizar et al., 2005; Stark, 2016; Di Tella etal., 2003; Luttmer, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
2005), social psychology (Townsend, 1987) and neuroscience (Kuo and Chiang, 2013; Beshai et al., 2017), 
though mostly in developed countries, that examine the effects of relative deprivation on labor supply 
behavior, well-being, health, and migration decisions. Surprisingly, empirical works that document the link 
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between occupational choices and relative deprivation of any dimension: income, wealth, social, in the 
context of youth in developing countries, is scare. In fact, a few existing empirical evidence (Akay et al., 
2012a; Akay et al., 2014), though inconclusive, suggest that relative deprivation is not as dominant a 
concern (in affecting decisions) in poor countries as it apparently is in rich ones (Carlsson et al, 2007b; 
Ravallion and Lokshin, 2010). This study looks for evidence in one of the world’s poorest countries, 
Ethiopia, in the context of youth employment and the rural economy. A valid question to ask then before I 
establish the link between relative deprivation and youth livelihood (or occupational) choices is whether 
relative concerns affect human behavior (or decisions) in the context of poor countries, as the current state 
of the art claims. If so, do they count enough to influence certain youth livelihood choices? There is 
emerging empirical evidence that tries to address this first question (Akay et al., 2012; Stark, 2009; Beshai 
et al., 2017). I attempt to answer both, with a strong emphasis on the second question by examining the 
effect of relative deprivation of different dimensions on young people’s occupational choices, across 
different time horizons and multiple reference groups. Put differently, I want to empirically test how might 
the notion of relative deprivation determine young people’s occupational choices (such as agricultural labor 
participation decisions, non-agricultural labor participation decisions, migrations), with implications for the 
labor market, poverty, and youth development. 
In this study, I focus on understanding the role of relative deprivation in shaping youth career choices 
(occupational choices) in a particular agricultural setting in Ethiopia. In doing so, the study draws on the 
seminal work of Stark (1984), Stark and Taylor (1989), Stark and Yitzhaki (1988), and Stark (2017)--which 
hypothesizes that household members undertake economic decisions such as migration not necessarily to 
increase the household’s or own absolute income but rather to improve the household’s or own position 
with respect to a specific reference group. Extending the relative deprivation theory beyond the income 
spheres, this present study conceptualizes relative deprivation along different dimensions: income 
(monetary), non-income (non-monetary) and social deprivation limiting or enhancing youth livelihood 
choices or decisions. Decomposing the contribution of other dimensions of relative deprivation such as 
non-income (asset), say land access, is important because, in an agricultural setting, access to land is one 
of the most important sources of household income and the main factor that could potentially determine 
youth participation in agriculture.  
Interest in decomposing relative deprivation, (especially in terms of social status) has a long history in 
different disciplines such as economics (Sen, 1983), sociology (Runciman, 1966), social policy (Townsend, 
1987), and Social psychology (Adler and Stewart, 2007). Cardinal measure of relative deprivation, which 
this study also adopted, is based on Runciman (1966)’s definition of relative deprivation suggest that 
relative deprivation implies not only comparisons in terms of income but also comparisons beyond income 
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that include indicators of prestige or power. In this study also, I will empirically distinguish relative income 
deprivation from other forms of relative deprivation (non-income and social) in the analyses of youth 
occupational choices, as I did in the previous chapter for the following reasons. In other words, unlike the 
existing studies that limit relative deprivation to income spheres, the study extends the analyses of relative 
deprivation along other two dimensions: non-income (asset or wealth) and social capital. Similar to the 
approaches employed in the proceeding chapter, RD is measured using two approaches: objective and 
subjective.  
First, subjective measures of relative deprivation or rank measure capture psychological dimensions of 
distaste for low status, and including such dimensions in the occupational choices of young people better 
capture how relative differences in socioeconomic conditions (i.e. both real and perceived) are associated 
with the behavioral determinants of youth occupational choices. However, it is also arguably to what extent 
social relative deprivation is independently associated with the occupational choices, adjusting for absolute 
and relative income deprivation. The only study I am aware of in literature that tries to decompose the 
associations between absolute and relative deprivation using subjective measure is a study by Elgar et al. 
(2016) in the context of health-obesity risk factors among Canadian youth. As I have seen in the preceding 
chapter, magnitude and sign of relative deprivation vary based on the choice of reference groups that will 
have important policy implications for youth development, especially in the context of migration policies. 
I employ, again in this chapter, the use of multiple reference groups in the computation of RD for the two 
measurement approaches and examine whether this holds in the context of occupational choices.  
Second, this study adds to the existing literature by incorporating relative deprivation of young people as a 
complementary explanation in the analyses of occupational choices. For instance, Runciman (1966) 
indicates that relative deprivation has prestige and power dimensions that can contribute to perceived social 
vulnerability and a reduced sense of control, in turn contributing to hopelessness and apathy that could 
dampen aspirations or motivations. Theoretical work also points that like income relative deprivation, social 
relative deprivation such as power (or prestige) is another important aspect that influences young people’s 
career choices (Powdthavee, 2009). Social relative deprivation in this context refers to the inability of youth 
to fulfill the expectations and pressures of family, neighbors, relatives, colleagues, and the failure to 
participate in customary community events or activities (Townsend, 1987) which has important 
implications for one’s desire to pursue or achieve career goals. The impact of social deprivation on 
occupational choices is perhaps best captured by measures of social capital. Social capital in this study 
refers to social trust, cooperative relations, social belonging, and connections between the youth and parents 
as well as with others of comparable status and power. Each social capital indicator can act as a lever 
mitigating or worsening the feelings of deprivation, and relative deprivation in each indicator of social 
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capital can affect occupational choice outcomes. Young people respond to the feelings of relative 
deprivation in a number of ways: by changing their occupation, migrating, increasing their labor 
participation, protesting, etc. The recent youth protest in Ethiopia is a good example that shows how young 
people respond to increasing inequalities and rising unemployment. 
Third, as noted in chapter four, recent studies have started to point out, though substantial evidence exists 
from developed countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom, relative deprivation helps to 
understand a number of factors related to life satisfaction (Becchetti and Rossetti, 2009; Hyll and Schneider, 
2014). For instance, Becchetti and Rossetti (2009: 3) reported “frustrated achievers (those individuals who 
report higher income but lower satisfaction as compared to the past) and the concept of adaptation (whereby 
individuals tend to adapt quickly to a new welfare status and, by consequence, derive less utility from the 
same level of welfare)”. This suggests that there are reasons to believe here also that relative deprivation 
approaches help to understand the dynamics of youth livelihood choice strategies. Finally, disaggregating 
relative deprivation along different dimensions and the use of various measures of relative deprivation help 
to identify appropriate intervention areas including intra-family resource allocation decisions pertinent to 
youth job creation.   
In sum, relative deprivation in all or one of the dimensions help to capture how such inequality impact 
occupational outcomes of the rural youth. I empirically show the impacts of such deprivations, the 
mechanisms through which relative deprivation affect youth’s agricultural labor participation decisions and 
the interactions between such dimensions. Therefore, motivated by absolute versus relative deprivation 
considerations, this study analyses the occupational choices of rural young people.  
Given the previous discussions, the paper addresses the following research questions: 1) how might relative 
deprivations affect (or shape) young people’s labor participation decisions in agriculture, and migration 
behavior, 2) to what extent does relative deprivation affect the occupational choices of rural youth? If it 
does, which dimensions (income, social capital, and non-income) and a measure of relative deprivation 
matter most in predicting occupational choice outcomes and why? By addressing these series of questions, 
the paper contributes to the scant literature on the role of relative deprivation in shaping young people’s 
occupational choices (realized and intended occupational choices) in the context of a rural and developing 
economy. Such kind of analyses brings new insights into why relative concerns are becoming important for 
youth occupational choices in developing countries. The insights are derived from a series of econometric 
models estimated using youth survey, and household survey complemented with focus group discussions 
held in different woredas with different categories of societies.  
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a conceptual framework and briefly discusses 
empirical literature on youth livelihood or occupational choices. Section 3 discusses the data sources, the 
different measurement approaches to relative deprivation employed in this study, and the econometric 
estimation techniques. Section 4 reports the descriptive and econometric results. Section 5 concludes and 
draws some policy implications.  
5.2. Conceptual framework  
There are different views why and under what conditions and when would young people like to make the 
decisions to opt for farming (Ellis, 1998, 2000; Bryceson, 1996; Rigg, 2006; Barrett et al, 2001; Sumberg 
et al., 2017). The decision of youngsters or teenagers to engage in agriculture not only depends on the access 
to resources that person has, both tangible and intangible assets but also depends on how a person behaves 
in comparison to his /her references groups (relative motives). In other words, an individual feels relatively 
deprived when others in his comparison group earn more than what he earns-relative ‘income’ deprivation 
and individual feels relative ‘socially’ deprived when he/she fails or constrained to fulfil the expectations 
and pressures of own, family, neighbours, communities and the failure to participate in important events 
that could, in turn, affect livelihood choices. Relative deprivations of an individual take multiple forms or 
dimensions: monetary, non-monetary (such as wealth, job, education, and other facilities), social, 
ecological, and political. The more an individual is concerned about relative income the more he is 
dissatisfied or motivated that may result in a change of livelihood decisions (such as increasing labor supply 
in agriculture and increase labor supply in non-farm, i.e. change occupation from farm to non-farm 
employment), social unrest or migration.  
The theory of relative deprivation (Sen, 1981; Stark and Yitzhaki, 1988; Stark and Taylor, 1991; Stark, 
2010; Deaton, 2011) suggests that household members undertake occupational choices (career decisions) 
not necessarily to increase the household’s or own absolute income but rather to improve the household’s 
or own relative standing (in terms of relative deprivation), with respect to a specific reference group. Let 
utility, U, be defined on RD (of different dimensions). According to the relative deprivation hypothesis, 
youth employment in farming is observed if  𝑈(𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝐹) > 𝑈(𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑁𝐹) , where  𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝐹 is the relative deprivation 
associated with employment in farming (farming is chosen as a livelihood strategy) and 𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑁𝐹 is relative 
deprivation associated with the choice of non-farm employment- any livelihood options outside farming, 
including schooling. Thus, individuals or households below the upper end say the income distribution may 
decide to leave agriculture and engage in migration to find job in non-farm jobs on the assumption that they 
will thereby succeed in improving their positon or their household’s position in the reference groups by 
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securing an income higher than their initial income. When an individual’s or household’s utility is a function 
of absolute income, non-income and social capital, and relative deprivation of the three dimensions arising 
from interpersonal comparisons, say intra-group wealth comparisons and intra-group social status (capital) 
comparisons, employment in farming is observed if  𝑈(𝑌𝑖
𝐹 , 𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝐹 , 𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝐹 ) > 𝑈(𝑌𝑖
𝑁𝐹 , 𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑁𝐹 , 𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑁𝐹); 
where 𝑌𝑖
𝐹, 𝑌𝑖
𝑁𝐹 represents absolute income or wealth in farming and non-farm employment, respectively; 
𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝐹, 𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑁𝐹 denotes relative social deprivation associated with employment in farming and non-farm, 
respectively.  In the same spirit with that of Schneider (2014), suppose individual or household relative 
deprivation depends on an objectively measured part such as RD and an individual aversion to relative 
deprivation such that RDi=RD(𝛔i,RDi, SRDi). Suppose also that three individuals with identical RDF and 
RDNF and with 𝛔1 < 𝛔2 < 𝛔3. Under such condition, though the three individuals have the same level of 
relative deprivation, say in terms of social deprivation, only the third individual may engage in changing 
occupations or migration because of distaste for relative income deprivation.   
 
5.3. Data and empirical estimation strategy  
5.3.1. The data 
The same data set used in the previous chapters, from 12 woredas of agricultural potential areas of Ethiopia, 
were used to test for the effects of relative deprivations along with other important variables described 
earlier on youth occupational choices. Description of the sample and sample selection procedures presented 
in chapter 1 and 2. The empirical analyses of this chapter are based on a panel survey of 1209 youth 
individuals (youth household heads and members who were between 13 and 34 years of age), from 521 
randomly selected farming households.  
Occupational choices of youth were captured in different ways ranging from binary responses (past and 
current realized occupation of youth) to continues (likelihood of staying or exiting agriculture and self-
reported probabilities of changing occupations from either part-time or non-farm full-time farming to full-
time farming, and vice versa). Occupations can be also categorized as realized and intentions. Realized 
occupation refers to main occupations of youth during the baseline and end line survey. Intentions refer to 
future participation in agriculture or non-agriculture elicited considering different time horizons (in 10, 20 
and 30 years’ time) during the second round of the survey (i.e. 2014/15) for youth working as (1) part-time 
farmer; (2) full-time farmers;(3) non-farm worker. Non-farm workers were mainly youth who engaged in 
business and other non-farm activities. Intentions also refer to the likelihood of moving into agriculture and 
out of agriculture (migration intention or propensity to migrate), considering the upper age limit of youth.   
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I present below the main questions presented to respondents in eliciting the different occupational choice 
outcomes. In 2014/15, youth respondents are asked30: “You are currently working as: (1) Part-time farmer   
(2) Full-time farmer (3) Full-time non-farm. From 1 to 10, what are the chances out of 10 that you would 
choose to work as part-time when you turn 34?” Similar questions are asked for full-time and non-farm. 
Series of questions relating to change of occupation (to capture the likelihood of changing one occupation 
to other) followed directly afterward: “You are currently working as a part-time farmer. From 1 to 10, how 
certain are you that you will be working as [full-time farmer or full-time non-farmer] when you turn 34?” 
“You are currently working as full-time non-farmer. From 1 to 10, how certain are you that you will be 
working as [full-time farmer] when you turn 34?” “You are currently working as a full-time farmer. From 
1 to 10, how certain are you that you will be working as a full-time farmer when you turn 34? The questions 
are pictorially supported. I call these responses ‘’subjective probabilities’’. From these responses, subjective 
probabilities are calculated. Binary responses to participation along different time horizons to capture future 
occupational preferences [intention to stay in agriculture] runs as follows: “Do you expect to remain active 
in agriculture in [10 years’ time, 20 years’, 30 years’ time]?” The module further contains a subset of 
questions that differentiate whether future participation (occupation) strategies would be full-time or part-
time; and whether it is a change of occupation, migration or maintaining the current status quo.     
I categorized the set of intended occupational outcomes (i.e. future occupation options for youth) at two 
levels: intention to stay or move into in agriculture and intention to leave agriculture or intention to migrate 
(move out). The first category refers to those who expect to stay or remain active in agriculture with 
different time horizons and for those willing to move into agriculture), given the current state of 
participation, denoted by the vector S. The second category refers to those who expect to leave agriculture 
in the future, given their current state of participation in agriculture), denoted by vector M. The vector S 
includes outcomes: The vector S includes outcomes: 
S1: expect to remain active (keeping current status quo) in agriculture up to 34 years,  
S2:  expect to remain active in agriculture in 10 years’ time,  
S3: expect to remain active in agriculture over the next 20 years,  
S4: expect to remain active in agriculture over the next 30 years,  
S5: expect to transit or change current state of participation from either part-time or non-farm work 
to full-time farming (moving into),  
While the vector M consists of outcomes: 
                                                                
30 For robustness check, I also asked occupational outcomes using Likert scale which run as follows: Do you think 
that you will continue farming either [as part-time or full time? 1. Very likely   2. Likely   3. Unlikely   4. Very unlikely. 
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M1: expect to transit current participation from part-time farming to non-farm work, 
M2: expect to change current occupation from full-time farming to non-farm work.  
Note that {𝑆𝑘}k= {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and {𝑀𝑞}q= {1, 2,} are binary outcomes. However, the survey elicited the 
probability of the occurrence (subjective probabilities) of the binary outcomes for the outcomes {𝑆𝑘}k= 
{1,5,},and {𝑀𝑞}q= {1,2,},  hence they are continues, i.e. 𝑃𝑖𝑘(𝑆𝑘 = 1) for k= {1, 5} and 𝑃𝑖𝑘(𝑀𝑞 = 1) for 
q={1,2}. An advantage of asking probabilistic questions relative to approaches that employ a Likert scale 
or a simply binary response (yes/no) is that responses are interpersonally comparable and allow the 
respondent to express uncertainty (Manski, 2004). To make use of such advantages, I elicited subjective 
probabilities using probabilistic questions for the binary occupation (participation): 𝑆5 and {𝑀𝑞}q= {1, 2,}. 
As is the case in many standard studies that collect subjective data, a brief introduction is read and presented 
to the respondents at the start of the survey. In most cases, in addition to the use of pictures, practical 
examples are also presented and dictated back and forth. The wording of the introduction is similar to that 
in Zafar (2009). The full introduction used in the survey questionnaire is presented in appendix Table 4A.1.   
The second part of the survey collected data for a set of characteristics: of youth, their parents (fathers and 
mothers) and their households, that are likely to influence the future occupational choices of youth [in that 
choice set per the respective time horizon selected]. Data are collected also on the labor allocation of each 
individuals’ labor time to farming, schooling, and other activities, and on household income from all 
sources during 2010/11 and 2014/15. Income for a household includes all sources of income farm 
production (on-farm and off-farm), petty trades, transfers, gifts, rental income (again the detail computation 
on this is presented in chapter three).  
Realized and intended occupations or livelihood strategies available to youth (as described earlier) is 
summarized using the following diagram (Figure 5.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1:  Realized and intended occupation strategies available to youth  
Past and current occupation 
 Full-time farming (A1) 
 Part-time farming (A2) 
 Non-farm work (A3) 
M2  
M1 
Stay  
(Stayers) 
Move into  
Exit/migrate 
(Move out of) 
  
S1  
S5  
S4 
S3  
S2  
Intended occupations   Realized occupations: benchmark   
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I use the two measurements of relative deprivation (objective and subjective) for the computation of relative 
deprivation indices. Selected characteristics of youth, their households, and community characteristics, with 
respect to the different categories of youth’s occupations, are summarised in Table 5.1.   
Table 5.1: Selected realized and intended occupational choices of youth and household characteristics   
  Part-time 
farmer 
Full-time 
farmer 
Non-farm 
worker 
Realized occupation: current and past     
(Realized past) main occupation (in 2010) 0.42 0.42 0.12 
(Realized current) main  occupation (in 2015): 0.35 0.51 0.14 
    
Intended occupational choices    
Continue current status quo until turning 34 [S1] 0.49 0.65 0.71 
Transit from part-time to full-time until turning 34 [S5] - 0.41 - 
Transit from non-farm to full-time until turning 34 [S6] - 0.33 - 
Transit from part-time to non-farm worker until turning 34 [M1] - - 0.68 
Transit from full-time to non-farm worker  until turning 34 [M2] - - 0.47 
Remain active in agriculture in 10 years’ time (Yes=1) [S2] 0.45 0.76 0.21 
Remain active in agriculture in 20 years’ time (Yes=1) [S3] 0.20 59 0 
Remain active in agriculture in 30 years’ time (Yes=1) [S4] 0.17 0..42 0 
    
Youth  characteristics      
Sex (Male=1) 0.49 0.78 0.32 
Age (in years) 18.28 24.67 20.21 
Birth order  3.46 3.23 3.42 
First born (Yes=1)) 0.24 0.27 0.42 
Household characteristics     
Per capita income ( in 2015 birr) 2668 2290 2065 
Livestock holding (in TLU) (in 2015)  11.62 8.04 7.96 
Land size per household (ha) (in 2015) 2.23 1.60 1.68 
Land size per own children (ha) (in 2015) 0.59 0.51 0.45 
Observations   320 321 19 
Source: survey results. Current occupation refers to occupation of youth at the time of end line survey (2015) 
5.3.2. Empirical estimation strategy 
I estimate the impacts of (household) relative deprivations on a host of occupational choices described 
earlier. For ease of reference, the selected outcomes on occupational choices presented above are classified 
into seven categories: S1, S, S3, S4, S5, M1 and M2. The estimation strategy and presentation of results are 
as follows. In the case of each outcome for the seven categories of occupational choices, I estimate three 
parameters of interest (income, non-income, social RD). The general procedures adopted here is to have 
different model specifications for each outcome variable (S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, M1, M2) (i.e. based on 
participation categories) against multiple reference groups. Accordingly, I run series of regression models 
on these different specifications that employ multinomial logit, probit, and OLS based on the nature of 
outcome variables. I use multinomial logit models to estimate the effect of relative deprivations (measured 
using objective and subjective) on youth’s realized labor supply decisions. These estimations serve as 
benchmarks. The probit models are used estimate the effect of relative deprivations on binary intended 
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occupation outcomes such as the probability of staying in agriculture until youth turn 34 (i.e. S1), and in 
the coming 10 (i.e. S2), 20 (i.e. S3) and 30 (i.e. S4) years’ time. The OLS regression models are used to 
estimate the effect of relative deprivations on the probability of changing occupations31 from part-time and 
non-farm to full-time farming (i.e. S5), and from part-time and full-time farming to non-farm work (i.e. 
M1-M2). First, the estimation of interest is the effect of (household’s) relative deprivations on youth’s 
(actual) occupations (such as labor participation decisions in agriculture and non-agriculture, i.e. A1-A3) 
and I examine each outcome with specifications presented below.  
5.3.2.1. The effect of relative deprivation on realized occupations  
The benchmark specification, against which the results of the intended occupational choices are compared, 
is the response probabilities from the multinomial logistic regression with random effects that uses youth’s 
realized labor participation decisions. In other words, while the response variables in our benchmark models 
are based on youth’s realized occupations (i.e. main occupation at the time of first and second round 
survey); the response variables for the comparison models are based on intended participation decisions in 
agriculture in the coming 10, 20, 30 years, given their realized participation during the end line survey. 
Accordingly, I relate realized occupational choices to the different dimensions of RD as well as a rich set 
of control variables. Since the dependent variable, realized occupation, is categorical, I estimate using 
multinomial logistic regression models with random effects. The response probabilities for multinomial 
logit model with three alternatives can be specified as follows: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑡 = 𝑝|𝑋) =
exp(𝑋𝛽𝑝)
1+∑ exp (𝑋𝛽𝑝)
3
𝑝=1
,  p=1, 2, 3.                                                 (5.1) 
Where p denotes realized occupation of the youth (i.e. past and current alternative occupations) which 
include: part-time farming (A1), full-time farming (A2) and non-farm work (A3); X is a vector whose 
components are explanatory variables ?̂?1, 𝑅?̂?1, ?̂?1, 𝑆𝑅?̂?1 (where ?̂?0 is the household’s estimated income if 
youth household member works as part-time farmer while attending school and 𝑅?̂?1 is the household’s 
estimated level of relative income deprivation associated with this income; ?̂?1 is youth’s estimated social 
capital if the youth works as part-time farmer and 𝑆𝑅?̂?1 is the youth’s estimated level of relative social 
deprivation associated with this social capital), and other variables (such as individual and household level 
factors) that influence occupational choice of youth. Measurements of the different dimensions of RD are 
presented in chapter 4 and summarised in section 5.4.2. The coefficients on these explanatory variables 
differ for each occupation outcomes (alternatives). After testing several model specifications (using various 
reference groups) based on (Equ.5.1) above, I report here the model with the highest predictive power, 
                                                                
31 Measured as the probabilities that an individual choose to stay in and exit agriculture from a given set of 
occupational choices. 
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which explain best occupational choices of youth, and annex the rest. In these set of regressions, I apply 
three different specifications of (5.1). The first and simplest specification (1) includes, in addition to the 
entire set of general control variables, only youth characteristics and relative deprivation as a determinant 
of occupational choices. In the second specification (2), I add father and mother characteristics to the first 
specification. Finally, in the specification (3), I add household head characteristics to the first specification 
as an alternative to the use of father and mother characteristics. In developing countries where parents’ 
expectations and roles are heterogeneous based on gender and age of their children and where there are 
strong links between gender roles and occupational choices, it is not possible with conventional approaches 
to address the question of whose attributes matter in the occupational choices of offspring. Thus, including 
parental attributes is an attempt to estimate (or capture) the different role of parents in the occupational 
choices of their children. This gives a better view of the dynamics of intra-household in shaping the 
occupational choices of young people, if there is significant difference between parents’ and youth’s 
preferences. 
5.3.2.2. The effect of relative deprivation on the intention to stay in agriculture  
An alternative approach to the above empirical estimation strategy of linking relative deprivations with 
occupational choices is to model the effect of intended occupational choices (or employment preferences) 
of youth along different time horizons. As described earlier since the alternative occupational outcome 
variables (S1-S4) are binary, and S5, M1, and M2 are continuous, probit model and OLS estimation 
techniques are used to estimate the effect of relative deprivations on occupational choices of youth, 
respectively.  
Remain active in agriculture (S1-S4): binary outcomes 
Let 𝐶𝑝 is the current state of labor participation where p = {1, 2, 3} = {part-time, fulltime, non-farm}. Let  
𝑆𝑖𝑘
∗  is the unobserved (latent) binary outcome for the different occupation outcomes of youth i, and form an 
indicator function 1[.] that takes on a value of ‘1’ for ‘yes’ responses (remain active in agriculture in 10, 
20, and 30 years’ time) and ‘0’ for ‘no’ responses. The probability of observing a ‘yes’ (or 𝑆𝑖𝑘=1) when the 
youth respondent decides to remain active in agriculture for {𝑆𝑘}k= {1, 2, 3, 4,} is: 
 𝑆𝑖𝑘
∗ =  𝜌0 + log(𝑌𝑖,ℎ) + 𝜌1𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟 + 𝜌2𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟 + 𝜽𝑿𝒊 + 𝜎𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, > 0                                (5.2) 
Where,  
 𝑆𝑖𝑘
∗ = {
1     𝑖𝑓      𝑆𝑖𝑘
∗ > 0
0   𝑖𝑓    𝑆𝑖𝑘
∗ ≤ 0  
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; 𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟(𝑌1, … , 𝑌𝑛) =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑌𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+1 − 𝑌𝑖), where 𝑌𝑗>𝑌𝑖; noting that for any j≤i, max {𝑌𝑗−𝑌𝑖, 0} = 0; 
𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟(𝑆𝑆1, … , 𝑆𝑆𝑛) =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑆𝑆𝑗 − 𝑆𝑆𝑖)
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+1 , where 𝑆𝑆𝑗 > 𝑆𝑆𝑖; noting that j≤i, max {𝑆𝑆𝑗−𝑆𝑆𝑖, 0} = 0; RD 
and SRD denote relative income deprivations measured using either objective or subjective measures, 
respectively. Xi is a vector that denotes individual, household and community characteristics determining 
intended occupational choices of youth, given their current participation; 𝜀𝑖 which is the error term is 
assumed to be independent of the explanatory variables and has the standard normal distribution. In the 
case of subjective relative deprivation, I directly relate the self-reported relative deprivation and 
occupational choices; whereas objective RD is computed using Yitzhaki index. The sign of relative 
deprivation cannot be determined a priori. Positive coefficient on RD means that an increase in RD induces 
an increase in the outcome variable, in this case the probabilities of staying in agriculture, and if negative 
it means that RD induce a reduction in the propensity of stay in agriculture and, thus, relative deprivation 
induces propensity to migrate.  
From (5.2) I can derive the response probabilities for 𝑆𝑖𝑘: 
P(𝑆𝑖𝑘 = 1|𝑋) = 𝑃(𝑆𝑖𝑘
∗ > 0|𝑋) = 𝑃(𝜀𝑖,𝑐 > −( 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟 + 𝜌2𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟 + 𝜃𝑋𝑐,𝑖 + 𝜎𝑘)|𝑋 
= 𝐺( 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑐 + 𝜌2𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑐 + 𝜃𝑋𝑐,𝑖 + 𝜎𝑘)                                    (5.3)  
G in the probit model32, is the standard normal distribution function (cdf), which is expressed as an integral: 
𝐺(𝑧) = Φ(𝑧) = ∫ 𝜙
𝑧
−
(𝑣)𝑑𝑣,                               (5.4) 
Where Φ(𝑧) is the standard normal density given as: 
ф(z) = (2𝜋)-1/2exp (-z2/2)                                                       (5.5) 
Where Z denotes vectors that denotes explanatory variables; predicted income (expected income), Yi, 
predicted relative deprivation associated with Yi, and vector X. 
Transition from part-time or non-farm to full-time farming: continuous outcome variable (S5) 
                                                                
32 Alternatively we can express the probably of observing S as follows. Probit:Pr(𝑆 = 1|𝑋) = Φ(𝑋𝜃) =F(X𝜃); 
Where F is cumulative density function which is non-liner in the parameters that should be estimated using 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The marginal effect (ME), which is the partial derivative, is given by (using 
chain rule): 
𝑀𝐸 =
𝜕𝐹(𝑋𝜃)
𝜕𝑋
= 𝐹′(𝑋𝜃) 
𝜕(𝑋𝜃)
𝜕𝑋
 =𝐹′(𝑋𝜃)𝜃; as we can see from the derivatives, the marginal effects depend on the 
level of X. Thus, marginal effects are different for each subjects.  
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This is a conditional subjective probability in the sense that it is conditional on participation in part-time or 
non-farm. Therefore, the conditional analysis is for those who are part-time or non-farm and wants to 
change to full-time farming until age turn 34. The relationship between subjective probabilities, of changing 
current participation from either part-time or non-farm to full-time until turning 34, can be modeled using 
OLS as follows: 
  𝑃𝑖𝑘
∗ (𝑆𝑖𝑘 = 1 | 𝐶𝑝=1,3) =  𝜌0 + log(𝑌𝑖,ℎ) + 𝜌1𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟 + 𝜌2𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + 𝜎𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐                                         (5.6) 
Where 𝑃𝑖𝑘
∗  is the unobserved (latent) subjective probability that takes the following values: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑘
∗(𝑆𝑖𝑘 = 1) =
{
 
 
 
 
1   𝑖𝑓  𝑃𝑖𝑘
∗ > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐶𝑝 = 2      
                                  
 0 < 𝑓 <  1    𝑖𝑓  𝑃𝑖𝑘
∗ > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑝 = 1 𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑝 = 3              
0  𝑖𝑓  𝑃𝑖𝑘
∗ ≤ 0                                                   
                                          (5.7) 
Where k= {5}; and the rest are as defined earlier.  
The above expression states that, given an individual i who is currently working as full-time farmer; the 
probability of observing S5 is 1 if the youth decides to remain as full-time until he/she turns 34; between 0 
and 1 if he/she decides to change occupation from either part-time or non-farm, and 0 otherwise. This 
outcome variable is the function of income relative deprivation, social relative deprivation and a set of 
control variables. The decision of youth to engage in agriculture not only depends on the individual 
characteristics of a youth but also on parents and community characteristics. Thus, variables that proxy 
these characteristics are captured and entered into the models. 
5.3.2.3. The effect of relative deprivation on intention to leave agriculture  
The relationship between the probabilities of changing current occupation from part-time farming or full-
time farming to non-farm work and relative deprivations (i.e. the transition from part-time or full-time 
farming to non-farm: M1 and M2)can be modeled as follows: 
  𝑃𝑖𝑞
∗ (𝑀𝑞 = 1|𝐶𝑝, 𝑋) =  𝜌0 + log(𝑌𝑖,ℎ) + 𝜌1𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟 + 𝜌2𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝑟 + 𝜽𝑿𝒊 + 𝜎𝑘 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑐                                (5.8) 
Where p= {1, 2,} and q= {1, 2,}; 𝜔𝑖,𝑐  is the error term; and the rest as defined above;  𝑃𝑖𝑞
∗ [.] is unobserved 
(or latent) subjective probabilities that takes the following values:  
𝑃𝑖𝑞
∗ (𝑀𝑞 = 1|𝐶𝑝, 𝑋) =
{
 
 
 
 
1   𝑖𝑓     𝐶𝑝 = 3                                 
                                  
 0 < 𝑓 <  1    𝑖𝑓  𝑃𝑖𝑞
∗ > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝐶𝑝 = 1 𝑜𝑟  𝐶𝑝 = 2
0   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                     
                                          (5.9) 
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The different specifications described earlier can be summarised as follows: 
 Actual occupation ( benchmark) [A1-A3] 
 Probability of stay in agri:10,20,30 years [S1-S5] 
 Probability of move into (agri. labor entry) [M1]   =    ∝ +𝜌𝑅𝐷 + 𝜎𝑆𝑅𝐷 + 𝜃𝑁𝑅𝐷 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜀 
 Probability of move out of (agri. labor exit)[M2]   
Where RD, SRD and NRD denote income, social and non-income relative deprivation, respectively, which 
is measured using either objectively or subjectively.  
I now turn to present descriptive statistics relevant for our econometric analyses followed by econometric 
results.  
5.4. Relative deprivation and occupational choices of the rural youth 
5.4.1. Descriptive results  
Youth, fathers, and mothers are asked about whether youth under consideration would continue to work in 
agriculture until they turn 34 (i.e. the upper limit for youth age). Table 5.2 reports the summary results of 
the different responses. As one can see from Table 4.5 there are no such variations in the responses offered 
based on the Likert scale but slight variation in terms of subjective probabilities between youth and their 
parents (Table 5.3). For instance, while 40% of youth who are currently working as part-time farmers 
perceive (very likely and likely) that they will continue to work as part-timers. While fathers also reported 
similar view with that of youth, mothers are less sure (36% reported very likely and likely). I checked also 
the median figures of probabilities and found almost similar results with the average figures. 
Table 5.2: Youth’s own and their parents’ perception about future engagement in agriculture   
Continue working in agriculture until 
the age of 34 as (%): 
 Youth 
[n=659] 
Fathers 
[n=291] 
Mothers 
[n=341] 
 
Part-time 
DN 0.31 2 2 
Very likely  9 11 6 
Likely  31 29 30 
Unlikely  42 43 47 
Very unlikely  19 17 15 
 
Fulltime 
DN 1 2 <1 
Very likely  34 29 24 
Likely  38 29 45 
Unlikely  18 30 26 
Very unlikely  10 10 5 
 
Non-farm 
DN 0 6 17 
Very likely  32 29 17 
Likely  21 29 33 
Unlikely  26 24 17 
Very unlikely  21 12 16 
 Source: own survey results   
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Table 5.3: Average [subjective] probabilities of staying, moving into and moving out of agriculture  
Currently working as [part-time, full-time, on-farm] and will 
continue  working as […] until the age of 34:  
N Youth  Fathers  Mothers category  
Keeping current statuesque       
Part-time farmer  320 0.49 0.45 0.42 Stay   
Full-time farmer  321 0.71 0.59 0.61 Stay  
Full-time non-farm worker   19 0.72 0.77 0.68 Stay 
Change of occupation        
From part-time or non-farm to full-time farming 339 0.48 0.41 0.40 Move into  
From part-time or full-time to full-time non-farm  641 0.65 0.60 0.62 Move out /exit 
Source: survey result 
 
Table 5.4 reports the relationship between income, education and other relevant social comparisons, and 
intended migration decisions. Irrespective of current participation status, about 60% of the sample reported 
remaining active (stay) in agriculture in 10 years’ time (i.e. employment in agriculture as a livelihood 
strategy) (as high as 72% among full-time farmer youth). Amongst those, 58% of youth respondents regard 
income comparisons as important. Only 73% of those who do not regard income comparisons as important 
(with regard to their peers) are planning to stay in agriculture in the coming 10 years; strong statistical 
significant at the 5% level (Table 5.4). Similarly, youth regard education and infrastructure (roads, 
electricity, marketplaces, etc) comparisons essential for their occupational choices. I also find that there is 
a strong statistical relationship (at 1 % level) between youth’s intention to stay in agriculture in 10 years’ 
time and infrastructure comparisons. Similar questions are addressed to respondents along 20 and 30 years’ 
time. Except for infrastructure comparisons, again, I find a statistically significant association between 
intentions to stay or leave agriculture in 20 and 30 years’ time, and income and education comparisons; 
suggesting the importance of social comparisons in youth migration choices (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4: Income, education and infrastructure comparisons, and youth intention to stay in agriculture  
 
Choices  
Income comparison  Education comparison  Infrastructure comparison 
Important  Not important   Important  Not important   Important  Not important  
Stay_10 348(58) 47(73)  292(56) 103(75)  279 (56) 116(70) 
Not stay_10 248(42) 17(27)  230(44) 35(25)  216(44) 49(30) 
Total  596(100) 64(100)  522(100) 138(100)  485(100) 165(100) 
 𝜒2(1)=5.44**  𝜒2(1)=15.88***  𝜒2(1)=10*** 
      
Stay_20 234(39) 17(27)  169(32) 82(59)  192(39) 59(36) 
Not stay_20 362(61) 47(73)  353(68) 56(41)  303(61) 106(64) 
Total  596(100) 64(100)  522(100) 138(100)  495(100) 165(100) 
 𝜒2(1)=3.95**  χ2(1)=33.87***  χ2(1)=0.48 
      
Stay_30 190(33) 11(15)  139(27) 62(45)  158(32) 43(26) 
Not stay_30 394(67) 65(85)  383(73) 76(55)  337(68) 122(74) 
Total  584(100) 76(100)  522(100) 138(100)  495(100) 165(100) 
 𝜒2(1)=10.35**  𝜒2(1)=17.25***  𝜒2(1)=2.01 
Source: survey results. Figures in parentheses are percentages; ***, ** statistically significant at the 1% and %% level, 
respectively.  
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The average relative income deprivation (using similar age as a reference group, for instance) is about 
1147 birr (1152 birr for youth planning to remain active in agriculture in 10 years’ and 1141 birr for those 
planning to exit agriculture in 10 years’ time). I find no significant difference between the two (Table 5.5). 
The average relative income deprivation for the reference groups: similar education, land size holding, and 
livestock holding are 0.87, 1087 birr, and 1078 birr, respectively with statistically significant difference 
between those who are planning to stay and those who are planning exit; highest relative income deprivation 
among those who are planning to exit in 10 years’ time (short stayers). Hence, on average, the feelings of 
relative income deprivation are stronger related between staying and exiting agriculture when youth relate 
themselves to other youth along economic domains. Similar results are obtained for relative non-income 
and relative social deprivation for the same (economic) reference groups (See Table 4.6).  
Table 5.5:  Relative deprivation mean difference between stayers and exitors: objective measure  
Dimensions RD Stay   Not stay  All 
 Remain active in agriculture in 10 years’ time  
 Mean SE  Mean SE Mean difference  Mean SE 
Income RD_AGE 1151.64 29.67  1141.27 38.42 10.367 1147.48 23.32 
Income RD_EDU 0.3671 0.08  1.61 0.83 -1.24* 0.87 0.33 
Income RD_LAND 1042.01 30.81  1154.89 42.39 -112.88** 1087.33 25.17 
Income RD_TLU 1038.44 31.86  1139.38 47.50 -100.93** 1078.98 27.01 
Income RD_OCCUPATRION 1134.73 28.49  1160.14 38.94 -25.41 1144.94 23.12 
Non-income RD_AGE 0.98 0.04  1.43 0.07 -1.16*** 1.16 0.04 
Social RD _LAND 1.94 0.98  2.38 0.13 -0.44*** 2.11 0.08 
Social RD_TLU 1.93 0.098  2.34 0.133 -0.45** 2.01 0.079 
Observations  395   265   660  
 Remain active in agriculture in 20 years’ time  
 Mean SE  Mean SE Mean difference Mean SE 
Income RD_LAND 993.41 38.11  1144.97 32.92 -151.57*** 1087.34 25.17 
Non-income RD_LAND 0.98 0.06  1.27 0.05 -0.288*** 1.16 0.04 
Social RD_LAND 2.11 0.12  2.12 0.11 -0.013 2.11 0.12 
Observations  251   409   660  
 Remain active in agriculture in 30 years’ time  
 Mean SE  Mean SE Mean difference Mean SE 
Income RD_LAND 971.38 42.46  1138.11 30.78 -166.73*** 1087.73 54.35 
Non-income RD_LAND 1.06 0.07  1.20 0.05 -0.144* 1.16 0.04 
Social RD_LAND 2.13 0.14  2.11 0.10 0.023 0.17 0.08 
Observations  201   459   660  
Source: survey results. ***, **, * Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Note: RD_AGE refers to relative deprivation with respect to reference group: similar age; in the same way EDU refers 
to similar education; LAND-size of land holdings; TLU-number of livestock holdings; OCCUPATION-other youth 
in the same occupation; TYPE-youth of similar status (household members, household head).     
Table 5.6 presents a summary of descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest used in the 
regression analyses.  
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Table 5.6: Summary statistics of main covariates  
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sex of youth (1-female, and 0 otherwise) 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Youth has mobile phone   0.53 0.50 0 1 
Age of youth  21.44 5.87 15 34 
Youth is currently attending school(1, yes; 0 otherwise) 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Birth order (rank) 3.35 2.33 1 14 
First born is son  0.17 0.38 0 1 
Age of father  52.55 12.27 29 95 
Education of father (years) 2.52 3.19 0 16 
Marital status of father (1=married to single spouse, 0 otherwise) 0.90 0.31 0 1 
Mother relationship to head (1 if household head, 0 otherwise) 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Age of mother respondent  46.76 11.79 25 90 
Education of mother respondent(years) 0.79 1.79 0 9 
# of male youth in the household  13-34 years 1.29 0.93 0 5 
# of female youth in the household  13-34 years 1.20 0.88 0 5 
Family size  7.41 3.29 2 20 
Land size holding per household (in hectares) 1.89 2.29 0.1 27.3 
Land size per own child (in hectares) 0.54 0.62 0.01 9.1 
Total income per household (in Birr) 17440 18714 9.3 190021 
Per capita income  2502 2739 1.86 27145 
Number of livestock owned (TLU) 9.78 10.10 0 86.4 
Materials used to construct the roof of the main house(1-corrugated metal, 0 
otherwise) 
0.48 0.50 0 1 
The PA has access to electricity (1 yes, 0 otherwise) 0.32 0.47 0 1 
The PA has access to public pipe water  0.44 0.50 0 1 
Availability of youth-related projects and programs in the kebele/woreda (1 
yes, 0 otherwise) 
0.77 0.42 0 1 
Land registration process completed in the PA (1 yes, 0 otherwise) 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Rural credit and saving institutions available in the PA (1, 0) 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Occupational choices: Engagement in agriculture  
Continue farming either [as part-time or full time or non-farm] until the age of 
34-cardinal response 
0.58 0.25 0.1 1 
Continue farming either [as part-time or full-time or non-farm] until the age of 
34 (0. very unlikely, 1. unlikely, 2.likely, 3 .very likely)-ordinal response  
1.62 0.97 0 3 
The probability of changing part-time farming to full-time farming at the age 
of 34 (for part-time or non-farm workers at the time of interview)  
0.42 0.27 0 0.9 
The probability of changing full-time farming to full-time non-farming at the 
age of 34 (for part-time or non-farm workers at the time of interview) 
0.58 0.27 0.1 1 
Expected to remain active in agriculture in 10 years’ time (1-yes, 0 otherwise) 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Expected to remain active in agriculture in 20 years’ time (1-yes, 0 otherwise) 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Expected to remain active in agriculture in 30 years’ time (1-yes, 0 otherwise) 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Source: survey results 
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5.4.2. The impact of relative deprivations on realized (realized) occupational choices  
Table 5.7 presents the summary results of the multinomial logistic regression with random effects for the 
benchmark models (i.e. realized occupations) using a subjective and objective measure of relative 
deprivations based on three different specifications described earlier. The first specification includes 
(household) relative deprivations and the relevant variables as used in literature that is expected to influence 
the relative return from and choices for schooling, agricultural and non-agricultural occupations. The 
second specification includes fathers, mothers, and youth’s individual characteristics to the first 
specification. The final specification, include household head attributes as an alternative to fathers’ and 
mothers’ characteristics to capture the effects of parents attribute on occupational choices of their children. 
District dummies are included in all the specifications to control for differences in infrastructure, 
information, and agro-ecological conditions. I also included year dummies to control for year effects. Since 
I have more than one youth from the same household for some, standard errors are corrected for clustering 
at the household level. Part-time farming (those who attend school while working on either own farm or 
family farm) is the base reference occupation category. Thus, the coefficients in a multinomial model 
reported below are calculated and reported in relation to the base outcome (in this case part-time farming). 
Though it is not meaningful to interpret the estimates directly like the linear models, I use the signs (since 
they are informative) and the marginal effects for interpretation of the results and report the multinomial 
log-coefficient.  
In general, the regression estimates illustrate that (household) relative deprivation have a significant effect 
on youth occupational choices. For instance, after controlling for individual attributes, household head and 
other characteristics, the effect of relative income deprivation (measured objectively) on the likelihood of 
choosing agriculture and non-farm employment is negative and statistically significant at 1% level for 
middle-income groups. According to this measure, it means that an increase in relative income deprivation 
reduces the likelihood of being working in agriculture and non-farm work for youth from middle-income 
households. It’s, however, interesting to note that relative income deprivation increases the probability to 
choose full-time farming and part-time farming for the most deprived and rich (or well-off) youth (reflected 
by the positive coefficient on RD square and income square, respectively) (see Table 5.7, Panel A). For 
instance, on average, a one percent increase (since it's in log form) in the mean income of the reference 
group (in this case similar occupation and age) results in 0.91% decrease in the likelihood of choosing full-
time farming compared to part-time farming). 
The use of subjective measures of RD suggests that the coefficient of relative income deprivation index 
(visa-a-vis age reference groups) is positive which suggest that an increase of relative income deprivation 
increases the likelihood of choosing both farming and non-farm employment compared to part-time farming 
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(Table 5.7, Panel B). With everything else in the logit equation held constant, youth who feel relatively 
deprived in terms of income compared to other youth in the same age groups are more likely to participate 
in full-time farm work and non-farm work than those who feel less deprived. However, the effect is negative 
for part-timers. The more the youth feels relatively deprived (in terms of income rank) compared to other 
youth in the same age and occupation groups, the more likely to choose full-time farming than part-time 
farming and non-farm employment.  
On the one hand, results suggest that while the poorest are locked in agriculture; youth from the richest 
households are considering agriculture as an attractive sector. On the other hand, it suggests that relative 
deprivation would force youth from middle-income households to consider livelihood options outside of 
agriculture and non-farm work such as investment in human capital or migration. For instance, youth 
attending school are optimistic about earning better through education (Bezu and Holden, 2014). This is 
true given the significant number of our sample youth are attending school. For instance, a one-unit increase 
of relative income deprivation index will increase the likelihood of schooling by about 2%. Thus, the exit 
rate is higher among the middle-income categories. Controlling for parental attributes, social relative 
deprivation has a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of working in agriculture 
whereas the direction of effect varies for non-farm employment depending on the type of measurement 
used (Table 5.7, panel A & B). With everything else in the logit equation, held constant, relatively socially 
deprived youth are more likely to stay in farm employment than less relatively socially deprived youth. 
Again further supporting the earlier claim that youth from deprived households are likely trapped in 
agriculture as migration decisions and livelihood diversification requires better networks (social capital) 
(also reflected by the negative effect of social deprivation on non-farm employment), financial capabilities 
and other material resources. The result also challenges the presumption that lack of access to productive 
resources and viable livelihood opportunities are the deriving factors behind youth disinterest in agriculture, 
given the exit rate is high among youth from middle-income group. Our results also suggest that addressing 
resource constraints alone is not adequate. Agriculture seems to be a less preferred livelihood strategy 
among young people from households with the resources and education such as among middle-income 
category compared to the extreme poor.  
Our multinomial logit analyses give an interesting insight but striking difference between part-time (who 
are attending school while participating in farming), and full-time youth farmers and non-farm workers 
(Appendix Table A5.2). On average, full-time farmer youth have 3.06 years of schooling, tend to be male 
(78%), have average per capita income of about 2288 birr, relative income deprivation of about 1081 birr, 
possess per capita farm size of 0.51 ha, and birth order of 3.23 and tend to possess farming experiences. 
Except for gender and land size differences, there are no significant differences across the three categories 
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of youth (i.e. part-time, full-time and non-farm). However, all these variables affect part-time and full-time 
farmer youth in very different ways. For instance, youth schooling has a significant positive effect on the 
probability of working as a part-time farmer but has a negative effect on full-time farming and non-farm 
employment (Appendix table A5.2). Better-educated youth prefer to work outside agriculture or prefer to 
continue their education expecting better earnings in the future. The same is true with regard to the effect 
of household demographic compositions (specifical number of youth members in the household, birth order, 
the age of youth and household head characteristics). Youth from female head households are more likely 
to engage in full-time farming and non-farm activities than in other livelihoods such as part-time farming. 
Youth members from more educated households are less likely to engage in full-time farming and non-
farm activities, and more likely to engage in part-time farming while attending school. Interestingly again, 
the attributes of parents remain crucial in determining the occupational choices of youth, especially in 
choosing livelihoods outside farming. Similarly, father and mother attributes affect youth occupational 
choices differently. In addition, availability of public institutions has a significant effect on livelihood 
choices both for within and outside agriculture (see Appendix Table A5.2). The estimated results show that 
the choice of parental attributes (whether to choose household head related attributes or father and mother 
related attributes) improves the predictive power of some variables of interest, suggesting the exclusion of 
these variables may lead to endogeneity as a result of omitted variables and also obscure the effects of 
parents (Table 5.7, column 2). For instance, the effect of gender and mothers’ education are significant 
when both father and mother attributes are used instead of using household head attributes in the 
specifications. Moreover, the results suggest the different role fathers and mothers have in shaping the 
occupational choices of youth, especially in choosing occupations outside agriculture. In addition, 
availability of credit and saving institutions, social capital, and public services has a significant effect on 
occupational choices both for within and outside agriculture (see Appendix Table A5.2).  
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 Table 5.7: Multinomial logit models of the effects of relative deprivations on (actual) youth occupational 
choices: results from objective and subjective measures  
 Full-time farm employment  Full-time non-farm employment  
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Panel A: Objective measures of RD  
Relative Income deprivation   -8.562*** -19.51*** -8.651***  -0.232 9.821 -0.338 
 (1.000) (2.471) (1.017)  (1.397) (6.503) (1.426) 
Relative income deprivation square  0.689** 3.209*** 0.666**  -0.158 -3.107 -0.132 
 (0.292) (0.744) (0.301)  (0.391) (3.028) (0.392) 
Log (per capita income) -13.58*** -25.45*** -14.10***  -6.201*** 7.778 -6.210** 
 (1.727) (3.528) (1.770)  (2.371) (8.152) (2.423) 
Log (income square) 0.686*** 1.294*** 0.718***  0.394*** -0.311 0.395*** 
 (0.0996) (0.198) (0.102)  (0.134) (0.438) (0.137) 
relative social deprivation  0.0515 0.228** 0.0400  -0.0655 0.198 -0.0603 
 (0.0492) (0.0927) (0.0503)  (0.0902) (0.199) (0.0904) 
Relative non-income deprivation  -0.00362 -0.164 0.00637  -0.156 -0.393 -0.151 
 (0.118) (0.183) (0.119)  (0.201) (0.468) (0.200) 
Land size per own child  -0.148 -0.248 -0.104  -0.100 -0.680 -0.0699 
 (0.156) (0.211) (0.154)  (0.263) (0.745) (0.263) 
Number of livestock owned (TLU) 0.0286** 0.0308* 0.0298**  -0.0263 0.00871 -0.0252 
 (0.0116) (0.0161) (0.0119)  (0.0254) (0.0467) (0.0253) 
Observations 1,209 546 1,209  1,209 546 1,209 
        
Panel B: Subjective measures of RD  
Relative Income deprivation   0.192* 0.145 0.204  0.120 -0.0477 129.3 
 (0.104) (0.143) (0.156)  (0.212) (0.489) (64,337) 
Log (per capita income) -0.0971 -0.274* -0.161  -0.117 1.121** 211.5 
 (0.0989) (0.149) (0.161)  (0.192) (0.555) (64,932) 
relative social deprivation -0.0592 -0.00772 0.0494  -0.102 0.596 -115.5 
 (0.0931) (0.137) (0.140)  (0.179) (0.439) (35,901) 
Land size per own child 0.0157 0.0341 -0.00982  0.0704 -0.197 -227.1 
 (0.164) (0.210) (0.259)  (0.308) (0.645) (56,913) 
Number of livestock owned (TLU) -0.000673 0.00490 0.0212  -0.0148 -0.0157 12.84 
 (0.00990) (0.0135) (0.0180)  (0.0245) (0.0505) (3,577) 
Observations 1,162 529 602  1,162 529 602 
Individual characteristics  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Household characteristics  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Father characteristics  No Yes No  No   Yes  No   
Mother  characteristics  No Yes No  No   Yes  No   
Head  characteristics  No No Yes  No   No   Yes    
Woreda and year dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
Note: The reference occupation (base outcome) is part-time farming. I reported the logs ratio. Reference group used 
is similar age and occupation. To avoid complexity, I did not report the estimation results from the use of other 
reference groups. I note that the use of other reference groups does not alter the basic conclusions. The full controls 
for the individual, household, parents as well as other controls used in the model are reported in Table 5.6. 
In summary, our benchmark estimation results, which uses realized occupation of youth, suggest that, after 
controlling for absolute income and other important factors, youth from relatively more deprived 
households (i.e. the poorest categories) and least deprived (i.e. the richest or better off categories) are more 
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likely to choose livelihood options within agriculture than youth from middle-class households. While the 
former (i.e. poor) categories are more likely locked in agriculture due to resource marginalization for 
diversification and increasing cost of migration limiting them to consider livelihood strategies outside 
agriculture; the latter youth categories (i.e. rich or better off) are staying within agriculture considering the 
sector as profitable business or attractive employment opportunity, especially in highly commercialized 
areas. In addition, results suggest that occupation choice strategies in rural areas are not mainly for absolute 
income or asset gains but also for relative motives. In addition to relative deprivation considerations, social 
networks (or social capital), education and livestock ownership strongly determine livelihood choices of 
the rural youth within and outside agriculture. For instance, households with resource constraints and 
limited social capital are less likely to diversify their livelihood strategy within and outside agriculture such 
as engagement in off-farm activities; this perpetuating further the problem of underemployment or 
unemployment. In addition, the choice of parental variables needs special attention in the analyses of 
occupational choices of rural youth. I now turn to the discussions of the role of relative deprivations in 
shaping future occupational choices (intended occupations) of the rural youth; an alternative approach to 
the analyses of occupational choices.    
5.4.3. The impact of relative deprivations on decision to stay or leave   
5.4.3.1. Econometric results from objective measures  
Relative deprivations and likelihood of stay in agriculture  
To explore in depth how and in what way relative deprivations influence intended occupational decisions 
of youth, I relate household’s relative deprivation to the likelihood of staying in agriculture in 10, 20 and 
30 years’ time. Table 5.8 reports the estimation results from the use of objective measures of relative 
deprivations. To avoid complexity, I report here selected variables of interest of the various specifications 
described earlier across multiple reference groups. Unless it is explicitly stated, the interpretations of the 
other variables in our analyses to follow are based on the specifications that control for youth and household 
head characteristics.  
The objective of relating RD and occupational choices along different time horizons (intended occupations) 
is to explore further how might relative deprivations affect intended occupational choices, i.e. decisions 
that are forward-looking or intentions that are not realized yet. Most migration analyses are modeled based 
on intentions. As I noted in chapter two intentions and realizations vary greatly, a common phenomenon in 
most rural areas where there are information asymmetry and credit constraints that could enhance the 
realization of plans. In the analyses of the correlation between intended occupational choices and relative 
deprivations, I do not necessarily claim causality since it is possible that our main explanatory variables of 
interest (i.e. relative deprivations) may still be confounded by youth and parents unobservable 
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characteristics that I could not fully capture with cross-section observations. The use of various measures 
of occupational choices also serves as a robustness check. Doing so also helps to understand the 
mechanisms through which incentives or interventions could be designed to enhance youth employment in 
agriculture. Accordingly, our discussions in the remaining sections will focus on correlations rather than 
causal inference. However, the novel use of multiple self-identified reference groups and the different 
methods of measuring relative deprivations and occupational choices (in addition to the benchmark analyses 
presented earlier based on panel data set) is an added robustness check to our findings and to argue further 
the importance of relative deprivations in shaping the occupational choices (or decisions) of rural youth.   
I argued earlier that absolute per capita income could have either positive or negative effect on youth 
likelihood of staying in agriculture, depending on the presence of non-farm employment or business 
opportunities, current occupational status (student or full-time farmer) and other related factors. I also 
hypothesized that relative deprivation (of different dimensions) would have either a negative or positive 
effect on decisions to stay in agriculture depending on wealth and availability of opportunities. Our 
empirical findings from the objective data confirm these expectations; that is the likelihood of choosing 
agriculture employment as an occupational strategy is highly correlated with household’s relative income 
deprivation, youth’s relative non-income, social deprivation and with per capita absolute income (Table 
5.8, panel A). As one can see from Table 5.8, the estimation results yield negative coefficients on both 
absolute per capita income and relative deprivation across all the reference groups used for those planning 
to stay in agriculture in 10 years’ time. The results for long stayers’ yields negative coefficients on relative 
deprivation and absolute income for all reference groups employed. Interestingly, the effect of relative 
income deprivation is stronger visa-a-vis age, woreda and occupation reference groups for all the 
specifications. After controlling for individual and household attributes as well as other variables and using 
woreda as a reference group, a one point increase of the relative income deprivation index will correspond 
to a 0.19 reduction in the probability of staying in agriculture in 10 years’ time (significant at the 5% level). 
This is an indication that income inequality within districts would result in the significant outflow of youth 
than the one resulted from the feelings of relative deprivation living with better-off neighbors. The effect 
of relative social deprivation and non-monetary deprivation also suggest similar conclusions.   
I relate also household’s relative deprivation to the likelihood of staying in agriculture in the coming 20 and 
30 years’ (Table 5.8, Panel B, and C). For those planning to stay 20 years, the effect of relative income 
deprivation is significant vis-a-vis the composite reference group similar occupation and age. This is partly 
because of the fact that for long-term occupation decisions and economic comparisons are more important 
among the youth of similar age working in similar occupations than say geographic comparisons. A positive 
significant effect of per capita income squared (not reported here) using neighborhood and land size holding 
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reference groups supports this line of reasoning. This is also in line with estimation results obtained in 
benchmark models. This also indicates that large-scale agriculture, such as the ones in the study areas, could 
be a potential source of youth employment (for those from better off households) if production inputs such 
as land are available.  
Table 5.8 also shows that the sign of the coefficients on per capita absolute income varies across the 
different reference groups for long stayers (with a positive sign when neighborhood (village) is used as a 
reference group). If the quadratic transformation of both absolute and relative income are included in the 
specifications to capture potential nonlinearities created by some economic constraints and subsistence 
concern (i.e. whether the exit is so high (probability of stay is so low) or low (the probability of stay is so 
high) among the two extremes of the income distribution), I find that the coefficient on per capita income 
squared remain consistently positive, and coefficient on the square of relative income deprivation remains 
negative. The findings are consistent in all the specifications and various settings. This means that the desire 
to exit agriculture become less likely among youth from households whose income is at the higher end of 
the woreda income spectrum; whereas the opposite is more likely for youth from household’s whose income 
spectrum is at the very low end of the woreda income spectrum (if woreda is a reference group). The result 
is expected for the former, given the agricultural potential of the areas and the growing commercialization 
of agriculture in the study areas. This is also consistent with what has been discussed earlier.  
The effect of relative income deprivation becomes stronger when the decision to stay is greater than 20 
years. Therefore, relative income considerations are more likely to matter more than or at least as much as 
concerns for absolute income when it comes to long-term employment decisions. In addition, the positive 
coefficients on per capita income visa-a-vis geographic reference groups (village) for those planning to 
stay more than 20 years also suggest that, youth are more likely to stay in agriculture to improve their 
economic status as well as their household’s relative standing, when it comes to neighbourhood economic 
comparisons and long-term decisions. Moreover, focus group discussions held among different groups of 
societies suggest that relative deprivation could be a source of motivation that induces hard work in order 
to catch up or improve one’s relative standing - “keeping up with the Joneses.” 
I have shown earlier that, the inconsistencies reported in the literature as to the effect of parents (fathers 
versus mothers) attributes on the children’s livelihood choice is partly because of the choice of variables a 
researcher often uses as a proxy. Ceteris paribus, a one-year increase in education of mothers’ is associated 
with a 3.7% decrease in the probability of staying in agriculture in the next 10 years (significant at the 5% 
level). For each additional year of age of fathers’, the likelihood of staying in agriculture in 10 years’ time 
decreases by about 1.1% for youth of all type, holding all other variables at their means. As is the case in 
the benchmark, female youth are 17% less likely to choose farming as their livelihood as compared to their 
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male counterparts. This suggests that there is heterogeneity of preferences in making occupational choices 
among youth categories. It also implies that parents prefer youth’s occupation outside agriculture, and this, 
in turn, increases the probability of youth migration. Another important point to note here is the effect of 
parental attributes on the likelihood of youth choosing farming. The further significant variable in this 
model specification is land. Keeping the influence of other factors constant, a 1-hectare increase in per 
capita farm size is associated with 18.8% increase in the probability of youth staying in agriculture, 
suggesting the importance of land for youth employment in agriculture. 
I disaggregate further our empirical analyses between part-time farmer and full-time farmer and examine 
what explains the heterogeneity between the two groups of youth since they are heterogeneous with 
different aspirations and socioeconomic conditions determining their career paths. The findings suggest the 
heterogeneous effects of relative deprivations on part-time and full-time as well as for short stayers and 
long stayers. Therefore, designing interventions related to youth while treating household members as 
homogenous groups is misleading.    
 Overall, other factors explaining the probability of staying in agriculture in the 10 years’ time (for short 
stayers) presented earlier remain significant for medium to long stayers as well (i.e. 20 and 30 years). 
However, the relative influence and importance of the variables differ between the two decision categories 
(short and long stayers) and between the two occupation categories. For instance, the relative influence of 
factors of production such as land and livestock is much greater for long stayers than short stayers. In 
addition, property rights such as land rights and farming experiences have a strong influence on the 
likelihood of youth choosing agriculture as a long-term occupation strategy. Moreover, agroecology or 
agricultural potential of districts (reflected via differences in districts) is an important factor that determines 
youth intended occupational choices both in short term and long term decisions.  
Our estimation results indicate that absolute income is negatively and significantly related to the probability 
of staying in agriculture. After controlling for other variables and head characteristics, a 1% increase in 
income (mainly crop income) is associated with 5%-17%% decrease in the probability of stay (Table 5.8, 
Panel A). One justification for this could be that as households get richer youth tend to consider livelihood 
options outside agriculture or diversify their occupations, especially at the early stage of their livelihood 
transformation, and less likely to engage in agriculture. To further investigate this, I included the quadratic 
transformation of income variable in the specifications. I find positive coefficient on income squared in the 
probability of stay, which complements the benchmark results (result not reported here). A subgroup 
analysis between part-time farmer and nonfarm workers for the two decision categories also result in similar 
conclusions. Furthermore, I note here that easing the constraints on access to land (the main constraining 
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factor of youth participation in agriculture) helps to attract more youth into agriculture (reflected by a 
positive correlation between per capita farm size and the probability of staying in agriculture).The OLS 
estimation also yields that a 1% increase in per capita farm size results in a 1.62%-2.40% increase in the 
probability of youth moving into agriculture (Table 5.10).  
Table 5.8: Average marginal effects of (the different dimensions of) relative deprivation on the probability 
of staying in agriculture: results from objective measures of relative deprivation (probit estimates)  
 
VARIABLES  
Reference groups  
AGE EDUCATION ETHNIC  VILLAGE  WOREDA  LAND  OCCUPATIO
N 
OCC_AG
E 
         
Panel A: Dependent variable: Remain active in agriculture in 10 years’ time (S2) (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
Relative Income deprivation   -3.588** -0.143** -0.163** -0.125* -0.188** -0.154** -0.173** -0.117 
 (1.813) (0.0684) (0.0729) (0.0658) (0.0756) (0.0749) (0.0688) (0.0912) 
relative social deprivation -0.523** -0.0258*** -0.0271*** -0.0275*** -0.0250*** -0.0276*** -0.0262*** -
0.0294*** 
 (0.247) (0.00899) (0.00914) (0.00873) (0.00907) (0.00917) (0.00896) (0.00900) 
Relative non-income 
deprivation  
-0.831* -0.0477** -0.0455** -0.0583*** -0.0467** -0.0434* -0.0404* -0.0473** 
 (0.500) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0215) (0.0226) (0.0230) (0.0228) (0.0232) 
Land size per own child 0.813 0.0458 0.0474 0.0788 0.0478 0.0862* 0.0496 0.0348 
 (0.889) (0.0472) (0.0473) (0.0480) (0.0472) (0.0509) (0.0471) (0.0466) 
Log (per capita income) -2.097** -0.0888** -0.0959** -0.0700** -0.105*** -0.0792** -0.100*** -0.0419 
 (1.013) (0.0396) (0.0401) (0.0344) (0.0402) (0.0360) (0.0385) (0.0284) 
         
Panel B: Dependent variable: Remain active in agriculture in 20 years’ time (S3) (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
Relative Income deprivation   -0.613 -0.0945 -0.0530 -0.00913 -0.0475 -0.0159 -0.0793 -0.143* 
 (0.551) (0.0666) (0.0674) (0.0591) (0.0664) (0.0660) (0.0641) (0.0799) 
relative social deprivation -0.0322 -0.00196 -0.00154 -0.00149 -0.000476 -0.00171 -0.00198 -0.00337 
 (0.0661) (0.00816) (0.00817) (0.00793) (0.00823) (0.00828) (0.00815) (0.00822) 
Relative non-income 
deprivation  
-0.155 -0.0258 -0.0238 -0.0367* -0.0161 -0.0259 -0.00886 -0.0245 
 (0.175) (0.0222) (0.0224) (0.0220) (0.0226) (0.0225) (0.0213) (0.0212) 
Land size per own child -0.475 -0.0582 -0.0581 -0.0467 -0.0573 -0.0527 -0.0559 -0.0611 
 (0.323) (0.0396) (0.0394) (0.0403) (0.0394) (0.0429) (0.0397) (0.0396) 
Log (per capita income) -0.214 -0.0368 -0.0158 0.00843 -0.0122 0.00377 -0.0272 -0.0224 
 (0.293) (0.0371) (0.0369) (0.0310) (0.0355) (0.0316) (0.0344) (0.0254) 
         
Panel C: Dependent variable: Remain active in agriculture in 30 years’ time (S4) (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
Relative Income deprivation   -0.958* -0.141** -0.122* -0.00692 -0.128* -0.0703 -0.132** -0.207*** 
 (0.562) (0.0644) (0.0664) (0.0580) (0.0661) (0.0687) (0.0635) (0.0765) 
relative social deprivation 0.0369 0.00526 0.00631 0.00678 0.00707 0.00624 0.00609 0.00403 
 (0.0678) (0.00792) (0.00788) (0.00762) (0.00799) (0.00802) (0.00789) (0.00794) 
Relative non-income 
deprivation  
0.0350 0.000887 0.000732 -0.00392 0.0104 -0.000444 0.00697 -0.00391 
 (0.178) (0.0213) (0.0215) (0.0209) (0.0214) (0.0216) (0.0207) (0.0205) 
Land size per own child -0.344 -0.0409 -0.0403 -0.0331 -0.0409 -0.0236 -0.0394 -0.0452 
 (0.330) (0.0386) (0.0387) (0.0393) (0.0386) (0.0422) (0.0387) (0.0389) 
Log (per capita income) -0.286 -0.0498 -0.0405 0.0176 -0.0400 -0.00927 -0.0416 -0.0292 
 (0.293) (0.0353) (0.0363) (0.0295) (0.0349) (0.0312) (0.0335) (0.0245) 
Individual characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Head  characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
# observations  560 560 560 552 560 560 560 560 
Standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: All predictors at their mean values. 46.3 % of the part-timers and 76% of the full-timers are planning to stay in agriculture in the next 
10 years’ time. Whilst 20 % and 17 % of the currently part-time farmers are planning to stay in agriculture in 20 and 30 years’ time, respectively. 
59% and 46 % of the current full-time farmers are planning to stay in 20 and 30 years’ time, respectively.  
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5.4.3.2. Econometric results from subjective measures  
Relative deprivations and likelihood of stay in agriculture 
To explore further, whether our estimation results are sensitive to the measurement of relative deprivations 
and occupational choices, I examine the effects of relative deprivation (measured subjectively) on youth’s 
self-reported likelihood of staying in agriculture in 10, 20 and 30 years’ time.33  The estimation results 
from the subjective approaches for selected reference groups are reported in Table 5.9. Overall, the sings 
are consistent with the results obtained using objective measures and the magnitude of the estimates remain 
higher visa-a-vis similar age and similar occupation. However, in the use of subjective measures, relative 
income deprivation show significant associations with the probability of staying in agriculture in the 20 
years’ time for most of the reference groups (Table 5.9, Panel B). Put differently, subjective measurement 
of relative income deprivation has also negative and significant effect on the probability of staying in 
agriculture in 10, 20, 30 years’ time. Both measurement approach to RD predict similar effect with respect 
to occupational choices but clearly shows that increase in youth’s comparators (kebele or woreda level) 
increases stress for those planning to stay 10 years and strengthens their inclination to stay in agriculture. 
In addition, the effect of social relative deprivation is significant in most specifications in this setting.  
 
Table 5. 9: Average marginal effects of relative deprivation on the probability of staying (remaining 
active) in agriculture: results from subjective measures (probit estimates) 
 
VARIABLES 
Reference groups  
AGE VILLAGE KEBELE WOREDA OCCUPATION LAND EDUCATION 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Remain active in agriculture in 10 years’ time (S2) (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
Relative Income deprivation   -0.112 -0.182* 0.0467 0.182* -0.0348 -0.513*** -0.124 
 (0.116) (0.108) (0.106) (0.0967) (0.124) (0.115) (0.0945) 
relative social deprivation -0.00434 -0.117 -0.336*** -0.229** -0.279** -0.279 -0.302 
 (0.0967) (0.103) (0.112) (0.105) (0.120) (0.1201) (0.112) 
Log (per capita income) 0.104 0.0796 0.127 0.119 0.101 0.0684 0.107 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) (0.118) (0.116) 
        
Panel B: Dependent variable: Remain active in agriculture in 20 years’ time (S3) (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
Relative Income deprivation   -0.443*** -0.328*** -0.358*** -0.239** -0.420*** -0.115 -0.015 
 (0.137) (0.127) (0.123) (0.112) (0.145) (0.135) (0.1041) 
relative social deprivation 0.207* -0.161 -0.0964 -0.0619 -0.0572 -0.413*** -0.155 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.128) (0.120) (0.138) (0.107) (0.1263) 
Log (per capita income) 0.0525 0.0346 0.0658 0.0641 0.0563 0.0554 0.0548 
 (0.127) (0.129) (0.127) (0.126) (0.127) (0.127) (0.126) 
        
        
        
                                                                
33 In general, I explore whether the estimation results are robust to the different measurement approaches to RD 
(i.e. subjective and objective measures) as well as to the various indictors of occupational choices (i.e. realized and 
intended occupations measures). 
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 Reference groups  
AGE VILLAGE KEBELE WOREDA OCCUPATION LAND EDUCATION 
Panel C: Dependent variable: Remain active in agriculture in 30 years’ time (S4) (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
Relative Income deprivation   -0.314** -0.218* -0.260** -0.179 -0.371** 0.0197 0.0357 
 (0.137) (0.129) (0.123) (0.112) (0.146) (0.135) (0.105) 
relative social deprivation 0.185 -0.230** -0.161 -0.0217 0.0652 -0.299*** -0.209 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.128) (0.119) (0.138) (0.0995) (0.127) 
Log (per capita income) 0.0871 0.0821 0.0987 0.0952 0.0967 0.0959 0.110 
 (0.132) (0.134) (0.131) (0.132) (0.132) (0.133) (0.131) 
Individual characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Household characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Father/mother characteristics  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  
Head  characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Woreda and other dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 638 638 638 638 638 638 638 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Gender-based analyses show that income RD using subjective measures is negative for male and vary for female. 
 
5.4.4. Relative deprivations and occupational mobility decisions  
Another alternative proxy used to measure intended occupational choices of youth is self-reported 
probabilities of moving into and out of agriculture. Put differently, I analyze further the association between 
relative deprivations and the likelihood of moving either into or out of agriculture. Table 5.10 present the 
OLS estimation results of the different model specifications (Eq. (5.6 and 5.8)) presented earlier for 
occupational choice sets: S5, M1, M2 reported in Table 5.6.  
I confirm again the stronger effect of relative deprivation on the probability of moving out than on moving 
into agriculture with respect to geographic and economic reference group. Whilst the impact of relative 
income deprivation is stronger and significant for moving into than for moving out visa-a-vis economic 
reference groups, mainly with respect to land size; the influence of relative income deprivation is stronger 
and significant for moving out of than moving into visa-a–vis socio-demographic reference groups (age, 
education) (Table 5.10, Panel A). The incentive to move out of agriculture decreases among youth from 
rich households and among the least deprived households. In other words, relatively highly deprived youth 
have a lower probability of exit (trapped in agriculture) and the relatively least deprived youth have also a 
lower probability of exit; a result consistent with the benchmark presented earlier. In some cases, youth 
from the most relatively deprived households cannot make proper choices since moving out of agriculture 
such as migration and investment in non-farm sector require financial capabilities and better connections 
(or social capital). The negative and significant coefficient on both relative income deprivation and the 
squared relative income deprivation suggest the former while the negative coefficient of social RD with 
respect to occupation and age reference groups suggest the later. The poor lack such capital forcing them 
locked in agriculture. Furthermore, absolute income is negatively associated with the probability of moving 
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into and is positively correlated with the probability of moving out of agriculture (agricultural labor exit or 
migration intention) confirming again more preferences toward non-farm employment or preferences for 
diversification, as income of the household improves or increases. Another interesting point to note from 
the results presented in Table 5.10 is that both measures (objective and subjective measure) of the income 
relative deprivation overall result in similar conclusions; whereas social relative deprivation affects 
predictions of migration into and out of agriculture outcomes differently (based on kind of measurement 
employed). For instance, when the comparison is between occupations, relative income deprivation induces 
within labor supply (increases the probability of stay) and decreases the probability of changing occupation 
(i.e. propensity to migrate) (irrespective of the measurement of relative deprivation). However, the 
probability of moving into agriculture is positively correlated with social relative deprivation measured 
using objective approaches and negatively correlated measured using subjective measures, but significant 
only for the later. In all the cases, decisions to change occupation or to work elsewhere is affected more by 
relative deprivation than absolute motive.   
Table 5.10: The effects of the different dimensions of relative deprivation on the probability of moving 
into and out of agriculture: OLS estimates using objective and subjective measures  
 
 
 
Variables  
Dep: probability of transiting from part-time or non-farm to full-
time (S5): agricultural labor entry 
 Dep: probability of transiting into non-farm employment 
(M1-M2): agricultural labor exits 
 Reference groups 
AGE VILLAGE KEBELE WOREDA LAND   AGE EDUCATION  OCCUPATION OCCUP_AGE 
Panel A: Objective RD           
Relative Income deprivation   -0.0552*** 0.000364 -0.00660 -0.0165 -0.0328*  -0.0645* -0.0690* -0.0534 0.103* 
 (0.0147) (0.0115) (0.0121)  (0.0121) (0.0172)  (0.0388) (0.0382) (0.0397) (0.0560) 
Relative social deprivation 0.00127 0.000580 0.00232 0.00202 0.00132  -0.00114 -0.000725 -0.000376 -0.0137** 
 (0.00495) (0.00495) (0.00501) (0.00502) (0.00512)  (0.00531) (0.00530) (0.00532) (0.00590) 
Relative non-income deprivation -0.0120 -0.0119 -0.0184 -0.00517 -0.00720  0.00493 -0.00423 -0.00629 0.0303** 
 (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0117)  (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0150) 
Observations 617 554 577 606 617  509 509 509 501 
R-squared 0.316 0.323 0.330 0.305 0.322  0.333 0.334 0.332 0.548 
Panel B: Subjective RD            
Relative Income deprivation   0.0133 0.0112 0.00678 0.00512 -0.0268***  -0.120* 0.0995 -0.149 - 
 (0.0119) (0.0113) (0.0104) (0.00934) (0.0103)  (0.0720) (0.104) (0.109)  
Relative social deprivation -0.0251** 0.0119 0.00148 -0.0188* -0.0208**  0.0335 - -0.0266 - 
 (0.00998) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.00920)  (0.101)  (0.115)  
Observations 621 621 621 621 621  621 621 621 - 
R-squared 0.313 0.315 0.313 0.316 0.313  0.313 0.313 0.313 - 
Individual characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Household characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Father/mother characteristics  No  No  No  No  No   No  No  No  No  
Head  characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Woreda dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
Note: Other controls such as material assets determine youth agricultural labor entry. The association between objective relative 
income deprivation and agricultural labor exit turns significant when log of PCI is used in the computation of relative deprivation 
with respect to occupation. It is also economically meaningful since per capita matters more than total income for individuals’ 
decisions such as migration decisions. VIF: to full=3.13, to non-=2.72, error term normally distributed and no heteroscedasticity. 
As to other controls significantly influencing youth decision options, a striking difference is observed on 
the two occupation strategies (options) (i.e. between movers into and movers out of agriculture) and also 
for the two subgroups (part-time workers and full-time workers). The OLS models suggest that, in addition 
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to RD, youth’s probability of changing current occupation from part-time farming or non-farm work to full-
time farming, and the probability of changing the current part-time farming or full-time farming to full-
time non-farm work are determined by demographic and socioeconomic factors. These include gender of 
youth and parents, the age of youth and father, education of youth and mother, birth order, farming 
experience, marital status of fathers and a number of female youth members in the household (Table A5.4). 
Except for birth order, each of these variables affects the two occupation options (categories) in very 
different ways. Compared to their male counterparts, female youth are 8% less likely to move into and 6% 
more likely to move out of agriculture. This has a clear gender dimension. Given the nature of farming in 
rural Ethiopia such as managing, the family farm is generally and (culturally) the responsibility of men. 
Farming experience (especially co-management of farmlands with parents) remains another important 
factor determining agricultural labor entry. Youth who have farming experiences are 10.7% more likely 
engage in agriculture than in other sectors compared to those who have no such experiences and 4.9% less 
likely to move out of agriculture. This clearly reflects the fact that there is no or weak complementarity 
between the experiences gained in agriculture and non-farm employment. In other words, the experiences 
one gain from farming cannot serve in non-farm employment for better earnings. Availability of public 
services has a different impact on youth’s probability of moving into and moving out of agriculture. In 
addition, public services such as public marketplaces and availability of veterinary services remain a key 
determinant of agricultural labor entry and exit.  
In sum, overall results suggest that increase of RD decrease labor participation in agriculture and increases 
inclination to resort to migration; irrespective of the measurement of relative deprivation and occupational 
choices. Interestingly, both measures of relative deprivations virtually result in similar conclusions with 
respect to occupational analysis, i.e. relative deprivation increases agricultural labor exits and decreases 
agricultural labor entry. The exit rate is higher among youth from middle-income group compared to the 
poorest category. In addition to economic disparities relative to peers, the recent expansion of education in 
rural areas has contributed to the decrease of youth labor force in agriculture. For instance, World Bank 
(2012) shows that Ethiopia saw her secondary school enrolment more than double between 2000 and 2012. 
However, I find also that agricultural occupation is also a potential source of employment (or wealth 
creation) for rich income groups (better off groups). Contrary to the assumptions that all types of youth 
disinterest in agriculture can be attributed to the absolute motives, our findings suggest that (at least in the 
context of agricultural potential areas) relative motives matter most or at least as equally as absolute motives 
in the occupational choices of rural youth. Put differently, I provide evidence that (various forms of) relative 
deprivation effect(s) occupational choices of rural young people and their engagement in agriculture. As a 
result development policies that aim at raising only absolute income through redistribution such as support 
for resource-poor youth or households may not result in best outcomes (and even may worsen youth 
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outmigration, i.e. more migration of youth that can hamper agricultural labor quality). The results are robust 
to different specifications. Table 5.11 provides a summary of the main findings.  
Table 5.11: The impact of relative deprivations on occupational choices: summary results  
 Realized occupation (multinomial logit) 
 Full-time farming  Non-farm employment  
Income RD -ve (sign) +ve (insig) 
Income RD square  +ve(sign) -ve(sign) 
Non-income RD -ve(sign) -ve(insign) 
Social RD +ve (sign) +ve (insign) 
Income square  +ve(sign) +ve(sign) 
Base outcome variable is part-time farming  
 Intended occupational choices 
Stay (probit): Move (OLS): 
10 years (S2) 20 years (S3) 30 years (S4) into (S5) out of 
Objective  measure of RD 
Income RD -ve (sign) -ve(sign) -ve (sign) -ve(sign) +ve(sign) 
Non-income RD -ve(sign) -ve(sign) -ve(insign) +ve(insign_ +ve(sign) 
Social RD -ve(sign) -ve(insign) -ve(insign) -ve(insig) -ve(sign) 
Subjective measure of RD 
Income  RD -ve (sign)  -ve(sign) -ve (sign) -ve(sign) -ve(sign) 
Non-income RD -ve(sign) -ve(insign) -ve(insign) - -ve(sign) 
Social RD -ve(sign) -ve (sign) -ve(sign) -ve(sign) --ve(insign) 
Note: (Dependent variables for intended occupations: remain active in agriculture in 10, 20 and 30 years’ time (S2, S3, S4) (1 if yes, 0 otherwise); 
the probability of moving into and out of agriculture takes the values between 0 and 1). Sign denotes that the estimate is statistically significant. –
ve, +ve and sign denote negative coefficient, positive coefficient and significant, respectively.  
 
5.5. Conclusions and policy implications  
The literature on the effect of relative concerns (measured in terms of household relative deprivations or 
positional concerns) on occupational choices of rural youth in developing countries is scant. Motivated by 
that, this study tries to examine the impact of relative deprivation on occupational choices of rural youth in 
Ethiopia. Specifically, the study tries to investigate two important issues: to what extent do (household’s) 
relative deprivation of different dimensions determine occupational choices (within and outside 
agriculture), and whether and how these shapes youth’s labor participation decisions within and outside 
agriculture. Using econometric techniques that use panel data from Ethiopia and employing an objective 
and subjective measure of relative deprivation, I provide evidence that relative deprivations affect 
occupational choices of young people: agricultural labor participation decisions and migration decisions. I 
show also that our results are overall consistent across various definitions of reference groups, measurement 
of relative deprivations and occupational choices. I summarize results from each specification as follows.  
Estimation results from multinomial logistic regression with random effects (based on realized occupations) 
suggest that both income and social relative deprivation have a significant effect on occupational choices 
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(i.e. on youth’s agricultural labor participation decisions). However, the magnitude and significance of the 
estimates depend on the type of measurement of relative deprivation employed and to some extent on the 
choice of parental controls. Youth from relatively more deprived and least deprived households are more 
likely to choose occupations within agriculture than youth from middle-income households. In other words, 
youth from the middle class are more likely to choose livelihood options outside agriculture than youth 
from the poorest and richest households. This suggests that, whereas the very poor are locked in agriculture 
(trapped in or locked into agriculture and low pay jobs), the rich stay because the incentive to move out of 
agriculture is low and agriculture is an investment opportunity with high return. The result is expected for 
the later, given the agricultural potential of the areas and the growing commercialization of agriculture in 
the study areas. The very poor locked in agriculture since they lack the necessary resources and better 
connections (or social capitals) which enable them to diversify their income sources and/or to migrate 
elsewhere in search of better opportunities, thus decreasing their social mobility. This suggests that the exit 
rate is higher among the middle-income group. In the long-run, this may lead labor force to higher rates of 
long-term unemployment and increased inequality. As a result, agricultural will be dominated by low 
skilled forces since youth from the middle class with relatively better skills and resources are more likely 
to choose livelihoods outside agriculture than youth from the poorest households; further leading to a high 
risk of rural labor drain and inequality. 
The empirical estimation from probit models that uses intended occupational choice (as an alternative 
measurement to occupational choices) analyses also show that relative income deprivation is strong 
predictor of youth’s intended likelihood of stay in agriculture (in the coming 10, 20 and 30 years); the 
results are robust across the various reference groups and measure of relative deprivation. Moreover, OLS 
estimation results (using the probability of changing current occupation from either part-time or non-farm 
to full-time farming; and vice versa) also suggests that relative deprivations (irrespective of the 
measurement employed) affect youth’s labor supply decisions in agriculture and non-agriculture. I find that 
the probability of transiting into non-farm (i.e. moving out of agriculture) is so low (negative and highly 
significant some up to 10%) among the youth from the most relatively deprived households but the 
probability of stay is positive among the least deprived households. This is a common phenomenon when I 
use geographic area reference groups and economic reference groups such as land, and occupation. Youth 
from the most relatively deprived households cannot make a proper choice since moving out of agriculture 
such as migration requires financial capability and better connections, which the poor lacks. Furthermore, 
absolute income is negatively associated with agricultural labor entry and is positively correlated with the 
likelihood of move out of (agricultural labor exit) suggesting youth’s more preferences toward non-farm as 
income of the household improves until agriculture appears commercial or attractive. It suggests also an 
increasing interest to diversify livelihood strategies as income levels increases. Social deprivation has 
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consistently negative and significant effect on the likelihood of choosing occupations within agriculture 
whereas its effect on choosing non-farm employment depends on the type of relative deprivation 
measurement employed. Estimation results also indicate that relative deprivation affects both agricultural 
labor entry and exits in a way that exacerbates unemployment, underemployment, and the vicious circle of 
poverty.  
As a result, the use of multiple reference groups and the different dimensions of relative deprivation add 
interesting insights in the analyses of occupational choices of the rural youth. For instance, economic 
comparisons are important than other social comparisons for occupational choices. In addition, the 
significant effect of relative deprivation vis-à-vis geographic reference groups suggests that a certain 
development policy solely motivated to raise absolute income level based on wealth differentials to stem 
rural-to-urban migration may not be optimal and misleading; if relative concerns are important and crucial 
in the youth’s occupational decisions. The use of multiple reference groups also helps to identify where 
problems associated with inequality are prevalent and persistent. For instance, it helps to inform which level 
of stratification best reveals problems associated with inequality (or RD): among unequal peers, societies, 
villagers, races, ethnicity, etc. Thus, the choice of multiple reference groups and robust measurement 
approaches to RD and occupational choices are important, especially when it comes to the analyses of long-
term occupational decisions. Moreover, the effects of the different dimensions of relative deprivation on 
occupational choices indicate that limiting relative deprivation analyses to income spheres may fail to 
capture the multifaceted effect of relative deprivations. Thus, disaggregating the effects of relative 
deprivations on occupational choices is important and doing so provide useful information to identify and 
design interventions aimed to tackle inequalities and rural under development.  
Our findings suggest that development policy that aims at redistribution such as support for resource-poor 
youth may not improve participation of the youth in agriculture. It could even worsen youth outmigration 
if rural employment opportunities are limited. As a result, agriculture may become the workplace of the left 
behind, especially male youth, since youth from better-off households may prefer to invest in education and 
non-farm activities. This, in turn, also affects agricultural productivity. If the poorest are locked in 
agriculture and the relatively better off (well-off are leaving agriculture), it might worsen the poverty 
situation in the country. As the better of leaves, agriculture will be dominated by the poor who lack the 
necessary resources to infuse agriculture with innovation, less educated, and low human capital, worsening 
the performance of agriculture and productivity. Unless appropriate policy that could address this problem 
is wisely designed and implemented, it is worrisome in the long run.  
Raising the incomes of highly deprived youth may reduce the youth’s incentive to leave agriculture but, 
should be coupled with improving access to farm inputs, credit and saving institutions that could unleash 
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such constraints. Governments need to invest in youth-targeted employment-generating schemes and 
entrepreneurial training, improving the forward and backward linkages between agriculture and non-
agriculture. Economic as well as social development that does not redress income or other resource 
inequalities may result in the most deprived youth to fall into extreme poverty that in turn affects the 
development and productivity of agriculture. To increase youth employment in agriculture and reduce youth 
unemployment and underemployment as well as infuse rural development, it is necessary also to improve 
the resource base of the marginalized youth, specifically for those youth who are trapped into structural 
poverty. Thus, explicit consideration of the relatively highly deprived households and improvement in land 
and labor markets could help to convert deprivation into opportunities and ameliorate the situations of the 
left-behind. Putting micro-financial institutions in place to ease liquidity and input supply constraints are 
vital. Such kind of institutions has to facilitate and encourage youth as well as parents to make use of 
resources for productive investments.  
 
The findings have important implications for marriage market as well. Agriculture in the long-run may 
become a workplace of left behind young men since female youth are more likely to choose livelihood 
options outside agriculture. Thus, policies need to readdress consequences of such inequality and 
deprivation. There is also a need to invest on the human capital of youth and institutions including 
agribusiness to make use of demographic dividend. It is also necessary to reduce vulnerability and promote 
productive youth employment such as off-farm, support systems, and interventions needed to build skills 
and prepare young people working in agriculture to successfully enter or access markets. Thus, investment 
in agribusiness is necessary to infuse agriculture with entrepreneurs. The transformation of manufacturing 
and the growing role of public rural investment are necessary to provide economic opportunities for the 
rural youth. Otherwise, young labor will be drained from the rural sector, with the risk of rural societies 
falling into decay. Finally, treating household members as homogenous groups in the design of 
interventions related to youth could be misleading and/or ineffective. Thus, explicit consideration of youth 
based on gender is necessary for designing interventions aimed to improve the well-being of rural youth. 
This requires better coordination within households, communication, and cooperation between different 
government departments, civil society, NGOs and the private sector. 
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6. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Efforts to improve youth employment in agriculture and tackling youth unemployment and 
underemployment problems require understanding a number of issues: how decisions are set, how young 
people behave in comparison to their peers, how parents’ behaviors and attributes affect children’s decisions 
and well-being. This necessitates the need for appropriate theoretical and empirical construct that helps to 
understand how relative concerns and related factors influence youth’s decisions to engage in agriculture, 
with consequences on the well-being of young people. This research is designed to contribute to filling 
these gaps and add insights to the existing knowledge in order to revitalize the agriculture sector and speed 
up the process of transformation of the agricultural sector through youth’s provision of labor in agriculture 
and agribusiness. Generating information in this regard help to contribute to the policy debate related to 
youth as well as to design appropriate policy instruments which lead to promising livelihood 
pathways of youth (as resource owners and farm workers) confronted with choices. This starts with the 
need to learn from and understand how youth make occupational choices and understanding the dynamics 
and drivers related to it. In this thesis, I propose the use of relative deprivation theory to better understand 
occupational choices (agricultural engagement and disengagement decisions) of rural youth in agriculture, 
with consequences on well-being. The thesis also uses this theory to explore how and to what extent intra-
household (youth, fathers and mothers) concerns for positionalities are linked to the well-being of the 
offspring, with implications on household’s resource allocations. The thesis begins by examining the effects 
of gender and age-specific values of agricultural labor returns (shadow wages or economic incentives) on 
youth labor supply in agriculture in Ethiopia. In doing so, I use econometric techniques and survey 
experimental methods matched with socio-demographic panel data. The survey experimental approach is 
based on a tailor-made experimental design conducted among Ethiopian youths and their fathers and 
mothers in rural areas. In addition, the study uses different triangulating measures of RD and examines how 
such measures affect the outcome variables of interest: well-being, occupational choices, and agricultural 
engagement decisions. 
The main goal of the thesis is to empirically investigate whether beyond material constraints; behavioral or 
psychological factors such as the feelings of relative deprivation affect and/or shape the well-being and 
occupational choices of young people. I empirically explore that young person compare their life condition 
(income, wealth, social capital) to that of others (their comparison groups) and such comparisons are driving 
their economic decisions such as labor participation decisions, migration decisions, with consequences on 
well-being. I also show that youth’s and parents’ (namely fathers’ and mothers’) engagement in 
interpersonal wealth comparisons have implications for household’s resource allocations and poverty 
measures (or reduction). 
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The dichotomy often exists in the literature of agricultural household members’ allocation of their labor, is 
its inadequacy to distinguish whether market and non-market labor are spent on-farm or off-farm and for 
which household member and age category is the phenomenon refers. Second and most importantly, 
understanding youth career choices requires exploring how youth labor is allocated within or among 
households that involves both market and non-market economy; and whether marginal productivities 
determine youth labor supply in agriculture. Using shadow wages estimation techniques applied to farm 
level panel data collected from a sample of youth and households in rural Ethiopia collected during the 
2010/11 and 2014/15 agricultural seasons, chapter 2 first econometrically investigate the effect of marginal 
products of labor (or shadow wages) on youth agricultural labor supply across gender, time and farm 
locations. Evidence from fixed effects and fixed effects instrumental variables (FE-IV) methods show that 
changes in economic incentives such as shadow wages matter for youth’s involvement in agriculture, but 
their impact differs for young men and women. In other words, trends and patterns of the youth’s 
involvement in agriculture vary across gender and farm work locations, and so do their labor returns. Whilst 
the participation of youth in on-farm for both young men and women is declining across time (though 
insignificant), the participation in off-farm is increasing for both. The total agricultural labor supply (sum 
of on-farm and off-farm) of both male and female youth is decreasing but none of them is significant. For 
instance, after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (FE estimates), I find positive and significant 
shadow wage elasticities (0.40, 0.11 and 0.40 for on-farm, off-farm and total labor supply of male youth 
members, respectively). I also find that the effect of shadow wage is higher in an on-farm labor supply 
compared to off-farm (0.40 vs 0.11). The effect of female shadow wages on youth female members labor 
supply is negative and strongly significant at 1% level, suggesting that female youth agricultural labor 
supply is backward bending. The results are consistent after controlling for individual heterogeneity, sample 
selection and instrumenting for possible endogeneity. The shadow wage elasticities are especially higher 
when instrumenting for shadow wages, a higher result than what is reported in some other studies such as 
Calves and Schoumaker (2004). In addition, inline with Omoti (2012), I also find that youth’s intentions 
and realized engagement in agricultural production vary greatly.  
Taking into account intensity of youth involvement on the family farm or own farm, off-farm as well as 
their farm work at the destination for youth migrating to other rural and peri-urban areas, the results 
challenge the presumption that youth are exiting agriculture, at least in agricultural potential areas of 
Ethiopia. Instead, youth’s labor makes an important economic contribution to the operation of their family, 
own farm as well as to other farms or the economy. Based on descriptive and econometric results, I conclude 
that the myths of youth departing agriculture over the last decade does not necessarily emanate from the 
trend and evolution of participation in agriculture but possibly from the methodological drawbacks. For 
170 
 
instance, Bezu and Holden (2014), Ahaibw et al. (2013) and Agwu et al. (2014) use intentions and 
separability methods in the analyses of labor supply, and conclude that youth are abandoning agriculture. 
However, our study underscores the previous finding that realized and intended engagements of youth in 
agriculture vary greatly. Studies using such data for the labor market and/or migration policy analyses 
should be cautious of such variations. Furthermore, contrary to Benjamin and Kimhi (2006), Ahearn et al. 
(2006), and Dupraz and Latruffe (2015) who use the aggregated measures, our results suggest that 
aggregating heterogeneous labor productivities in the computation of shadow wages are likely to mislead 
policy conclusions. The findings suggest that it is necessary to enhance labor productivity and employment 
opportunities, as well as a structural transformation that addresses the imperfections and rigidities in labor 
and other input markets, to make agriculture more attractive to youth.    
Relative income concerns (or positional income concerns) is one mechanism through which income or 
wealth inequality is hypothesized to affect human behavior, with consequences on well-being. For instance, 
strong positional concerns (an increase in relative concerns or want of social status) among parents may 
lead to diversion or allocation of more resources to members in order to improve the relative standing of 
their offspring, which in turn fosters life satisfaction. Employing survey experimental methods conducted 
in 2010/11 and 2014/15 among Ethiopian youth and their parents matched with a socio-demographic 
survey, chapter 3 finds that positional concerns are heterogeneous among household members: youth 
members, fathers, and mothers. Youth exhibit higher positional concerns for income than their parents 
(fathers and mothers) do, and young women than men do. Our findings are contrary to the previous work 
of Akay et al (2012) who find very low positional concerns among adult rural farmers in Northern Ethiopia. 
This could perhaps reflect the fact that youth are more oriented towards the performance of their peers 
compared to their parents. Of parents’ positional concerns, mothers’ exhibited a higher positional concern 
for income than fathers’. Evidence from interval regression models suggests that factors that motivate the 
positional concerns of the three categories of household members also differ. Estimation results from the 
ordered probit model further show that youths’ own and their fathers’ positional concerns are strongly and 
significantly associated with the well-being of youth. Though mothers’ are more positional than fathers’ 
are, their positional concerns for income has a statistically insignificant effect on the welfare of youth. 
However, mothers’ attributes such as education are more likely to influence the well-being of youth 
members than their concerns for positionality. Rather than through the effect of status concerns, mothers’ 
affect the wellbeing of household members through their human capital (such as education). The strong 
significant effect of fathers’ positional concerns on well-being compared to mothers’ may have to do with 
differences in intra-household bargaining power affecting resource allocations. This is reflected by the fact 
that youth from positional fathers are associated with higher well-being compared to those with less 
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positional fathers. There could be several factors at play. First, parents who are more positional may invest 
more on their offspring in order to improve the relative standing of their children compared to less positional 
parents. Second, the altruistic behavior of parents towards their children and centralized motives between 
youth and parents may also cause this; this is likely in rural areas where there is strong social capital that 
complements (or eases) the stress resulting from relative concerns. Furthermore, I find that controlling for 
parents’ attributes in the specifications do substantially improves the explanatory power of the models as 
well as the magnitude of the estimates of some variables. The findings underscore the implications of 
heterogeneity of parents’ preferences suggesting that interventions targeting youth should also consider 
intra-household heterogeneity and within household resource distributional issues. The study also finds that 
having separate income sources has strong and significant effects on positional concerns and well-being of 
rural youth. The majority of youth in rural areas are unpaid family laborers who work on their family’s 
farms living with their parents. Youth contribute a significant share of family labor or income (as indicated 
in chapter 2). However, they do not get their fair share and by far less happy in their life satisfaction. This 
may, in turn, limit youth entrepreneurship or agency, which again affects the welfare and future 
occupational choices of youth. It is worth mentioning that, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the 
first empirical test of the effect of intra-household positional concerns on the well-being of youth household 
members, with implications on the household’s resource allocations. In addition, this is among the few 
empirical studies that explicitly focus on both the simultaneous role of fathers and mothers in the analyses 
of youth well-being. 
Recent empirical studies provide evidence that people take actions out of a concern for relative deprivation 
(Stark and Taylor, 1991; Easterlin, 1995; Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002; Alpizar et al, 2005; Ferreri-i-
Carbonell, 2005; Park, 2010; Stark and Hyll, 2011). Theoretical studies also illustrate that more can be 
explained if I move beyond the standard choice theory and recognize relative concerns (Easterlin, 1995, 
2001; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Alpizar et al., 2005; Stark, 2016). The present study checks these effects 
against multiple self-identified reference groups, enabling us to examine a broader range of questions 
related to youth well-being than in previous studies in developing countries. In doing so, chapter 4 extends 
the standard analyses of relative concerns (or relative deprivation) to income per se, and consider social 
relative deprivation as well as non-monetary (assets) relative deprivation. Since the effects of relative 
deprivation on well-being are also sensitive to the kind of measurements employed, the thesis employs two 
measurements of relative deprivation: objective and subjective, and compares the results from both, the 
first empirical test to the best of the author’s knowledge. Evidence from random-effects ordered logistic 
regression and fixed effects models suggest that while income RD has a motivational impact (resulting from 
“positive externality” or “signal effect’’), assets and social capital RD has a deterrent impact (resulting from 
status effect) on the well-being of youth. A ‘’signal effect’’ or a ‘’positive externality’’- higher income of 
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others in the reference group indicate higher prospects for youth or induce motivation or aspirations (i.e. 
relative deprivation induced aspirations). In contrast to limited work in developing countries such as 
Carlsson et al (2007b), Ravallion and Lokshin (2010), and Akay and Martinsson (2011) which find that 
relative income does not significantly affect the well-being of the poor, our empirical results do suggest 
that income disparities relative to peers are a welfare relevant concern for most rural youth in Ethiopia. If I 
employ objective measures of RD, our findings are also in contrast to past empirical works in developed 
countries such as Pingle and Mitchell (2002), Carlsson et al (2007) and Friehe et al (2014) which find strong 
negative impact of relative deprivation on well-being, or Oshio et al. (2011) who find the Yitzhaki measure 
of relative deprivation negatively correlated with happiness for China and South Korea. 
Unlike the previous studies on adults in developing countries such as Akay et al (2014), Luttmer 
(2004), and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), the signs and significance of RD also varies with gender, 
age, and youth category: the strongest effect of RD on SWB for members or younger youth who 
live with their parents, and for young women than men. In addition, the comparison of the two 
measurement approaches, suggest that the sign and magnitude of the impact of monetary RD on 
SWB depend on the kind of the measurements employed, the choice of parental controls and to a 
lesser extent on the choice of reference groups. For instance, when land size is used as a reference 
group, the effect of income RD is strongly significant for youth who live with their parents and for 
young women suggesting that land inequalities are more serious among female youth members 
[that could have implications for female youth participation in agriculture]. When young men 
compare themselves with those having a larger number of livestock, the negative effect of social 
RD is stronger and significant while this is the not the case for younger women. On the other hand, 
when young women compare themselves with those having a larger portion of land, the negative 
effect of social RD on their SWB is stronger and significant; while this is the not the case for young 
men. The results also indicate that decomposing the contribution of RD in dimensions would help 
to avoid the averaging of positive and negative income and non-income, and SWB relations; 
reducing the problem of aggregation. The findings further indicate that while the effect of absolute 
income on SWB of young men is consistent across the two measurement approaches employed, it 
varies for young women.  
One of the channels through which relative deprivations affect human behavior is through its effect on 
human decisions such as occupational choices. Incorporating relative deprivations into youth occupational 
choices help to provide a complementary explanation, if not an alternative explanation, to better understand 
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occupational choices of rural youth in Ethiopia as well as to the considerable intra-household preference 
differences existent in the labor markets of developing countries. The main goal of the thesis is ultimate to 
understand the implications of relative deprivations by examining their interactions not only with the 
underlying drivers of occupational choices of young people but also their interactions with the occupational 
choices or decisions themselves. Using various estimation techniques, chapter 5 finds that relative 
deprivation is a strong predictor of occupational choices of the rural youth and their engagement in 
agriculture (irrespective of the relative deprivation and occupational choice measurements employed) with 
an influence of the preferences and attributes of the parents. Youth from relatively more deprived 
households (poor income groups) and least deprived households (rich income groups) are more likely to 
choose livelihood options within agriculture than youth from middle-income households. Whereas the very 
poor appear locked in (informal) agriculture, the rich stay or participate in agriculture because of the 
potential returns from it. It also suggests that relative deprivation would force youth from middle-income 
households to consider livelihood options outside of agriculture and non-farm work such as investment in 
human capital or migration. This raises the latent demand for education since youth attending school are 
optimistic about earning better through education. For instance, a one-unit increase of relative income 
deprivation index will increase the likelihood of schooling (part-time farming) by about 2% and decreases 
the likelihood of choosing full-time farming in 10 years’ time by about 0.91%. If the exit rate is high among 
the middle-income group with relatively better skills, resources, and aspirations; agriculture may be the 
workplace of the left behind, further hampering the future of agriculture and food security of the country.  
The thesis adds some insights for understanding the causes of rural under development. In addition, the 
study finds that the decision of youngsters or teenagers to engage in agriculture not only depends on youth’s 
own choices or employment preferences driven by their capabilities and behavior but also depends on the 
preferences and attributes of parents. I show earlier that, the inconsistencies reported in literature as to the 
effect of parents’ (fathers’ versus mothers’) attributes on the choices of children’s livelihood partly emanate 
from the specifications used in the regression models (i.e. the choice of variables a researcher often uses as 
a proxy to control for parental effects). For instance, educations of fathers’ and mothers’ have opposite 
effects on the probability of youth staying in agriculture. Ceteris paribus, a one-year increase in education 
of mothers’ is associated with a 3.7% decrease in the probability of staying in agriculture in the next 10 
years (significant at the 5% level), holding all other variables at their means. I find also that the effect of 
relative income deprivation becomes stronger when the decision to stay is greater than 20 years. Therefore, 
relative income considerations are more likely to matter more than or at least as much as concerns for 
absolute income when it comes to long-term employment decisions. This study is the first empirical attempt 
to tests the theory of RD in the context of occupational choices in one of the world’s poorest countries, 
Ethiopia. 
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In general, the different dimensions of relative deprivation, the use of multiple reference groups, and robust 
measurement approaches to RD add interesting insights in the analyses of well-being and occupational 
choices of the rural youth, for understanding the causes of rural under-development. First, it suggests that 
economic comparisons are important than other social comparisons for occupational choices of rural youth. 
Second, the significant effect of relative deprivation vis-à-vis geographic reference groups, in the context 
of occupational choices, suggests that a certain development policy solely motivated to raise absolute 
income level based on wealth differentials to stem rural-to-urban migration may not be optimal and 
misleading. Third, the use of multiple reference groups and robust measurement approaches to RD help to 
identify and inform which level of stratification and inequality best reveal problems associated with RD: 
among unequal peers, societies, villagers, races, ethnicity, etc. In addition, the use of multiple reference 
groups and measurements highlights possible areas of interventions to enhance the positive externalities 
arising from relative deprivations (RD induced aspirations). The use of multiple reference groups also helps 
to identify the best domains (channels) through which the positive externalities from economic gains to rich 
or better-off spillovers to benefit the poor, that cannot be captured using conventional approaches. Lastly, 
the effects of the different dimensions of relative deprivation on occupational choices and well-being 
indicate that limiting relative deprivation analyses to income spheres is misleading and doing so may fail 
to capture the multifaceted effect of relative deprivations on the well-being, occupational choice, or labor 
market analyses of rural young people. Therefore, disaggregating the effects of relative deprivations on 
occupational choices and well-being are important and doing so provide useful information to identify and 
design interventions aimed to tackle rural under-development. As Yitzhaki (2002) illustrates, decomposing 
an inequality index supplies additional information that is useful for poverty measurement.    
Overall, our empirical results do suggest that economic disparities relative to peers are a welfare relevant 
concern for most rural youth in Ethiopia. In addition, the thesis illustrates that controlling for both father 
and mother attributes simultaneously in the specifications crucially interacts with the impact of some of the 
variables of interest. For instance, unlike the conventional approach of controlling for household head 
characteristics, controlling for both father and mother attributes simultaneously brings more information 
into the regression and may increase or alter the predictive power of some of the variables of interest. To 
develop well-informed interventions aimed at improving youth employment and rural transformation, the 
thesis also indicates the following policy implications: 
To increase youth employment in agriculture and reduce youth unemployment and underemployment as 
well as infuse rural development, it is necessary to improve the resource base of the marginalized youth, 
specifically for those youth who are trapped in structural poverty. Putting micro-financial institutions in 
place helps to liquidity and input supply constraints. Such kinds of institutions have to facilitate and 
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encourage youth as well as parents to make use of credit for productive investments. Thus, explicit 
consideration of the relatively highly deprived households and improvement in land and labor markets 
could help to convert deprivation into opportunities and ameliorate the situations of the left-behind. This 
requires better coordination within households, communication, and cooperation between different 
government departments, civil society, NGOs, and the private sector. 
Development interventions that target few people in rural areas will create significant welfare externalities-
in terms of technology adoption, increase labor force participation, etc. Interventions targeting youth should 
also consider intra-household heterogeneity in preferences and resource distributional issues. At the same 
time, there is a need to reducing relative poverty (despite targeting absolute poverty reduction strategies) 
and addressing resource inequalities including wealth, non-income and social inequalities by designing 
appropriate redistributive policies, especially among the very poor. This requires appropriate and careful 
development policies. Agriculture, in the long run, may become a workplace of left behind male youth 
since female youth are more likely to choose livelihood options outside agriculture. Thus, policies need to 
readdress consequences of such inequality and deprivation. There is also a need to invest on the human 
capital of youth and institutions including agribusiness to make use of demographic dividend and reduce 
poverty. It is also necessary to reduce vulnerability and promote productive youth’s employment such as 
off-farm, support systems, and interventions needed to build skills and prepare young people working in 
agriculture to successfully enter or access markets. Thus, investment in agribusiness is necessary to infuse 
agriculture with entrepreneurs. It is hoped that the information generated would inform policy for urgent 
actions, help to contribute to the current policy debate, and helpful to design programs and projects aimed 
at youth development. Our findings have also implications for poverty reduction, poverty measurements, 
and inclusive growth and suggest possible positive external effects arising from the provision of local 
private goods (entrepreneurship), local employment opportunities, or productivity-enhancing spillovers. 
Finally, the thesis suggests that future research should devote to exploring the relevance of the different 
dimensions of RD and its implications for the growing inequality. Future research should also focus on the 
important role of multidimensional measurement of relative deprivation and/or inequality in other 
developing countries, especially in Africa, in order to understand broadly the effect of relative deprivations 
on the well-being of young people. In addition, further research is needed to understand the mechanisms 
through which relative concerns could affect aspirations (or positive external effects) without exacerbating 
further inequalities or poverty. Furthermore, addressing the methodological challenges in measuring RD 
are fertile grounds for future research, including the development of innovative approaches to the 
measurements and weighting of the different components of multidimensional RD indices.   
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APPENDICES 
Table A2.1. Migrants and non-migrants (who are still working in farming) characteristics  
 
Source: Own computation from household and youth survey data in 2010/11 and 2014/15  
Table A2.2. First stage regressions for shadow wages  
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male shadow 
wage  
Female 
shadow wage  
Male mature 
shadow wage  
Female mature 
shadow wage  
Child shadow 
wage  
Shadow 
income  
       
youthdensity 0.267*** 0.391*** 0.184** 0.026 0.449*** 0.354** 
 -0.071 -0.078 -0.073 -0.104 -0.126 -0.163 
roof_corrug 0.028 -0.101 - 0.165 0.200 -0.248 
 -0.071 -0.076  -0.102 -0.128 -0.169 
floor_conc 1.332* 0.374 -0.902 -1.221 - - 
 -0.800 -0.379 -0.871 -1.144   
woodstove - 0.280** 0.162 0.259 -0.715*** 0.571* 
  -0.128 -0.134 -0.171 -0.220 -0.292 
mosvolbed 0.137** 0.000 -0.025 -0.069 0.119 -0.226 
 -0.065 -0.070 -0.068 -0.093 -0.115 -0.152 
mobile 0.133** 0.093 -0.003 -0.047 -0.029 - 
 -0.060 -0.064 -0.065 -0.086 -0.106  
radioo 0.022 0.127* - -0.070 0.080 0.021 
 -0.066 -0.070  -0.094 -0.117 -0.155 
jewlery -0.019 0.006 - 0.0892* -0.069 -0.021 
 -0.034 -0.036  -0.048 -0.060 -0.080 
cart 0.081 0.414*** 0.222 - -0.432* -0.237 
 -0.137 -0.146 -0.146  -0.245 -0.320 
water_riv_rain  -0.054 -0.026 - 0.193 0.029 
  -0.074 -0.072  -0.123 -0.163 
water_pip_dry  0.062  0.213 0.147 0.637** 
  -0.123  -0.160 -0.204 -0.267 
Constant -1.871** -0.176 0.720 1.770 -0.732 7.095*** 
 (0.902) (0.577) (0.984) (1.290) (0.786) (1.482) 
Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 
R-squared 0.316 0.275 0.363 0.271 0.248 0.131 
A2.2. Test for exclusion criteria   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES On-farm male SS On-farm female 
youth SS 
On-farm male 
mature SS 
On-farm female 
mature SS 
On-farm child labor SS 
      
Variables  Migrants  Non-migrants  
Gender (%)     
                        Male 55 62 
                        Female 45 38 
  
  
Age of migrant(years) 22.76 21.64 
Average education (years) 2.80 2.4 
Work at destination (main) %) 
  
                        Farming 31.46 53.33 
                        Domestic 16.85 13.00 
                        Student 16.85 33.67 
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youthdensity -0.038 -0.034 -0.101 -0.060 0.050 
 -0.091 -0.080 -0.079 -0.075 -0.064 
roof_corrug -0.064 0.044 -0.033 0.104 0.049 
 -0.091 -0.078 -0.078 -0.074 -0.063 
floor_conc 0.643 -0.353 -0.198 -0.178 - 
 -1.019 -0.389 -0.880 -0.823  
woodstove - -0.272** 0.011 0.095 -0.354*** 
  -0.132 -0.135 -0.123 -0.109 
mosvolbed 0.016 0.045 0.016 0.072 -0.069 
 -0.083 -0.072 -0.070 -0.067 -0.057 
mobile -0.121 -0.156** -0.018 -0.071 -0.077 
 -0.076 -0.066 -0.066 -0.062 -0.053 
radioo 0.030 -0.119*  -0.053 0.031 
 -0.083 -0.072  -0.067 -0.058 
jewlery -0.037 -0.013  0.005 -0.0548* 
 -0.043 -0.037  -0.035 -0.030 
cart 0.172 -0.287* -0.378**  -0.116 
 -0.174 -0.151 -0.150  -0.121 
water_riv_rain  0.057 0.159**  0.164*** 
  -0.076 -0.074  -0.061 
water_pip_dry  -0.180  0.326*** 0.146 
  -0.127  -0.115 -0.102 
inputprice1  -0.014  -0.044  
  -0.089  -0.079  
Constant 0.165 1.258** 0.390 1.053 1.422*** 
 (1.148) (0.593) (0.996) (0.928) (0.476) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 
R-squared 0.381 0.317 0.340 0.225 0.194 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: SS denotes labor supply  
 
Table A3.1: Design of the experiments 
Instructions: income relative deprivation for youth respondent (a replication with some modification of Akay et al. 
(2011) and Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002):  
“I want to ask you questions related to income. Imagine that you can choose to live in one of two different societies, 
society A and society B. Your monthly income and the average monthly income of people differ between the two 
societies. Except for the income differences, other things like living expenses are the same in the two societies. For 
each society that we will consider, I will tell you the amount of your monthly income and the average monthly 
income of the group. Then I will ask you to choose which society you would like to live in. Let me illustrate this 
choice by the following example. In this example, we will just name the group of people ‘other youth.’”  
Table A.1. A case example presented to youth respondents.  
Society  Your own income: 
birr/month 
Average income of other youth:  
birr/month 
Society A 800 900 
Society B 770 600 
Which society do you choose to live in? 
 
In this example, your monthly income is 30 birr more in Society A than in Society B. In Society A, you earn 100 
birr less than the average income of other youth in the society, while in Society B you get 170 birr more. Given 
these differences, you can either choose to live in Society A or B. In which Society, A or B1, do you want to live?  
(Repeat question and example).  
Now, I’ll ask you to make your choice between the different societies. 
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(Enumerator: For each table of a reference group, ask the first questions in the following way. Do not change the 
order the tables from what is given in this questionnaire! ) 
In Society A, your monthly income is _____ birr, while the average monthly income of ___________ in the society 
is _____ birr. In Society B1, your monthly income is ____ birr, while the average monthly income of __________ 
in the society is _____ birr. In which Society, A or B1, do you want to live? 
  
(If the respondent chooses A, stop and proceed to the next table. If the respondent chooses B1, ask her/him to choose 
between Society A and Society B2. If the respondent chooses B2 to ask her/him to choose between Society A and B3. 
Continue in a similar manner for the rest of the choices. Do not change the format of the question except for the 
numbers. Follow the same procedure for the other tables. Remember! Do not change the order of the tables as it is 
given in this printout and always start from the first choice in each table!) 
Alternatives in experiment: Youth  
Others in the society 
Society  Your own income 
birr/month  
Average income of others birr/month  
A 960 1080 
B1 924 720 
Which society do you choose to live in? 
(Circle choice. If the choice is A, stop and go to next page, if the choice is B1, proceed below) 
A  960 1080 
B2 888 720 
Which society do you choose to live in? 
(Circle choice. If the choice is A, stop and go to next page, if the choice is B2, proceed below) 
A 960 1080 
B3 852 720 
Which society do you choose to live in? 
(Circle choice. If the choice is A, stop and go to next page, if the choice is B3, proceed below) 
A 960 1080 
B4 816 720 
Which society do you choose to live in? 
(Circle choice. If the choice is A, stop and go to next page, if the choice is B4, proceed below) 
A 960 1080 
B5 780 720 
Which society do you choose to live in? 
(Circle choice. If the choice is A, stop and go to next page, if the choice is B5, proceed below) 
A 960 1080 
B6 744 720 
Which society do you choose to live in? 
(Circle choice.) 
Enumerator: please write in this box clearly and briefly why the respondent made such choices 
 
Alternatives in experiment: father and mother  
Others in the society 
Society  Your  son/daughters  income birr/month  Average income of other youth: birr/month  
A 960 1080 
B1 924 720 
Which society do you choose your son/daughter to live in? 
(Circle choice. If the choice is A, stop and go to next page, if the choice is B1, proceed below) 
A  960 1080 
B2 888 720 
Which society do you choose your son/daughter to live in? 
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Table A3.2: The general Edenred-Ipsos Barometer measure of well-being    
  
Scale for responses 
 01-05;  
1 Proud of residential places  
2 I am proud of my clothes  
3 I feel proud of the job done by my parents  
4 I am proud of the work I have to do  
5 I feel proud to show my friends or other visitors where I live  
6 If I try hard, I can improve my situation in life  
7 The job I do makes me feel proud  
8 I can improve my life condition   
9 Other people in my STREET/VILLAGE look down on me and my family  
10 When I am at community/school/ gatherings/market I am usually treated by others with 
fairness and with respect 
 
11 Make his/her own life decisions   
 Dummy variables  1-yes, 0 otherwise 
12 Able to get loan   
13 Parental divorce   
14 Alcohol abuse   
15 Parental illness   
16 Poor relation with parents   
17 School performance   
Note: scales 01=Strongly disagree; 02= disagree; 03= more or less; 04= agree; 05=Strongly agree 
Appendix A3.4: Specification and description of ordered probit model 
The response probabilities for our ordered probit model with five alternatives can be expressed as follows: 
𝑃(𝑆𝑊𝐵(𝑖,ℎ) = 𝑚) =
exp(𝑋𝑖𝛽−𝑘𝑀−1)
1+[exp(𝑋𝑖𝛽−𝑘𝑚−1)]
 ;  
Where M is cut-off terms in this case 5 and denotes the five ordinal categories constructed from the life satisfaction asking subjects to rate their life 
satisfaction on 1 to 9 scales (1 indicating the worst possible life and 9 the best possible life). Xi is a vector that denotes different factors that affect 
well-being of youth i in the household h, including the main variables of interest, marginal degree of positionality for the three categories (youth, 
fathers and mothers), individual and household characteristics (especially father and mother characteristics), local institutions and community 
characteristics expected to influence subjective well-being.   
 (Circle choice. If the choice is A, stop and go to next page, if the choice is B2, proceed below) 
A 960 1080 
B3 852 720 
Which society do you choose your son/daughter to live in? 
 (Circle choice. If the choice is A, stop and go to next page, if the choice is B3, proceed below) 
A 960 1080 
B4 816 720 
Which society do you choose your son/daughter to live in? 
 (Circle choice. If the choice is A, stop and go to next page, if the choice is B4, proceed below) 
A 960 1080 
B5 780 720 
Which society do you choose your son/daughter to live in? 
 (Circle choice. If the choice is A, stop and go to next page, if the choice is B5, proceed below) 
A 960 1080 
B6 744 720 
Which society do you choose your son/daughter to live in? 
 (Circle choice.) 
Enumerator: please write in this box clearly and briefly why the respondent made such choices 
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Table A3.5: Logit estimate of determinants of marginal positional concerns of different groups  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Youth     
VARIABLES All Members  Head  Members  father mother head 
Youth characteristics         
Female youth  -0.00559 0.0669 -0.177 -0.0308 0.0766 -0.0793 0.00435 
 (0.0527) (0.0589) (0.121) (0.0807) (0.0683) (0.0584) (0.0547) 
Youth has no mobile phone  0.0696* 0.0714 0.0421 0.111 -0.165*** -0.0423 -0.145*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0500) (0.0766) (0.0698) (0.0586) (0.0494) (0.0453) 
Age  0.00670 0.00812 0.00816 -0.00237 -0.00656 -0.00296 -0.00789 
 (0.00604) (0.00793) (0.00963) (0.0118) (0.00999) (0.00820) (0.00779) 
Education(years) 0.00884 0.0101 0.00878 -0.0148 0.00739 0.0221*** 0.00860 
 (0.00659) (0.00802) (0.0117) (0.0113) (0.00970) (0.00787) (0.00741) 
Currently student  0.0404 0.0555 -0.0705 0.122 0.0163 0.00538 0.0166 
 (0.0532) (0.0576) (0.331) (0.0825) (0.0759) (0.0543) (0.0551) 
Youth relationship to head(1 if member and zero otherwise) -0.0394   0.121  0.397** -0.0386 
 (0.0734)   (0.631)  (0.169) (0.253) 
Birth order  -0.00883 -0.00345 -0.0316 0.141 0.0572 -0.0850 0.0456 
 (0.0757) (0.0840) (0.185) (0.106) (0.0879) (0.0867) (0.0723) 
First born son  0.0256 0.121 -0.0665 -0.133 -0.133 -0.0493 -0.191* 
 (0.0926) (0.108) (0.205) (0.139) (0.114) (0.107) (0.0982) 
# of male youth in the household  13-34 years -0.0127 -0.00388 -0.0415 -0.0427 0.00786 -0.0350 -0.00933 
 (0.0248) (0.0267) (0.0767) (0.0347) (0.0318) (0.0269) (0.0258) 
# of female youth in the household  13-34 years 0.0180 -0.00126 0.261*** 0.0141 -0.0939** -0.00382 -0.0398 
 (0.0254) (0.0274) (0.0937) (0.0381) (0.0370) (0.0255) (0.0246) 
Have separate cash income 0.0180 0.0338 -0.0142 0.200*** 0.00993 -0.0301 -0.0364 
 (0.0429) (0.0531) (0.0752) (0.0740) (0.0683) (0.0508) (0.0485) 
Father characteristics         
Age     0.000131 0.00314   
    (0.00503) (0.00279)   
Education (years)     0.0182* 0.00846   
    (0.0107) (0.0102)   
Married to single spouse     0.119 0.0315   
    (0.127) (0.104)   
Mother characteristics         
Age     0.00877  -0.00696***  
    (0.00610)  (0.00251)  
Education(years)    0.0301  0.0275**  
    (0.0192)  (0.0135)  
Relationship to head (1- head, 0 otherwise)      -0.00644  
      (0.0508)  
Head characteristics         
Female-headed        0.0438 
       (0.0528) 
Age of the household head        -0.00234 
       (0.00227) 
education of household head(years)         0.00848 
       (0.00960) 
Married to single spouse        -0.0129 
       (0.0334) 
Household assets         
Farm size per own child(in hectares) -0.0456 -0.0690* -0.0553 -0.195** -0.0495 -0.00896 -0.0143 
 (0.0338) (0.0365) (0.110) (0.0772) (0.0553) (0.0388) (0.0312) 
Log(per capita income in Birr) 0.0469** 0.0800*** 0.00830 0.0382 -0.0568 -0.000345 -0.0230 
 (0.0236) (0.0299) (0.0429) (0.0498) (0.0352) (0.0304) (0.0335) 
Livestock holing (tlu) 0.00197 0.00132 0.000425 0.00764* 0.00122 0.00585** 0.00403* 
 (0.00246) (0.00263) (0.00838) (0.00427) (0.00274) (0.00249) (0.00206) 
Roof of the main house is made of corrugated iron -0.0448 -0.0514 -0.0775 -0.0682 0.0977 -0.0147 0.0869* 
 (0.0459) (0.0561) (0.0811) (0.0808) (0.0631) (0.0527) (0.0512) 
There is electricity in the PA  0.0218 -0.00615 0.0267 -0.0697 -0.0833 -0.0492 -0.127** 
 (0.0593) (0.0704) (0.116) (0.106) (0.0729) (0.0706) (0.0603) 
Have no access to public pipe water 0.0675 0.121 0.0749 0.220 -0.0486 0.177** 0.0660 
 (0.0986) (0.126) (0.170) (0.181) (0.137) (0.0859) (0.0966) 
There is no youth related projects and programs in the PA 0.128* 0.0364 0.175 0.192* 0.0188 -0.00589 0.0417 
 (0.0732) (0.0888) (0.121) (0.114) (0.0997) (0.0874) (0.0794) 
has no land certificate 0.130 0.135 0.105 0.224 -0.0760 -0.0478 -0.0739 
 (0.104) (0.126) (0.182) (0.169) (0.148) (0.146) (0.121) 
Saving and credit institutions are available in the PA 0.0298 -0.0176 0.0253 0.115 0.115 0.323*** 0.179** 
 (0.0733) (0.0915) (0.123) (0.112) (0.103) (0.0840) (0.0832) 
District dummies  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  
Observations 638 442 196 233 281 394 443 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3.6: determinants of marginal degree of positionality disaggregated by gender: youth, father and mother-marginal effects of the logit model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
              Youth positional concerns Father positional concern Mother positional concerns Head positional concern  
VARIABLES All Sons    Daughters   Sons    Daughters   Sons    Daughters   Sons    Daughters   Sons    Daughters   
Youth characteristics             
Female youth  -0.00604           
 (0.0496)           
Youth has no mobile phone  0.0700* 0.0933* 0.0567 0.132 0.0733 -0.0453 -0.413*** -0.0474 -0.00765 -0.109* -0.220*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0527) (0.0730) (0.0900) (0.104) (0.0878) (0.0933) (0.0638) (0.0717) (0.0649) (0.0649) 
Age  0.00684 0.00571 0.00644 0.0167 -0.0120 0.0118 -0.0269 0.00306 -0.0249* -0.00119 -0.0177 
 (0.00615) (0.00753) (0.0108) (0.0168) (0.0191) (0.0145) (0.0173) (0.0114) (0.0146) (0.0106) (0.0125) 
Education(years) 0.00885 0.0116 -0.00168 -0.00726 -0.0135 0.0166 -0.00233 0.0136 0.0238** 0.0172 0.00169 
 (0.00664) (0.00846) (0.0118) (0.0154) (0.0186) (0.0137) (0.0175) (0.0109) (0.0118) (0.0110) (0.0120) 
Currently student  0.0408 0.00669 0.0732 0.243** 0.0501 0.0247 0.0577 -0.00208 0.0192 0.0412 -0.0231 
 (0.0527) (0.0699) (0.0876) (0.119) (0.146) (0.0939) (0.111) (0.0770) (0.0860) (0.0731) (0.0800) 
Birth order  0.00265 0.00925 -0.0120 0.0464 -0.0205 -0.0497** -0.0273 0.0367** 0.0208 -0.0288 -0.00490 
 (0.00975) (0.0152) (0.0132) (0.0315) (0.0286) (0.0251) (0.0185) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0188) (0.0134) 
First born son  0.0247 0.0475  0.0836  -0.189*    -0.206**  
 (0.0611) (0.0707)  (0.125)  (0.107)    (0.0853)  
Youth relationship to head(1 if member and zero 
otherwise) 
-0.0407 -0.0350 -0.115 -0.282    0.432* 0.257  0.118 
 (0.0748) (0.0885) (0.144) (0.826)    (0.224) (0.271)  (0.276) 
# of male youth in the household  13-34 years -0.0126 -0.0264 0.00183 -0.0757 -0.0771 0.0128 -0.0728 -0.0595 0.0276 -0.00685 -0.0150 
 (0.0245) (0.0354) (0.0359) (0.0525) (0.0550) (0.0475) (0.0534) (0.0374) (0.0342) (0.0390) (0.0359) 
# of female youth in the household  13-34 years 0.0181 0.00185 0.0160 -0.0291 0.0616 -0.0857* -0.128** -0.00969 -0.000194 -0.0242 -0.0604 
 (0.0255) (0.0354) (0.0385) (0.0505) (0.0584) (0.0498) (0.0619) (0.0361) (0.0370) (0.0371) (0.0401) 
Have separate cash income 0.0176 0.0674 -0.0500 0.301*** 0.0167 0.00955 0.0232 -0.107* 0.156* -0.0916 0.00476 
 (0.0427) (0.0529) (0.0788) (0.0917) (0.141) (0.0819) (0.107) (0.0640) (0.0830) (0.0632) (0.0763) 
Water source during dry season (1 if  and 0 
otherwise) 
-0.000562 0.0204 0.00299 0.255** -0.111 0.0747 0.0455 -0.0567 0.0378 0.0770 0.0636 
 (0.0471) (0.0594) (0.0796) (0.121) (0.143) (0.0980) (0.107) (0.0822) (0.0800) (0.0758) (0.0782) 
Father characteristics             
Age     -0.00933 -0.00960 0.00299 0.00787     
    (0.0075) (0.00775) (0.00482) (0.00513)     
Education (years)     0.00693 0.0161 0.00112 0.0125     
    (0.0152) (0.0168) (0.0139) (0.0131)     
Married to single spouse     0.457** 0.00484 0.0186 0.264*     
    (0.218) (0.167) (0.139) (0.155)     
Mother characteristics             
Age     0.0167* 0.0154   -0.00757** -0.0135***   
    (0.0088) (0.0115)   (0.00357) (0.00400)   
Education(years)    0.0244 0.0737*   0.0319** 0.0102   
    (0.0265) (0.0387)   (0.0155) (0.0209)   
Relationship to head (1- head, 0 otherwise)        -0.0705 0.0268   
        (0.0675) (0.0720)   
Head characteristics             
Female-headed           0.0467 0.0550 
          (0.0719) (0.0770) 
Age of the household head           0.000205 -0.00595* 
          (0.00306) (0.00317) 
education of household head(years)            0.00912 0.00698 
          (0.0121) (0.0125) 
Married to single spouse           0.00889 -0.0256 
          (0.0526) (0.0464) 
Household assets             
Farm size per own child(in hectares) -0.0456 -0.0645 2.02e-05 -0.202** -0.234 -0.161 -0.119 -0.0520 0.168** -0.0942* 0.0397 
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 (0.0360) (0.0416) (0.0734) (0.101) (0.156) (0.0982) (0.112) (0.0366) (0.0757) (0.0564) (0.0722) 
Log(per capita income in Birr) 0.0471** 0.0409 0.0411 -0.00302 0.0958 0.0175 -0.140*** 0.0463 -0.121** 0.0794* -0.144*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0318) (0.0386) (0.0638) (0.0859) (0.0578) (0.0430) (0.0418) (0.0522) (0.0406) (0.0384) 
Livestock holing (tlu) 0.00199 0.000279 0.00875 0.00962** 0.0125 -0.00307 0.0149** 0.00397 0.00660 0.000973 0.0117** 
 (0.00251) (0.00282) (0.00547) (0.0044) (0.00828) (0.00398) (0.00635) (0.00281) (0.00485) (0.00299) (0.00457) 
Roof of the main house is made of corrugated iron -0.0448 -2.79e-05 -0.0932 -0.158 -0.0178 0.110 0.195** 0.0300 -0.0846 0.0480 0.111 
 (0.0445) (0.0599) (0.0761) (0.118) (0.143) (0.0935) (0.0982) (0.0725) (0.0805) (0.0735) (0.0768) 
There is electricity in the PA  0.0225 0.00820 0.0714 -0.115 0.128 -0.0268 -0.186 -0.00802 -0.0251 -0.142 -0.111 
 (0.0578) (0.0763) (0.0981) (0.145) (0.202) (0.131) (0.119) (0.116) (0.0967) (0.0982) (0.0919) 
Have no access to public pipe water 0.0682 -0.0869 0.368* -0.117 2.613 0.0358 -0.331 0.314** -0.0668 0.0446 -0.0669 
 (0.0961) (0.121) (0.190) (0.270) (134.6) (0.213) (0.228) (0.144) (0.165) (0.144) (0.159) 
There is no youth related projects and programs in 
the PA 
0.127* 0.169* 0.0662 -0.0166 0.378* 0.0822 0.120 -0.00733 0.0493 0.0681 0.108 
 (0.0724) (0.0892) (0.121) (0.156) (0.226) (0.139) (0.169) (0.128) (0.127) (0.111) (0.121) 
has no land certificate 0.129 0.0298 0.348* 0.119 0.601** -0.0300 0.225 0.0527 -0.0467 -0.0928 0.227 
 (0.105) (0.139) (0.184) (0.243) (0.282) (0.290) (0.296) (0.216) (0.177) (0.220) (0.194) 
Saving and credit institutions are available in the 
PA 
0.0302 0.0401 -0.0415 -0.0184 0.0935 0.208 0.0252 0.446*** 0.230* 0.194 0.134 
 (0.0724) (0.0948) (0.122) (0.163) (0.212) (0.153) (0.158) (0.136) (0.119) (0.122) (0.119) 
District dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 638 407 222 125 105 157 124 215 179 244 196 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable –is 0 if a subject chooses society A in the first choice and 1 otherwise. All predictors at their mean values. 
 
Table A3.7: Determinants of subjective well-being for youth by gender: ordered logit results  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Using youth characteristics only using youth and parents characteristics Using youth and head characteristics  
VARIABLES All Sons   Daughters   All Sons   Daughters   All Sons   Daughters   
Positional concerns           
Youth positional concern (1 if a youth subject chooses society Bi in the first choice and 0 if A in the first choice)  0.445*** 0.457** 0.492* 0.471* 0.411 1.032** 0.404** 0.414 0.534* 
 (0.150) (0.191) (0.265) (0.274) (0.420) (0.522) (0.182) (0.255) (0.293) 
Father positional concern (1 if a father subject chooses society Bi in the first choice and 0 if A in the first choice)    1.158*** 1.223*** 1.463***    
    (0.305) (0.445) (0.549)    
Mother positional concern (1 if amother subject chooses society Bi in the first choice and 0 if A in the first choice)    -0.357 0.700 -1.287**    
    (0.311) (0.484) (0.561)    
Head  positional concern (1 if a head subject chooses society Bi in the first choice and 0 if A in the first choice)       0.680*** 0.805*** 0.622* 
       (0.198) (0.274) (0.318) 
Youth characteristics           
Female youth  0.0855   -0.183   -0.00512   
 (0.188)   (0.341)   (0.224)   
Youth has no mobile phone  -0.264* -0.209 -0.493* 0.164 0.227 -0.309 0.0162 0.319 -0.312 
 (0.155) (0.197) (0.280) (0.298) (0.436) (0.565) (0.193) (0.271) (0.310) 
Age  0.0456*** 0.0449** 0.0677** 0.0286 0.0262 0.0249 0.0512 0.0542 0.0341 
 (0.0164) (0.0204) (0.0319) (0.0512) (0.0844) (0.0861) (0.0313) (0.0453) (0.0503) 
Education(years) 0.0212 0.0328 0.0190 -0.0323 -0.00136 -0.147* 0.00810 0.0345 0.0229 
 (0.0250) (0.0325) (0.0439) (0.0491) (0.0749) (0.0879) (0.0318) (0.0452) (0.0519) 
Currently student  0.798*** 0.856*** 1.132*** 1.281*** 1.427** 2.995*** 0.796*** 0.917*** 1.003*** 
 (0.202) (0.265) (0.347) (0.379) (0.601) (0.697) (0.229) (0.327) (0.372) 
Birth order 0.0278 -0.0819 0.131** 0.129* -0.102 0.258* 0.0801* -0.0730 0.216*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0557) (0.0537) (0.0779) (0.157) (0.132) (0.0462) (0.0777) (0.0641) 
First born is son 0.338 0.0548  0.600 0.392  0.307 -0.0812  
 (0.235) (0.269)  (0.429) (0.570)  (0.305) (0.372)  
Father characteristics           
Age     -0.0424** -0.0379 -0.0354    
    (0.0211) (0.0372) (0.0364)    
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Education(years)    -0.0307 0.0260 -0.149*    
    (0.0461) (0.0764) (0.0821)    
Married to single spouse     0.107 -0.353 1.771*    
    (0.539) (0.989) (0.921)    
Mother characteristics           
Age     0.0348 0.0487 0.0277    
    (0.0267) (0.0427) (0.0496)    
Education (years)    -0.0445 -0.0244 -0.0391    
    (0.0807) (0.113) (0.164)    
Head characteristics           
Sex       -0.313 -0.114 -0.624* 
       (0.211) (0.299) (0.335) 
Age        -0.0110 -0.00601 -0.0265* 
       (0.00892) (0.0126) (0.0139) 
Education(years)       0.0126 0.0600 -0.0904 
       (0.0363) (0.0514) (0.0577) 
Married to single spouse        0.0924 0.168 -0.0554 
       (0.147) (0.218) (0.218) 
# of male youth in the household  13-34 years -0.0719 -0.0895 -0.132 -0.108 0.0359 -0.433 -0.0961 -0.0846 -0.190 
 (0.0929) (0.136) (0.141) (0.148) (0.255) (0.293) (0.104) (0.162) (0.162) 
# of female youth in the household  13-34 years -0.0713 -0.0982 -0.00566 0.0237 0.0215 0.222 -0.116 -0.224 -0.0962 
 (0.0985) (0.139) (0.152) (0.179) (0.264) (0.341) (0.110) (0.165) (0.166) 
Household assets           
Farm size per own child(in hectares) 0.321** 0.369* 0.0954 1.121*** 1.684*** 0.990 0.293* 0.377* -0.0366 
 (0.152) (0.190) (0.322) (0.379) (0.550) (0.960) (0.166) (0.221) (0.352) 
Log(per capita income in Birr) 0.166* 0.198 0.107 0.247 0.0373 0.397 0.342*** 0.266 0.327 
 (0.0936) (0.125) (0.156) (0.217) (0.335) (0.450) (0.122) (0.170) (0.215) 
Livestock holing (tlu) 0.0328*** 0.0386*** 0.0336* 0.00687 0.0370 0.0274 0.0282** 0.0322** 0.0434** 
 (0.00982) (0.0123) (0.0185) (0.0169) (0.0244) (0.0409) (0.0110) (0.0143) (0.0209) 
Roof of the main house is made of corrugated iron 0.451*** 0.289 0.503* 0.753** 0.144 0.928 0.490** 0.407 0.270 
 (0.171) (0.222) (0.288) (0.336) (0.488) (0.630) (0.216) (0.308) (0.337) 
There is electricity in the PA  -0.405* -0.297 -0.184 -0.0889 0.243 0.399 -0.0604 0.264 0.159 
 (0.220) (0.286) (0.390) (0.401) (0.643) (0.741) (0.265) (0.383) (0.420) 
Have no access to public pipe water  -0.604* -0.703 -0.736 -1.608** -0.370 -3.603** -0.303 -0.415 -0.219 
 (0.367) (0.448) (0.684) (0.742) (0.989) (1.559) (0.478) (0.609) (0.864) 
There is no youth related projects and programs in the PA  0.639** 0.446 1.095** 0.309 -0.524 0.772 0.289 -0.363 1.226** 
 (0.276) (0.355) (0.472) (0.511) (0.815) (0.863) (0.340) (0.485) (0.532) 
has no land certificate  0.875** 0.297 2.337*** 1.079 -0.0927 1.853 1.243** 0.175 2.809*** 
 (0.420) (0.531) (0.769) (0.769) (1.207) (1.407) (0.542) (0.762) (0.890) 
Saving and credit institutions are available in the PA  -0.0576 0.0168 -0.132 0.0200 -0.468 1.116 -0.399 -0.909* 0.113 
 (0.276) (0.360) (0.463) (0.513) (0.842) (0.924) (0.362) (0.536) (0.542) 
District dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 638 407 231 233 125 108 443 247 196 
Standard errors in parentheses                      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: dependent variable: youth subjective well-being is based on the GHQ-12 measure obtained by summing up 15 questions and categorized into 5 ordered values. The test for cut points confirms that 
the cut points are different from zero. 
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Table A4.1: Summary of descriptive statistics of covariates  
Variables   Contracted as Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Subjective wellbeing  SWB 3.81 1.67 1 9 
Female youth  2.ressex 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Youth has mobile phone   2.resmobile 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Age of youth  resage 19.95 6.05 12 34 
Education of youth (years) edu_youth 3.52 3.20 0 14 
Currently attending school curr_stud 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Birth order (rank) birth_order 3.34 2.33 1 14 
First born is son  First_son 3.35 2.33 1 14 
Youth has mobile phone   2.resmobile 0.48 0.49 0 1 
# of male youth in the household  13-34 years Youth_male 1.35 1.05 0 7 
# of female youth in the household  13-34 years Youth_female 1.25 0.90 0 5 
# of male mature in the household  >34 years Mature_male 0.57 0.68 0 3 
# of female mature in the household  >34 years mature_fem 0.74 0.66 0 4 
# of children in the household[5-12] Childern_tot 1.48 1.15 0 5 
Water source during dry seasons: water_sourcedry 
    
River 2.water_sourcedry 0.22 0.38 0 1 
Rain water 3.water_sourcedry 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Unprotected well 4.water_sourcedry 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Stream 5.water_sourcedry 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Protected well 6.water_sourcedry 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Piped water 7.water_sourcedry 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Other  0.25 0.43 0 1 
Land size per own child (in hectares) land_PC 0.56 0.0.71 0.01 10.46 
Number of livestock owned (TLU)u totpresnt_tlu 9.78 10.18 0 91.95 
Roof of the main house is thatched roof                                         rooftpe2 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Youth is household head  youth_rtohead 0.28 0.46 0 1 
The PA has access to electricity  electricity1 0.24 0.46 0 1 
The PA has access to public pipe water pubpipewater1 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Youth related project available in the PA  0.24 0.43 0 1 
Land registration completed  landregcomp1 0.48 0.49 0 1 
Saving and credit available in the PA  sav_credit 0.43 0.49 0 1 
PA has phone coverage  phoncoverage1 0.83 0.38 0 1 
Availability of DA office in the PA  DA_office1 0.97 0.18 0 1 
Household head is female  Sexhead  0.28 0.45 0 1 
Age of household head to which youth belongs agehead 43.0 15.18 17 95 
Education of household head (years) educhead 1.91 2.92 0 14 
AGP Woreda  AGP 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Source: survey results  
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Table 4A.1: Introduction used in the survey of occupational choices  
Say: We would kindly request you to participate in the following game based (scenarios) on the rules with a scale of 
1-10. We want you to point out how likely any situation will occur in the future. For example, if you are asked how 
likely it will rain tomorrow and if you are totally sure that it will rain tomorrow, then 10 indicates the point of the rule. 
If you are absolutely sure that it will not rain, 1 indicates the point of the rule. If you are not sure, but believe it is quite 
possible it will rain, you would place closer to the point of 10 to 1, and if you think that it is very possible that it will 
not rain, you would place/indicate points closer to 1 to 10. Now let’s practice. Can you show me how the rule works? 
How likely is it going to rain tomorrow? (Please indicate with a pencil or your finger) (If the respondent do not know 
the answer or fail to answer, try to help him otherwise, fill in DK)  
Currently, you are working as 1. Part-time farmer   2. Full-time farmer 3. Full-time non-farm    
1. You are currently working as a part-time farmer. Assume that you continue working as a part-time farmer as 
your primary occupation.  From 1 to 10, how certain are you that you will be working as part-time farmer at 
the age of 34?’[what do you think is the percent chance/what are the chances out of 10/ that you would 
choose to work part-time when you turn 34] 
 
Full-time farmer  
2. You are currently working as a full-time farmer. Assume that you continue working as a full-time farmer as 
your primary occupation.  From 1 to 10, how certain are you that you will be working as a full-time farmer at 
the age of 34? 
 
Full-time non-farm:   
3. You are currently working as full-time non-farmer and assume that you continue working as full-time non-
farmer as your primary occupation. From 1 to 10, how certain are you that you will be working as full-time 
non-farmer at the age of 34?   
 
The transition from part-time to the full-time farmer:   
4. You are currently working as a part-time farmer.  Assume that you want to engage as full-time farmer and 
this is the decision you make to work as your primary occupation. From 1 to 10, how certain are you that you 
will be working as a full-time farmer at the age of 34?   
 
5. Currently, you are working as a part-time farmer.  Assume that you are engaged as full time nonfarm and this 
is the decision you make to work as your primary occupation. From 1 to 10, how certain are you that you will 
be working as full-time nonfarm at the age of 34?   
 
Say: Now I am going to ask you about the possibilities of your future occupational decisions in a different way.  
Given your current situation, you have three possibilities: that you continue as a part-time farmer, that you shift 
from part-time to the full-time farmer, and that you exit from agriculture and engage in full-time non-farm 
employment. I will ask you about the three possibilities.  
 
6. Do you think that you will continue farming either [as part-time or full time? Enumerator: chose the current 
activity that the respondent is engaged] at the age of 34? 1. Very likely   2. Likely   3. Unlikely   4. Very 
unlikely  
 
7. If you are currently working as a part-time farmer, do you think that you will change your work from part-
time farming to full-time farming at the age of 34?   1. Very likely   2. Likely   3. Unlikely   4. Very unlikely  
 
8. If you are currently working as a part-time farmer, do you think that you will change your work from part-
time farming to full-time non-farming at the age of 34?   1. Very likely   2. Likely   3. Unlikely   4. Very 
unlikely  
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Table A4.2: Random effects estimation results from objective approach: Male youth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES benchmark hhinc_age youthtype edu religion village kebele woreda land TLU occupation occup_age wored_age 
2.resmobile -0.178 -0.294 -0.152 -0.316 -0.300 -0.225 -0.245 -0.295 -0.280 -0.256 -0.302 -0.271 -0.288 
 (0.346) (0.344) (0.345) (0.345) (0.345) (0.353) (0.348) (0.346) (0.344) (0.344) (0.346) (0.348) (0.348) 
resage 0.187 0.164 0.222 0.200 0.207 0.254 0.207 0.204 0.200 0.187 0.209 0.156 0.199 
 (0.173) (0.173) (0.172) (0.173) (0.172) (0.173) (0.171) (0.171) (0.173) (0.172) (0.173) (0.172) (0.172) 
age2 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0035) 
edu_youth -0.0450 -0.0365 -0.0515 -0.0405 -0.0395 -0.0312 -0.0393 -0.0368 -0.0319 -0.0296 -0.0452 -0.0533 -0.0329 
 (0.0716) (0.0716) (0.0723) (0.0727) (0.0714) (0.0735) (0.0714) (0.0713) (0.0715) (0.0714) (0.0714) (0.0728) (0.0713) 
curr_stud 0.158 0.164 0.165 0.133 0.158 0.0775 0.169 0.146 0.154 0.148 0.0535 0.217 0.150 
 (0.295) (0.295) (0.294) (0.296) (0.295) (0.289) (0.294) (0.294) (0.294) (0.295) (0.307) (0.297) (0.295) 
youth_rtohead 0.413 0.150 0.411 0.0986 0.178 0.100 0.308 0.189 0.240 0.361 0.197 0.696 0.213 
 (0.795) (0.786) (0.799) (0.786) (0.787) (0.800) (0.792) (0.784) (0.788) (0.784) (0.784) (0.690) (0.788) 
birthorder -0.0449 0.0213 -0.0267 0.0318 0.0237 -0.0073 -0.0161 0.0172 0.00240 -0.0125 0.0249 0.00852 0.00486 
 (0.0810) (0.0818) (0.0821) (0.0814) (0.0811) (0.0831) (0.0806) (0.0816) (0.0813) (0.0813) (0.0819) (0.0816) (0.0809) 
Youth_male 0.374** 0.435*** 0.383** 0.450*** 0.434*** 0.385** 0.358** 0.428*** 0.403** 0.405** 0.468*** 0.403*** 0.424** 
 (0.154) (0.166) (0.153) (0.164) (0.165) (0.169) (0.166) (0.166) (0.163) (0.165) (0.163) (0.154) (0.167) 
Youth_female 0.233 0.293* 0.230 0.314* 0.290* 0.213 0.231 0.281 0.266 0.264 0.327* 0.263 0.277 
 (0.162) (0.171) (0.162) (0.176) (0.171) (0.170) (0.172) (0.171) (0.168) (0.171) (0.171) (0.163) (0.170) 
Mature_male 0.145 0.199 0.180 0.188 0.174 0.129 0.135 0.172 0.159 0.156 0.203 0.160 0.168 
 (0.184) (0.188) (0.186) (0.186) (0.185) (0.187) (0.185) (0.187) (0.186) (0.185) (0.186) (0.185) (0.188) 
mature_fem 0.269 0.257 0.299 0.257 0.243 0.221 0.235 0.243 0.249 0.243 0.259 0.250 0.241 
 (0.210) (0.214) (0.211) (0.218) (0.215) (0.218) (0.216) (0.216) (0.219) (0.213) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) 
Childern_tot 0.141 0.159 0.142 0.174 0.154 0.104 0.123 0.153 0.137 0.151 0.178 0.144 0.159 
 (0.121) (0.123) (0.121) (0.125) (0.123) (0.127) (0.125) (0.125) (0.121) (0.122) (0.124) (0.122) (0.125) 
2.water_sourcedry 0.404 0.242 0.400 0.230 0.234 0.424 0.334 0.246 0.313 0.344 0.208 0.201 0.280 
 (0.418) (0.419) (0.418) (0.418) (0.419) (0.424) (0.423) (0.420) (0.419) (0.424) (0.416) (0.413) (0.420) 
3.water_sourcedry -1.075 -1.116 -1.048 -1.124 -1.084 -1.012 -1.050 -1.085 -1.046 -1.092 -1.095 -1.160 -1.097 
 (1.287) (1.275) (1.298) (1.268) (1.278) (1.262) (1.282) (1.272) (1.265) (1.282) (1.277) (1.289) (1.278) 
4.water_sourcedry 0.220 0.109 0.141 0.101 0.106 0.297 0.209 0.113 0.164 0.201 0.0707 0.0337 0.155 
 (0.514) (0.531) (0.522) (0.533) (0.529) (0.513) (0.517) (0.526) (0.528) (0.525) (0.529) (0.522) (0.526) 
5.water_sourcedry 0.379 0.244 0.363 0.238 0.234 0.464 0.320 0.252 0.290 0.357 0.215 0.140 0.299 
 (0.407) (0.410) (0.407) (0.409) (0.412) (0.415) (0.409) (0.411) (0.418) (0.418) (0.408) (0.390) (0.408) 
6.water_sourcedry 0.522 0.417 0.531 0.397 0.387 0.441 0.465 0.394 0.446 0.485 0.418 0.345 0.441 
 (0.455) (0.461) (0.455) (0.464) (0.464) (0.455) (0.456) (0.462) (0.463) (0.462) (0.461) (0.461) (0.461) 
7.water_sourcedry 0.558 0.458 0.556 0.443 0.427 0.601 0.519 0.439 0.478 0.511 0.419 0.407 0.472 
 (0.523) (0.525) (0.523) (0.528) (0.527) (0.536) (0.524) (0.526) (0.527) (0.531) (0.526) (0.524) (0.526) 
8.water_sourcedry 0.513 0.339 0.507 0.326 0.339 0.487 0.465 0.355 0.421 0.480 0.305 0.298 0.394 
 (0.474) (0.481) (0.477) (0.481) (0.482) (0.479) (0.472) (0.480) (0.482) (0.488) (0.480) (0.464) (0.482) 
land_PC -0.0328 -0.0440 -0.0196 -0.0428 -0.0391 -0.0441 -0.0275 -0.0361 -0.0584 -0.0443 -0.0394 -0.0319 -0.0388 
 (0.114) (0.120) (0.116) (0.123) (0.121) (0.116) (0.115) (0.121) (0.128) (0.116) (0.122) (0.120) (0.119) 
totpresnt_tlu 0.0288** 0.0311** 0.0302** 0.0311** 0.0311** 0.0288** 0.0308** 0.0306** 0.0310** 0.0253* 0.0303** 0.0328** 0.0300** 
 (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0134) (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0127) 
roof_corrug 0.0224 -0.00231 0.0146 -0.0050 -0.0019 0.0567 0.00693 -0.0095 0.000645 0.00720 -0.00354 -0.0582 -0.00564 
 (0.267) (0.270) (0.269) (0.271) (0.270) (0.266) (0.268) (0.270) (0.267) (0.267) (0.272) (0.272) (0.269) 
electcity 0.00461 0.0509 0.0176 0.0713 0.0613 0.00288 -0.0117 0.0511 0.0124 -0.0292 0.0884 0.0801 0.0252 
 (0.285) (0.286) (0.285) (0.286) (0.287) (0.287) (0.285) (0.287) (0.285) (0.286) (0.287) (0.288) (0.286) 
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2.pubpipewater -0.494* -0.464* -0.502* -0.446* -0.455* -0.573** -0.495* -0.463* -0.480* -0.513* -0.448* -0.423 -0.482* 
 (0.264) (0.263) (0.264) (0.263) (0.263) (0.268) (0.264) (0.263) (0.263) (0.265) (0.263) (0.264) (0.263) 
2.landregcomp 0.00858 0.00228 -0.0225 -0.0202 -0.0051 0.0554 0.0457 0.00147 0.0127 0.0214 -0.00569 0.00324 0.00647 
 (0.263) (0.261) (0.264) (0.261) (0.261) (0.266) (0.263) (0.261) (0.263) (0.263) (0.261) (0.264) (0.262) 
sav_credit -0.223 -0.218 -0.207 -0.228 -0.240 -0.219 -0.226 -0.218 -0.213 -0.165 -0.236 -0.260 -0.201 
 (0.245) (0.247) (0.245) (0.249) (0.248) (0.251) (0.246) (0.246) (0.247) (0.248) (0.248) (0.249) (0.246) 
2.phoncoverage 0.469 0.524 0.495 0.522 0.539 0.362 0.459 0.505 0.504 0.446 0.518 0.576 0.490 
 (0.369) (0.370) (0.370) (0.371) (0.370) (0.367) (0.369) (0.370) (0.368) (0.371) (0.370) (0.374) (0.370) 
2.DA_office 0.430 0.455 0.400 0.461 0.465 0.435 0.434 0.441 0.433 0.404 0.465 0.567 0.439 
 (0.382) (0.380) (0.380) (0.377) (0.378) (0.386) (0.381) (0.379) (0.382) (0.378) (0.377) (0.373) (0.379) 
2014.year 3.922*** 3.916*** 3.941*** 3.895*** 3.896*** 3.893*** 3.908*** 3.899*** 3.895*** 3.887*** 3.937*** 4.068*** 3.905*** 
 (0.402) (0.407) (0.402) (0.398) (0.399) (0.407) (0.399) (0.398) (0.406) (0.397) (0.401) (0.393) (0.401) 
Observations 743 743 743 743 743 733 743 743 743 743 743 743 743 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    Table A4.2: Random effects estimation results from objective approach: female youth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES benchmark hhinc_age youthtype edu village kebele woreda land TLU occupation occup_age wored_age 
 (0.426) (0.425) (0.424) (0.427) (0.429) (0.430) (0.428) (0.419) (0.430) (0.428) (0.429) (0.427) 
resage 0.147 0.113 0.126 0.131 0.0760 0.133 0.127 0.131 0.159 0.133 0.123 0.131 
 (0.292) (0.293) (0.293) (0.293) (0.297) (0.294) (0.292) (0.294) (0.293) (0.293) (0.293) (0.293) 
age2 -0.00246 -0.00179 -0.00195 -0.00194 -0.00112 -0.00202 -0.00174 -0.00183 -0.00240 -0.00205 -0.00253 -0.00187 
 (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00676) (0.00674) (0.00695) (0.00683) (0.00677) (0.00679) (0.00678) (0.00672) (0.00678) (0.00681) 
edu_youth 0.0394 0.0547 0.0465 0.0496 0.0823 0.0480 0.0533 0.0645 0.0509 0.0681 0.0499 0.0575 
 (0.0780) (0.0794) (0.0806) (0.0797) (0.0801) (0.0798) (0.0791) (0.0822) (0.0780) (0.0819) (0.0784) (0.0794) 
curr_stud 0.279 0.297 0.321 0.257 0.292 0.290 0.294 0.264 0.343 0.139 0.465 0.303 
 (0.333) (0.333) (0.338) (0.338) (0.334) (0.332) (0.329) (0.346) (0.332) (0.347) (0.339) (0.330) 
youth_rtohead -0.271 -0.255 -0.177 -0.333 0.130 -0.342 -0.388 -0.306 -0.398 -0.322 -0.300 -0.301 
 (1.187) (1.228) (1.198) (1.221) (1.171) (1.204) (1.218) (1.228) (1.194) (1.238) (1.197) (1.228) 
birthorder 0.230** 0.246*** 0.236*** 0.242** 0.250*** 0.231** 0.235** 0.265*** 0.262*** 0.244** 0.245** 0.243** 
 (0.0922) (0.0947) (0.0914) (0.0938) (0.0950) (0.0935) (0.0942) (0.0956) (0.0951) (0.0951) (0.0954) (0.0948) 
Youth_male 0.0778 0.174 0.0936 0.160 0.123 0.120 0.183 0.178 0.216 0.201 0.138 0.191 
 (0.186) (0.201) (0.186) (0.201) (0.197) (0.190) (0.197) (0.201) (0.188) (0.204) (0.194) (0.197) 
Youth_female 0.329* 0.443** 0.321* 0.437** 0.444** 0.375* 0.453** 0.449** 0.521*** 0.479** 0.417** 0.466** 
 (0.188) (0.196) (0.191) (0.198) (0.198) (0.195) (0.200) (0.190) (0.200) (0.198) (0.195) (0.199) 
Mature_male 0.111 0.136 0.121 0.136 0.227 0.124 0.141 0.151 0.141 0.145 0.105 0.136 
 (0.304) (0.305) (0.306) (0.306) (0.298) (0.304) (0.304) (0.307) (0.304) (0.307) (0.307) (0.305) 
mature_fem -0.266 -0.203 -0.238 -0.207 -0.198 -0.238 -0.183 -0.171 -0.146 -0.181 -0.197 -0.181 
 (0.257) (0.258) (0.262) (0.258) (0.268) (0.260) (0.260) (0.254) (0.257) (0.258) (0.261) (0.260) 
Childern_tot 0.0957 0.163 0.125 0.148 0.194 0.125 0.178 0.135 0.208 0.187 0.158 0.184 
 (0.155) (0.162) (0.155) (0.161) (0.157) (0.160) (0.161) (0.161) (0.164) (0.165) (0.166) (0.164) 
2.water_sourcedry 0.584 0.607 0.541 0.640 0.516 0.571 0.553 0.707 0.470 0.606 0.609 0.572 
 (0.558) (0.542) (0.558) (0.546) (0.566) (0.550) (0.541) (0.548) (0.540) (0.547) (0.544) (0.540) 
3.water_sourcedry 2.042 2.216 2.068 2.237 2.096 2.075 2.113 2.677** 2.317* 2.263 2.298* 2.179 
 (1.384) (1.398) (1.405) (1.413) (1.454) (1.396) (1.419) (1.269) (1.384) (1.402) (1.343) (1.392) 
4.water_sourcedry 1.737* 1.740* 1.771* 1.796** 1.528* 1.724* 1.688* 1.744** 1.673* 1.752** 1.836** 1.751* 
 (0.892) (0.890) (0.911) (0.894) (0.909) (0.906) (0.915) (0.875) (0.875) (0.893) (0.892) (0.907) 
5.water_sourcedry 0.820 0.878 0.776 0.909* 0.725 0.808 0.792 0.976* 0.800 0.873 0.871 0.826 
 (0.545) (0.542) (0.544) (0.544) (0.579) (0.543) (0.547) (0.548) (0.546) (0.551) (0.541) (0.544) 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
6.water_sourcedry 1.182** 1.233** 1.070* 1.258** 1.132* 1.172** 1.175** 1.320** 1.232** 1.213** 1.161** 1.194** 
 (0.579) (0.582) (0.583) (0.582) (0.601) (0.576) (0.584) (0.599) (0.593) (0.589) (0.571) (0.586) 
7.water_sourcedry 1.083* 1.117* 1.019 1.136* 0.861 1.062* 1.051* 1.192* 1.054 1.112* 1.100* 1.082* 
 (0.636) (0.630) (0.640) (0.632) (0.663) (0.636) (0.636) (0.630) (0.641) (0.642) (0.638) (0.637) 
8.water_sourcedry 1.577** 1.596** 1.516** 1.611** 1.583** 1.579** 1.554** 1.649** 1.560** 1.584** 1.621** 1.580** 
 (0.691) (0.690) (0.694) (0.692) (0.729) (0.693) (0.696) (0.693) (0.700) (0.698) (0.686) (0.692) 
land_PC 0.383 0.336 0.412 0.335 0.269 0.342 0.302 0.0361 0.269 0.312 0.330 0.322 
 (0.376) (0.365) (0.378) (0.369) (0.378) (0.377) (0.360) (0.350) (0.341) (0.362) (0.360) (0.360) 
totpresnt_tlu 0.0152 0.0143 0.0160 0.0161 0.0128 0.0136 0.0131 0.0160 -0.00980 0.0158 0.0162 0.0145 
 (0.0239) (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0237) (0.0236) (0.0238) (0.0236) (0.0237) (0.0233) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0235) 
roof_corrug -0.0537 -0.0397 -0.0535 -0.0522 0.0489 -0.0526 -0.0265 -0.0732 -0.0483 -0.0323 -0.0367 -0.0153 
 (0.365) (0.367) (0.372) (0.367) (0.370) (0.367) (0.369) (0.369) (0.370) (0.366) (0.366) (0.368) 
electcity -0.0187 -0.101 -0.0304 -0.104 -0.126 -0.0386 -0.0532 -0.108 -0.147 -0.133 -0.0863 -0.0893 
 (0.320) (0.333) (0.322) (0.329) (0.320) (0.322) (0.330) (0.332) (0.335) (0.331) (0.328) (0.331) 
2.pubpipewater 0.164 0.137 0.164 0.121 0.198 0.167 0.149 0.180 0.122 0.124 0.192 0.133 
 (0.373) (0.369) (0.371) (0.372) (0.378) (0.369) (0.368) (0.361) (0.364) (0.370) (0.366) (0.368) 
2.landregcomp -0.0361 0.000484 0.00996 0.00782 -0.0592 -0.0307 -0.0321 0.0236 -0.00239 0.0165 0.0218 -0.0226 
 (0.349) (0.340) (0.351) (0.342) (0.352) (0.347) (0.338) (0.334) (0.331) (0.341) (0.341) (0.336) 
sav_credit 0.407 0.410 0.405 0.422 0.466 0.398 0.377 0.396 0.505 0.428 0.385 0.393 
 (0.353) (0.353) (0.355) (0.354) (0.359) (0.355) (0.355) (0.347) (0.349) (0.347) (0.358) (0.352) 
2.phoncoverage -0.936** -0.921** -0.935** -0.923** -0.889* -0.902** -0.912** -0.843* -0.971** -0.951** -0.860* -0.908** 
 (0.435) (0.450) (0.434) (0.447) (0.455) (0.441) (0.451) (0.463) (0.450) (0.444) (0.452) (0.446) 
2.DA_office -0.356 -0.425 -0.423 -0.398 -0.406 -0.359 -0.405 -0.644 -0.567 -0.417 -0.386 -0.421 
 (0.526) (0.531) (0.526) (0.529) (0.537) (0.529) (0.528) (0.555) (0.524) (0.529) (0.522) (0.527) 
2014.year 2.742*** 2.749*** 2.702*** 2.684*** 2.736*** 2.718*** 2.686*** 2.697*** 2.653*** 2.655*** 2.776*** 2.679*** 
 (0.498) (0.500) (0.498) (0.497) (0.508) (0.499) (0.496) (0.499) (0.486) (0.496) (0.498) (0.492) 
2.sexhead -0.422 -0.481 -0.336 -0.469 -0.321 -0.457 -0.504 -0.471 -0.466 -0.518 -0.463 -0.504 
 (0.602) (0.606) (0.601) (0.605) (0.602) (0.606) (0.603) (0.626) (0.602) (0.609) (0.601) (0.605) 
agehead -0.0322 -0.0352* -0.0314 -0.0354* -0.0278 -0.0325 -0.0332 -0.0381* -0.0333* -0.0354* -0.0349* -0.0349* 
 (0.0200) (0.0204) (0.0200) (0.0204) (0.0195) (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0212) (0.0199) (0.0206) (0.0200) (0.0202) 
educhead 0.159** 0.162** 0.169** 0.160** 0.150* 0.160** 0.160** 0.159** 0.167** 0.152* 0.160** 0.159** 
 (0.0769) (0.0782) (0.0766) (0.0789) (0.0793) (0.0802) (0.0788) (0.0795) (0.0797) (0.0791) (0.0771) (0.0786) 
marithead -0.0295 -0.0502 -0.0197 -0.0447 -0.0898 -0.0231 -0.0486 -0.114 -0.136 -0.0738 -0.0506 -0.0480 
 (0.449) (0.455) (0.452) (0.455) (0.462) (0.456) (0.459) (0.462) (0.457) (0.454) (0.458) (0.456) 
d_market_dist 0.0758 0.0816 0.0755 0.0833* 0.0788 0.0742 0.0760 0.0835 0.0865* 0.0836* 0.0797 0.0789 
 (0.0500) (0.0505) (0.0499) (0.0502) (0.0533) (0.0515) (0.0502) (0.0515) (0.0509) (0.0508) (0.0503) (0.0503) 
p_market_dist -0.0952 -0.112 -0.0774 -0.113 -0.0727 -0.0801 -0.101 -0.116 -0.111 -0.120 -0.101 -0.106 
 (0.0963) (0.0975) (0.0996) (0.0968) (0.0996) (0.0978) (0.0980) (0.0992) (0.0981) (0.0982) (0.0954) (0.0971) 
vet_dist -0.0164 -0.0182 -0.0309 -0.0195 -0.0167 -0.0241 -0.0135 -0.0129 -0.0205 -0.0178 -0.0258 -0.0241 
 (0.0761) (0.0758) (0.0821) (0.0762) (0.0794) (0.0763) (0.0762) (0.0752) (0.0762) (0.0757) (0.0744) (0.0761) 
Observations 419 419 419 419 413 419 419 419 419 419 419 419 
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Table A5.2: Youth intended participation in agriculture  
  All youth Male Female 
1 Do you expect to remain active in agriculture in 10 years’ time? (%) 
 Yes 59.76 68.03 45.90 
 No 40.24 31.97 54.10 
 Total  100 100 100 
1.1 If yes, do you expect to remain in agriculture in 10 years’ time as:   
 Full-time  55.56 63.10 37.14 
 Part-time  44.44 36.90 62.86 
 Total  100 100 100 
2 Do you expect to remain active in agriculture in 20 years’ time?   
 Yes 37.97 48.32 20.49 
 No 62.03 51.68 79.51 
 Total 100 100 100 
2.1 If yes, do you expect to remain in agriculture in 20 years’ time as    
 Full-time  73.08 75.80 69.44 
 Part-time  28.85 24.20 30.56 
 Total  100 100 100 
3 DO you expect to remain active in agriculture in 30 years’ time?   
 Yes 30.41 38.94 15.98 
 No 69.59 61.06 84.02 
 Total 100 100 100 
3.1 If yes, do you expect to remain in agriculture in 30 years’ time as    
 Full-time  56.72 75.42 59.26 
 Part-time  43.28 24.58 40.74 
 Total  100 100 100 
Source: survey results  
Table A5.3: The effect of relative deprivation on youth occupational choices: results from the multinomial logit models 
using subjective measures  
 Age as a reference group  
 Farming  Non-farm  
VARIABLES base_noSRD base_all_age base_FM_age base_head_age base_noSRD base_all_age base_FM_age base_head_age 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Income RD_AGE - 0.192* 0.145 0.204 - 0.120 -0.0477 129.3 
  (0.104) (0.143) (0.156)  (0.212) (0.489) (64,337) 
Social RD_AGE - -0.0592 -0.00772 0.0494 - -0.102 0.596 -115.5 
  (0.0931) (0.137) (0.140)  (0.179) (0.439) (35,901) 
logPCI 0.152 -0.0971 -0.274* -0.161 0.0245 -0.117 1.121** 211.5 
 (0.189) (0.0989) (0.149) (0.161) (0.184) (0.192) (0.555) (64,932) 
Female youth  -1.246*** -0.119 -0.182 -0.300 -1.304*** 1.042** 0.255 153.2 
 (0.470) (0.233) (0.327) (0.367) (0.455) (0.487) (1.021) (65,803) 
Have no mobile phones 0.00191 0.0792 0.0486 -0.147 0.0936 0.00396 0.422 -312.1 
 (0.360) (0.193) (0.274) (0.296) (0.353) (0.384) (0.876) (72,807) 
resage -0.372*** 0.429*** 0.395*** 0.464*** 0.0396 0.400*** 0.480*** 0.249 
 (0.0466) (0.0353) (0.0591) (0.0577) (0.0362) (0.0487) (0.124) (2,928) 
edu_youth 0.0917* -0.322*** -0.356*** -0.576*** -0.230*** -0.0990* -0.177 32.91 
 (0.0553) (0.0379) (0.0572) (0.0741) (0.0508) (0.0584) (0.132) (11,569) 
birthorder -0.0509 0.0272 -0.0573 0.0187 -0.0229 0.0770 0.0809 39.05 
 (0.0750) (0.0463) (0.0792) (0.0747) (0.0749) (0.0856) (0.214) (21,032) 
first_son -1.130* 0.518* 0.679 0.0215 -0.586 1.152* 1.758 204.7 
 (0.585) (0.303) (0.415) (0.476) (0.557) (0.607) (1.182) (64,653) 
2.farm_expri -0.290 -0.0403 0.0204 -0.112 -0.306 0.377 0.607 -99.69 
 (0.362) (0.194) (0.282) (0.302) (0.352) (0.375) (0.845) (38,403) 
Youth_male 0.129 -0.00656 0.0650 -0.0551 0.138 -0.0846 -0.327 -126.9 
 (0.215) (0.102) (0.137) (0.155) (0.213) (0.223) (0.486) (38,203) 
Youth_female -0.00430 -0.0487 -0.00681 -0.0780 -0.110 0.102 0.602 -15.30 
 (0.193) (0.108) (0.151) (0.170) (0.193) (0.215) (0.428) (62,633) 
Mature_male 0.128 0.0199 -0.0670 0.0544 0.0728 -0.0110 0.971 114.9 
 (0.311) (0.142) (0.214) (0.222) (0.307) (0.316) (0.691) (49,950) 
mature_fem -0.127 -0.327** -0.221 -0.272 -0.473 0.0776 0.550 160.6 
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 (0.313) (0.150) (0.211) (0.207) (0.304) (0.317) (0.715) (47,619) 
Childern_tot 0.253 -0.251*** -0.258** -0.425** 0.0423 -0.335* -0.0918 33.88 
 (0.169) (0.0929) (0.130) (0.166) (0.166) (0.182) (0.397) (85,583) 
land_PC -0.176 0.0157 0.0341 -0.00982 -0.0974 0.0704 -0.197 -227.1 
 (0.298) (0.164) (0.210) (0.259) (0.290) (0.308) (0.645) (56,913) 
totpresnt_tlu 0.0114 -0.000673 0.00490 0.0212 0.00870 -0.0148 -0.0157 12.84 
 (0.0225) (0.00990) (0.0135) (0.0180) (0.0225) (0.0245) (0.0505) (3,577) 
roof_corrug -0.183 -0.0392 -0.309 0.0773 -0.174 -0.00203 0.218 -573.1 
 (0.392) (0.229) (0.327) (0.372) (0.383) (0.457) (1.072) (259,601) 
electcity 0.381 -0.145 -0.221 -1.006 0.344 -0.584 0.161 811.5 
 (0.443) (0.253) (0.369) (0.620) (0.438) (0.517) (1.138) (1.606e+06) 
2.pubpipewater 0.987** -0.121 -0.369 0.179 0.783* -0.534 -1.669 1,351 
 (0.469) (0.264) (0.369) (0.627) (0.459) (0.580) (1.302) (1.296e+06) 
2.landregcomp -0.398 0.246 0.341 0.0672 -0.305 0.138 1.234 -2,016 
 (0.435) (0.245) (0.345) (0.518) (0.428) (0.588) (1.374) (2.631e+06) 
sav_credit 0.531 -0.378 -0.277 -0.300 0.226 -0.541 -1.474 169.4 
 (0.413) (0.234) (0.327) (0.466) (0.404) (0.454) (0.954) (633,453) 
2014.year -0.713 0.119 0.502 - -0.776* 0.923** 1.503 - 
 (0.433) (0.236) (0.331)  (0.423) (0.456) (1.015)  
wealthindex1 0.0613 0.0371 0.0684 0.00676 -0.217 0.646* 0.662 -207.0 
 (0.170) (0.132) (0.188) (0.195) (0.165) (0.376) (0.789) (119,635) 
d_market_dist 0.00144 0.0148 -0.0291 -0.0151 -0.00769 0.0232 0.107 -142.9 
 (0.0264) (0.0190) (0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0260) (0.0402) (0.0968) (95,713) 
tele_dist 0.0141 -0.0294* -0.0238 -0.0306 0.0109 -0.00923 -0.00657 83.14 
 (0.0187) (0.0176) (0.0236) (0.0366) (0.0184) (0.0338) (0.0690) (38,113) 
vet_dist 0.00737 0.0446 0.0417 0.0572 0.000645 -0.0172 -0.191 -91.33 
 (0.0405) (0.0304) (0.0413) (0.0540) (0.0398) (0.0684) (0.155) (141,775) 
vet_numb -0.978** 0.551** 0.444 0.715 -0.509 0.959* 2.730* 1,151 
 (0.384) (0.280) (0.446) (0.449) (0.371) (0.549) (1.601) (1.414e+06) 
agefather   0.00471    -0.114  
   (0.0199)    (0.0732)  
eduather   -0.0810    -0.362*  
   (0.0515)    (0.216)  
maritfather   0.174    2.186  
   (0.445)    (1.840)  
agemother   0.0355    0.155*  
   (0.0276)    (0.0859)  
edumother   0.138*    0.347  
   (0.0783)    (0.220)  
2.sexhead    0.0271    413.7 
    (0.376)    (135,756) 
agehead    -0.0254**    2.939 
    (0.0129)    (1,668) 
educhead    -0.0766    -24.61 
    (0.0639)    (13,166) 
marithead    -0.0229    58.99 
    (0.356)    (168,310) 
Constant 8.095*** -6.262*** -6.001*** -4.053* 3.887** -8.877*** -25.57*** -2,003 
 (1.902) (1.202) (1.863) (2.211) (1.830) (2.343) (6.632) (3.389e+06) 
         
Observations 1,162 1,162 529 602 1,162 1,162 529 602 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Table A5.4: The effect of relative deprivation on youth livelihood choices: results from the multinomial logit models 
using objective measures 
 Farm employment   Non-farm employment  
VARIABLES base_noRD base_all_inIRD base_FM_inIRD base_head_inIRD  base_noRD base_all_inIRD base_FM_inIRD base_head_inIRD 
Objective measures of RD 
  (0.118) (0.183) (0.119)   (0.201) (0.468) (0.200) 
Female youth  -0.175 -0.00726 0.138 -0.0231  1.061** 1.078** 0.643 1.085** 
 (0.230) (0.255) (0.383) (0.259)  (0.459) (0.486) (0.996) (0.500) 
No mobile phone  0.123 0.306 0.0496 0.298  0.0326 -0.00339 1.251 -0.00264 
 (0.189) (0.212) (0.334) (0.214)  (0.358) (0.390) (0.919) (0.391) 
resage 0.431*** 0.425*** 0.355*** 0.432***  0.404*** 0.402*** 0.594*** 0.413*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0385) (0.0650) (0.0400)  (0.0466) (0.0501) (0.141) (0.0522) 
edu_youth -0.323*** -0.280*** -0.280*** -0.261***  -0.0893 -0.0798 -0.396*** -0.0715 
 (0.0370) (0.0394) (0.0649) (0.0402)  (0.0561) (0.0593) (0.138) (0.0620) 
birthorder 0.0260 0.0614 -0.0856 0.0851  0.0581 0.0530 0.139 0.0704 
 (0.0458) (0.0500) (0.0884) (0.0527)  (0.0838) (0.0887) (0.226) (0.0915) 
first_son 0.400 0.534 0.791 0.581*  1.047* 0.630 1.541 0.680 
 (0.296) (0.333) (0.506) (0.338)  (0.562) (0.596) (1.192) (0.602) 
2.farm_expri -0.0733 0.150 -0.0341 0.233  0.420 0.841* 0.620 0.874** 
 (0.191) (0.248) (0.399) (0.251)  (0.362) (0.440) (1.010) (0.441) 
Youth_male -0.0483 -0.862*** -1.129*** -0.838***  -0.0200 0.130 0.282 0.145 
 (0.0989) (0.141) (0.212) (0.142)  (0.198) (0.260) (0.498) (0.262) 
Youth_female -0.0574 -0.944*** -1.351*** -0.946***  0.100 0.0720 0.656 0.0552 
 (0.106) (0.149) (0.241) (0.149)  (0.204) (0.247) (0.518) (0.247) 
Mature_male 0.0493 -0.482*** -0.241 -0.279  -0.0244 0.150 1.438* 0.247 
 (0.138) (0.166) (0.260) (0.189)  (0.297) (0.334) (0.789) (0.371) 
mature_fem -0.306** -0.688*** -0.466* -0.568***  0.0699 0.00680 0.813 0.0610 
 (0.149) (0.173) (0.276) (0.181)  (0.305) (0.321) (0.718) (0.348) 
Childern_tot -0.258*** -0.713*** -0.981*** -0.731***  -0.323* -0.352* -0.0549 -0.356* 
 (0.0911) (0.111) (0.177) (0.113)  (0.171) (0.201) (0.376) (0.203) 
land_PC -0.116 -0.148 -0.248 -0.104  -0.0160 -0.100 -0.680 -0.0699 
 (0.142) (0.156) (0.211) (0.154)  (0.242) (0.263) (0.745) (0.263) 
totpresnt_tlu -0.00162 0.0286** 0.0308* 0.0298**  -0.0144 -0.0263 0.00871 -0.0252 
 (0.00959) (0.0116) (0.0161) (0.0119)  (0.0227) (0.0254) (0.0467) (0.0253) 
roof_corrug -0.0363 -0.0611 -0.634 -0.114  -0.0872 -0.218 0.0183 -0.225 
 (0.224) (0.253) (0.398) (0.255)  (0.427) (0.452) (1.098) (0.463) 
electcity -0.214 -0.372 -0.395 -0.405  -0.610 -0.610 -0.0796 -0.644 
 (0.246) (0.276) (0.441) (0.281)  (0.491) (0.539) (1.016) (0.544) 
2.landregcomp 0.159 0.129 -0.134   -0.362 -0.653 -0.273  
 (0.226) (0.254) (0.387)   (0.475) (0.495) (1.192)  
sav_credit -0.293 -0.290 -0.0472 -0.286  -0.559 -0.488 -1.635 -0.518 
 (0.228) (0.250) (0.383) (0.251)  (0.434) (0.464) (1.099) (0.470) 
2014.year -0.0121 0.0433 0.751** 0.0746  0.885** 1.123** 2.587** 1.242*** 
 (0.212) (0.238) (0.362) (0.234)  (0.414) (0.455) (1.037) (0.464) 
wealthindex1 0.0580 0.129 0.183 0.185  0.603* 0.600* 0.759 0.620* 
 (0.127) (0.144) (0.232) (0.146)  (0.333) (0.354) (0.942) (0.358) 
d_market_dist 0.00858 0.00363 -0.0554 -0.000534  0.0122 -0.00855 0.0476 -0.0100 
 (0.0183) (0.0204) (0.0404) (0.0208)  (0.0346) (0.0382) (0.0691) (0.0385) 
vet_dist 0.0288 0.0340 0.0745 0.0261  -0.0556 -0.0609 -0.304** -0.0677 
 (0.0277) (0.0308) (0.0509) (0.0311)  (0.0556) (0.0574) (0.137) (0.0578) 
vet_numb 0.504* 0.518* 0.874 0.563*  0.289 0.462 -0.240 0.523 
 (0.258) (0.293) (0.548) (0.298)  (0.404) (0.438) (0.890) (0.442) 
agefather   0.0293     -0.0645  
   (0.0238)     (0.0643)  
eduather   -0.0699     -0.357*  
   (0.0616)     (0.183)  
maritfather   -0.0301     -0.0734  
   (0.538)     (1.574)  
agemother   0.0178     0.0556  
   (0.0312)     (0.0867)  
edumother   0.201**     0.263  
   (0.0895)     (0.221)  
2.sexhead    0.265     0.185 
    (0.291)     (0.586) 
agehead    -0.0239**     -0.0133 
    (0.00943)     (0.0158) 
educhead    -0.0749*     -0.0562 
    (0.0431)     (0.0726) 
marithead    -0.0399     0.00483 
    (0.260)     (0.517) 
Constant -6.015*** 62.63*** 119.8*** 65.40***  -8.903*** 14.26 -58.93 14.27 
 (1.069) (7.889) (16.28) (8.096)  (2.042) (11.16) (39.91) (11.48) 
Observations 1,209 1,209 546 1,209  1,209 1,209 546 1,209 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Table A5.3: Average marginal effects of covariates on the probability of staying in agriculture in 10 years’ time; and 
OLS estimates of changing occupation    
 Remain active in agriculture in 10 years’ time (S2) Transit from part-time to fulltime 
(S5) 
Transit from full-time or part-time to non-farm work 
(M1-M2) 
VARIABLES All youth  Controlling for 
mother and father 
characteristics  
Controlling 
for head 
characteristics   
All youth  Controlling for 
mother and father 
characteristics  
Controlling 
for head 
characteristics  
All youth  Controlling for 
mother and father 
characteristics 
Controlling for 
head 
characteristics  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
          
position_youth_dum 0.0356 0.151** 0.0640 0.0386* 0.0730** 0.0225* 0.015 -0.0630** -0.0345 
 (0.0349) (0.0606) (0.0443) (0.0193) (0.0308) (0.0227) (0.0192) (0.0308) (0.0245) 
posi_fath_dum - 0.130* -  -0.0953*** - - 0.0758*** - 
  (0.0667)   (0.0334) - - (0.0334) - 
posi_mom_dum - -0.0409 -  -0.00896 - - 0.03879  
  (0.0637)   (0.0332)   (0.0332)  
posi_head_dum - - 0.149***   -0.0345   0.0253 
   (0.0470)   (0.0245)   (0.0252) 
2.ressex -0.148*** -0.167** -0.176*** -0.0798*** 0.0804** -0.0411 0.0612** 0.00845 0.0711** 
 (0.0456) (0.0708) (0.0536) (0.0245) (0.0373) (0.0276) (0.0245) (0.0374) (0.0276) 
2.resmobile 0.0479 0.0807 0.0318 0.0232 -0.0366 -0.000264 -0.0234 0.0372 -0.000264 
 (0.0371) (0.0675) (0.0483) (0.0202) (0.0338) (0.0239) (0.0202) (0.0338) (0.0239) 
resage 0.0150*** 0.00938 0.0118 0.0159*** 0.00759 0.00916** -0.0659*** -0.00754 -0.00916** 
 (0.00394) (0.0125) (0.00813) (0.00210) (0.00542) (0.00390) (0.0210) (0.00542) (0.00390) 
edu_youth -0.0273*** -0.0166 -0.0239*** -0.0103*** -0.01624* -0.00872** 0.0143*** 0.00822* 0.0112** 
 (0.00534) (0.0106) (0.00749) (0.00320) (0.00526) (0.00389) (0.00320) (0.00526) (0.00389) 
curr_stud -0.0406 0.0355 -0.0464 -0.0483* -0.3854*** -0.0390 0.0486* 0.0559 0.0390 
 (0.0438) (0.0823) (0.0536) (0.0261) (0.0406) (0.0279) (0.0261) (0.0407) (0.0279) 
birthorder 0.00807 0.0213 0.0186 -0.0106** -0.00366 -0.00663 0.00156 -0.00396 0.00663 
 (0.00858) (0.0181) (0.0116) (0.00478) (0.00881) (0.00578) (0.00479) (0.00884) (0.00578) 
first_son -0.00143 0.0817 0.0368 -0.0284 0.0217 -0.0176 0.0527* 0.0154 0.0176 
 (0.0550) (0.0964) (0.0731) (0.0297) (0.0467) (0.0370) (0.0296) (0.0465) (0.0370) 
2.farm_expri -0.261*** -0.0953 -0.234*** -0.0797*** -0.107*** -0.107*** 0.0492** 0.0492** 0.0251 
 (0.0564) (0.0613) (0.0481) (0.0215) (0.0401) (0.0267) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0348) 
agefather  -0.0109**   0.00464**   -0.00466**  
  (0.00505)   (0.00232)   (0.00232)  
edufather  -0.00351   -0.00631   0.00628  
  (0.00987)   (0.00501)   (0.00501)  
maritfather  0.0846   0.0142**   -0.0153  
  (0.142)   (0.0097)   (0.0597)  
age_mom  0.0103   -0.00334   0.00340  
  (0.00653)   (0.00299)   (0.00299)  
educ_mom  -0.0370**   0.0129   -0.0129  
  (0.0184)   (0.00891)   (0.00892)  
Youth_male -0.0703** 0.0188 -0.0122 -0.00167 -0.0139 0.00935 0.00177 0.0143 -0.00935 
 (0.0206)* (0.0329) (0.0253) (0.0117) (0.0161) (0.0127) (0.0117) (0.0161) (0.0127) 
Youth_female -0.0693 0.00339 -0.0201 -0.00667 -0.0317* -0.000495 0.00679 0.0317* -0.000495 
 (0.0222) (0.0390) (0.0275) (0.0124) (0.0180) (0.0133) (0.0124) (0.0180) (0.0133) 
land_PC 0.0287 0.188** 0.0817 0.0107 0.0240 0.0162 -0.0106 -0.0240 -0.0162 
 (0.0356) (0.0851) (0.0502) (0.0164) (0.0226) (0.0174) (0.0164) (0.0226) (0.0174) 
logPCI 0.0184 -0.0338 0.0264 -0.00402 -0.0524* -0.00171 0.00411 0.000610 0.00171 
 (0.0202) (0.0507) (0.0278) (0.0114) (0.0227) (0.0141) (0.0114) (0.0228) (0.0141) 
totpresnt_tlu -0.0048** -0.00139 -0.00671*** -0.00048 0.00136 -0.000880 0.000448 -0.00139 0.000880 
 (0.00209) (0.00384) (0.00260) (0.00114) (0.00172) (0.00122) (0.00114) (0.00172) (0.00122) 
roof_corrug -0.00908 -0.138* -0.0497 -0.0305 -0.00331 -0.0287 0.0506** 0.00353 0.0287 
 (0.0401) (0.0796) (0.0535) (0.0222) (0.0387) (0.0268) (0.0222) (0.0387) (0.0268) 
sav_credit -0.0593 -0.125 -0.0857 -0.0139 -0.00698 0.0288 0.0146 0.00699 0.0288 
 (0.0652) (0.116) (0.0885) (0.0359) (0.0550) (0.0444) (0.0359) (0.0551) (0.0444) 
2.sex_head   0.0359   0.0404*   -0.0504** 
   (0.0521)   (0.0258)   (0.0258) 
age_head   -0.00315   0.000775   -0.000775 
   (0.00226)   (0.00112)   (0.00112) 
edu_head   -0.00370   -0.00154   -0.00154 
   (0.00872)   (0.00437)   (0.00437) 
marit_head   0.0166   0.0265   -0.0265 
   (0.0375)   (0.0182)   (0.0182) 
Constant    0.199* 0.164 0.113 0.204* 0.832*** 0.887*** 
    (0.116) (0.239) (0.153) (0.116) (0.240) (0.153) 
Observations 638 223 443 621 225 427 621 225 427 
R-squared    0.313 0.294 0.209 0.314 0.294 0.209 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: All predictors at their mean values. VIF: full=3.13, non-=2.72, error norm disturb, no heteroscedasticity. We observed also existence of 
spatial variations (heterogeneity between woredas). For example, youth in Abichugna woreda are more likely to stay in agriculture compared to 
base woreda-Shirka. 
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Table A5.4: Effect of RD on the likelihood of changing occupations: results from objective data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES tofarm_head_full tofarm_head_full tofarm_head_full tofarm_head_full tononfarm_head_full tononfarm_head_full tononfarm_head_full tononfarm_head_full 
 Transit to full-time farming (movers into): agricultural labor entry  Transit into non-farm employment(movers out of): agricultural labor exits  
 age village kebele woreda age edu occup Occup_age 
Income RD -0.0119 -0.0203 -0.0181 0.0146 -0.0645* -0.0690* -0.0534 0.103* 
 (0.0652) (0.0615) (0.0634) (0.0904) (0.0388) (0.0382) (0.0397) (0.0560) 
 (0.0174) (0.0165) (0.0158) (0.0154) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0150) 
2.ressex 0.0204 0.0198 0.0214 0.0182 0.0292 0.0310 0.0322 -0.0881*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0355) (0.0338) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0278) (0.0302) 
2.resmobile 0.0232 0.0222 0.0229 0.00818 -0.0254 -0.0253 -0.0244 0.000256 
 (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0283) (0.0220) (0.0219) (0.0220) (0.0241) 
resage 0.00368 0.00413 0.00429 0.00268 -0.0144*** -0.0139*** -0.0134*** 0.00310 
 (0.00442) (0.00442) (0.00436) (0.00415) (0.00265) (0.00260) (0.00258) (0.00288) 
edu_youth -0.00219 -0.00141 -0.00218 -0.00416 0.0111*** 0.0128*** 0.0107*** -0.00468 
 (0.00509) (0.00519) (0.00511) (0.00468) (0.00400) (0.00417) (0.00400) (0.00440) 
curr_stud 0.0162 0.0158 0.0159 0.0434 0.0553** 0.0568** 0.0578** -0.404*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0388) (0.0353) (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0278) (0.0305) 
birthorder -0.00116 -0.00119 -0.00108 -0.00124 -0.00112 -0.00125 -0.00121 -0.00659 
 (0.00674) (0.00673) (0.00674) (0.00642) (0.00511) (0.00509) (0.00510) (0.00556) 
first_son 0.0667 0.0687 0.0694 0.0670 0.0189 0.0184 0.0190 -0.0144 
 (0.0493) (0.0494) (0.0494) (0.0465) (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0350) 
2.farm_expri -0.0937*** -0.0977*** -0.0949*** -0.0950*** 0.0215 0.0291 0.0320 -0.0706*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0348) (0.0352) (0.0328) (0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0248) (0.0267) 
Youth_male -0.0542 -0.0550 -0.0552 -0.0304 -0.0189 -0.0192 -0.0198 0.0222 
 (0.0433) (0.0434) (0.0434) (0.0414) (0.0293) (0.0293) (0.0294) (0.0322) 
Youth_female -0.0225 -0.0219 -0.0228 -0.00930 0.0225 0.0224 0.0218 0.0285 
 (0.0350) (0.0348) (0.0349) (0.0323) (0.0273) (0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0299) 
Male_adult 0.0277 0.0284 0.0284 0.00360 0.0120 0.0103 0.0133 -0.0286 
 (0.0431) (0.0430) (0.0430) (0.0412) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0291) (0.0316) 
Female_adult 0.0149 0.0137 0.0145 0.00766 -0.0186 -0.0196 -0.0165 -0.0303 
 (0.0328) (0.0329) (0.0330) (0.0308) (0.0256) (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0278) 
Childern_tot 0.0115 0.0112 0.0118 0.00154 -0.0148 -0.0154 -0.0145 0.0139 
 (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0141) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0115) 
land_PC -0.0365 -0.0340 -0.0355 -0.0613 0.00622 0.00576 0.00364 -0.00967 
 (0.0380) (0.0380) (0.0380) (0.0377) (0.0262) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0284) 
logPCI -0.00358 -0.00782 -0.00589 0.00163 -0.0280 -0.0324 -0.0227 0.0194 
 (0.0337) (0.0336) (0.0321) (0.0214) (0.0229) (0.0234) (0.0231) (0.0185) 
totpresnt_tlu -0.000217 -0.000220 -0.000233 -0.000212 -1.45e-05 1.27e-05 -0.000139 -0.000667 
 (0.00156) (0.00156) (0.00154) (0.00147) (0.00133) (0.00132) (0.00132) (0.00143) 
roof_corrug 0.0143 0.0152 0.0151 0.00170 0.0360 0.0361 0.0368 -0.0106 
 (0.0365) (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0350) (0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0257) (0.0282) 
electcity -0.00947 -0.00933 -0.00845 -0.0282 -0.0548 -0.0552 -0.0566 0.0218 
 (0.0545) (0.0545) (0.0548) (0.0521) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0413) (0.0453) 
2.youthprojec -0.0761 -0.0794 -0.0784 -0.0353 -0.00390 -0.00186 -0.000258 -0.0749* 
 (0.0605) (0.0606) (0.0606) (0.0581) (0.0404) (0.0405) (0.0407) (0.0445) 
sav_credit 0.0152 0.0131 0.0129 0.0110 0.00129 -0.000475 -0.00134 0.0465 
 (0.0622) (0.0623) (0.0623) (0.0598) (0.0429) (0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0477) 
wealthindex1 -0.00581 -0.00617 -0.00557 0.00682 0.0320 0.0319 0.0334 -0.00628 
 (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0337) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0246) 
2.sexhead 0.160*** 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.106** -0.0276 -0.0289 -0.0308 0.0448 
 (0.0561) (0.0561) (0.0561) (0.0533) (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0348) (0.0379) 
agehead 0.00222 0.00223 0.00221 0.00241* 0.000400 0.000439 0.000380 0.00129 
 (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00130) (0.000977) (0.000977) (0.000977) (0.00108) 
educhead 0.00826 0.00849 0.00828 0.00897* -0.00468 -0.00439 -0.00481 0.00272 
 (0.00534) (0.00534) (0.00534) (0.00501) (0.00432) (0.00433) (0.00432) (0.00473) 
marithead 0.0908** 0.0908** 0.0907** 0.0740* -0.0207 -0.0194 -0.0199 0.0399 
 (0.0432) (0.0431) (0.0432) (0.0403) (0.0317) (0.0316) (0.0317) (0.0347) 
d_market_dist 0.00537* 0.00543* 0.00539* 0.00499* 0.000628 0.000694 0.000542 0.00156 
 (0.00301) (0.00301) (0.00301) (0.00291) (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00236) 
tele_dist -0.00411 -0.00423 -0.00406 -0.00377 0.000387 0.000366 0.000469 -0.00275 
 (0.00271) (0.00272) (0.00271) (0.00257) (0.00178) (0.00179) (0.00178) (0.00197) 
p_market_dist -0.0111 -0.0113 -0.0114 -0.00795 -0.00602 -0.00603 -0.00588 -0.000626 
 (0.00740) (0.00739) (0.00742) (0.00712) (0.00487) (0.00486) (0.00488) (0.00540) 
vet_dist 0.00890* 0.00906* 0.00890* 0.00758 0.00473 0.00503 0.00493 0.00149 
 (0.00497) (0.00498) (0.00497) (0.00469) (0.00367) (0.00367) (0.00368) (0.00404) 
vet_numb 0.0226 0.0238 0.0231 0.0204 0.0374 0.0394 0.0369 0.0118 
 (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0491) (0.0476) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0360) (0.0395) 
Constant 0.236 0.266 0.246 0.207 1.109*** 1.130*** 1.043*** 0.710*** 
 (0.371) (0.361) (0.346) (0.246) (0.250) (0.244) (0.245) (0.203) 
Observations 272 272 272 286 509 509 509 501 
R-squared 0.220 0.219 0.218 0.219 0.333 0.334 0.332 0.548 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
